DCB Legal Court Date March Resident

Colonizemars · 23 August 2024 at 7:53AM

Secure A Space Limited (Claimant)

XXX XXX (Defendant)

Witness Statement of Defendant

1. I am XXX, (ADDRESS) and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

2. In my statement, I shall refer to (Exhibits 1-9) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3. The Defendant draws to the attention of the court that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal). The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

4. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. (SeeExhibit xx-01)

5. The Defendant believes the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs. The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. This lack of specificity places me, the Defendant, at a distinct disadvantage, as I find myself in the position of having to mount a defence without a clear understanding of the precise nature of the alleged violation.

Facts and Sequence of events

6. It is admitted that on the material dates, I was the registered keeper of the vehicle XXXXXXX. It is unknown who the driver of the vehicle was on the dates of the claimed PCNs, given the PCNs date back to 2021.

7. Multiple individuals were authorised by me to use the vehicle at the times of the alleged contraventions via their own comprehensive insurance policies, which allowed them to use another private vehicle for which they were covered on a third party only basis.

8. I do not recall receiving any pre-claim correspondence relating to the PCNs in question. I would like to point out to the court that I was a tenant at this property for 6 years. And parked in the private underground car park in accordance to my tenancy agreement. [See Exhibit 02]

9. I left this property in July 2022 so any correspondence sent may not have reached me.

[See Exhibit-03]

10. I would like to make clear the claimant has had one claim struck out by the Judge at Edmonton County Court already pertaining to myself parking at my residence at Tower Point. And has partially discontinued another. [See Exhibit 04]

11. The Claimant has stated in their Witness Statement ‘24. The Defendant does not dispute being the Keeper of the Vehicle but denies driving. My Company reasonably believes that the Defendant was the Driver because they would otherwise have nominated a driver, and therefore the Defendant is pursued on that basis. My Company has complied with POFA and can pursue the Defendant as Keeper in the alternative’. As multiple individuals were authorised by me to use the vehicle at the time, and given the PCNs in question relate back to 2021, I am unable to nominate a driver given the length of time that has surpassed since the alleged contraventions.

12. The Claimant has stated in their Witness Statement ’19. To make the driver aware, a PCN was affixed to the Vehicle in accordance with Section 7 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“POFA”)’. I as the Defendant have not confirmed receipt of the Notice to Keeper at any point. I would like to make it clear that I do not recall receiving any pre-claim correspondence in relation to the alleged contraventions.

13. The Defendant does not recall being served with a compliant Notice to Keeper for these charges, that complied with the Protection of Freedoms Act ('POFA') 2012 wording prescribed in Schedule 4. Outwith the POFA, parking firms cannot invoke 'keeper liability'. This legal point has already been tested on appeal (twice) in private parking cases and the transcripts will be adduced in evidence:

(i). In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but dd not. Mr Smith's appeal was allowed and Excel's claim was dismissed (See Exhibit xx-05).

(ii). In April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation. HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed (See Exhibit xx-06).

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently examined by the Government

14. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

15. I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii) a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.

16. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

(iii). Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if the entire sum was 'overdue' on the day of parking;

17. This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

18. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

"Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

19. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

20. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or 'enforcement' (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

21. With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra 'fee'. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery' and the Defendant takes that position.

22. The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs 'eight times less' (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced 'industry standard' Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

23. In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and 'would appear to be penal.

24. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the 'costs of the operation' and the DLUHC's IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

25. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing 'market failure' more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

Colonizemars · 23 August 2024 at 7:53AM

26. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

CRA Breaches

27. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

28. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

29. The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

30. Now for the first time, the DLUHC's draft IA exposes that template 'debt chaser' stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel v Wilkinson. (See Exhibit xx-07)

The Beavis case is against this claim

31. The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs - (See Exhibit xx-08) - set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

32. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'. (See Exhibit xx-09) for paragraphs from ParkingEye v Beavis).

