Horizon- Court Date next week- Defence and Advice

Edvance_Guy

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82131162#Comment_82131162

Tesco express/ essos east reach, taunton somerset. Its esso fuel pumps and tesco express shop.

They are late with their WS and have said they wont attend court.

When you say 'advocate' not attending they have said they won't attend so I assume they have covered themselves?

Edvance_Guy

Its ESSO Petrol station/ Tesco Express shop, 30-33 East Reach , TAUNTON, SOMERSET

glastones aren't comming so I don't think they are sending an advocate so could they lose on that if attend?

we are both late on witness statements though,…..

I did not receive notification of the court date first thing I knew was monday WS.

Edvance_Guy

MY DRAFT:

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT
SMITHHHHH

Claim No:***

BETWEEN:

HORIZON PARKING LIMITED Claimant

-and-

Defendant

WITNESS STATEMENT OF SMITH MSITH

I ************* am the Defendant in these proceedings.

I make this Witness Statement in support of my Defence to the claim brought by Horizon Parking Limited ("the Claimant").

I apologise to the Court for the late service of this witness statement. I am a litigant in person, have not previously been involved in proceedings of this nature and am unfamiliar with the court process. I did not receive the notice of the hearing date by post and first became aware of the hearing date when the Claimant served its witness statement on *September 2026. I prepared and served this statement promptly after becoming aware of the hearing. I respectfully request that the Court admit the statement notwithstanding its late service. I submit that the short delay has caused no material prejudice to the Claimant, which has already served its own evidence.

The facts and matters set out in this statement are within my own knowledge unless otherwise stated. Where I refer to matters of law or documents, I do so based upon the documents available to me.

I am a litigant in person and have no formal legal training. I have nevertheless made every effort to present the facts and evidence accurately and fairly.

I respectfully ask the Court to consider the whole of the circumstances rather than treating the ANPR entry and exit times as automatically establishing that the Claimant is entitled to the parking charge.

1. THE PARKING EVENT

1. The alleged parking event occurred on  May 2024 at the car park serving ESSO Petrol Station & Tesco Express Shop, East Reach.
2. The Claimant's ANPR evidence records the vehicle entering the site at approximately ^^:08 and leaving at approximately ^^:07.
3. The total ANPR period is therefore approximately 59 minutes.
4. I understand the Claimant's case to be that the permitted maximum stay was 30 Minutes, and that the vehicle therefore remained on site for approximately 29 minutes beyond that period.
5. I do not accept that the ANPR period, by itself, establishes a contractual breach giving rise to the sum claimed.
6. In particular, the Claimant must prove:

a. the precise contractual terms relied upon;

b. that those terms were sufficiently prominent and clearly communicated;

c. that those terms applied to this particular car park and vehicle;

d. that the alleged 30 minute restriction was properly communicated to the driver before or at the time the contract was formed;

e. that the Claimant had authority from the landowner to offer parking contracts and pursue charges;

f. that the applicable consideration and grace periods were properly applied; and

g. that the amount now claimed is contractually and legally recoverable.

2. ANPR TIMINGS, CONGESTION AND OBSTRUCTION

1. The Claimant imposed, or seeks to enforce, a 30-minute maximum parking period. I contend that this constitutes a provision, criterion or practice which must be considered in the context of its effect upon such a limited carpark which also has some disabled parking.
2. The ANPR timestamps record only when the vehicle crossed the entrance and exit points. They do not establish the period for which the vehicle was actually parked. The recorded period included time spent waiting for a parking space in the congested forecourt, manoeuvring into a space and subsequently waiting to leave after another vehicle blocked my vehicle. I estimate that the vehicle was parked and left unattended for less than 30 minutes.
3. I therefore contend that the rigid application of a 30 minute maximum, without appropriate consideration of delays due to congestion or obstructions on such a busy site.

