2x CCJ's - Civil Enforcement Limited - Private Parking Violation

RedOrchid

48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.

49. I repeat paragraph 11, DCBL traced my current address in 2023 as I received a NOTICE OF DEBT RECOVERY.  Why then did Civil Enforcement Limited revert to the oldest address for the two claims?

 

50. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

 

51. In my case, no. I only became aware of the two CCJs against my name once an alternative credit report was generated. The DCBL sent to the correct address out of the blue in 2023 bore all the hallmarks of a scam and offered no information, no photos, and no copy of the alleged contract (sign).  I heard nothing more and knew nothing about the two claims disingenuously sent to a known to be older address. SEE EXHIBIT XX-05 INCLUDE DCBL LETTER FROM JUNE 2023

 

52. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in June 2024 – SEE EXHIBIT XX-05 INCLUDE POC) and I knew nothing from Civil Enforcement Limited about any supposedly outstanding parking charges. I had used said car park several times as my barbers was around the corner and this place was a short walk, they always had a pay machine which I paid each time. There was no consideration on offer and thus, no contract, so any claims would fall at the first hurdle.

 

53. What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

 

54. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to defend two duplicate boilerplate robo-claims for meritless parking charges which have been allegedly committed over 2-3 years ago. This is far too late and unfair to resurrect.

55. Further, the two claims themselves are an abuse in terms of duplication (Henderson v Henderson is the authority which applies to duplicated litigation) and in view of the inadequate POC x 2, shown later in this statement which is a reason in itself to strike both claims out.

 

56. The decision in Good Law Project v (1) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and (2) Pharmaceuticals Direct Limited [2021] EWHC 1782 (TCC) emphasised the importance of serving a claim form correctly on time. In that case sending the claim form to the wrong email address (the claim form was sent to the solicitors, not the designated email address) did not constitute valid service.

 

57. In Pitalia & Anor v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657 the Court of Appeal held that a claimant could not resist its claim being struck out as a result of its failure to serve the claim form within the four month period in CPR 7.5. This was the case even though the strike out application had not been made correctly.

 

58. In IDEAL SHOPPING DIRECT LTD & ORS V MASTERCARD INCORPORATED & ORS [2022] EWCA CIV 14. the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that the claimant had not validly served proceedings and there were no good reasons or exceptional circumstances for the court to indulge the erring Claimant by granting a retrospective order validating the attempted service.

 

59. Held: CPR 3.10 (General power to rectify following error of procedure) did not enable the court to rectify ineffective service of the claim form and remedy the claimants’ error. That rule should not be used to get around service requirements and the claimants also did not satisfy the requirements under CPR 6.15 or 6.16. Following the approach in Piepenbrock v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) ([69]), having considered all the circumstances under rule 6.15, and finding no ‘good reason’, in Ideal Shopping Direct there were similarly no grounds to find the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required under rule 6.16.

 

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS

 

60. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.” 

 

61. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

 

62. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity. 

 

63. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]  

 

64. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...] 

 

65. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...] 

 

66. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.” 

 

67. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so. 

 

68.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

 

69. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a). 

 

70. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

 

71. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

 

CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT 

 

72. In the alternative: the claims x 2 should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

 

73. The Claimants inexplicably doubled the costs and court time wasted, by filing two separate claims (for parking charges with exact same facts). I have only just, in June 2024, seen the two generic (near duplicate) POC, which are reproduced below:

 

 

CLAIM FOR MONEY RELATING TO A PARKING CHARGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TERMS/CONDITIONS(TCS) FOR PARKING IN PRIVATE CAR PARK (CP) MANAGED BY CLAIMANT. DRIVERS MAY ONLY PARK PURSUANT TO TCS OF USE DISPLAYED IN CP AND AGREED UPONENTRY/PARKING. ANPR CAMERAS OR MANUAL PATROLSMONITOR VEHICLES ENTERING/EXITING THE CP AND TC BREACHES.

