2x CCJ's - Civil Enforcement Limited - Private Parking Violation

RedOrchid

50. Whatever the reason, it was vexatious, wholly unreasonable and an abuse of process to trace a newer address, write to it once, then - when they received no reply from me - revert to what they knew was an out-of-date address (where the Claimants had also not heard from me).  Having taken steps to trace it, the newer address used for the notice of debt recovery had to be used for the claims x 2. But it was not.

 

51. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

 

52. In my case, no. I only became aware of the two CCJs against my name once an alternative credit report was generated. The DCBL sent to the correct address out of the blue in 2023 bore all the hallmarks of a scam and offered no information, no photos, and no copy of the alleged contract (sign).  I heard nothing more and knew nothing about the two claims disingenuously sent to a known to be older address. SEE EXHIBIT XX-05 INCLUDE DCBL LETTER FROM JUNE 2023

 

53. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in June 2024 – SEE EXHIBIT XX-05 INCLUDE POC) and I knew nothing from Civil Enforcement Limited about any supposedly outstanding parking charges. I had used said car park several times as my barbers was around the corner and this place was a short walk, they always had a pay machine which I paid each time. There was no consideration on offer and thus, no contract, so any claims would fall at the first hurdle.

 

54. What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

 

55. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to defend two duplicate boilerplate robo-claims for meritless parking charges which have been allegedly committed over 2-3 years ago. This is far too late and unfair to resurrect.

56. Further, the two claims themselves are an abuse in terms of duplication (Henderson v Henderson is the authority which applies to duplicated litigation) and in view of the inadequate POC x 2, shown later in this statement which is a reason in itself to strike both claims out.

 

57. The decision in Good Law Project v (1) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and (2) Pharmaceuticals Direct Limited [2021] EWHC 1782 (TCC) emphasised the importance of serving a claim form correctly on time. In that case sending the claim form to the wrong email address (the claim form was sent to the solicitors, not the designated email address) did not constitute valid service.

 

58. In Pitalia & Anor v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657 the Court of Appeal held that a claimant could not resist its claim being struck out as a result of its failure to serve the claim form within the four month period in CPR 7.5. This was the case even though the strike out application had not been made correctly.

 

59. In IDEAL SHOPPING DIRECT LTD & ORS V MASTERCARD INCORPORATED & ORS [2022] EWCA CIV 14. the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that the claimant had not validly served proceedings and there were no good reasons or exceptional circumstances for the court to indulge the erring Claimant by granting a retrospective order validating the attempted service.

 

60. Held: CPR 3.10 (General power to rectify following error of procedure) did not enable the court to rectify ineffective service of the claim form and remedy the claimants’ error. That rule should not be used to get around service requirements and the claimants also did not satisfy the requirements under CPR 6.15 or 6.16. Following the approach in Piepenbrock v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) ([69]), having considered all the circumstances under rule 6.15, and finding no ‘good reason’, in Ideal Shopping Direct there were similarly no grounds to find the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required under rule 6.16.

 

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS

 

61. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.” 

 

62. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

 

63. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity. 

 

64. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]  

 

65. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...] 

 

66. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...] 

 

67. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.” 

 

68. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so. 

 

69.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

 

70. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a). 

 

71. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

 

72. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

 

CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT 

 

73. In the alternative: the claims x 2 should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

 

74. The Claimants inexplicably doubled the costs and court time wasted, by filing two separate claims (for parking charges with exact same facts). I have only just, in June 2024, seen the two generic (near duplicate) POC, which are reproduced below:

 

 

CLAIM FOR MONEY RELATING TO A PARKING CHARGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TERMS/CONDITIONS(TCS) FOR PARKING IN PRIVATE CAR PARK (CP) MANAGED BY CLAIMANT. DRIVERS MAY ONLY PARK PURSUANT TO TCS OF USE DISPLAYED IN CP AND AGREED UPONENTRY/PARKING. ANPR CAMERAS OR MANUAL PATROLSMONITOR VEHICLES ENTERING/EXITING THE CP AND TC BREACHES.

