Letter Before Claim - SCS Law & UKPC - Please Advise

CVKTA

Good day to all, I've now received the claim form. I will be scribing my intial defence and posting for critiquing and guidance shortly.
CVKTA

CVKTA

Hi all,

I've drafted part of my defence and have followed the Primacy of Contract route which I've posted below. Is it advisable to have an alternative defense? If so what would people suggest?
Please advise
Many thanks

Preliminary
1. The Particulars of Claim are baseless and unsubstantiated. The Claimant is claiming contraventions with the full knowledge that the Defendants lease cannot be varied in a way that the Claimant is alluding to.

2. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of any contract or Lease agreement that the Defendant was already benefitting from.

Background
3. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant was the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXXXX which is the subject of these proceedings.

3.1. The Defendant firmly believes parking by legitimate tenants does not constitute "unauthorised parking". The defendants lease clearly states that they have the “The exclusive right to park one private motor vehicle on the parking space (or each of the spaces as may be the case) tinted in green an Plan 1 or as allocated by the Lessor or the Management Company in writing from time to time”. A copy of Plan 1 is enclosed.


Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract

4. It is denied that the Defendant was in breach of any parking conditions or was not permitted to park a vehicle in the space allocated in Plan 1. The space allocated in Plan 1 was assigned to the address in question, where the Defendant owned the property and therefore, as per the Defendants lease, had the “The exclusive right to park one private motor vehicle on the parking space”. This direct wording from the Lease agreement between the Defendant and the Landowner, under the Landlord & Tenant act, cannot be varied by any alleged parking terms.

5. There is no mention on the Lease agreement of any potential parking charges, or contractual agreements with a private parking company, or any other 3rd party. The lease agreement is wholly between the Landowner and the Defendant, and gives the Defendant right to park a vehicle in the designated space, as a property owner. The Claimant cannot introduce a regulation that removes a right that is already there as per the Defendant lease agreement.

6. The Defendant avers that the The Claimant cannot fetter their lease agreement by entering car park users into a contract with them, via signage.
The Lease between the Landowner and the Defendant clearly states: Clause 6.4 “The company may at any time or times during the term in the interest of good management impose such regulations of general application regarding the Estate as it may in its absolute discretion think fit in addition to or in place of the regulations (but so that any such regulations shall not conflict with this Lease)”
The Defendant avers that Clause 6.4 was not included within the Lease by the Landowner to allow it’s residents to be subject to extortion, but to project it’s residents and prevent unlawful parking by non-residents. ‘In the interest of good management’ would not include imposing a parking firm who will target and sue residents, by any reasonable interpretation.
The Defendant avers that the Claimants operation directly conflicts with the lease. Moreover, as per the Landlord & Tenants Act the client did not carry out consultation with leaseholders whereby they were consulted and the required consensus was obtained, before they imposed their onerous regime.

7. Accordingly it is denied that:

7.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant

7.2. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.


8. The Defendant submits that any declared contract between the Claimant and the Defendant, entered via signage present on the site is null and void to the Defendant already being in contract with the Landowner. Under Primacy of Contract, the Claimant has no grounds to attempt to enter the Defendant into an agreement.

KeithP

What is the Issue Date on your County Court Claim Form?

CVKTA

KeithP January 22nd...

KeithP

With a Claim Issue Date of 22nd January, you have until Monday 10th February to file an Acknowledgment of Service, but there is nothing to be gained by delaying it. To file an AoS, follow the guidance offered in a Dropbox file linked from post #2 of the NEWBIES FAQ sticky thread. About ten minutes work - no thinking required.

Having filed an AoS, you have until 4pm on Monday 24th February 2020 to file your Defence.

That's over three weeks away. Plenty of time to produce a Defence, but please don't leave it to the last minute.


When you are happy with the content, your Defence could be filed via email as suggested here:

Print your Defence.
1. Sign it and date it.
   
2. Scan the signed document back in and save it as a pdf.
   
3. Send that pdf as an email attachment to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk
   
4. Just put the claim number and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'Please find my Defence attached'.
   
5. No need to do anything on MCOL, but do check it after a few days to see if the Claim is marked "defence received". If not, chase the CCBC until it is.

After filing your Defence, there is more to do...

1. Do not be surprised to receive an early copy of the Claimant's Directions Questionnaire. Nothing of interest there. Just file it.
   
2. Wait for your own Directions Questionnaire from the CCBC, or download one from the internet, and then complete it as described by bargepole in his 'what happens when' post linked from post #2 of the NEWBIES thread.
3. The completed DQ should be returned by email to the CCBC to the same address and in the same way as your Defence was filed earlier.
4. Send a copy of your completed DQ to the Claimant - to their address on your Claim Form.

