Incorrect info on ticket

KeithP

SergeiK wrote: »

8th Aug and yes

With a Claim Issue Date of 8th August, you have until Tuesday 27th August to do the Acknowledgement of Service, but there is nothing to be gained by delaying it. To do the AoS, follow the guidance offered in a Dropbox file linked from post #2 of the NEWBIES FAQ sticky thread. About ten minutes work - no thinking required.

Having done the AoS, you have until 4pm on Tuesday 10th September 2019 to file your Defence.

That's over four weeks away. Plenty of time to produce a Defence, but please don't leave it to the last minute.


When you are happy with the content, your Defence should be filed via email as suggested here:

Print your Defence.
1. Sign it and date it.
   
2. Scan the signed document back in and save it as a pdf.
   
3. Send that pdf as an email attachment to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk
   
4. Just put the claim number and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'Please find my Defence attached'.
   
5. Log into MCOL after a few days to see if the Claim is marked "defence received". If not chase the CCBC until it is.
   
6. Do not be surprised to receive an early copy of the Claimant's Directions Questionnaire, they are just trying to keep you under pressure.
   
7. Wait for your DQ from the CCBC, or download one from the internet, and then re-read post #2 of the NEWBIES FAQ sticky thread to find out exactly what to do with it.

SergeiK

Claim Acknowledged, started to draft a deference, assuming its a good idea to post up on here before sending it?

waamo

SergeiK wrote: »

Claim Acknowledged, started to draft a deference, assuming its a good idea to post up on here before sending it?

Very much so.

SergeiK

I'm concerned that my defence is a little on the lengthy side (7 pages), I also have a query about an entry sign at the car park which i don't think is in a very obvious position.

is it worth this being added in, bearing in mind the circumstances and if so how do i link to photos for your views?

Redx

7 pages is far too long , read the concise defence by bargepole to get an idea of what it should be like

also read his recent posts , plus those by johnnersh , in the Didgeridoo thread to see what a defence requires , and what a WS requires at the WS + Exhibits + costs schedule stage

no photos are included in the defence either , no exhibits , nothing , just text

pics can be hosted on imgur if you really need to do so, then add the url on here

SergeiK

Redx wrote: »

7 pages is far too long , read the concise defence by bargepole to get an idea of what it should be like

e

my concern was that it was much longer than most others i had read

I based it on the defence in the newbies thread re RingGo app which is fairly lengthy anyway. I've also added in the abuse of court part which has made it longer

I'm aware that all pics evidence etc goes later at the WS stage

nosferatu1001

To get to 7 pages its either full of excerpts from cases, which dont go in a defence, or it is written like a WS.

So, work out which.

SergeiK

I've taken some bits out that i don't think are relevant

still on the long side. first draft so expecting plenty of corrections, I'm new to all this sort so it's certainly not my forte...I appreciate the time you guys put in


In The County Court

Claim No: XXXXXXX

Between

Napier Parking Ltd Ltd (Claimant)

-and-

Joe Bloggs (Defendant)

