UKPC windscreen for private space

breakerjacuzzi

Le_Kirk said:

What is the date of issue of the N1SDT claim form and when do you plan to submit the AoS?

The issue date is 19th November.
I’m attempting to look at it today…. 

Edit: submitted my AoS today

breakerjacuzzi

I want to preface this with:
I’ve struggled with this so please be gentle with me. I’m disabled and have cognitive issues after a coma so I don’t fully understand what I’ve got here but all I ask is you let me know if I’ve copied pasted too much or made errors.

this is what I’m hoping is my defence?
Do I add anything re disability here as one of my issues is I can easily forget to display a permit in the future due to cognitive issues.

1. The Defendant is the registered keeper and probable driver of vehicle XXXXXXX which is the subject of these proceedings.
2. The Defendant's vehicle was almost certainly parked at XXXXXX because this is the defendant’s home, where they were de facto authorised to park a roadworthy vehicle.
3. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.
4. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.
5. Accordingly it is denied that:
   5.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
   5.2. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.
   5.3.  the Claimant has suffered or incurred any 'damages or indemnity costs if applicable' as stated in the claim
6. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. Under the terms of the Defendant's lease, ‘The right to exclusively and responsibly use the car parking space shown edged in blue on the plan’ ‘Not to park or allow to be parked on the parking space included in the Premises nor upon the Estate any commercial vehicles or vans or lorries exceeding 2,500 kilograms and any traller boat caravan or any home on wheels motor caravan commercial vehicle and like movable object and to use the parking space included in the Premises for the parking of a private motor vehicle only’
7. There are no terms within the lease requiring lessees to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant, for non-display of permits
8. The Defendant, at all material times, parked in accordance with the terms granted by the lease. The erection of the Claimant's signage, and the purported contractual terms conveyed therein, are incapable of binding the Defendant in any way, and their existence does not constitute a legally valid variation of the terms of the lease. Accordingly, the Defendant denies having breached any contractual terms whether express, implied, or by conduct.
9. The Claimant, or Managing Agent, in order to establish a right to impose unilateral terms which vary the terms of the lease, must have such variation approved by at least 75% of the leaseholders, pursuant to s37 of the Landlord & Tenant Act 1987, and the Defendant is unaware of any such vote having been passed by the residents.
10. The Defendant's vehicle clearly was 'authorised' as per the lease and the Defendant relies on primacy of contract and avers that the Claimant's conduct in aggressive ticketing is in fact a matter of tortious interference, being a private nuisance to residents.
11. In this case the Claimant has taken over the location and runs a business as if the site were a public car park, offering terms with £100 penalty on the same basis to residents, as is on offer to trespassers. However, residents are granted a right to park/rights of way and to peaceful enjoyment, and parking terms under a onerous 'permit/licence' cannot be re-offered as a contract by a third party. This interferes with the terms of leases and tenancy agreements, none of which is this parking firm a party to, and neither have they bothered to check for any rights or easements that their regime will interfere with (the Claimant is put to strict proof). This causes a substantial and unreasonable interference with the Defendant's land/property, or her use or enjoyment of that land/property.
12. The Claimant may rely on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 as a binding precedent on the lower court. However, that only assists the Claimant if the facts of the case are the same, or broadly the same. In Beavis, it was common ground between the parties that the terms of a contract had been breached, whereas it is the Defendant's position that no such breach occurred in this case, because there was no valid contract, and also because the 'legitimate interest' in enforcing parking rules for retailers and shoppers in Beavis does not apply to these circumstances. Therefore, this case can be distinguished from Beavis on the facts and circumstances.
13. The Claimant, or their legal representatives, has added an additional sum of £70 to the original £100 parking charge, for which no explanation or justification has been provided. Schedule 4 of the Protection Of Freedoms Act, at 4(5), states that the maximum sum which can be recovered is that specified in the Notice to Keeper, which is £100 in this instance. It is submitted that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.
14. For all or any of the reasons stated above, the Court is invited to dismiss the Claim in its entirety, and to award the Defendant such costs as are allowable on the small claims track, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 27.14. Given that the claim is based on an alleged contractual parking charge of £100 - already significantly inflated and mostly representing profit, as was found in Beavis - but the amount claimed on the claim form is inexplicably £265.92, the Defendant avers that this inflation of the considered amount is a gross abuse of process.
15. In the alternative, the Court is invited, under the Judge's own discretionary case management powers, to set a preliminary hearing to examine the question of this Claimant's substantial interference with easements, rights and 'primacy of contract' of residents at this site, to put an end to not only this litigation but to send a clear message to the Claimant to case wasting the court's time by bringing beleaguered residents to court under excuse of a contractual breach that cannot lawfully exist.

