Brittania parking- BW Legal

Mrs44474

Unfortunately I can’t find the transcript so I seem unable to quote anything! I’ll have a search on here and see if someone’s got something.

I’ll print it! Thank you.

Does anyone know of any other cases I can quote with a machine failure? As in not working at all to buy a ticket?

Coupon-mad

Jolley v Carmel should be findable on Google. Loads of posters have found it.

Try again (I am cooking right now even though it looks like I am online!).

Mrs44474

Thank you, though I have looked and looked. I get summaries but not the whole transcript. I have found Lexis or something where I can sign up for a weeks free trial (but it’s not instant, you have to apply via email) but once I get that through I should be able to get it. Honestly no idea where everyone else found it?

Coupon-mad

It used to be hosted on a website that no longer exists, unfortunately.

So you are right, it's not easy, but you can get it from LexisNexis. If you get a (non-personal file) PDF as a result of that please post the PDF here for others.

Redx

I had similar issues when I tried it the other day and again tonight

I can find extracts but most sites want you to sign up

I never found a downloadable pdf , unlike all those case law ones on pransksters site

you are not alone

Mrs44474

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim number: ///////////////

BETWEEN

Britannia Parking (Claimant)

AND

Madam Blob (Defendant)


Witness Statement

1. I am Madam Blob of 123 Leave me alone drive. The Defendant in this matter. I will say as follows:

2. On 12/07/18 my wife, four children and I, went to the National Marine Aquarium in Plymouth, along with a large group of friends. We parked in the Harbour Car Park, operated by Britannia Parking, the claimant, and owned by Sutton Harbour Plc.

3. I purchased a ticket for 3 hours (Please see Exhibit A), thinking this would be ample time, as this was our first day out with our one week old newborn.

4. Surprisingly three hours flew by, and all the children were still happy so I went to put another ticket on the car – around 10/15 minutes before my current ticket ran out.

5. At the car park I found the machine on the level I parked not working. It would go through all the steps but not accept payment of cash or card. I went to another level, but the same thing happened. The third machine, the last I could find in the car park, was also not working. I videoed the process it takes you through but not accepting any payment. (Exhibit B – The memory stick).

– I recall other families unable to use the machines also. I did request a record of the PDT machines, to see how long they were out of order on that day, in a SAR to Britannia in late January of this year. A response was given saying they are no longer dealing with me and all correspondence should be through B W Legal. B W Legal was asked (at the same time as I sent the SAR) to put my account on hold whilst I waited for all relevant information. They would not do this despite the Limitation Act giving them 6 years to pursue this case through court. “…your account will not be suspended from further collections activity unless we are instructed to do so by our client.” (Exhibit C)
Britannia has failed to provide such info needed therefore placing me at an unfair advantage in defending my case. As such, this case should be struck out.
6. I had the parking app, JustPark, on my phone. I made a note of the car park number. I headed back to the aquarium, all the while trying to pay for my extra parking via the app. Unfortunately due to lack of signal it could not process my request.

7. My wife and I decided it wasn’t worth the risk of a PCN, so we proceeded to leave. Unfortunately we had not yet paid our entrance to the aquarium as it was a school trip as such with a large group of us. It was easiest to pay at the end of the tour, so everyone was accounted for. This took some time to organise and for each family to organise payment through one member of our party. This can be confirmed with the National Marine Aquarium. Once we had paid, we said goodbye to our friends and left.

8. We have four children, so the walk back to the car took around 15/20 minutes with a toilet trip along the way for the little ones.

9. We live an hour so drive from the aquarium, and as our newborn was beginning to fuss, my wife fed him in the car before we left.

10. Upon receipt of the NTK a week later (there was no windscreen PCN) we appealed through their own appeals system, supplying our evidence of the machines not working. However, they have elected to pursue this matter via litigation.

11. Having researched this company and car park, I have found a long history of questionable enforcement of tickets; because of their machines not working no less. (Exhibit D)

12. There is also various media and news reports surrounding this specific car park too. (Please see Exhibit E & F). “Parking firm accused of ‘damaging tourism’ in Plymouth.” And “Father WINS Court appeal over £250 Parking Ticket fine after he changed his daughters nappy.”

13. I have photos of the signs in the car park vs the signs in the Beavis case. (Please see Exhibit G & H)

14. I have put in complaints with my Local MP, Mr //////////. He tried to work things out with Britannia on my behalf, as it is against the will of Parliament the way these car parks and fines are being doled out. Unfortunately he wasn’t able to get anywhere with them.