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.
2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.
2. It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXXX when it was parked in XXXXXXXXXXX November 2018
2.1. The FCN stated the contravention as 'Failure to clearly display a valid ticket/permit’ and this contravention is denied. The Defendant denies liability for the purported parking charge (penalty), not least because it is already common ground that the correct parking charge (tariff) had already been paid but also due to an error in the cashless pay by phone app not caused by the consumer, further more the cashless system provides no physical ticket or permit to display
2.2. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.
3. It is denied that:
a. A contract was formed to pay anything more than the advertised tariff;
b. There was any agreement to pay a further penalty parking charge;
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site which prominently displayed the £90 penalty, in at least as large lettering as the tariffs shown at the machine (both the machine instructions and the Ringgo app were silent about any fine).
d. The terms and conditions made any mention of VRN data needing to be entered at all to constitute valid ‘virtual permit’
e. in addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums;
f. the claimant in fact expended the claimed additional sums;
g. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice.
Primary defence - payment was made but the system hid a concealed pitfall or trap
4. The Defendant made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking by using an approved payment channel. Payment for parking was made via telephone using a cashless system provided by Ringo.
4.1. Paying by phone for parking is indisputably a 'distance contract' - a remote telephone transaction involving the exchange of more than one message/text - and under the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, such a contract requires certain information to be supplied in advance. The app used by the Claimant failed to comply with the statute and this directly led to the system failure regarding the VRN data.
4.2. The Defendant followed the Ringo instructions exactly as shown on the signage at the payment machine. The payment channel did not indicate any failure to make payment and responded that payment had been made.
4.3. The service makes no provision to print a ticket to display, or a receipt so that a driver could check the details in a tangible format. The Defendant reasonably expected that the payment was made appropriately and had no reason to question the confirmation text message relied upon.
4.4. It was only when a FCN arrived in the post, that the Defendant knew (too late) of what appeared to be a minor data problem caused by the Claimant's system itself. The app used by the Claimant had carried forward stored data without the Defendant's consent, and the app wrongly used the VRN relating to a completely different parking session.
4.5. No prominent warning had been displayed by the app system and it is averred that such unauthorised and potentially onerous data storage by the Claimant's agent, the app provider RingGo, causes far more potential detriment to a consumer in any private car park than (presumably) the aim of minor time saved for people using the same car every day for months/years.
4.5.1. Further, it is averred that a distance contractual payment where the wrong VRN data can be so easily assigned against the payment made, unbeknown to the driver yet with the risk of a penalty becoming extremely high over even a short period of time in a typical two car household, offends against the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 (the DPA), which was the statute in place at the time of the parking event. Storage of a VRN as the 'default' data is both untimely, excessive and disproportionate, and thus breaches the DPA's data protection principles.
4.5.2. The DPA states that personal data is 'inaccurate' if it is incorrect or misleading as to any matter of fact. The matter of fact here is that payment of the tariff was made by the driver of the vehicle which was captured by MNPR, and for which the Claimant duly obtained the Defendant's personal data from the DVLA.
4.5.3. Given the fact that the MNPR data did not match with a payment made, an automated FCN was issued. However, it was within the gift of the Claimant to ensure before starting enforcement at any site, that their systems are fit for purpose, such that the dangerous 'default to the old VRN' presumption and associated consumer risk is eliminated from the app when their locations codes are input.
4.6. A FCN in these circumstances is completely foreseeable by a professional parking firm, and it is averred that this punitive charge relies upon the Claimant's own data being wrong at the outset, and going unnoticed by a driver.
4.7. The 'automated decision' of the Claimant's chosen payment app to decide to set one of the registered cars as 'default' is not the Defendant's responsibility, especially since it was done without the Defendant's consent or knowledge. It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to be forced after the event to assume the unknown burden or obligation of spotting an error in the stream of data that emanates solely from the Claimant's payment agent.
5. The Defendant sent a written appeal explaining that there are two cars in the household both, both registered on RingGo, The Defendant has also pointed out the data processing/storage error, and the system failed by assuming a default VRN from an old parking session, with no warning to alert the driver to the risk of a fine if they 'failed' to notice the app's inaccurate data.
5.1. Thus, given the Defendant's appeal and the MNPR camera secondary data stream, which proved which car of the two, was actually in this car park, the Claimant knew about the error and was afforded ample opportunity to rectify the inaccurate data held by their system. At all times, from the MNPR image, the Claimant knew the correct VRN, and their two data streams (MNPR and app) conflict, and this data inaccuracy could have been easily rectified at no cost.
5.2 the Claimant is aware of a simple error but has continued to increase to a 3 figure sum Despite having no legitimate interest, and despite the face that parking operators can not simply ‘punish’ mistakes and profit from them, because – as was clearly established in the entirely different ParkingEye v Beavis case – that would fall foul of the penalty rule

No agreement on the penalty and no contract formed by conduct
6. The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.
6.1. It is clear that no conduct by the Defendant caused the penalty to arise and a professional parking firm could not reasonably lay any blame with the Defendant, for their own agent's data storage presumption and negligence. The charge offends against the reasonable and statutory expectations of trader/consumer relations requiring 'open dealing' and the doctrine of good faith.
6.2. Further, the Claimant will no doubt hope to convince the court that a 'relevant contract' existed and was breached. As this would be a consumer contract, it must be 'fair' and 'transparent' as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and must also be a valid and enforceable ('distance') telephone payment contract that is not unconscionable, given the facts of the case. The Defendant avers that this punitive charge fails in all respects.
6.2.2. And the Claimant would have the court believe that a 'relevant obligation' existed, which under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (setting out the will of Parliament for parking tickets issued on private land, even if a Claimant is not relying upon that Act) is defined as ''an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract''.
6.2.3. The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
6.2.4. The misleading omissions/conduct of the trader and/or their agent, caused the Defendant to make a transactional decision that would not otherwise have been taken, had the 'default VRN' not been hidden among the data presented with no 'Red Hand Rule' style warning giving appropriate prominence to the onerous risk. Since the Defendant followed all instructions and was never asked to input the VRN, the Defendant cannot be liable for that inaccuracy.
7. The Claimant may also try to rely upon the completely different Supreme Court case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, the Defendant avers that decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the facts. To quote from the decision in Beavis:
Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might omperate disadvantageously to the customer.''