 

 CHARGES OF GBP182.00 CLAIMED.   VIOLATION DATE: 15/05/2021                   PAYMENT DUE DATE: 13/06/2021                 TIME IN: 10:56 TIME OUT: 12:08               PCN: REFXXXX                           VEHICLE REG MARK: XXXXX CAR PARK:-         LEAGRAVE                                                                                  TOTAL DUE- GBP182.00                         (PAY:WWW.CE-SERVICE.CO.UK OR 01158225020)    THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE SUM OF GBP219.06     FOR THE UNPAID PARKING CHARGE INC GBP37.06   INTEREST UNDER S.69 OF THE CCA 1984          RATE: 8.00% PA FROM DUE DATE TO- 30/11/23    SAME RATE TO JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT      AT DAILY RATE OF- GBP0.04                    TOTAL DEBT AND INTEREST DUE- GBP219.06   

CLAIM FOR MONEY RELATING TO A PARKING CHARGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TERMS/CONDITIONS(TCS) FOR PARKING IN PRIVATE CAR PARK (CP) MANAGED BY CLAIMANT. DRIVERS MAY ONLY PARK PURSUANT  TO TCS OF USE DISPLAYED IN CP AND AGREED UPONENTRY/PARKING. ANPR CAMERAS OR MANUAL PATROLSMONITOR VEHICLES ENTERING/EXITING THE CP AND TC BREACHES. CHARGES OF GBP182.00 CLAIMED. VIOLATION DATE: 20/10/2020                   PAYMENT DUE DATE: 18/11/2020                 TIME IN: 16:21 TIME OUT: 16:44               PCN: REFXXXXX                          VEHICLE REG MARK: XXXXX CAR PARK:-         LEAGRAVE                                                                                  TOTAL DUE- GBP182.00                         (PAY:WWW.CE-SERVICE.CO.UK OR 01158225020)    THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE SUM OF GBP227.32     FOR THE UNPAID PARKING CHARGE INC GBP45.32   INTEREST UNDER S.69 OF THE CCA 1984          RATE: 8.00% PA FROM DUE DATE TO- 30/11/23    SAME RATE TO JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT      AT DAILY RATE OF- GBP0.04                    TOTAL DEBT AND INTEREST DUE- GBP227.32             

 

74. In view of those woeful POC I am confident in relying upon a recent persuasive Appeal judgment as authority to support striking out the claims x 2 (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims). Dismissing these two meritless claims is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

 

75. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Civil Enforcement Limited with their well-documented connections to the BPA Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

 

76. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

 

RedOrchid

77. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX-06 CHAN SCRIPT- Chan and other Judgments) the Court should strike out the two claims, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

 

78. This claim should also be struck out for failing to strictly adhere to s69 of the County Courts Act 1984, in that Civil Enforcement Limited have applied the wrong interest rate. For the first claim, Civil Enforcement Limited are claiming interest for 900 days from 13/06/2021 to 30/11/2023. They are claiming that the amount they are calculating interest on is £182 (For which the particulars of claim offer no explanation on how that figure is reached considering the PCN was for £100). Interest can only be calculated at a flat rate (Interest cannot be compounded) of 8%. A simple calculation of interest on £182 at 8%/annum is £14.56/annum. 900 days is 2 years 9 months and 17 days (2.4632 years).  So, the interest accrued on £182 at a flat rate of 8% per year for 2.4632 years is £35.86. Whilst it may not be a big difference, it must be highlighted that the figure in the PoC is simply not true even though it has been signed with a statement of truth which is a clear abuse of process and lack of integrity by the claimant.

 

The second claim is also flawed. The calculation is 3 years and 12 days = 3.0329 years at 8%/year, so the interest accrued on £182 at a flat rate of 8% per year for 3.0329 years is £44.22. Again, that is at variance with the amount stated on the second claim in the PoC. Given that the MoJ's quarterly statistics show that 90% of small claims go to default CCJs (including this one) there is clearly an abuse by parking claimants who were said by the CJC to be the main perpetrators. The added fake (unincurred and disproportionate) £82 fee and inflated interest both appear to be for the profit of Civil Enforcement Limited and nothing to do with the Claimant's alleged PCN.  I hope the court formally warns or sanctions Civil Enforcement Limited as the court sees fit.  I see this as 'vexatious litigation' and there has been a totally unreasonable course of litigation conduct from start to finish.  I contend that I must succeed in getting all my costs awarded, including the court fees (£606 for two applications) and for travel to and attendance at the application hearing(s).