3. THE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

1. I respectfully invite the Court to examine the Claimant's Particulars of Claim carefully.
2. If, as appears from the Claimant's pleading, the Particulars merely state that the vehicle was parked in breach of the terms displayed on signage, without identifying the actual contractual term, the precise breach and the contractual basis upon which the sum is claimed, I submit that the pleading is insufficiently particularised.
3. This is important because I cannot reasonably be expected to answer an allegation that was not properly set out in the Particulars of Claim.
4. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan, Ref. E7GM9W44, HHJ Murch, on 15 August 2023, considered the adequacy of private parking Particulars of Claim and held that the Particulars did not set out the conduct said to amount to the breach relied upon.
5. Similarly, in Car Park Management Services Ltd v Akande, Ref. K0DP5J30, HHJ Evans, on 10 May 2024, emphasised the importance of Particulars setting out the basic facts upon which a claimant relies to establish its claim.
6. I rely upon those authorities as persuasive authorities. I do not suggest that they are binding upon this Court.
7. If the Claimant's Witness Statement attempts to introduce a materially different allegation from that actually pleaded, I respectfully submit that the Court should be cautious about allowing the Claimant to substantially change or expand its pleaded case through witness evidence.
8. I respectfully submit that a parking operator enforcing a strict maximum stay by automated ANPR should have procedures in place to consider circumstances where a motorist is delayed by site congestion, difficulty finding a parking space, or being obstructed from leaving by another vehicle.
9. I respectfully submit that it is not sufficient for the Claimant simply to rely upon an automated ANPR calculation without considering the factual circumstances giving rise to the alleged overstay.
10. This was not a case where I deliberately remained on site for a substantial additional period in disregard of the parking terms.

4. APPLICABLE CODE OF PRACTICE AND GRACE PERIODS

1. The alleged parking event occurred on May 2024 the Claimant is required to demonstrate compliance with the Accredited Trade Association code applicable on May 2024.
2. was therefore not the applicable Code at the material time.
3. I understand that the applicable Accredited Trade Association Code would depend upon the Claimant’s trade-association membership at the material time. I therefore ask the Claimant to identify the applicable Code and demonstrate how its requirements concerning parking duration, consideration periods, grace periods, signage and camera enforcement were applied.
4. I do not rely upon the later Single Code as creating retrospective legal obligations. To the extent that it is referred to, it is relied upon only as subsequent industry material recognising the distinction between consideration periods, grace periods and the recorded duration of a vehicle’s presence on a site..
5. I therefore put the Claimant to strict proof of its membership of the relevant Accredited Trade Association at the material time and of the version of the Code applicable to this site.
6. The Code distinguishes between a consideration period and a grace period.
7. The consideration period gives a motorist an opportunity to read and understand the applicable terms and decide whether to accept them and remain or reject them and leave.
8. The applicable industry Code of Practice requires signage to be clear, visible and capable of being understood by motorists before any parking contract is formed.

I therefore put the Claimant to strict proof of:

a. the consideration period registered for this particular site;

b. the grace period applied by the Claimant;

c. how those periods were calculated in this case;

d. whether the Claimant actually applied the required grace period before issuing the charge; and

e. the evidence demonstrating how the alleged breach was calculated.

1. On the Claimant's own ANPR figures, the alleged excess is 29 minutes.
2. If a 10-minute grace period is applicable and properly deducted, the alleged excess would be reduced to approximately 19 minutes.
3. That remaining period must then be considered alongside the circumstances of the visit, the practical circumstances of leaving the site and the adequacy of the signage.
4. I respectfully submit that the full 29 minutes should not be treated as chargeable time without first applying any relevant consideration and grace periods.
5. The Claimant has refused to disclose the Landowner Authority Agreement, including any provisions relating to grace periods, despite such documents being directly relevant to the Claimant's authority to operate on the site and to the issues in dispute.

5. ANPR DOES NOT BY ITSELF PROVE A CONTRACTUAL BREACH

1. I accept that ANPR technology can record when a vehicle enters and leaves a site.
2. However, the ANPR timestamps do not by themselves prove what contractual terms were communicated to the driver, whether those terms were sufficiently prominent, whether the consideration period was properly applied, whether the grace period was applied, or whether the sum demanded is contractually recoverable.
3. The Claimant therefore needs to establish the contractual chain from:

signage → offer → acceptance → applicable terms → alleged breach → contractual charge.

1. It is not sufficient simply to produce two photographs showing the registration number and timestamps.

6. SIGNAGE AND FORMATION OF CONTRACT

1. The Claimant must prove the signs that were actually present at this site on ** May 2024, rather than relying upon generic, stock or subsequently produced photographs. To the best of my recollection, some of the signs appearing in the Claimant’s later photographs were not present, or were not displayed in the same form or position, on ** May 2024. The Claimant is therefore put to strict proof of the date on which each sign was installed and the form in which it appeared on the material date.
2. I respectfully ask the Court to consider whether the 30 minute maximum stay was:

a. displayed at the entrance;

b. sufficiently prominent;

c. readable by a driver approaching the site;

d. positioned so that the driver could understand the restriction before accepting the alleged contract; and

e. consistent throughout the car park.

