UK Parking Control Limited (via DCB Legal Ltd) Defence

GolfR12

Hi guys,

So I have received a Claim Form with UK Parking Control Limited as the Claimant and DCB Legal Ltd acting on their behalf.

Two PCN's claimed are dating back to April and September 2019. The site of the claimed PCN's was a gym that I previously attended, however, it is also a mini retail park so I cannot recall for sure what the purpose of the visit(s) were. 

I have drafted up a defence for which I would appreciate any critique.

Many thanks in advance.

B789

This is an example of the current defence to use for claims with very sparse or ambiguous PoC such as those from UKPC/DCB Legal:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/5r7vbqttho3q948/2023 defence.pdf?dl=0

If you add any new paragraph, all subsequent paragraphs must be renumbered sequentially.

KeithP

Your paragraph 4 starts...

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.

There are no facts in your Defence.

... unless you are telling the court that the whole of the template Defence comes from 'the Defendant's own knowledge'.

Le_Kirk

Notwithstanding what others have said, every paragraph requires a number.  Not sure that your unnumbered paragraph between 3 & 4 brings anything to the party, nor is it a defence.

Coupon-mad

You do need facts about the car park ... do you recognise the location? A shopping park local to you? ... and say vaguely why the driver might have had business there. Shopping?

And please remove the greengrocer's apostrophe every time, in "PCN’s".

GolfR12

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.: XXXXXX

 

Between

 

UK PARKING CONTROL LIMITED

(Claimant)

 

-and-  

 

 

XXXXXX

             (Defendant)

 

___________________________________________________________________________

 

DEFENCE

___________________________________________________________________________

 

1. The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the Particulars.

 

2. The Claimant has made one claim for two separate parking events.

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

 

3. It is admitted that on the material dates, the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle XXXXXXX. It is unknown who the driver of the vehicle was on the dates of the claimed PCNs, given these date back to 2019.

 

4. The Defendant does not recall receiving any ‘pre-claim’ correspondence from the Claimant.

 

5. The Defendant does not recall why the vehicle was at the claimed site of the PCNs. The Defendant recognises the site as a car park for a gym, which the Defendant attended occasionally.

 

6. The Defendant avers that the Claimant failed to serve a Notice to Keeper compliant with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Consequently, the claimant cannot transfer liability for this charge to the Defendant as keeper of the vehicle. The Claimant is put to strict proof.

 

7. The Particulars of Claim ('POC') appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action”.

 

8. The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case is being pursued.

 

9. The POC are entirely inadequate, in that they fail to particularise (a) the contractual term(s) relied upon; (b) the specifics of any alleged breach of contract; and (c) how the purported and unspecified 'damages' arose and the breakdown of the exaggerated quantum.

 

10. The claim has been issued via Money Claims Online and, as a result, is subject to a character limit for the Particulars of Claim section of the Claim Form. The fact that generic wording appears to have been applied has obstructed any semblance of clarity. The Defendant trusts that the court will agree that a claim pleaded in such generic terms lacks the required details and requires proper particularisation in a detailed document within 14 days, per 16PD.3

 

11. The guidance for completing Money Claims Online confirms this and clearly states: “If you do not have enough space to explain your claim online and you need to serve extra, more detailed particulars on the defendant, tick the box that appears after the statement 'you may also send detailed particulars direct to the defendant.”

 

12. No further particulars have been filed and to the Defendant's knowledge, no application asking the court service for more time to serve and/or relief from sanctions has been filed either.

 

13. In view of it having been entirely within the Claimant's Solicitors' gift to properly plead the claim at the outset and the claim being for a sum, well within the small claims limit, such that the Defendant considers it disproportionate and at odds with the overriding objective (in the context of a failure by the Claimant to properly comply with rules and practice directions) for a Judge to throw the erring Claimant a lifeline by ordering further particulars (to which a further defence might be filed, followed by further referral to a Judge for directions and allocation) the court is respectfully invited to strike this claim out.

 

14. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. To pre-empt the usual template responses from this serial litigator: the court process is outside of the Defendant's life experience and they cannot be criticised for using, in part, pre-written wording suggested by a reliable online help resource. The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence.

 

15. With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case. In breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims, no copy of the contract (sign) accompanied any Letter of Claim. The POC is sparse on facts and specific breach allegations, which makes it difficult to respond in depth at this time; however this claim is unfair, generic and inflated.

 

16. This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67. Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal’.

 

17. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

 

18. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued."

 

19. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as this claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

 

20. The DLUHC consulted for over two years, considering evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt/robo-claim firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate these claims with 'costs/damages' in addition to the strictly capped legal fees the small claims track allows.

 

21. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders. The parking charge was held to cover that work.

 

22. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone these unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage.

 

23. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice. The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'. A clear steer for the Courts which it is hoped overrides mistakes made in a few appeal cases that the parking industry desperately rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One

Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).

 

24. Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals saw Circuit Judges led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon these, the Defendant avers that errors were made in every case. Evidence was either overlooked (including signage discrepancies in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted parking contract in Beavis. Those learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of information as the DLUHC, whose incoming statutory Code of Practice now clarifies such matters as a definition of 'parking' as well as consideration and grace periods and minor matters such as 'keying errors' or 'fluttering tickets/permits' where a PCN should not have been issued at all, or should have been cancelled in the pre-action dispute phase.

GolfR12

POFA and CRA breaches

 

25. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation'). If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred.

 

26. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA'). The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

 

27. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith.

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished (lack of legitimate interest/prominence of terms)

 

28. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must each be determined on their own facts. That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, and took into account the prominent yellow/black uncluttered signs with £85 in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

29. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps’.

 

30. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver. Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous 'penalty' was seen or agreed. Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include: (i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and (ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

 

31. Both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and (iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio).

 

32. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies. In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike."

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

 

33. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules). It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name. The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

 

34. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed. Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).

 

Conclusion

35. The claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 

36. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

 

37. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks: (a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and (b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

 

38. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

 

Statement of Truth

 

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Defendant’s signature:

Date

GolfR12

Hi guys,

I have given this defence another shot. Hopefully it is a bit better this time? As always, appreciate any critique.

Thank you in advance.

GolfR12

Coupon-mad said:

You do need facts about the car park ... do you recognise he location? A shopping park local to you? ... and say vaguely why the driver might have had business there. Shopping?

And please remove the greengrocer's apostrophe every time, in "PCN’s".

Really don't know why I've been putting an apostrophe in PCNs, feel like a pleb! Haha 

Coupon-mad

You are not a pleb!

Good work, that final version is now an exemplar Defence and I might now point people to it as a great example of a DCBLegal case where you cannot recall anything much about any PCNs, don't know who was driving and are relying on the POFA as well as other points.

Expect to get some notifications when we post your name to show people your example - sorry!

Could you please delete that previous version to stop people landing on the wrong one? Cheers.

GolfR12

Wow, wasn't expecting that at all. Thank you! 

Previous version deleted. 

Once again, many thanks for your assistance and contribution to this forum. It is much appreciated.