No standing or landowner authority
8. Further and in the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices under defined parameters (including when caused by failure of their own data processing/excessive storage) and to form/offer contracts in their own name, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

No legitimate interest or commercial justification
9. It is the Defendant's case that there can be no legitimate interest or commercial justification in pursuing paying patrons for a hundredfold penalty, for not noticing inaccurate data presented to them on behalf of the Claimant, in small print on a phone app that stores data contrary to the DPA (and now the GDPR).
9.1. The Defendant avers that this is a significant and all-too-common issue requiring investigation by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and to this end, a formal complaint has now been lodged about the untimely, excessive and disproportionate storage of the Defendant's personal data (and VRNs are personal data, according to the ICO) which has resulted in such a significant imbalance in the Defendant's consumer rights.
9.2. The penalty represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.
Costs on the claim - disproportionate and disingenuous

10. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

- Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

- The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

- Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air, this appears more so that the fact the claimant cannot not even agree how much these costs are, as in previous correspondence including letter of claim Claimant was seeking £60 but is now seeking £54. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

- According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

- The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

- Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:

The Judge stated:-
''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

- In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

- There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

- The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Name

Signature

Date

KeithP

All paragraphs need a sequential number - including those that appear to start with a hyphen.

SergeiK

Take 2


In The County Court

Claim No: XXXXXXX

Between

Napier Parking Ltd (Claimant)

-and

Edd the Duck (Defendant)

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.
2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.
2. It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of a Fixed Charge Notice (FCN) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXXXX when it was parked in XXXXXXX November 2018
2.1. The FCN stated the contravention as 'Failure to clearly display a valid ticket/permit’ and this contravention is denied. The Defendant denies liability for the purported parking charge (penalty), not least because it is already common ground that the correct parking charge (tariff) had already been paid but also due to an error in the cashless pay by phone app not caused by the consumer, further more the cashless system provides no physical ticket or permit to display
2.2. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.
3. It is denied that:
a. A contract was formed to pay anything more than the advertised tariff;
b. There was any agreement to pay a further penalty parking charge;
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site which prominently displayed the £90 penalty, in at least as large lettering as the tariffs shown at the machine (both the machine instructions and the RingGo app were silent about any fine).
d. The terms and conditions made any mention of VRN data needing to be entered at all to constitute valid ‘virtual permit’
e. in addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums;
f. the claimant in fact expended the claimed additional sums;
g. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice.
Primary defence - payment was made but the system hid a concealed pitfall or trap
4. The Defendant made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking by using an approved payment channel. Payment for parking was made via telephone using a cashless system provided by Ringo.
4.1. Paying by phone for parking is indisputably a 'distance contract' - a remote telephone transaction involving the exchange of more than one message/text - and under the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, such a contract requires certain information to be supplied in advance. The app used by the Claimant failed to comply with the statute and this directly led to the system failure regarding the VRN data.
4.2. The Defendant followed the Ringo instructions exactly as shown on the signage at the payment machine. The payment channel did not indicate any failure to make payment and responded that payment had been made.
4.3. The service makes no provision to print a ticket to display, or a receipt so that a driver could check the details in a tangible format. The Defendant reasonably expected that the payment was made appropriately and had no reason to question the confirmation text message relied upon.
4.4. It was only when a FCN arrived in the post, that the Defendant knew (too late) of what appeared to be a minor data problem caused by the Claimant's system itself. The app used by the Claimant had carried forward stored data without the Defendant's consent, and the app wrongly used the VRN relating to a completely different parking session.
4.5. No prominent warning had been displayed by the app system and it is averred that such unauthorised and potentially onerous data storage by the Claimant's agent, the app provider RingGo, causes far more potential detriment to a consumer in any private car park than (presumably) the aim of minor time saved for people using the same car every day for months/years.
4.5.1. Further, it is averred that a distance contractual payment where the wrong VRN data can be so easily assigned against the payment made, unbeknown to the driver yet with the risk of a penalty becoming extremely high over even a short period of time in a typical two car household, offends against the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 (the DPA), which was the statute in place at the time of the parking event. Storage of a VRN as the 'default' data is both untimely, excessive and disproportionate, and thus breaches the DPA's data protection principles.
4.5.2. The DPA states that personal data is 'inaccurate' if it is incorrect or misleading as to any matter of fact. The matter of fact here is that payment of the tariff was made for the vehicle which was captured with manual number plate recognition (MNPR), and for which the Claimant duly obtained the Defendant's personal data from the DVLA.
4.5.3. Given the fact that the MNPR data did not match with a payment made, an automated FCN was issued. However, it was within the gift of the Claimant to ensure before starting enforcement at any site, that their systems are fit for purpose, such that the dangerous 'default to the old VRN' presumption and associated consumer risk is eliminated from the app when their locations codes are input.
4.6. A FCN in these circumstances is completely foreseeable by a professional parking firm, and it is averred that this punitive charge relies upon the Claimant's own data being wrong at the outset, and going unnoticed by a driver.
4.7. The 'automated decision' of the Claimant's chosen payment app to decide to set one of the registered cars as 'default' is not the Defendant's responsibility, especially since it was done without the Defendant's consent or knowledge. It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to be forced after the event to assume the unknown burden or obligation of spotting an error in the stream of data that emanates solely from the Claimant's payment agent.
5. The Defendant sent a written appeal explaining that there are two cars in the household both, both registered on RingGo, The Defendant has also pointed out the data processing/storage error, and the system failed by assuming a default VRN from an old parking session, with no warning to alert the driver to the risk of a fine if they 'failed' to notice the app's inaccurate data.
5.1. Thus, given the Defendant's appeal and the MNPR camera secondary data stream, which proved which car of the two, was actually in this car park, the Claimant knew about the error and was afforded ample opportunity to rectify the inaccurate data held by their system. At all times, from the MNPR image, the Claimant knew the correct VRN, and their two data streams (MNPR and app) conflict, and this data inaccuracy could have been easily rectified at no cost.
5.2 the Claimant is aware of a simple error but has continued to increase to a 3 figure sum Despite having no legitimate interest, and despite the face that parking operators can not simply ‘punish’ mistakes and profit from them, because – as was clearly established in the entirely different ParkingEye v Beavis case – that would fall foul of the penalty rule

