VCS Letter Before Claim

Milliered

Hi Le_Kirk, thanks for the input,appreciated.
I needed to get it sent off that evening as it was the only evening I could get help from my brother and the use of his pc .
I had also spent the week doing it and the last two evenings not getting to bed till 5am.
It needed to have been filed by Monday at the latest and both myself and brother were busy with work so couldn't guarantee being able to get it filed in time so just had to decide to go with it.
I will just have to hope that the odd grammar issue doesn't make a difference to the outcome.

I have the utmost gratitude to everyone that has commented and helped me through the process and given me a fighting chance.
I am going to post the WS soon as I can get chance.
Thank you

Coupon-mad

Yes please!  We would like to share your final draft with other new posters as you worked hard on it and the stuff in it is up to date.

Milliered

Hi all, my final WS.

Table of Contents 

Witness Statement of Defendant

Para 14) Boarding Flight details email exhibit #1

Para 16)  Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Schedule 4) exhibit 2 

Para 18) (i) Excel v Smith Transcript exhibit #3 

Para 18) (ii)  VCS v Edward Transcript exhibit #4

Para 40 Excel v Wilkinson Case Transcript #5

Para 41 The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 case sign for comparison exhibit #6

Para 42 ParkingEye Limited v Beavis. (2015) UKSC 67 exhibit #7 

                                                                                                         

In the County Court of.                                                                                                                                           Hearing Date xxxxxxx
Xxxxx                                                                                Vehicle Control Services Limited

                                                                                                        (Claimant)
                                                                                                                  V
                                                                                                   Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                                                                                                       (Defendant)
  
                                                                                             


                                     

                                                                                                   Witness Statement

1. I am xxxxxxxxxx of  xxxx xxx  and I am the Defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

2. In my statement, I shall refer to (Exhibits 1-7) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to paragraphs and  reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows:           

        Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out         

                                                        

3. The Defendant draws to the attention of the court that there is now many persuasive Appeal judgments to support striking out the claim .  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. The Charge Notice (CN) Notice to Keeper( NTK) that was issued by the Claimant states “the driver is liable for the charge”. However,at the bottom of the CN( in tiny writing) ,it also states ‘ we may persue you( the keeper) on the assumption that you were the driver.”

 The Particulars of Claim that then followed on the Claim Form states “ at all material times the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or driver” 

 This statement is factually incorrect as a registered keeper  is not necessarily and/or driver which the Claimant had already freely stated on the CN by declaring they did not know the identity of the driver,only the registered keeper.

By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based on previous persuasive cases.

Facts and Sequence of events

4. On the 13/08/2023 in the early hours, myself and my family (Wife and two young children)returned to the UK from a holiday in Lanzarote,landing at East Midlands Airport at approx 00.15am

5. Once we were in the terminal building in the baggage reclaim area ,my wife phoned a relative(Driver) to collect us as planned before we flew out,using my vehicle (Defendant and registered keeper) as it would have been too expensive to leave it at the airport whilst we were away.

6. During this phone call,her relative(Driver)said that he would need to obtain fuel and that there was a BP fuel station at East Midlands Airport that he had used many years back. He said rather than him collect us in the short stay 1 car park that we had arranged, that to make our way to the BP fuel station and meet him there while he obtained fuel if we cleared security and baggage  before he arrived at the airport..

7. When we got to the BP fuel station it was very apparent that it was fully closed and in darkness. The forecourt entrance was barricaded off with traffic cones to prevent access.

8. With the relative (Driver) already on his way,we couldn’t phone him to inform him as it would have distracted him whilst driving ,especially as it was dark and he is elderly. He would not have known where to pick us up if we hadn’t have waited where he had asked us to and would have got confused and worried. He would then have had to stop and phone us once at the airport.

 9. After a very short wait,the relative (Driver) arrived at approx 01.10 am and attempted to go into the BP garage forecourt.

 However,he had no choice but to stop and obey  as traffic cones were blocking off the access to the forecourt. To drive through these would have caused damage to both the vehicle and the cones and a possible traffic infringement to be caused.

10. My family and myself got in to the vehicle after loading our luggage and left probably no more than a couple of minutes later.