 

 CHARGES OF GBP182.00 CLAIMED.   VIOLATION DATE: 15/05/2021                   PAYMENT DUE DATE: 13/06/2021                 TIME IN: 10:56 TIME OUT: 12:08               PCN: XXXX                           VEHICLE REG MARK: XXXXX CAR PARK:-         LEAGRAVE                                                                                  TOTAL DUE- GBP182.00                         (PAY:WWW.CE-SERVICE.CO.UK OR 01158225020)    THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE SUM OF GBP219.06     FOR THE UNPAID PARKING CHARGE INC GBP37.06   INTEREST UNDER S.69 OF THE CCA 1984          RATE: 8.00% PA FROM DUE DATE TO- 30/11/23    SAME RATE TO JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT      AT DAILY RATE OF- GBP0.04                    TOTAL DEBT AND INTEREST DUE- GBP219.06   

CLAIM FOR MONEY RELATING TO A PARKING CHARGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TERMS/CONDITIONS(TCS) FOR PARKING IN PRIVATE CAR PARK (CP) MANAGED BY CLAIMANT. DRIVERS MAY ONLY PARK PURSUANT  TO TCS OF USE DISPLAYED IN CP AND AGREED UPONENTRY/PARKING. ANPR CAMERAS OR MANUAL PATROLSMONITOR VEHICLES ENTERING/EXITING THE CP AND TC BREACHES. CHARGES OF GBP182.00 CLAIMED. VIOLATION DATE: 20/10/2020                   PAYMENT DUE DATE: 18/11/2020                 TIME IN: 16:21 TIME OUT: 16:44               PCN: XXXX                           VEHICLE REG MARK: XXXXX CAR PARK:-         LEAGRAVE                                                                                  TOTAL DUE- GBP182.00                         (PAY:WWW.CE-SERVICE.CO.UK OR 01158225020)    THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE SUM OF GBP227.32     FOR THE UNPAID PARKING CHARGE INC GBP45.32   INTEREST UNDER S.69 OF THE CCA 1984          RATE: 8.00% PA FROM DUE DATE TO- 30/11/23    SAME RATE TO JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT      AT DAILY RATE OF- GBP0.04                    TOTAL DEBT AND INTEREST DUE- GBP227.32             

RedOrchid

75. In view of those woeful POC I am confident in relying upon a recent persuasive Appeal judgment as authority to support striking out the claims x 2 (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims). Dismissing these two meritless claims is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

 

76. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Civil Enforcement Limited with their well-documented connections to the BPA Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

 

77. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

 

78. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX-06 CLARIFY WHAT SHOULD GO HERE AND WHERE TO FIND SUCH INFORMATION- Chan and other Judgments) the Court should strike out the two claims, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

 

79. This claim should also be struck out for failing to strictly adhere to s69 of the County Courts Act 1984, in that Civil Enforcement Limited have applied the wrong interest rate. For the first claim, Civil Enforcement Limited are claiming interest for 900 days from 13/06/2021 to 30/11/2023. They are claiming that the amount they are calculating interest on is £182 (For which the particulars of claim offer no explanation on how that figure is reached considering the PCN was for £100). Interest can only be calculated at a flat rate (Interest cannot be compounded) of 8%. A simple calculation of interest on £182 at 8%/annum is £14.56/annum. 900 days is 2 years 9 months and 17 days (2.4632 years).  So, the interest accrued on £182 at a flat rate of 8% per year for 2.4632 years is £35.86. Whilst it may not be a big difference, it must be highlighted that the figure in the PoC is simply not true even though it has been signed with a statement of truth which is a clear abuse of process and lack of integrity by the claimant.