No agreement on the penalty and no contract formed by conduct
6. The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.
6.1. It is clear that no conduct by the Defendant caused the penalty to arise and a professional parking firm could not reasonably lay any blame with the Defendant, for their own agent's data storage presumption and negligence. The charge offends against the reasonable and statutory expectations of trader/consumer relations requiring 'open dealing' and the doctrine of good faith.
6.2. Further, the Claimant will no doubt hope to convince the court that a 'relevant contract' existed and was breached. As this would be a consumer contract, it must be 'fair' and 'transparent' as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and must also be a valid and enforceable ('distance') telephone payment contract that is not unconscionable, given the facts of the case. The Defendant avers that this punitive charge fails in all respects.
6.2.2. And the Claimant would have the court believe that a 'relevant obligation' existed, which under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (setting out the will of Parliament for parking tickets issued on private land, even if a Claimant is not relying upon that Act) is defined as ''an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract''.
6.2.3. The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
6.2.4. The misleading omissions/conduct of the trader and/or their agent, caused the Defendant to make a transactional decision that would not otherwise have been taken, had the 'default VRN' not been hidden among the data presented with no 'Red Hand Rule' style warning giving appropriate prominence to the onerous risk. Since the Defendant followed all instructions and was never asked to input the VRN, the Defendant cannot be liable for that inaccuracy.
7. The Claimant may also try to rely upon the completely different Supreme Court case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, the Defendant avers that decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the facts. To quote from the decision in Beavis:
Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might omperate disadvantageously to the customer.''

No standing or landowner authority
8. Further and in the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices under defined parameters (including when caused by failure of their own data processing/excessive storage) and to form/offer contracts in their own name, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

No legitimate interest or commercial justification
9. It is the Defendant's case that there can be no legitimate interest or commercial justification in pursuing paying patrons for a hundredfold penalty, for not noticing inaccurate data presented to them on behalf of the Claimant, in small print on a phone app that stores data contrary to the DPA (and now the GDPR).
9.1. The Defendant avers that this is a significant and all-too-common issue requiring investigation by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and to this end, a formal complaint has now been lodged about the untimely, excessive and disproportionate storage of the Defendant's personal data (and VRNs are personal data, according to the ICO) which has resulted in such a significant imbalance in the Defendant's consumer rights.
9.2. The penalty represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.
Costs on the claim - disproportionate and disingenuous

10. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10.1 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

10.2 The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

10.3 Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air, this appears more so that the fact the claimant cannot not even agree how much these costs are, as in previous correspondence including letter of claim Claimant was seeking £60 but is now seeking £54. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

10.4 According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

10.5 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

10.6 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:

The Judge stated:-
''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

10.7 In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

10.8 There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

10.9 The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

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