1. Version 1.1 of the Single Code requires signs to be visible, legible and unambiguous. It also provides specific requirements concerning entrance signs and the information which should be displayed to drivers.
2. I therefore put the Claimant to strict proof of the precise signage relied upon, including:

a. photographs of the entrance as it existed on **May 2024;

b. photographs of all relevant signs;

c. the location of those signs;

d. the height, position and orientation of the signs;

e. the wording appearing on the signs;

f. evidence establishing that those signs were in place on the date of the alleged event; and

g. evidence establishing that the 30 minute restriction was sufficiently prominent.

1. If the Claimant relies upon photographs taken after the event, those photographs do not necessarily establish what a driver saw on ** May 2024.

7. THE CLAIMANT'S AUTHORITY

1. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it had sufficient authority from the landowner to:

a. manage the land;

b. enter into parking contracts with motorists;

c. issue parking charges;

d. retain the charges; and

e. commence proceedings in its own name.

1. I request that the Claimant produce the contemporaneous landowner agreement applicable to the site and date in question, including any relevant schedules, site plans, amendments and extensions.
2. A generic witness statement asserting that the Claimant has authority is not necessarily equivalent to producing the underlying agreement.
3. The Court is respectfully invited to require the Claimant to prove its standing rather than assume it.
4. Despite repeated requests, the Claimant has failed and/or refused to provide a copy of the Landowner Authority Agreement or any other evidence demonstrating its authority to operate on the land and to pursue parking charges in its own name.
5. In the absence of the contemporaneous Landowner Authority Agreement, the Court is unable to verify the scope of the Claimant's authority, any site-specific restrictions, grace periods or cancellation provisions that may have existed at the material time.

8. CONSUMER RIGHTS ACT 2015

1. I also rely upon the Consumer Rights Act 2015 insofar as the alleged parking terms constitute consumer contract terms or consumer notices.
2. Section 62 provides protection against unfair consumer contract terms and section 68 requires relevant terms and notices to be transparent.
3. The issue is particularly important where a motorist is allegedly bound by a substantial charge following a relatively short overstay.
4. I respectfully submit that a term imposing a parking charge must be sufficiently prominent and transparent for the motorist to understand the consequence of remaining beyond the permitted period.
5. If the Claimant relies upon a term which is difficult to see, hidden amongst other information, or insufficiently prominent, I ask the Court to consider that when determining whether the term was fairly incorporated into the alleged contract.

9. PARKINGEYE LTD v BEAVIS

1. I recognise the authority of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.
2. I do not dispute that a properly formed parking contract can, in appropriate circumstances, support a parking charge which is not calculated simply by reference to the landowner's actual financial loss.
3. However, Beavis does not mean that every private parking charge is automatically enforceable.
4. The Supreme Court's decision depended upon the particular circumstances of that case, including the prominently displayed terms, the legitimate interests involved and the overall contractual context.
5. The Claimant must therefore still prove that the contractual terms in this case were adequately communicated and incorporated.
6. I respectfully submit that the present case must be determined on its own facts, including the nature of the petrol forecourt, the distinction between the ANPR period and the actual parking period, the congestion encountered, the obstruction which delayed my departure, the applicable consideration and grace periods, and the prominence and adequacy of the signage.

10. THE AMOUNT CLAIMED

1. I deny liability for any sum which has not been properly established as being due under the alleged contract.
2. If the Claimant seeks to recover an additional sum above the original parking charge, I put the Claimant to strict proof of the contractual or statutory basis for that additional sum.
3. Any purported debt recovery charge or similar additional amount must not simply be assumed to be recoverable because it appears in the Claimant's Particulars of Claim.
4. The Court is invited to examine separately:

a. the original parking charge;

b. any interest;

c. court fees; and

d. every additional sum claimed.

1. I respectfully submit that the Claimant should not obtain double recovery or recover sums which are not supported by the contractual terms, applicable legislation or a proper legal basis.

11. THE CLAIMANT'S EVIDENCE MUST BE TESTED AGAINST THE MATERIAL DATE

1. The relevant date is  May 2024.
2. The Court is respectfully invited to distinguish between:

a. evidence showing what was actually displayed on that date; and

b. photographs or documents subsequently created or obtained by the Claimant.

1. A sign installed, replaced, altered or photographed after the alleged event cannot automatically establish what the driver saw on May 2024.
2. I therefore ask the Court to attach appropriate weight to contemporaneous evidence and to require the Claimant to establish the position as it existed on the material date.

