Advice needed for signage appeal - PPM - IAS appeal

M03

Thanks for the detailed reply

"it's back at the beginning with the driver able to pay at £60 or appeal, or ignore (but I'd still respond once to confirm you were driving).

Might even be worth the LOLs, effort and delay of an IAS appeal":

I did wonder whether an appeal would kill two birds with one stone, assuming I appeal as the driver?

"I understand this is your home car park where you're a leaseholder, so what was the car doing in that place (unloading?) for less than a minute as far as I can see from the 2 photos?":

The full story is this - yes I am a leaseholder and yes I do have a permit. However, I rent the property out and needed to deliver a dishwasher to my tenants. My allocated space was in use, so I used another. The permit was not on display either, which was a genuine mistake (since I don't live there, it was in the glove box). Obviously the permit was for another space in any case, so that might not be relevant. It was there for a while, and the photos on the PPM website shows approximately 12 minutes between the earliest and latest times, though these are not on the NTK as you noticed.

"you could argue that there's no period of parking on the PCN":

Yes I did note that, specifically I noted "Not PoFA compliant - NtK has no period of parking 9(2)(a)" which I was going to use in an appeal prior to not appealing originally.

"no consideration period was allowed":

I guess they did based on my above comment, of ~12 minutes?

"the signs are crap":

Yes, the entrance sign at the time was just the same as the rest of the signs, e.g. small writing. I visited this week actually and noticed that they have since put a replacement entrance sign up. I wonder if this is proof that they didn't comply properly in the past? Also, it is only visible if you turn in right to the car park, and is completely hidden if turning in left.

"you are a leaseholder (attach proof that you are)":

As mentioned above, yes I am. I can definitely get proof. Would a land registry title deed be good for that? Does having a permit but for another space add anything to my case?

"Was there habitual parking or unloading in that spot before PPM arrived to interfere with residential rights and made your lives Hell?":

To an extent, yes the spaces are used for unloading. E.g. supermarket and delivery vans. Typically vehicles are parked on the entrance road for this, rather than bays though, if only because it is closer to the communal entrance doors.

I really appreciate your help with this.

M03

In addition, I noticed that the privacy notice URL as displayed on the signs is not valid https://www.parkingandpropertymanagement.co.uk/privacy-notice

Coupon-mad

The full story is this - yes I am a leaseholder and yes I do have a permit. However, I rent the property out and needed to deliver a dishwasher to my tenants.

You should have said!

That's EXACTLY like Jopson v Homeguard (search the forum).

Adduce the transcripts of Jopson v Homeguard as well as Duchess of Bedford House and appeal as driver, also attaching your title deed and the receipt for the dishwasher AND any dated messages with the tenants about the delivery of the dishwasher.

Rinse & repeat at IAS making sure you upload and link both case law transcripts and your evidence, and use my words about the principle established by the Duchess of Bedford House case because I copied them from a friend who is a barrister.

Give it a really hard effort. No templates!

M03

I have just read the court notes for that case and indeed it's quite similar!

On that day the lift in the building was also not working, and therefore I had to carry the dishwasher up to the fourth floor (with assistance) which obviously took longer than planned. I have a text message from my tenant for this, and I could try and get confirmation from the managing agent (though they were unwilling to help with the PCN).

The only other thing to note is that my space is only 2 spaces aside, so I cannot argue that access was a particular issue.

Coupon-mad

Give it your best effort with all that evidence and case law. If nothing else, it means you'll have done the groundwork for a court defence.

Thorndorise

Just as an aside, IPC do not accept that any of their AOS's sites require an entrance sign, even though it's stated in the CoP v8 and v9 - now superseded by the Joint code (but doesn't matter as the sign's don't have to be in place until Oct).

IPC rely on this anomaly by stating there 'should' be sign's - which are not necessary if the other signage on site is adequate (it likely never is). This is different to the BPA guidance and the joint code that state 'must'.

Ergo, IPC have a get out clause every time - useless and pointless as an ATA.

M03

See below the appeal I have written. I have made it quite verbose and covering several areas, focussing on those that you mentioned above. Therefore I can hopefully use the same appeal with the IAS, when PPM likely reject it, without having to make many changes.

I haven't mentioned the "Duchess of Bedford House" case as I found it hard to reference in relation to my situation, but the "Jopson v Homeguard" one is perfect.

I have pasted it from a PDF, so hopefully the formatting isn't too bad:

---

Appeal Re: PCN for xxx

Vehicle Registration: xxx

Parking and Property Management Ltd reference number: xxx

I, the driver of this vehicle at the time of the alleged Parking Charge Notice (PCN), received a letter dated 02/06/2025 from Parking and Property Management Ltd (PPM). I contend that I am not liable for the alleged parking charge and wish to appeal against it on the following grounds: 

1. The vehicle was not parked, rather it was being unloaded – Laura Jopson v Homeguard Services Limited

2. There is poor signage, especially regarding the “entrance sign”, as per the IPC Code of Practice version 8 onwards

3. No Evidence of Landowner Authority

4. No Evidence of Period Parked – NtK does not meet PoFA 2012 9(2)(a) requirements

5. Signage references an invalid privacy notice URL

1) The vehicle was not parked, rather it was being unloaded – Laura Jopson v Homeguard Services Limited

At the time of the PCN, the vehicle was not parked. The definition of “parking”, as per paragraph 20 of the Laura Jopson v Homeguard Services Limited court transcript:

“...is that of leaving a car for some duration of time beyond that needed for getting in or out of it, loading or unloading it…”

As a leaseholder and landlord of a property (and parking space) within xxx, a building within the estate to which the private road of xxx belongs, I had stopped the vehicle for the purpose of unloading a washing machine to deliver to my tenants. I have attached a title register to show my ownership of the property.