 

The second claim is also flawed. The calculation is 3 years and 12 days = 3.0329 years at 8%/year, so the interest accrued on £182 at a flat rate of 8% per year for 3.0329 years is £44.22. Again, that is at variance with the amount stated on the second claim in the PoC. Given that the MoJ's quarterly statistics show that 90% of small claims go to default CCJs (including this one) there is clearly an abuse by parking claimants who were said by the CJC to be the main perpetrators. The added fake (unincurred and disproportionate) £82 fee and inflated interest both appear to be for the profit of Civil Enforcement Limited and nothing to do with the Claimant's alleged PCN.  I hope the court formally warns or sanctions Civil Enforcement Limited as the court sees fit.  I see this as 'vexatious litigation' and there has been a totally unreasonable course of litigation conduct from start to finish.  I contend that I must succeed in getting all my costs awarded, including the court fees (£606 for two applications) and for travel to and attendance at the application hearing(s).

 

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

 

80. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible. I discovered a CCJ was lodged onto my credit file on the 10th of June 2024. On the same day (10th June 2024) I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. On the 11th of June 2024 I wrote to Civil Enforcement Limited offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to right the wrong done to me, their responses did not offer an answer to my offer so on 25th June 2024, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case (See Exhibit XX-07 – INCLUDE EMAIL SENT TO CEL) 

 

81. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

 

Statement of truth: 

 

82. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

Signed:  XXXXX

 

CLAIM No: XXXXX

BETWEEN:

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT LIMITED (Claimant)

-- and --

XXXXX (Defendant)

______________________________________________

DRAFT ORDER

______________________________________________

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

 

 

UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on 25/06/2024;

 

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;

 

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's usual residential address;

 

AND UPON more than 4 months having passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings;

 

IT IS ORDERED:

 

1.      The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant is hereby set aside.

 

2.      The claim x2 be struck out as more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings.

 

3.      Costs of the application be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant in the sum of £606.

Coupon-mad

Para 11 needs re-writing as much of it isn't true for your case because they DID find your current address (then deliberately reverted to the older out of date address for the claims. Pure abuse):

"a Notice of Debt Recovery stating that they tried writing to me at a different address but did not receive a response, therefore they used a tracking service to find my current address."

You need to be talking about that abuse in 11 and attaching that letter as an exhibit.  And assuming you tried to get them to consent to set aside (I think you did?) you should tell the Judge about that effort to resolve it, too.

Para 66 is not right because the C hasn't made an application to escape sanctions in your case.

The judgments link you asked about are in a thread today which I think you missed reading.

1505grandad

Para 47 stills states IPC

RedOrchid

Coupon-mad said:

Para 11 needs re-writing as much of it isn't true for your case because they DID find your current address (then deliberately reverted to the older out of date address for the claims. Pure abuse):

"a Notice of Debt Recovery stating that they tried writing to me at a different address but did not receive a response, therefore they used a tracking service to find my current address."

You need to be talking about that abuse in 11 and attaching that letter as an exhibit.  And assuming you tried to get them to consent to set aside (I think you did?) you should tell the Judge about that effort to resolve it, too.

Para 66 is not right because the C hasn't made an application to escape sanctions in your case.

The judgments link you asked about are in a thread today which I think you missed reading.

Hi CP,

Regarding paragraph 11, it is true that the claimant (CEL) did not find my current address, however, once the case got passed to DCBL, they themselves did find me, in light of this, do you still believe that it needs re-writing?

Paragraph 49 touches on your ask as I state "It seems that DCBL paid lip service to this rule; they must have traced my current address in 2023 because out of the blue, I received a NOTICE OF DEBT RECOVERY. (...)"

Paragraph 79 also tells the Judge of my efforts to resolve the situation by a joint application to set aside the CCJ.

Regarding paragraph 66, should I remove it? If I am to remove it, it doesn't make sense to keep 65, 66, 67 or 68. Do you agree?

Will try and track down those links, the Chan case.

RedOrchid

Have found the script for CEL vs CHAN too, so I'll attach the PDF as an exhibit.