Coupon-mad

No, use our Template Defence, 

breakerjacuzzi

Oops! I did a bit too much mixing and matching of posts then.

1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to 'state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action'. The added costs/damages are an attempt at double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The claim also exceeds the Code of Practice (CoP) £100 parking charge ('PC') maximum. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Whilst the Defendant reserves the right to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided, the court is invited to strike out the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

2. The allegation(s) and heads of cost are vague and liability is denied for the sum claimed, or at all. At the very least, interest should be disallowed; the delay in bringing proceedings lies with the Claimant. This also makes retrieving material documents/evidence difficult, which is highly prejudicial. The Defendant seeks fixed costs (CPR 27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct and further costs (CPR 46.5). The Defendant has little recollection of events, save as set out below and to admit that they were the registered keeper

3. The Defendant, at all material times, parked in accordance with the terms granted by the lease. The erection of the Claimant's signage, and the purported contractual terms conveyed therein, are incapable of binding the Defendant in any way, and their existence does not constitute a legally valid variation of the terms of the lease. Accordingly, the Defendant denies having breached any contractual terms whether express, implied, or by conduct.

4. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

5. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view).

6. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

7. Attention is drawn to (i) paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of  Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner) and also to (ii) the binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'.

8. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act will curb rogue conduct by operators and their debt recovery agents (DRAs). The Government recently launched a Public Consultation considered likely to bring in a ban on DRA fees, which a 2022 Minister called ‘extorting money from motorists’. They have identified in July 2025: 'profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than ... by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.

9. Pursuant to Sch4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') the claim exceeds the maximum sum and is unrecoverable: see Explanatory Note 221: 'The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper ... for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5))'. Late fees (unknown to drivers, not specified on signs) are not 'unpaid parking related charges'. They are the invention of 'no win no fee' DRAs. Even in the (unlikely) event that the Claimant complied with the POFA and CoP, there is no keeper liability law for DRA fees.

10. This claim is an utter waste of court resources and it is an indication of systemic abuse that parking cases now make up a third of all small claims. False fees fuel bulk litigation that has overburdened HMCTS. The most common outcome of defended cases is late discontinuance, making Claimants liable for costs (r.38.6(1)). Whilst this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)) the White Book has this annotation: 'Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'

Coupon-mad

Better but ... hmmm... thinking about this a bit more, I just looked back at your first posts and:

1. Under the terms of the Defendant's lease, the Defendant enjoys ‘The right to exclusively and responsibly use the car parking space shown edged in blue on the plan’. There are no terms within the lease requiring lessees to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant, for non-display of permits. No permits are required. The Defendant has primacy of contract. This position is supported by the binding Court of Appeal decision in Duchess of Bedford House RTM Company Limited & Ors V Campden Hill Gate Ltd (2023) ECWA Civ 1470 which reaffirms residential parking rights using not only a fair interpretation of the lease but also Section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

2. Even if the court does not accept this position and believes that a permit scheme could somehow be foisted on such a resident, the Defendant cannot be held liable for a parking charge arising from alleged conduct of 'unauthorised parking' because:

(i)  they were at all times permitted to use their exclusive use bay, and

(ii)  they have significant cognitive impairment, following a coma. An ongoing symptom of the Defendant's medical condition is forgetfulness. The Claimant knows this because the Defendant appealed. As such, the Claimants could not insist on permit display and - once alerted to the Defendant's protected characteristics - had an overriding statutory duty to make a 'reasonable adjustment': i.e. they should have cancelled the charge at first appeal stage. Instead, they rejected it out of hand and bombarded the Defendant with increasing demands for money, a course of harassment which (compounding the initial illegality of failing to make a reasonable adjustment) means this Claimant continues to be in breach of the Equality Act 2010 by dragging a disabled Defendant through court.