For the record, it is a very common occurrence on this estate for delivery vehicles to stop on the roadways and spaces, as there is no other convenient place to stop within proximity of the building.

To add to the above, and reiterated by the attached screenshot of a message from my tenant received on that day, the lift was not working on this day. This is a frequent issue with the block at the moment, and the building’s management company is early in the process of replacing said lift. My flat is located on the fourth floor.

Paragraph 19 says that:

“...it is possible to draw a real and sensible distinction between pausing for a few moments or minutes to enable passengers to alight or for awkward or heavy items to be unloaded, and parking in the sense of leaving a car for some significant duration of time…”

The indisputable weight of a washing machine clearly warrants some proportionality to the length of time needed to unload this essential appliance to my tenants, especially so considering the unplanned situation on the day.

2) There is poor signage, especially regarding the “entrance sign”, as per the IPC Code of Practice version 8 onwards

It is not clear as to which version of the IPC Code of Practice this car park is following, so I have made the assumption that it must be at least version 8. In section “Schedule 1 – Signage”, this code specifically states that:

“Where a Car Park has a defined entrance, Operators should display entrance signs”

At the time of the PCN, it is noted that no entrance sign was displayed, rather a “Signs Displaying Terms and Conditions” was poorly positioned at the car park entrance.

Additionally, it states:

“The size of the text on the sign must be appropriate for the location of the sign and should be clearly readable by a Motorist having regard to the likely position of the Motorist in relation to the sign.”

The text size is not large enough to be easily readable while driving a vehicle, nor is it visible to vehicles turning left into xxx. Finally, the sign is on the passenger side of the vehicle, several meters from the roadway.

It should be noted that the sign has since been replaced, indicating that the previous sign was insufficient.

3) No Evidence of Landowner Authority

The IPC Code of Practice, point 23.1 states:

“If an Operator is issuing Parking Charges on land which is not owned by them, they must have written permission from the Landowner to operate on the Private Land.”

As PPM does not have proprietary interest in the land, I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

4) No Evidence of Period Parked – NtK does not meet PoFA 2012 9(2)(a) requirements

Without prejudice, there is no record to show that the vehicle was parked versus attempting to read the terms and conditions before deciding against parking/entering into a contract.

The Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 Schedule 4 paragraph 9 refers at numerous times to the “period of parking”. Most notably, paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to:

“specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;”

The PCN simply refers to an “incident time/date” of 15:02 23/11/2024. At no stage is the “period of parking to which the notice relates”, as required by PoFA, explicitly mentioned.

5) Signage references an invalid privacy notice URL

The car park signage at the time of the PCN, and of the signage installed at a later date, make the following statement:

”Please see full privacy notice at: www.parkingandpropertymanagement.co.uk/privacy-notice”.

This URL is not valid and produces an error page. Therefore it is not possible to refer to how my personal data (as per the ICO definition and covered by the GDPR Data Protection Act 2018, and indeed the IPC Code of Practice) is to be used and stored. You have acquired my personal data without implicit consent, and therefore I demand that the signage is updated to reflect that.

END

M03

@Coupon-mad if you wouldn't mind, please could you review the above? I hope it summarises everything you advised. Thanks in advance

Coupon-mad

Yes that'll do for first appeal but this is a mistake:

I haven't mentioned the "Duchess of Bedford House" case as I found it hard to reference in relation to my situation, but the "Jopson v Homeguard" one is perfect.

But Duchess of Bedford House is a binding authority (i.e. it is case law) because it went as far as the Supreme Court, who refused an application to appeal it.

Jopson is just a first stage appeal in the county court platform. Not binding. IAS will ignore it.

Search the forum to find the wording I've recently posted about rights to park and habitual practice pursuant to the landmark case of Duchess of Bedford House.

M03

Good point. I have added in the following, based on various searching around on here and other sites:

2) Primacy of existing residential rights – Duchess of Bedford House RTM Company Limited v Campden Hill Gate Limited

As a leaseholder, the primary contract is between the lessee (me) and the lessor (landowner). The secondary contract is between the driver (me) and PPM. The secondary contract cannot limit the rights that I am granted through the primary contract. As the lease provides the right for: 

“...for the Lessee and the tenant or occupiers of the Demised Premises his or their employees and visitors (in common with other persons having the like right) to go pass and re-pass at all times and for all purposes of access to and egress from the Demised Premises only with or without vehicles (as appropriate) over and along the Accessways and on foot only over and along the entrance hall landing and staircase used by two or more of the Lessees within the Building within the Maintained Property.”,

it is not within the realm of a parking enforcement company to limit that right.

As per Duchess of Bedford House RTM Company Limited & Ors v Campden Hill Gate Limited, a landmark case which was ratified by the Supreme Court (they refused an appeal application), The Court of Appeal confirmed the fundamental principle: whilst parking operators can introduce a scheme where it is in the interests of residents to supply a VRM for a whitelist or display a permit, those operational conveniences cannot supersede residential rights under leases or habitual practice.

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2023/1470

It is habitual practice on this estate, for vehicles to be temporarily left on the roadways and spaces, for the purposes of loading/unloading and for deliveries - this has been happening for as long as I have rented within and later become a leaseholder of this estate.

This habitual practice is demonstrated on a daily basis by residents wishing to load and unload heavy goods from their vehicles, as well as by delivery drivers (for example couriers, takeaway deliveries and supermarket food deliveries).