UKCPM County Court Claim HELP

chris0147

11.   The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

12.   Accordingly it is denied that:
12.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
12.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
12.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.

 

 

 

Alternative Defence - Failure to set out clearly parking terms

13.   In the alternative, the Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout.

14.   The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.

15.   At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation.

16.   The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the International Parking Community’s ("IPC") Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory.

17.   The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgment of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3.

18.   The Defendant avers that the residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkingEye distinguished.

19.   It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking parking management. The Claimant has provided no proof of any such entitlement.
20.   It is denied that the Claimant has any entitlement to the sums sought.

chris0147

21.   It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the Claimant.

22.   The Particulars of Claim set out an incoherent statement of case and the quantum has been enhanced in excess of any sum hidden in small print on the signage that the Claimant may be relying upon.  Claiming ‘costs/damages’ on an indemnity basis is stated to be unfair in the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, CMA37, para 5.14.3.  That is the official Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA 2015') legislation which must be considered, given the duty in s71.  The Defendant avers that the CRA 2015 has been breached due to unfair terms and/or unclear notices (signs), pursuant to s62 and with regard to the requirements for transparency and good faith, and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 and 18 in Sch2.  NB: this is different from the UTCCRs considered by the Supreme Court, in that there is now a requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair.

23.   It is denied that the exaggerated sum sought is recoverable. The Defendant's position is that this moneyclaim is in part/wholly a penalty, applying the authority in ParkingEye cases (ref: paras 98, 100, 193, 198) ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 and para 419 of HHJ Hegarty’s High Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increasing ultimately to £135.  Much like the situation in this claim, the business model involved sending a series of automated demands to the keeper.  At para 419, HHJ Hegarty found that adding £60 to an already increased parking charge 'would appear to be penal' and unrecoverable.  ParkingEye had dropped this punitive enhancement by the time of Mr Beavis' famous parking event.

24.   Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of the cost of their standard automated letter-chain.  It is denied that the Claimants have expended additional costs for the same letters that the Beavis case decision held were a justification for the (already increased from the discount) parking charge sum of £85.

25.   The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties.  It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing.  He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice.  He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #5 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed.  It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

26.   Pursuant to Sch4 of the POFA at 4(5), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a parking firm has complied with its other requirements (denied in this case).  It is worth noting that even though the driver was known in Beavis, the Supreme Court considered the POFA, given that it was the only legislation specifically dealing with parking on private land.  There is now also the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 with a new, more robust and statutory Code of Practice being introduced shortly, which evolved because the two Trade Bodies have failed to properly govern this industry.

 

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

27.   Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being dismissed as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.

28.   Their decision was specific to what was stated to be a unique set of facts: the legitimate interest/commercial justification, the car park location and prominent and clear signs with the parking charge itself in the largest/boldest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all parking charges are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and very conspicuous yellow/black signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

29.   Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.

30.   The Supreme Court held that the intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of the tests in Beavis.

chris0147

31.   The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Sch2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen, known or agreed.

32.   Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include:

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (the ‘red hand rule’ case) and

(ii)                Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

both leading authorities confirming that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii)                 Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000,

where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In many cases where parking firm Claimants have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio.  To pre-empt that, in fact Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

33.   Fairness and clarity are paramount in the new statutory CoP being finalised by the MHCLG and this stance is supported by the BPA and IPC alike. In the November 2020 issue of Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, the Chief Executive of the IPC Trade Body, observed:  'Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike."   The Defendant's position is that the signs and terms the Claimant is relying upon were not clear, and were in fact, unfair and the Beavis case is fully distinguished.

34.   In the alternative, the Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence, of a chain of authority flowing from the landholder of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this Claimant to issue parking charges or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are, nor whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to act as an agent ‘on behalf of’ the landowner.

 

 

In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

35.   (a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a late Notice of Discontinuance.  The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases by this Claimant, and will seek further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

36.   The Defendant invites the court to find that this exaggerated claim is entirely without merit and to dismiss the claim. In relation to parking on private land, it is settled law from the Supreme Court, that a parking charge must be set at a level which includes recovery of the costs of operating a scheme. However, this Claimant is claiming a global sum of £160. This figure is a penalty, far exceeding the £85 parking charge in the ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis case.

 

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

Defendant’s signature:  …………………………….…………………………….                  

Defendant’s name:          …………………………….…………………………….

Date:                              …………………………….…………………………….

 

chris0147

Does it looks good?

If I need to change it back to sub numbers, please let me know!

D_P_Dance

Are you familiar with unreasonable behaviour costs under CPR27.14(2)(g).  Imo every D in a residential parking case shuld ask for them. 

chris0147

D_P_Dance said:

Are you familiar with unreasonable behaviour costs under CPR27.14(2)(g).  Imo every D in a residential parking case shuld ask for them. 