1505grandad

Some further observations:-

"4. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the BPA Code of Practice 21.10 and CPR 6.9, as more than 24 months have passed since the PCN on 15/05/21, and the CCJ on 21/12/2023."

Should that be 24.1c?

Para 11  -  "Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, DVLA, HMRC."

However in several following paras you go to great pains stating that the DVLA is a one time only look up. Perhaps Electoral Roll instead? (Realise DVLA is in the exemplar)

Coupon-mad

Yes para 11 must be completely re-written.

What the Debt crawler agents did was done on CEL's behalf, of course.

Paras 49 and 79 are far too late to hide such important background.

RedOrchid

1505grandad said:

Some further observations:-

"4. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the BPA Code of Practice 21.10 and CPR 6.9, as more than 24 months have passed since the PCN on 15/05/21, and the CCJ on 21/12/2023."

Should that be 24.1c?

Para 11  -  "Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, DVLA, HMRC."

However in several following paras you go to great pains stating that the DVLA is a one time only look up. Perhaps Electoral Roll instead? (Realise DVLA is in the exemplar)

Hi @1505grandad

I have now updated to 24.1c, thanks for spotting!

Regarding paragraph 11, I'm unable to include electoral roll as I am a Brazilian citizen, however, as per Coupon's latest reply, I have re-written the paragraph altogether. Please take a look to see if it's ok!

@Coupon-mad regarding paragraph 66 and my previous question, should I remove those bits?

RedOrchid

UPDATED WS & DRAFT ORDER


Civil Enforcement Limited

 

V

 

XXXX

 

 

Case number 

 

XXXXX

 

WITNESS STATEMENT 

 

I, XXXX, of XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, will say as follows: 

 

1. I am the Defendant in this matter, and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgments (CCJ) entered against me on 21/12/2023, in default due to a defective service of Claim. 

 

2. I was not aware of the claim made against me until I obtained a credit report from a different credit agency on the 10/06/2024. This is when I found out the Claimant had obtained two default CCJs against me. 

 

3. The Claimant served the claims to an old address which is a clear breach of both the CPRs and the BPA Code of Practice.  These facts and issues are explained further, below.

 

4. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the BPA Code of Practice 24.1c and CPR 6.9, as more than 24 months have passed since the PCN on 15/05/21, and the CCJ on 21/12/2023. 

 

5. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above. 

 

6. Whilst I am unsure which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed. 

 

7. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, 13.3).  Given that I am going further and declaring the unserved claims x 2 to be expired and thus, time barred and as such, I am disputing the jurisdiction of the court to dispense with service and allow the two claims to continue, this application also relies upon CPR 11 (but due to the lack of service, I cannot also acknowledge service, which that rule assumes a defendant can). In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the expired POC fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".  More detail follows below.

 

8. The Claimant inexplicably doubled the costs and court time wasted, by filing two separate claims (for parking charges with exact same facts, issued within days of each other). I kindly ask for the two applications re setting aside the CCJs in claim number XXXX and claim number XXXXX to be consolidated and heard together at one hearing, to save time and costs for the court and both parties.

 

9. I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order. 

 

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM 

 

10. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 21/12/2023. I am aware that the Claimant is Civil Enforcement Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice. 

 

11. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence." It seems that DCBL paid lip service to this rule on behalf of CEL; they must have traced my current address in 2023 because out of the blue, I received a NOTICE OF DEBT RECOVERY.  Why then did Civil Enforcement Limited revert to the oldest address for the two claims?  A reasonable interpretation could be that they wanted to obtain default CCJs.

12. Whatever the reason, it was vexatious, wholly unreasonable and an abuse of process to trace a newer address, write to it once, then - when they received no reply from me - revert to what they knew was an out-of-date address (where the Claimants had also not heard from me).  Having taken steps to trace it, the newer address used for the notice of debt recovery had to be used for the claims x 2. But it was not.