11. For the record,I myself am not familiar with East Midlands Airport,never having driven there previously. On the only other occasion I have been there,my family and I travelled to and from the airport in the back of a black cab,as we did when we flew out for our departure two weeks earlier. I mention this to reflect the fact that I am not aware of signage in and around the airport or on approach as a driver.

12. I may also add that the relative( Driver) is elderly and holds a disability blue badge. The reason I mention this is that  he could access the short stay car park 1 for free so there was absolutely no financial gain to be had.

 

13. If, as the Claimant assumes,I was the driver(which I was not) ,this would suggest that after a four hour flight,I made my wife and two young children aged 11 and 13 carry and pull all our luggage across the airport car park to the garage in the dark to stand on their own to wait for me to go and get my car out of the car park ( which wasn’t there)to then pick them up!! Myself and my family can be seen on the photographic evidence waiting at the BP garage to be collected. I am sure that this scenario would seem unlikely and on the balance of probability would assume that I (Defendant)wasn’t the driver

14. The flight details and boarding passes were emailed to me and and I include this as exhibit #1.

       

This shows all the flight details for myself and my family to prove I was away. The flight departure from Lanzarote was due for 20.35PM on the previous evening. I will also be happy,if needed, to show photographs of myself and family in Lanzarote on the evening of departure as proof I was abroad.,in court.

15. I am the registered keeper of the vehicle xxxxxx that is shown in the images and do not deny the vehicle being at this location.

 However,I (the Defendant)categorically denies being the driver at the time of the alleged contravention.

16. It is noted that the Particulars of Claim (POC) states that “At all material times the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or driver”.  The Defendant categorically denies being the driver and the Claimant is put to strict proof otherwise. As the alleged contravention occurred on land under statutory control (not relevant land as defined by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘the POFA’) and a place where airport bylaws and/or the Traffic Management Act applies, the registered keeper cannot be held liable.(‘POFA 2012’ exhibit #2)

17. The CHARGE NOTICE (CN) upon which it is assumed that the Claimant intends to rely as a Notice To Keeper (NTK) for the purposes of POFA paragraph 6 (1) (b), states that the keeper will be assumed to be the driver in such circumstances but there are no grounds for this assumption.  POFA paragraph 9 (2) (f) states that “the creditor will (if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid”.  The applicable conditions have not been met, therefore Vehicle Control Services Limited (‘VCS’) have no right to recover any alleged debt from the keeper.

18. Even if this was ‘relevant land’ (which it is not) and even if the POFA conditions had been met, the keeper cannot be assumed to be the driver.  Vehicle Control Services v Edward (HOKF6C9C) is the current authority, a persuasive appeal case involving this same Claimant (‘VCS’), who cannot lawfully “assume” the keeper was the driver.  Since VCS lost this appeal case in 2023, they are already well aware that it is improper for them to plead that they may ‘assume the keeper was the driver’.Outwith the POFA, parking firms cannot invoke ‘keeper liability’. This legal point has already been tested on appeal (twice) in private parking cases involving VCS and its sister firm, Excel Parking Services Ltd and the following transcripts are adduced in evidence:

                                      

                       (i). In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E in June 2017, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA.  Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all).  HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting ‘on behalf of’ the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Mr Smith’s appeal was allowed and Excel’s claim was dismissed (Full transcript exhibit #3 17(i)

                      (ii). In April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver , because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation.  HHJ Gargan held at 35.1. “The finding I make is consistent with the underlying purpose of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act, namely, that it was necessary to bring in keeper liability pursuant to that legislation, because liability could not be established.  If this were not the case car parking companies could simply have obtained the details of the registered keeper, launched proceedings and waited to see whether or not there was a positive defence put forward, and in the absence of a positive defence they would have succeeded. If the court took such an approach, it would have been imposing a duty on the registered keeper, to identify the driver or at least set out a positive case in order to avoid responsibility himself. In my judgment that was not the position before ... [the POFA] ... was in force;” (transcript VCS v Edward exhibit #4)

 

 HHJ Gargan continued at 35.2. “...my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so.  [...]. 35.3.  it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion...”