CVKTA

Brilliant, thanks KP.

If anyone has any suggestions to my question above that would be fantastic.

Coupon-mad

Add the other things in example defences, such as the one I wrote for basher52.

CVKTA

I’ll search and check in on this and repost another draft thanks as always C-M

CVKTA

Hi all, I've used C-M's defence for basher52 massively here to scribe my 2nd draft. Points 1-11 are pretty much what I've written with the rest fo the body then edited and added to to make it relevant to my case.

Posting for critiquing from all.

Thanks in advance

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The Particulars of Claim are baseless and unsubstantiated. The Claimant is pursuing unwarrented charges with the full knowledge that the Defendants lease cannot be varied in this way and they are already aware that their conduct has unlawfully interfered with the Defendant's existing grants, rights, easements and peaceful enjoyment of the property. It is averred that no due diligence was carried out by UKPC to protect the interests of the residents before enforcement began; the intention of which (according to the Managing Agents) was in fact to deter fly parking by trespassers. This aggressive, unnecessary and rogue operation has all the hallmarks of UKPC's well-reported 'sledgehammer to crack a nut' typical 'ex-clamper' thought process for parking enforcement.

2.1. All tickets were received when the car was in the Defendant's own parking space and some were received when the pass was on the dashboard but apparently not 'displayed correctly' to UKPC's liking which the Defendant can only guess means on the windscreen itself (despite the fact that the permit was visible through the windscreen). UKPC penalise genuine residents at the same punitive rate as if they were trespassers, rather than exempting residents' cars without requiring paper permits, or at least alongside that scheme, by way of double check to avoid unfair penalties. A 'white list' of exempt residents cars that could be updated online by each resident quickly (e.g. if using another car, or for visitors) would have been a reasonable and simple step to implement.

3. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of any contract or Lease agreement that the Defendant was already benefitting from with the Landowner

4. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXXXXX at the time of these alleged incidents.

5. The Defendant firmly believes parking by legitimate tenants does not constitute "unauthorised parking". The defendants lease clearly states that they have the “The exclusive right to park one private motor vehicle on the parking space (or each of the spaces as may be the case) tinted in green an Plan 1 or as allocated by the Lessor or the Management Company in writing from time to time”. A copy of Plan 1 is enclosed.

6. It is denied that the Defendant was in breach of any parking conditions or was not permitted to park a vehicle in the space allocated in Plan 1. The space allocated in Plan 1 was assigned to the address in question, where the Defendant owned the property and therefore, as per the Defendants lease, had the “The exclusive right to park one private motor vehicle on the parking space”. This direct wording from the Lease agreement between the Defendant and the Landowner, cannot be varied by any alleged parking terms.

7. There is no mention on the Lease agreement between the Defendant and the Landowner of any potential parking charges, or contractual agreements with a private parking company, or any other 3rd party. The lease agreement is wholly between the Landowner and the Defendant, and gives the Defendant right to park a vehicle in the designated space, as a property owner. The Claimant cannot introduce a regulation that removes a right that is already there as per the Defendants lease agreement.

8. The Defendant avers that the Claimant cannot fetter their lease agreement by entering car park users into a contract with them, via signage.:
The Lease between the Landowner and the Defendant clearly states: Clause 6.4 “The company may at any time or times during the term in the interest of good management impose such regulations of general application regarding the Estate as it may in its absolute discretion think fit in addition to or in place of the regulations (but so that any such regulations shall not conflict with this Lease)”
8.1 The Defendant avers that Clause 6.4 was not included within the Lease by the Landowner to allow it’s residents not to be subject to extortion, but to project it’s residents and prevent unlawful parking by non-residents. ‘In the interest of good management’ would not, by any reasonable interpretation, include imposing a parking firm who will target and sue residents.
8.2 The Defendant avers that the Claimants operation directly conflicts with the lease. Moreover, as per the Landlord & Tenants Act the client did not carry out consultation with leaseholders whereby they were consulted and the required consensus was obtained, before they imposed their onerous regime.
9. In this respect and in all other facts - including the Defendants Primacy of Contract, the cases of Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] and Link Parking v Ms P C7GF50J7 [2016] are fully distinguished.

In both cases it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant’s right to park by requiring a permit to park.


10. Moreover, due to inadequate notice of any parking charge and/or any added sums, the defendant did not enter into any 'agreement on the charge’.


11. In this respect and in all other facts - including the lack of prominence and clarity of the signage and the small font used to hide the onerous terms, the Supreme Court case of Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is fully distinguished.


12. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

13. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

14. The terms on the Claimant’s signage are also displayed in a font which is too small to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily, particularly given the low lighting conditions and lack of lighting of the signs. The defendant finds it less than a coincidence that the Claimants ‘evidence bundle’ contained one solitary picture of the small font signage in high light, time stamped at 12:09pm, captured with the midday sun just behind it.

15. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

16. The five PCNs question were tenuously based upon signage setting 'parking charges' at a level of £100 each, (5 x £1000 = £500) yet the Claimant is trying to recover a claim totalling an eye watering £930. The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of both the CPRs, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 ('the CRA') 'terms that may be unfair'.

17. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'recovery costs' is potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

18. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process, because parking charges (unlike other 'debt' claims) must by definition, already encompass the costs of the operation.

19. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'damages/costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added again, to the 'parking charge', thus avoiding a case of ‘Double Recovery’

The Pace v Mr N case is against this claim.

20.0 The Pace v Mr N case was dismissed within minutes due to the simple wording and upholding of the Defendants Lease agreement with the Landowner which stated that they had the right to use the parking space and that could not be altered by a 3rd party, akin to the Defendants case we have before us.

20.1 In the Pace v Mr N case , District Judge Coonans opening gambit stated: “I have to deal with this on the evidence that is before me now. I have before me a tenancy agreement which gives Mr [N. redacted] the right to park on the estate and it does not say “on condition that you display a permit”. It does not say that, so he has that right. What Pace Recovery is seeking to do is, unilaterally outside the contract, restrict that right to only when a permit is displayed. Pace Recovery cannot do that. It has got to be the other contracting party, Affinity Sutton, which amends the terms of the tenancy agreement to restrict the right to park on a place in circumstances in which a permit is displayed but that is not in this tenancy agreement and you as a third party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the tenancy agreement”

The Link Parking v Ms P case is against this claim.


21. In the Link Parking v Ms P case, the judge ruled that that for Link or CPML (the management company) to have any right to manage the parking on the Landowner's property, the deeds would have to be altered to state this for the whole site. She ruled that the Landowner could not be penalised for parking in her own space.

22. Studying the Pace v Mr N & the Link Parking v Ms P case and combining with a tiny degree of common sense shows that if there is car park management at a residential site, this will be primarily to stop non-residents from parking. No reputable car parking company would target the residents and refuse to cancel a parking charge


The Beavis case is against this Claim

23. The Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, where it was stated three times that the £85 had to cover the costs of the letters.

23.1. In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''


23.2. At para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye's accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.'' and at para 198: ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''


The POFA 2012 and the ATA Code of Practice are against this Claim

24. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' ('NTK'). Further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is no more than £100, and in this case the parking charge in the small print on the signs, and in each NTK, was stated to be £80 and this must have been set to include the costs of recovering the charge, or it falls foul of the Beavis case.

The CRA 2015 is against this claim

25. Further, the purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, vague and in breach of the CRA Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'. This Claimant has arbitrarily added an extra 60% to the parking charge, in a double recovery attempt that has already been exposed and routinely disallowed by many Courts in England and Wales. It is astounding to this Defendant, that this has been allowed to continue unabated for so many years. Even if most courts are routinely disallowing the added £60 'costs' of all parking charge cases now (and it is clear from online reports that almost all courts are disallowing that sum) this is not enough.

25.1. It is especially unacceptable that parking firms are still filing claims including what they know is a tainted and unrecoverable sum, considering the number of victims receiving this Claimant's exaggerated Letter before Claim, or the claim form, who then either pay an inflated amount or suffer a default judgment for a sum that could not otherwise be recovered. It is only those who defend, who draw individual cases to the attention of the courts one by one, but at last in 2019, some areas noticed the pattern and have moved to stop this abuse of process at source, including in the Caernarfon Court in Case number F2QZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

25.2. In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being struck out in the area overseen by His Honour Judge Iain Hamilton-Douglas Hughes QC, the Designated Civil Judge for Dorset, Hampshire, Isle of Wight & Wiltshire. Cases summarily struck out in that circuit, included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in the Beavis case. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

25.3. BW Legal made an application objecting to two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against a parking firm for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge. This has been repeated conduct in recent years, on the back of the Beavis case, where parking firms have almost unanimously contrived to add £60, or more, on top of the 'parking charge'. Members of both ATAs who have influence on their self-serving 'Trade Bodies' have even voted to have this imaginary 'damages/debt collection' sum added to their respective two Codes of Practice, to create a veil of legitimacy, no doubt to allow their members to confuse consumers and to enable them to continue to 'get away with it' in several court areas which are still allowing this double recovery.