^^^^^^

Having reconsidered your case, I think both of those points should be your paragraphs 1 and 2 instead of the template paras 1 and 2.

That will be a much stronger defence.

I would also replace this at the end of 4:

"On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs."

with this:

The unsolicited 'permit scheme' is in fact a private nuisance which continues to cause substantial interference with the Defendant's rights of way and expectation of peaceful enjoyment of their land. No valuable consideration is on offer and for this Claimant (who is not a party to the lease) to attempt to charge £100 a day for using a bay already demised to the Defendant with 'exclusive use' is interference and a derogation from grant.

Le_Kirk

breakerjacuzzi said:

Le_Kirk said:

What is the date of issue of the N1SDT claim form and when do you plan to submit the AoS?

The issue date is 19th November.

Edit: submitted my AoS today

With an issue date of 19/11/25 and having completed the AoS in a timely manner your defence deadline date is 4.00 p.m. on 22/12/25

breakerjacuzzi

Coupon-mad said:

Better but ... hmmm... thinking about this a bit more, I just looked back at your first posts and:

1. Under the terms of the Defendant's lease, the Defendant enjoys ‘The right to exclusively and responsibly use the car parking space shown edged in blue on the plan’. There are no terms within the lease requiring lessees to pay penalties to third parties, such as the Claimant, for non-display of permits. No permits are required. The Defendant has primacy of contract. This position is supported by the binding Court of Appeal decision in Duchess of Bedford House RTM Company Limited & Ors V Campden Hill Gate Ltd (2023) ECWA Civ 1470 which reaffirms residential parking rights using not only a fair interpretation of the lease but also Section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

2. Even if the court does not accept this position and believes that a permit scheme could somehow be foisted on such a resident, the Defendant cannot be held liable for a parking charge arising from alleged conduct of 'unauthorised parking' because:

(i)  they were at all times permitted to use their exclusive use bay, and

(ii)  they have significant cognitive impairment, following a coma. An ongoing symptom of the Defendant's medical condition is forgetfulness. The Claimant knows this because the Defendant appealed. As such, the Claimants could not insist on permit display and - once alerted to the Defendant's protected characteristics - had an overriding statutory duty to make a 'reasonable adjustment': i.e. they should have cancelled the charge at first appeal stage. Instead, they rejected it out of hand and bombarded the Defendant with increasing demands for money, a course of harassment which (compounding the initial illegality of failing to make a reasonable adjustment) means this Claimant continues to be in breach of the Equality Act 2010 by dragging a disabled Defendant through court.

^^^^^^

Having reconsidered your case, I think both of those points should be your paragraphs 1 and 2 instead of the template paras 1 and 2.

That will be a much stronger defence.

I would also replace this at the end of 4:

"On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs."

with this:

The unsolicited 'permit scheme' is in fact a private nuisance which continues to cause substantial interference with the Defendant's rights of way and expectation of peaceful enjoyment of their land. No valuable consideration is on offer and for this Claimant (who is not a party to the lease) to attempt to charge £100 a day for using a bay already demised to the Defendant with 'exclusive use' is interference and a derogation from grant.

I honestly cannot thank you enough.
I will edit with what you’ve provided me and get it sent off today- or would you advise waiting a certain time period as my deadline is 22/12?

Le_Kirk

No reason to wait, you won't get a better answer than that from @Coupon-mad; make sure you fit it into the template defence and check it fits into the box on MCOL

Coupon-mad

If it doesn't fit, remove the final paragraph of the template, which is optional.

breakerjacuzzi

And now I wait…😬