15. I rang the National Marine Aquarium, to see if they could help at all. I spoke with the manager, ???? , on the 23/01/19 at 10:36am. She had to talk to HR and get back to me. The following day she called at 09:14am and informed me that as they are a charity there wasn’t anything they could personally do and they did not own the car park so they had no authority there either. She did say however, that this is not the first time their customers have complained to them regarding parking tickets and machines malfunctioning. She implied it happens a lot. She said the CEO will write to the parking firm.

16. I rely on the doctrine of Frustration of contract. There was in this case a malfunctioning machine making it near enough impossible for the driver to form a contract. Though every effort was tried to obtain a ticket.

17. CPR 44.3 (2) states: “Where the amount of costs is to be assesd on the standard basis, the court will –

(a) Only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) Resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

18. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm ‘costs’ in County courts up and down the Country. In claim number F0DP201T on 10thJune 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgement or Order of DJ Grand, who on the 21stFebruary 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial claimant (Britannia, using BW Legals robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones’ robo-claim model) yet the order was identical in striking out both the claims without a hearing:
“IT IS ORDERED THAT the claim is struck out as an Abuse Of Process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protections of Freedom Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an Abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998…”

19. In summary, the Claimants particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is my position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The claimants vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs and litigation.

20. I invite the Court to dismiss the claim in its entirety, and to award my costs of attendance at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true.

Signature

29thJuly 2019

Do I attach the Jolley v Carmel as evidence and highlight a specific part and just out it in my bundle or do I have to mention it in my WS? Also PoFA schedule 4. it is mentioned in my WS do I highlight a specific part?

Thank you everyone!!

Redx

before IT IS ORDERED , write , The judges stated


I would add specific parts of it to the WS , QUOTING from previous cases etc

I am hoping to get a copy of the pdf tomorrow if you dont have one

The judge will have access to it anyway

POFA does not apply to an admitted driver, but can be used to try to argue against the extra costs , hence the Judge Taylor and Judge Grand statements


some spelling errors need correcting

Mrs44474

I have managed to get hold of one case transcript for Jolley v Carmel.

I can't seem to find the part I have mentioned in my defence? "In Jolley v Carmel ltd (2000) 2 - EGLR - 154, it was held that a party, who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach."

Is the above just a summary of the case? As that's not what I get from reading it lol.

Ill post the transcript below:

Jolley v Carmel Limited

[2000] Lexis Citation 1453

(Transcript: Smith Bernal)

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

CHADWICK LJ
10 JULY 2000
10 JULY 2000


P Smith QC for the Applicant;

The Respondent did not appear and was not represented

Halliwell Landau

CHADWICK LJ:
1. This is a renewed application, made under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 52.16 (6)(a), for an order that an appeal in these proceedings be expedited.

2. The application is made in these circumstances. The defendant below, and the respondent to the appeal, Carmel Ltd, entered into a conditional contract on 7 August 1998 for the purchase from the appellant, Mr Leslie Jolley, of property at Clifton Drive North, St Anns-on-Sea, Lancashire. The contract contained a condition that the purchaser should not be required to complete unless planning permission had been granted in a form satisfactory to it; and an obligation on the purchaser to proceed with an application to obtain planning consent. There is also a term, not unusual in contracts of this nature, enabling the purchaser to waive the condition if it thought fit. The contract did not provide any time within which planning consent must be sought.

3. In due course, the purchaser made an application for planning consent, which was refused by the local authority in September 1999. That refusal is the subject of an appeal which is due to be heard on 3 August 2000. A second application was made by the purchaser on 6 December 1999. That application was granted by the local authority; but the Secretary of State has called it in, and has directed that that application should be the subject of the inquiry to be heard at the same time as the planning appeal. In the meantime, the purchaser has sold on the property to third parties, and has served notice seeking to complete the purchase.

4. The vendor declined to complete. He took the point that the application for planning consent had not been effected within a reasonable time and, consequently, the contract had come to an end. The dispute came before Mr Lewison QC (sitting as a judge of the High Court) in May 2000. He handed down his judgment on 30 May. He found in favour of the purchaser; holding that the contract was still in existence. But he gave permission to appeal. I am told that notice of appeal has been served by the appellant.

5. It was a condition of the permission to appeal that the appellant should support any application for expedition made by the respondent. That application was made by letter dated 9 June 2000. The letter sets out the facts. The application could not be considered by this Court until a time estimate had been given by counsel. That came through, I think, on 15 June 2000.