No I am not a familiar so should I add that unreasonable behaviour cost in my defence??

chris0147

@Coupon-mad Have you see my post above?

I need to get it done asap. 

Please help me!!!

chris0147

@Coupon-mad I am still waiting for your answer. I have only got 2 weeks away to file a defence so please help me!!!!!!!!!!

Johnersh

It's a little repetitive. You cite the same cases on multiple occasions and have two sections in which you seek to distinguish beavis. That is likely because you've bolted 2 or 3 templates together. They're a guide, not restrictive tramlines. 

I'm not a fan of the scattergun. I think some pruning is advisable to set out the strongest case you can.  Ask yourself this: are your strongest points clear or are they lost in a soup of general stuff. 

The defence is not usually the place for quotations or to explain in detail cases. (many of the court of appeal cases are law school 101 and need only a passing mention). 

Also (genuine Q - without wishing to condescend) do you fully understand these arguments? You will need to do so, when you present them at court. 

chris0147

Johnersh said:

It's a little repetitive. You cite the same cases on multiple occasions and have two sections in which you seek to distinguish beavis. That is likely because you've bolted 2 or 3 templates together. They're a guide, not restrictive tramlines. 

I'm not a fan of the scattergun. I think some pruning is advisable to set out the strongest case you can.  Ask yourself this: are your strongest points clear or are they lost in a soup of general stuff. 

The defence is not usually the place for quotations or to explain in detail cases. (many of the court of appeal cases are law school 101 and need only a passing mention). 

Also (genuine Q - without wishing to condescend) do you fully understand these arguments? You will need to do so, when you present them at court. 

Yes I did as I have bolted 2 templates together. I have added to this to my defence following by:


Preliminary
1. The Particulars of Claim lack specificity and are embarrassing. The Defendant is prejudiced and is unable to prepare a full and complete Defence. The Defendant reserves the right to seek from the Court permission to serve an Amended Defence should the Claimant add to or expand his Particulars at a later stage of these proceedings and/or to limit the Claimant only to the unevidenced allegations in the Particulars.

2. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of any contract and neither comply with the CPR 16 in respect of statements of case, nor the relevant practice direction in respect of claims formed by contract or conduct. The Defendant further notes the Claimant's failure to engage in pre-action correspondence in accordance with the pre-action protocol and with the express aim of avoiding contested litigation.

Background
3. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant is the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXZZZ which is the subject of these proceedings. The vehicle is insured with [provider] with [number] of named drivers permitted to use it.

4. It is admitted that on [date] the Defendant's vehicle was parked at [location]

5. It is denied that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle. The Claimant is put to strict proof.
5.1. The Claimant has provided no evidence (in pre-action correspondence or otherwise) that the Defendant was the driver. The Defendant avers that the Claimant is therefore limited to pursuing the Defendant in these proceedings under the provisions set out by statute in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("POFA")
5.2. Before seeking to rely on the keeper liability provisions of Schedule 4 POFA the Claimant must demonstrate that:
5.2.1. there was a ‘relevant obligation’ either by way of a breach of contract, trespass or other tort; and
5.2.2. that it has followed the required deadlines and wording as described in the Act to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper.
It is not admitted that the Claimant has complied with the relevant statutory requirements.

5.3. To the extent that the Claimant may seek to allege that any such presumption exist, the Defendant expressly denies that there is any presumption in law (whether in statute or otherwise) that the keeper is the driver. Further, the Defendant denies that the vehicle keeper is obliged to name the driver to a private parking firm. Had this been the intention of parliament, they would have made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those provisions do not apply to this matter.

Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract
6. It is denied that the Defendant or lawful users of his/her vehicle were in breach of any parking conditions or were not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and leaseholder of [address], whose tenancy agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant allocated bay, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle or the requirement to display a parking permit. A copy of the lease will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given.

7. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

7. Accordingly it is denied that:
7.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
7.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
7.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.

Alternative Defence - Failure to set out clearly parking terms
8. In the alternative, the Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout.
8.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.
8.1.1. At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation;
8.1.2. The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the Independent Parking Committee’s ("IPC") Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory; and
8.1.3. The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgment of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3
8.2. The Defendant avers that the residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkingEye distinguished.

9. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking parking management. The Claimant has provided no proof of any such entitlement.

10. It is denied that the Claimant has any entitlement to the sums sought.

11. It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the Claimant.


This is the one I have to add to my defence from the solicitor's defence regarding to resident parking.

I need @coupon@Coupon-mad help as I have use his new template, then added the solicitor's defence.

Yes I do understand these arguments. I have to post on the forum to get it check up to make sure that no double sentence are the same thats all.