 

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

 

79. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible. I discovered a CCJ was lodged onto my credit file on the 10th of June 2024. On the same day (10th June 2024) I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement and on the 11th of June 2024 I wrote to Civil Enforcement Limited offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment as mentioned in paragraph 13, since no efforts were made by CEL to reach an agreement, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case.

 

80. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

 

Statement of truth: 

 

81. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

Signed:  XXXXXX

 

CLAIM No: XXXXX

BETWEEN:

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT LIMITED (Claimant)

-- and --

XXXXX (Defendant)

______________________________________________

DRAFT ORDER

______________________________________________

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

 

 

UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on [date];

 

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;

 

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's usual residential address;

 

AND UPON more than 4 months having passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date]

 

IT IS ORDERED:

 

1.      The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant on is hereby set aside.

 

2.      The claim be struck out as more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings.

 

3.      Costs of the application be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant in the sum of £606.

1505grandad

48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice  -  ?

Also a reminder of the post by C-m re two important paras that should be near the top of the WS

RedOrchid

1505grandad said:

48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice  -  ?

Also a reminder of the post by C-m re two important paras that should be near the top of the WS

Ah super, IPC find and replace… will scan for International Parking Community’s too. 

Regarding CPs recommendations, I have moved those over to paragraphs 11-14 so they are at the top of the WS! 

Coupon-mad

RedOrchid said:

Have found the script for CEL vs CHAN too, so I'll attach the PDF as an exhibit.

Better to use the multiple 'judgments' link in the helpful thread yesterday by @Le_Kirk  which starts with Chan then cascades all the others:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6536578/judgments-link

Just remove THIS from para 66:

"Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. "

Paragraph 11 is much better! Makes sense now doesn't it? Just add this as an exhibit - the 2023 'NOTICE OF DEBT RECOVERY' which proves they had your most recent address all along.

RedOrchid

Super, thanks CP. I now have the PDF for all judgments including CHAN's. I also removed paragraph 66 as you asked. 

Are those all the changes we needed to do?  

I'm currently in Amsterdam until Thursday for my conference so I'll submit the set asides on Friday!

Coupon-mad

Yes.  .  

RedOrchid

Hi all, 

Finally back home and ready to get this over with! 

I was wondering if there are any threads that can help me with the actual application, I've filled out two N244 forms but I'm unsure on a few things: 

1. Do I create 2 copy's and send them by post to the court and to CEL? 
2. How do I pay for these two forms, do I need to ring up CNBC again? 
3. Do I need to send my Witness Statements and Draft Orders as separate documents? 

Zbubuman

RedOrchid said:

Hi all, 

Finally back home and ready to get this over with! 

I was wondering if there are any threads that can help me with the actual application, I've filled out two N244 forms but I'm unsure on a few things: 

1. Do I create 2 copy's and send them by post to the court and to CEL? 
2. How do I pay for these two forms, do I need to ring up CNBC again? 
3. Do I need to send my Witness Statements and Draft Orders as separate documents? 

1. You need to send two applications separately . can do this all via email ( you don't need to send any copies to CEL). If you are relying on Henderson V Henderson, state in your message whether it is possible to have both cases grouped into one hearing. 
2. After sending the emails, call the CNBC to make payment. Advise that you submitted 2 x applications and would like to pay for them. £303 each. 
3. All forms, WS, Draft order and exhibits need to be separate documents.  So when sending the application each email should have the following attachments ( N244 form, WS -Pdf, Draft Order - Word doc, Exhibits - pdf's and numbered accordingly example if your name is John Smith it would be Exhibit-JS-01, Exhibit-JS-02,etc)

RedOrchid

Ah superb, thanks Zbubuman! 

I followed your thread, did you have any luck in getting both CCJs in one hearing? 

Should I not pay the court until they’ve come back to me saying whether they have agreed to merge both claims, thus not needing to pay 303 x2?