33. Hidden Terms:

The £100 penalty clause is positively buried in small print, as seen on the signs in evidence. The purported added (false) 'costs' are even more hidden and are also unspecified as a sum. Their (unlawful, due to the CRA Schedule 2 grey list of unfair terms) suggestion is that they can hide a vague sentence within a wordy sign, in the smallest possible print, then add whatever their trade body lets them, until the DLUHC bans it in 2024. And the driver has no idea about any risk nor even how much they might layer on top. Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

Conclusion

34. The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court's time and that of the Defendant.

35. The Defendant asks the judge to read the persuasive Judgment from His Honour Judge Murch (August 2023) in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, and deliver the same outcome given this Claimant has submitted a similarly vague POC. It is worth noting that in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case the POC, while still ambiguous, did contain a subtle indication of the alleged contravention, specifically regarding the duration of the defendant's parking on the premises. In contrast, the POC in this case lacks even a minimal effort to hint at the nature of the alleged violation. In the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, full costs were awarded to the motorist and the claim was struck out.

36. There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that 'debt recovery' costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.

37. With the DLUHC's ban on the false 'costs' there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

38. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

39. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date: 22 August 2024

Thoughts on this ? Still haven’t got through to Edmonton so this could be late for all I know but submitting today

Coupon-mad · 23 August 2024 at 10:30AM

37 is wrong. There's no ban.

I'd remove 34-37 completely.

Higher up, change:

"The Defendant believes"

to

"I believe"

And where you talk about those earlier claims, add a paragraph about Henderson v Henderson (cause of action estoppel). Search the forum or just read this morning's posts that I've replied on, as someone just quoted the wording needed.

Le_Kirk · 23 August 2024 at 3:03PM

You have been pointed at the thread that you need 14 August at 8:52PM <<<<LINK

Colonizemars · 23 August 2024 at 3:37PM

Thanks for everyone’s help submitted BLINDLY who knows I may be too late. Fuming tbh

still haven’t got through to Edmonton they don’t answer phones.

Let’s just say this witness statement has been filed late am I not allowed to bring anything to the hearing ?

also going to email DCB legal to encourage them to discontinue going to attach the other struck out claim and the one where they discontinued partially.

Do I do it “without prejudice” or just standard email

LDast · 23 August 2024 at 5:20PM

DCB Legal are not going to discontinue just because you ask them to. You will sound desperate to them, encouraging them to persist as they will honestly believe you are low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree, about to capitulate and pay into their scam.

Either wait for the discontinuation or go to trial with the conviction of your defence. Whimpering to them with a begging letter asking them to discontinue is NOT the way forward.

Coupon-mad · 23 August 2024 at 7:20PM

Can you show us your WS after all the changes made? It should be pretty good.

Colonizemars · 23 August 2024 at 9:09PM

LDast said:

DCB Legal are not going to discontinue just because you ask them to. You will sound desperate to them, encouraging them to persist as they will honestly believe you are low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree, about to capitulate and pay into their scam.

Either wait for the discontinuation or go to trial with the conviction of your defence. Whimpering to them with a begging letter asking them to discontinue is NOT the way forward.

Okay thanks won’t bother emailing them then

Colonizemars · 23 August 2024 at 9:11PM

Coupon-mad said:

Can you show us your WS after all the changes made? It should be pretty good.

Yes sure

Secure A Space Limited (Claimant)

Xxxxx (Defendant)

Witness Statement of Defendant

1. I am xxxx, xxxxxx and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

2. In my statement, I shall refer to (Exhibits 1-9) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3. The Defendant draws to the attention of the court that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal). The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

4. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. (SeeExhibit xx-01)

5. I believe the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs. The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. This lack of specificity places me, the Defendant, at a distinct disadvantage, as I find myself in the position of having to mount a defence without a clear understanding of the precise nature of the alleged violation.

Facts and Sequence of events

6. It is admitted that on the material dates, I was the registered keeper of the vehicle X 7LPL. It is unknown who the driver of the vehicle was on the dates of the claimed PCNs, given the PCNs date back to 2021.

7. Multiple individuals were authorised by me to use the vehicle at the times of the alleged contraventions via their own comprehensive insurance policies, which allowed them to use another private vehicle for which they were covered on a third party only basis.

8. I do not recall receiving any pre-claim correspondence relating to the PCNs in question. I would like to point out to the court that I was a tenant at this property for 6 years. And parked in the private underground car park in accordance to my tenancy agreement. My son who would have been around 3 years old at the time is diagnosed with autism and sensory processing disorder. Admitted being rigid within his routine there were multiple times he would enter into a meltdown as a result of becoming overstimulated destroying anything within reach. Admitted during these meltdowns my primary focus was to contain him so he wasn’t to hurt myself or his sister. [See Exhibit 02]