12. CMA CONCERNS REGARDING PRIVATE PARKING PRACTICES

1. On 16 July 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority announced a package of measures concerning standards and potentially unfair practices within the private parking sector.
2. The CMA identified concerns including the handling of appeals and attempts by some operators to recover additional fees above the original parking charge.
3. The CMA also opened an investigation into Euro Car Parks concerning parking charges issued at petrol stations, including whether it is fair for motorists to receive charges while queuing for or using petrol pumps and other forecourt services.
4. I recognise that the investigation concerns Euro Car Parks rather than the Claimant in these proceedings and that the CMA has not reached any conclusion that consumer law has been infringed.
5. I do not rely upon the investigation as evidence that the Claimant has acted unlawfully. I refer to it only as relevant background showing that the treatment of time spent queuing for, using and leaving petrol forecourts has been identified as a matter requiring regulatory consideration.

13. OVERALL CIRCUMSTANCES

1. This is not a case where I deliberately ignored a clearly displayed restriction for a substantial period.
2. The allegation concerns an ANPR stay of approximately 59 minutes against an alleged 30 minute maximum, the ANPR period commenced when the vehicle entered the site and not when a parking space became available or the vehicle was actually parked.
3. when you drive onto site not when you are able to legally park the vehicle.
4. The alleged overstay is therefore approximately 29 minutes, before consideration of the applicable grace period.
5. I respectfully submit that these circumstances are materially different from a case involving deliberate misuse of a car park or a substantial period of unauthorised parking as in the case Beavis v Parking Eye.
6. The Claimant should not be permitted simply to rely upon an automated timestamp while disregarding the contractual, Code and factual circumstances surrounding the alleged breach.

14. CONCLUSION

1. For the reasons set out above, I respectfully submit that the Claimant has failed to establish its claim on the balance of probabilities.
2. The Claimant relies primarily upon ANPR entry and exit timestamps showing that the vehicle was present on the site for approximately 59 minutes. However, those timestamps do not establish the period for which the vehicle was actually parked, nor do they account for time spent waiting for a space, manoeuvring within a congested site, or the delay caused by my vehicle being obstructed from leaving.
3. The Claimant has not produced satisfactory evidence demonstrating: a. that the contractual terms relied upon were clear, prominent and properly incorporated into any contract; b. that the signage in place on 17 May 2024 clearly communicated the alleged 30-minute restriction; c. that any applicable consideration period and grace period were correctly applied; d. that the Claimant had the necessary landowner authority to issue and pursue the charge in its own name; and e. that the additional sums claimed are contractually or legally recoverable.
4. I respectfully submit that this case is materially distinguishable from ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis because it concerns a short alleged excess period on a small and congested petrol forecourt site, where the ANPR evidence does not reflect the actual time parked and does not account for the circumstances which delayed my departure.
5. The Court is invited to consider the evidence as a whole, including: a. the limitations of the ANPR evidence; b. the circumstances of the visit; c. the congestion and obstruction encountered on the site; d. the absence of evidence regarding grace periods and landowner authority; and e. the adequacy and prominence of the signage relied upon by the Claimant.
6. In all of the circumstances, I respectfully invite the Court to dismiss the claim.
7. In the alternative, if the Court finds that a contractual breach occurred, I respectfully request that the Court carefully consider the applicable consideration period, any grace period, the circumstances which delayed my departure, and whether the entirety of the sum claimed is recoverable.

15. UNREASONABLE CONDUCT – CPR 27.14(2)(g)

1. If the Court considers it appropriate, I respectfully reserve my position concerning costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
2. I recognise that the small claims costs regime is restrictive and that an award under CPR 27.14(2)(g) requires unreasonable behaviour.
3. Should the Court conclude that the Claimant has failed to establish the contractual terms relied upon, its authority to operate on the site, the basis upon which the charge was calculated, or the applicability of any consideration or grace periods, I respectfully invite the Court to consider whether the continuation of the claim was reasonable in all the circumstances.I will rely upon the Claimant's actual evidence and conduct in the proceedings rather than making allegations which cannot be supported.
4. If the Court considers the threshold for unreasonable conduct satisfied, I seek such costs as are permitted under CPR 27.14(2)(g), including my reasonable litigant-in-person costs.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed

NAME:

Date: September 2026

Car1980

Sorry, I didn't realise it was a petrol station rather than a petrol station within a bigger Tesco store.