25.4. That N244 application to try to protect the cartel-like position of some of the 'bigger player' parking firms, was placed before the area Circuit Judge and a hearing was held on 11th November 2019, with other parking charge cases in that circuit remaining struck out or stayed, pending the outcome. The Defendants successfully argued on points including a citation of the CRA 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points below were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court, who agreed that:
(a) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).
(b) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.
(c) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the CRA, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14.

25.5. At the hearing, the Judge refused their request to appeal. A transcript will be publicly available shortly. In his summing up, it was noted that District Judge Grand stated: ''When I come to consider whether the striking out of the whole claim is appropriate, that the inclusion of the £60 charge means that the whole claim is tainted by it, the claimant should well know that it is not entitled to the £60. The very fact that they bring a claim in these circumstances seems to me that it is an abuse of process of the court, and in saying that, I observe that with any claim that can be brought before the court that if a party doesn't put in a defence to the claim, default judgments are entered. So, the Claimant, in bringing the claims is, in other cases, aware that if the defendant doesn’t submit a defence, the Claimant is going to get a judgment of a knowingly inflated amount. So I conclude by saying that I dismiss the application to set aside Judge Taylor’s ruling.''

25.6. Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the CRA 'core exemption'. The CMA Official Government Guidance to the CRA says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).'' The parking industry is the exception to this rule because they have no consumer 'customers' yet are consumer-facing. Their intention is very clearly in many cases (including this case) for a consumer not to see the onerous terms hidden in their notices and it is averred that no regard is paid to consumer law.

25.7. The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expanded at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. [...] Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''

26. In December 2019 in a different Court circuit, Deputy District Judge Josephs sitting at Warwick County Court had clearly heard about the decisions affecting the IOW, Hampshire, Dorset and Wiltshire circuit because he summarily struck out another parking ticket claim. The Judge mentioned the POFA 2012 and the Beavis case, and determined that ''it is an abuse of process for the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.'' Further, in issuing his Order without a hearing, the Judge stated that he had ''considered S71(2) of the CRA 2015 for the fairness of the contract terms and determined that the provision of the additional charge breached examples 6, 10 and 14''.

27. The Defendant requests that this Court - using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. - recognises its duty to consider the CRA 2015 in the same way as the Southampton and Warwick courts recently have done, and opts to summarily strike out this claim due to the Claimant's flagrant disregard for consumer rights as set out in statute.

28. The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015, and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

29. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

30. If this claim is not summarily struck out for the same reasons as the Judges cited in the multiple Caernarfon, Southampton, IOW and Warwick County Court decisions, then due to this Claimant knowingly proceeding with a claim that amounts to an abuse of process, full costs will be sought by the Defendant at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.

Statement of Truth...

Coupon-mad

2. The Particulars of Claim are baseless and unsubstantiated. The Claimant is pursuing unwarranted charges [STRIKE]contraventions[/STRIKE] with the full knowledge that the Defendants lease cannot be varied in [STRIKE]a way that the Claimant is alluding to.[/STRIKE] this way and they are already aware that their conduct has unlawfully interfered with the Defendant's existing grants, rights, easements and peaceful enjoyment of the property. It is averred that no due diligence was carried out by UKPC to protect the interests of the residents before enforcement began; the intention of which (according to the Managing Agents) was in fact to deter fly parking by trespassers. This aggressive, unnecessary and rogue operation has all the hallmarks of UKPC's well-reported 'sledgehammer to crack a nut' typical 'ex-clamper' thought process for parking enforcement.

2.1. All tickets were received when the car was in the Defendant's own parking space and some were received when the pass was on the dashboard but apparently not 'displayed correctly' to UKPC's liking which the Defendant can only guess means on the windscreen itself (despite the fact that the permit was visible through the windscreen). UKPC penalise genuine residents at the same punitive rate as if they were trespassers, rather than exempting residents' cars without requiring paper permits, or at least alongside that scheme, by way of double check to avoid unfair penalties. A 'white list' of exempt residents cars that could be updated online by each resident quickly (e.g. if using another car, or for visitors) would have been a reasonable and simple step to implement.

Are there five parking charges listed in the claim and were they £80 each?

If so, I suggest:

16. The five [STRIKE]parking charges[/STRIKE] PCNs in question [STRIKE]are[/STRIKE] were tenuously based upon signage setting 'parking charges' at a level of £80 each (5 x £80 = £400) yet the Claimant is trying to recover a claim [STRIKE]£800,[/STRIKE] totalling an eye watering £930.