13. On the 11th of June 2024 I wrote to Civil Enforcement Limited offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to right the wrong done to me, their responses did not offer an answer to my offer so on 25th June 2024. (See Exhibit XX-07 – INCLUDE EMAIL SENT TO CEL) 

 

14. The claim form was not served at my current address; thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I obtained a credit report on 10/06/2024. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3). 

 

15. The address on the claim is XXXXXX. I moved from this address to three different addresses since the PCN was issues and I have lived at my newest address at XXXXX in September 2023. In support of this, I can provide documentation showing my updated address, including V5C, driving license, bank statements, a letter from DCBL and a credit check report. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-01)  DRIVING LICENSE, V5C, BANK STATEMENT.

 

16. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country. 

 

 

THE BRITISH PARKING ASSOCIATION CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED 

 

17. British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The BPA Code of Practice 2024 - Version 9, February 2024, clause 24.1c states; 

18. “Before serving a Letter Before Claim and prior to the issue of proceedings, Operators must, if no responses have been received to the NTD/NTK/reminder letters, take reasonable endeavours to ensure that the contact details for the person you are writing to are correct.” 

 

DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE 

 

19. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not and notify of appeal rights. 

 

20. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out. 

 

21. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept'). 

 

22. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

 

23. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note: 

 

24. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said 

 

25. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments." 

 

26. The same sentiment was echoed by: 

 

27. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014) 

 

28. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) 

 

29. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, i would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)  

 

30. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe 

 

31. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all." 

 

 

 

Cause of Action estoppel

 

31. Being legally represented, the Claimant knows, or should know, that by detaching or allowing to remain detached, elements of alleged debts and issuing separate claims, each which rely upon essentially duplicate particulars and facts, is an abuse of the civil litigation process. 

 

32. The Claimant has issued two claims with identical Particulars with the exception of the Parking Charge issue date.

 

XXXXXX - PCN Issue Date 15/05/2021

 

XXXXXX - PCN Issue Date 18/11/2020

 

33. In Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 3 All ER 41 the court noted that cause of action estoppel “…applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter.” 

 

34. In Henderson -v- Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313 the court noted the following: 

 

(i) when a matter becomes subject to litigation, the parties are required to advance their whole case; 

 

(ii) the Court will not permit the same parties to re-open the same subject of litigation regarding matters which should have been advanced in the earlier litigation, but were not owing to negligence, inadvertence, or error; 

 

(iii) this bar applies to all matters, both those on which the Court determined in the original litigation and those which would have been advanced if the party in question had exercised ''reasonable diligence''. 

 

35. Two claims were raised on behalf of the claimant where one would have sufficed; which has doubled the waste to court time and also doubled the cost in setting aside the two CCJ’s.  

 

36.  The Claimant filing the first claim and failing to advance the whole case, any cause of action was immediately extinguished for any other similar fact Parking Charges against the Defendant. The courts may estop a second claim where the cause of action is substantially the same. 

 

37. The Defendant invites the court to dismiss the second claim under the grounds of cause of action estoppel.  In the alternative, the Court is invited to consolidate the claims to be determined together, and to apply appropriate sanctions against the Claimant.   

 

THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED

 

I HEREBY CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IT NOW (EFFECTIVELY THAT WOULD MEAN DISPENSING WITH SERVICE). THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE VERY LIMITED COURT DISCRETION TO RETROSPECTIVELY VALIDATE DEFECTIVE SERVICE BY RESURRECTING AN EXPIRED AND UNSERVED (AND HOPELESS) CLAIM.

 

38. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved.   The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.

 

39. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5). 

 

40. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved.

 

41. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the BPA code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address. 

 

42. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address. 

 

43. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served). 

 

44. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred.  There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15.  Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.

 

45. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:

 

46. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

 

47. In my case, no.  An old DVLA address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service.  Indeed the DVLA do not sell 'keeper data' with any warranty that it can be used or relied upon for service of court papers to a motorist; it is merely a snapshot in time of where a vehicle was once registered.