 Mr Edward’s appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed.  In the extant case, this Claimant has launched ‘roboclaim’ cut & paste proceedings saying vaguely that the Defendant was ‘keeper and/or driver’ and waited to see if the registered keeper has the nous to research the POFA and to meaningfully defend, or if they could gain a default CCJ (as happens in 90% of small claims).  It is a lucrative gamble with the odds of wrongful success heavily weighted in parking operators’ favour, but this is plainly an abuse of the court process.  This baseless claim demonstrates precisely the behaviour that HHJ Gargan identified in 35.1. This claim has no basis in law and neither the court nor the Defendant should be troubled with a hearing.

 19. Further and in the alternative: a binding consumer contract in UK law must comprise some key elements, including: offer, acceptance and consideration.  The sparsely placed signage (researched online; not supplied by the Claimant) makes no offer of parking; it is forbidding, therefore there can have been no consideration flowing between the parties and no acceptance of ‘parking’ terms by the driver. The Defendant believes that the signage at the site fails to create any form of contractual meeting of minds and therefore no possibility of a breach under contract law.  The correct remedy would lie with the Airport to invoke the terms of the byelaws which provide for a penalty, ot for a Penalty to be issued under relevant road traffic enactments (given that this meets the definition of public highway) not for a third party to profit from dressing it up as if it were a parking contract.

20. In any event, the Airport byelaws allow for certain conduct including emergency stops and it is clear that bringing vehicles to a brief halt is not in fact prohibited in every circumstance.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that their supposed contract aligns with the byelaws, which clearly take precedence, and to prove the circumstances that caused a ‘parking charge’ or ‘CN’ to arise.  For the avoidance of doubt, the byelaws are statutory, not advisory.

  

 

Milliered

21. In a similar case heard (and claim dismissed) at Leicester County Court on 07/01/2022, Deputy District Judge Wigham asked VCS’ solicitor if they were aware of the statutory Bylaws in force at this Airport, especially condition 4 (4) on page 5 of the East Midlands Airport Byelaws 2001 booklet. VCS’ legal representative’s reply was “I am instructed that the byelaws are advisory”.  

The learned Judge disagreed, pointing out that the Airport Byelaws carry statutory weight and remain in force at EMA by order of the Secretary of State, reportedly telling VCS’ solicitor: “these Byelaws are there to protect the public from firms like you”.  She dismissed the case and permission to appeal was refused.

22. Further and by way of alternative defence: Airport approach roads are subject to road traffic enactments (public highway).  Even if the Claimant is able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that:

(a) they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that

(b) they offered a parking space with value, and a licence to park there, and that

(c) the driver (who was not the Defendant) was afforded the opportunity to accept contractual terms and that

(d) these terms were prominently displayed and well lit, and that

(e) this charge (described by the Airport as a ‘fine’) can override statutory Byelaws and has sufficient contractual, commercial and ‘legitimate interest’ to save it from falling foul of the penalty rule, and that

(f) the driver was in breach, and that

(g) there is some way that - despite the two persuasive appeal judgments against their two firms - they can hold the Defendant liable outwith the POFA;

the Claimant is also put to strict proof that:

(h) this access road is not part of the public highway. A ‘public highway’ is any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle. It is averred that the Airport approach road is ‘public highway’ and the Claimant is put to strict proof to the contrary.

23. The Defendant believes that the approach road comes off a roundabout and is not clearly demarcated as ‘private land’, nor is it a private car park and thus, any parking/traffic contraventions on this roadway would be a matter for the local authority. Such roads are subject to the rules of the Road Traffic Act and statutory instrument and any ‘PCN’ must be a proper penalty charge notice issued under the Traffic Management Act 2004. As such, the claimant is put to strict proof that this approach road is a part of ‘the Airport’ site where road traffic enactments do not apply.

24. The roadway referred to is in fact subject to road traffic enactments rather than airport byelaws, as per the Airport Act 1986:

‘’65 Control of road traffic at designated airports -

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the road traffic enactments shall apply in relation to roads which are within a designated airport but to which the public does not have access as they apply in relation to roads to which the public has access.’’

Both the Airport Act 1986 and the airport byelaws state that byelaws only apply to roads to which road traffic enactments do not apply. This location is publicly accessible and therefore the Road Traffic Act applies.