Anyway, check the landowner contract they should have included in their bundle. No contract = no contract that allows them to operate on the land.

That aside you'll just have to send to court and the other side in the morning and hope for the best on the day.

There are no hard and fast rules about WS lateness and attendance. It's just down to the judge.

If it looks like it's not going your way concentrate on the £70 fake add-on fee. Judges routinely disallow it because there is no basis for it. You can't just slap on a random £70 and call it a recovery fee.

Car1980

Landowner contract really needs examining. Do Horizon hold a contract with the right party?

Google suggests as we're talking the forecourt they need to have a contract with Esso. Yet the signs are Tesco branded.

Add in the blurb above in the landowner contract bit and try and bring it up at the hearing.

Edvance_Guy

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82131611#Comment_82131611

Thanks for the info my enquiries and experience with Horizon has lead me to believe they contract with tescos and never check who the land owner is not care.

They have always refused to provide the land owner contract and in their witness statement state that it is commercially sensitive see statement>

The Claimant provides, manages and enforces private parking at the land located at Tesco E Reah (their typo)
Esso Express, 30-33 E Reach, Taunton TA1 3ES (the ‘Site’). The agreement between the
landowner and the Claimant expressly confers upon the Claimant the requisite authority, standing
and contractual rights to manage, regulate and enforce the parking terms and conditions in
operation at the site, including the right to issue and pursue charges arising from breaches of those
terms. The landowner is a substantial and well-established commercial entity. The agreement
contains commercially sensitive and confidential information, and the landowner has made clear
that it does not consent to the agreement being disclosed more widely than is strictly necessary,
nor to it being placed into the public domain. The Claimant is therefore not authorised to disclose
the agreement as part of these proceedings. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant confirms that
a valid written agreement exists between the landowner and the Claimant, and that the agreement
provides the Claimant with the necessary authority to manage and enforce the parking terms at the
relevant site. The Claimant relies upon the decision in One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw
[2021] whereby it was found that it is not necessary for the Claimant to prove the Landowner’s
authority to constitute a valid cause of action to recover the PCN; what is required is proof that
there is a binding contract between the Claimant and the Defendant, meaning the Signs at the Site.
Further, that the contract between the Claimant and the Landowner does not affect the validity of
any contract between the Claimant and the Defendant.

So I am of the opinion that the forecourt and external areas may well be Esso and the retail store is only tescos. Chances are the land belongs to Esso as it used to be just an esso petrol station and shop, until tescos took over, also the fuel is ESSO as is pump and signage for fuel the retail offering is the only tesco element. You get clubcard points on fuel but can't use tesco vouchers on fuel purchases etc.

I caught Horizon out on an express that shared a carpark with another business before, they signed it as all tescos etc the other business marked their bays with signage saying private parking and their business name. When I appealed on the ground I was at the other business I got an email from a Director saying they were cancelling it but had entered into a contract with the other business and installed new signage on the bays in question with their info. They still used ANPR so had no idea what bays were being used.

Edvance_Guy

They have filed acknowledged my WS and filed a case summary/ skeleton argument.

Car1980

One Parking Solution are in the IPC trade body.

Horizon are in the BPA.

I would argue that Horizon are obliged to follow their trade body's rules regarding landowner contracts, which was a pre-requisite of obtaining keeper information via the DVLA's KADOE scheme. So this case can be distinguished from One Parking v Wilshaw.

The agreement 
contains commercially sensitive and confidential information, and the landowner has made clear 
that it does not consent to the agreement being disclosed more widely than is strictly necessary, 
nor to it being placed into the public domain

So they withdraw from every Popla appeal then?

Email customer.care@chd.exxonmobilsupport.com and ask them whether they or Tesco hold a contract to operate on that land. They may well just happily answer!

Edvance_Guy

I had already put my skeleton argument in so need to raise this in my summary but good point.

BPA Popla require landowner contract.

Edvance_Guy

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82131943#Comment_82131943

They have not been helpful>

Thank you for contacting Esso Consumer Care.

30-33 East Reach - Tesco Rex Taunton Express (Rt) Fuel Service Station is operated by Tesco and therefore due to the nature of your concern they will be better placed and responsible for addressing your issue moving forward.

We would kindly ask you to contact them using the phone number provided below or via their Contact Us Form:

Telephone number: 0800 505 555
Consumer service contact form:

Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention, we are sorry that we cannot directly address the experience that you have raised and we hope that you will continue to choose Esso Branded Petrol Stations.