6. The matter came before me, as a supervising Lord Justice, on 28 June. I took the view that, although there were understandable commercial reasons why the respondent, Carmel Limited, should wish to have the appeal heard and disposed of before the end of July, I was not satisfied that any of the criteria for expedition set out in Unilever plc v Chefaro Proprietaries Ltd (1995) 1 WLR 243, (1995) 1 FLR 1102, at pp 246 and 247 were satisfied. The letter of 9 June did not address the requirements set out in that practice note. The respondent has renewed its application in open court, as it is entitled to do.

7. On the renewed application it is submitted, first, that the criteria identified under para 1, at p 247 C in Chefaro, is satisfied in the present case: that is to say that this is a case in which a party may lose its livelihood, business or home or suffer irreparable loss or extraordinary hardship if the appeal is not heard with expedition.

8. I am not persuaded that that criteria is made out in the present case. The only limb relied on is the loss, said to be irreparable, which will flow from the costs to be incurred in the planning inquiry. But it is entirely a matter for Carmel whether it chooses to incur those costs. In the circumstances that, since the date of Mr Lewison's judgment, Carmel has served a further notice to complete and is now seeking summary judgment in the High Court in Manchester, at a hearing on 17 July, to enforce its notice to complete, no doubt it will choose to incur those costs. That would be consistent with its assertion that it is already the owner of the property. But that is a commercial decision for Carmel to take. If it suffers loss, it will do so because it chooses to take the risk.

9. There is, of course, the further risk that loss will be suffered because the inquiry will reach a conclusion which is unfavourable to Carmel. That is a feature of a development contract which is conditional on a planning consent. In such a case the loss will be the same. The loss will be incurred because Carmel, as the potential developers, chooses to take a commercial decision based on its assessment of the risk. This is not the sort of case which falls within element 1 of the criteria at all.

10. The other paragraph in the Chefaro guidelines which is relied upon is para 5, on p 246, letter H. That paragraph relates to cases where the appeal is genuinely urgent in the sense that something irrevocable is about to happen within the next few days. Paragraph 5 is particularly directed to the execution of a possession order; where the execution is imminent and the appeal appears to have some merit. There is no imminent danger of a possession order in the present case unless the judge, hearing the application for summary judgment for specific performance, takes the view that, notwithstanding that Mr Lewison has given leave to appeal and an appeal is pending, nevertheless, an order for specific performance with an ancillary order for possession should be made and should not be stayed. If the judge takes that view, then no doubt he will indicate his reasons for it. If this Court is faced with an application for a stay by Mr Jolley, as the party against whom the possession order will have been made, it will have the benefit of seeing what are the judge's reasons for declining a stay. If that position arises (which I think unlikely), I have no doubt that this Court will be able to deal with that application as a matter of expedition.

11. I should add this. The Court of Appeal is always anxious to accommodate parties, where possible, in order to avoid a situation where the delay inevitable in the appeal process interferes with their proper commercial interests. The difficulty is that to accommodate these parties in July may well lead to a situation in which other parties, whose appeal cases may be genuinely urgent as opposed to merely commercially desirable, are denied a hearing.

12. This is not a case in which it would be right, in my view, to displace any appeal which is already fixed. The only open dates available to the court at present are right at the end of July - on 27 and 28. By that stage most of the expense in preparation for the inquiry will have already been incurred. Accordingly, the concern to have expedition so as to save that expense will not be met. And, to fix a matter for the 27 or 28 July at this stage of term, opens up the risk that the court will then be unable to accommodate some matter which is indeed genuinely urgent in the last week of term. It would not be right to do that at this stage.

13. Nothing that I say prevents either party from seeking to persuade the listing office to list the appeal in the short warned list, so that the matter can be slipped in at a late stage on virtually no notice. But this is not a case in which an order for expedition should be made, which will have the effect either of displacing other appeals or pre-empting the listing officer's ability to accommodate appeals that are genuinely urgent.

14. For those reasons, I confirm the view which I expressed on 28 June. This is not a case in which an order for expedition should be made.

Application dismissed.

Redx

try this link for the file


https://mega.nz/#!osl1QCIK!90E97gXfnX08bd-SNwAV7dr_pc2BsduBpCRYogkUs00

Mrs44474

Hi! Is this the correct transcript for the case I used in my defence? ^^^^

Thank you for looking!