Exaggerated Claim and ‘market failure’ currently examined by the Government.

 

25. The alleged ‘core debt’ from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

26. I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii)  a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.  The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong ‘legitimate interest’ extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). ‘adequate notice’ of the ‘penalty clause’ charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

(iii).  Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if the entire sum was ‘overdue’ on the day of parking;

27. This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate ‘Debt Fees’. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the ‘numbers game’ of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

 28. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

“Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists.”

29. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code’s implementation (marking it as temporarily ‘withdrawn’ as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed ‘Debt Fees’. This is revealed in the Government’s analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

30. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or ‘enforcement’ (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

31. With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra ‘fee’. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended ‘legal representatives fees’ cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute ‘double recovery’ and the Defendant takes that position.

32. The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs ‘eight times less’ (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced ‘industry standard’ Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

 

33. In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 (‘the Beavis case’). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified ‘admin costs’ inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and ‘would appear to be penal.

34. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an ‘automated letter-chain’ business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the ‘costs of the operation’ and the DLUHC’s IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

 

35. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC’s Secretary of State mentions they are addressing ‘market failure’ more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

 

36. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘the POFA’) the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

CRA Breaches

37. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for ‘prominence’ of both contract terms and ‘consumer notices’. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

 

38. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

 

39. The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

40.    Now for the first time, the DLUHC’s draft IA exposes that template ‘debt chaser’ stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel v Wilkinson. (See Exhibit #05)

The Beavis case is against this claim

41.    The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That ‘unique’ case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs - (See Exhibit #06) - set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

42. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a ‘legitimate interest’ in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor ‘concealed pitfalls or traps’. (See Exhibit #07) for paragraphs from ParkingEye v Beavis).

 

 43. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. There are two main issues that render this parking charge to be purely penal (i.e. no legitimate interest saves it) and thus, it is unenforceable:

(i). Concealed pitfall or trap: 

          The entrance to the fuel station car park was closed off with traffic cones and was also poorly lit. I stood there and watched the driver turn into and attempt to enter the fuel station via the access road. As the road was blocked off with the cones,he was forced to stop abruptly. This would seem to be a hotspot for the cctv unit to sit in the shadows knowing full well that drivers would have to come to a stop due to traffic cone barrier. Compliance to not stop was therefore impossible.

Conclusion

 

44. The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court’s time and that of the Defendant.

45. There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that ‘debt recovery’ costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.

 

46. The DLUHC’s potential ban (still at review stage) on the false ‘costs’, there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 47. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

48. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant’s costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): “Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg)).”

 

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Defendant’s signature:

Milliered

All the Table of Contents and exhibits are able to be clicked on to access the pdfs.
The sub headings are all underlined and in hold but haven't come across to me in the email from my bros .
I'm sure there some mistakes here and there! I have done my best with the invaluable help and input from all on here that have took so much time to help.me.
Thank you

Coupon-mad

That's well worth signposting people to, if they have a case like yours where the breach was pleaded (so no use of Chan was really applicable) and where the site or NTK was non-POFA (good use of VCS v Edward & Excel v Smith).

Milliered

Brilliant,thanks Coupon-mad,a ringing endorsement coming from yourself😁 
Ref the Chan case,that's why I edited the preliminary to suit by leaving it out.
They have till tomorrow to pay the court fee so but even if they do,I am feeling hold enough and encouraged to see them in court😏

Milliered

Hi all.
Well they have paid the court fee,which is a very small amount. Annoyingly,it was paid a couple of days before my WS was sent so they wouldn't have had chance to assess it before deciding whether to continue..
The court has confirmed the WS has been put on the case file and accepted which is good to hear.
In your experiences,is it likely with these to go to court now,even though the WS and defence is strong? Or just a case of sometimes they do,sometimes they don't?
Also,I still haven't received their WS yet which is overdue. I have read previously on the forum that the claimant gets some leeway which seems completely unfair. How much later than the cut off date is normal,any idea?
Many thanks

Milliered

I should add that I was talking about my WS had been accepted by the court,forgot I ask about theirs

Coupon-mad

Have they sent you a WS?