Nottingham PCN Incorrect VRN

Bakedalasker

Hi guys, here is my first draft defence. I need to revisit things in red.



HX Car Park Management (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)



DEFENCE


1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.

2.1 It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXXXX when it was parked at Marco Island, Huntington Street, Nottingham, NG1 1AT in 2019.

2.2. The PCN stated the contravention as 'Failed to purchase and/or validate a pay and display ticket' and this contravention is denied. The Defendant denies liability for the purported parking charge (penalty), not least because it is already common ground that the correct parking charge (tariff) had already been paid.

2.3. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

2.4 The principle of de minimis applies here, namely that this is a legal action for technical breaches of rules or agreements where the impact of the breach is negligible.

3. It is denied that:

a. A contract was formed to pay anything more than the advertised tariff;
b. There was any agreement to pay a further penalty parking charge;
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site which prominently displayed the £100 penalty, in at least as large lettering as the tariffs shown at the machine
d. In addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums;
e. The claimant in fact expended the claimed additional sums;
f. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice.

4.1 The Defendant paid for a ticket for the appropriate time that the car was parked. The response to the initial appeal about the PCN from HX Car Park states "You entered the registration DE. As this is not the full correct registration for your vehicle the ticket is not valid". This clearly shows that the claimant agrees that a ticket was purchased, and the untrue allegation "you entered the registration DE" is denied.
4.2. It was only when a PCN arrived in the post, that the Defendant knew (too late) of what appeared to be a minor data problem caused by the Claimant's system itself incorrectly recording the vehicle registration. There is evidence on the internet, including trustpilot reviews, to show that other users of car parks run by HX Car Park Management have suffered similar machine problems.
4.3 Whilst entering the correct registration into the machine There were two witness on the scene to vouch for this, the defendant's daughter and her friend. The daughter called out the registration number directly from the vehicle number plate to make sure there was no error. This reinforces the suggestion in 4.2 that the machine was at fault.
4.4 Here I’m considering the including proof where these machines have been questioned across the country. The case between the Warrington MP and the HX guy where the MP received a number of complaints like what I’m going through. I believe the MP is taking the guy to court.

4.5 Given the fact that the ANPR data did not match with a payment made, an automated PCN was issued. However, it was within the gift of the Claimant to ensure before starting enforcement at any site, that their systems are fit for purpose, including that they correctly store the data inputted by a driver.

4.6 A PCN in these circumstances is completely foreseeable by a professional parking firm, and it is averred that this punitive charge relies upon the Claimant's own data being wrong at the outset, and going unnoticed by a driver.

4.7 It is clear that the claimant is trying to claim an excessive amount for what may be an error in their own data recording equipment. It is preposterous to believe that any driver when promoted to enter a car registration would solely enter two letters. Even if the registration was entered as suggested by the claimant (which is disputed) it is accepted that payment was made, and that a punitive PCN has been issued for a technical breach of terms and conditions. The principle of de minimis applies here, namely that this is a legal action for technical breaches of rules or agreements where the impact of the breach is negligible.

5. The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

6.1. It is clear that no conduct by the Defendant caused the penalty to arise and a professional parking firm could not reasonably lay any blame with the Defendant, for their own machine's data storage fault. The charge offends against the reasonable and statutory expectations of trader/consumer relations requiring 'open dealing' and the doctrine of good faith.

6.2. Further, the Claimant will no doubt hope to convince the court that a 'relevant contract' existed and was breached. As this would be a consumer contract, it must be 'fair' and 'transparent' as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

6.3 And the Claimant would have the court believe that a 'relevant obligation' existed, which under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (setting out the will of Parliament for parking tickets issued on private land, even if a Claimant is not relying upon that Act) is defined as ''an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract''.

6.4 The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

7. The Claimant may also try to rely upon the completely different Supreme Court case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, the Defendant avers that decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the facts. To quote from the decision in Beavis:

Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''


8. Further and in the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices under defined parameters (including when caused by failure of their own data processing/excessive storage) and to form/offer contracts in their own name, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

9.1 It is the Defendant's case that there can be no legitimate interest or commercial justification in pursuing paying patrons for a hundredfold penalty when it is agreed that payment was actually made.

9.2 The penalty represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.

10. The costs on the claim are disproportionate and disingenuous:

CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
10.1 Only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
10.2 Resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Two letters received from Gladstones Solicitors were a standard feature of a low cost business model. ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] ruled that Claimants are the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum is, by definition, already hugely inflated for profit, not loss, and the Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead their case in damages, as none exist.

10.4 The Claimant cannot reasonably recover an additional (partially invented) £XXX.XX in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The PoFA states that the maximum sum that may be recovered is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100 (this sum also being the ceiling allowed by the BPA) and thus £100 is the maximum sum potentially recoverable under contract, regardless of whether the illegible small print on the signs attempted to bolt on a further sum (this is not known, but is a common trick by this industry).

10.5 Even the purported 'legal costs' are made up out of thin air. No individual Director or solicitor has signed the Particulars of Claim - in breach of Practice Direction 22, rendering the statement of truth a nullity - and this template roboclaim has clearly had no input from any supervising Solicitor, whether in house or externally. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA the claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent on preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated clerical staff.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Name
Signature
Date

Le_Kirk

Regarding your point 4.4, proof, i.e. evidence comes later at the Witness Statement (WS) stage. Your point 4.7 is a repeat (albeit with more facts) of 2.4.

You need paragraph numbers for those points between 7 and 8.

To support your point 10 and following, search the forum for the Abuse of Process thread by beamerguy and comments at post # 14 of that thread by Coupon-mad. There is some brilliant new info there that could be added to your defence points or, since you have introduced the point in your defence, could expand upon it in your WS.

Coupon-mad

4.4 Here I’m considering the including proof where these machines have been questioned across the country. The case between the Warrington MP and the HX guy where the MP received a number of complaints like what I’m going through. I believe the MP is taking the guy to court.

That'll be OK as long as it's not written with words like 'guy' and 'like what...' which are not formal English of course.

As above, change your last points to instead use the words from the 14th post in beamerguy's abuse of process thread.

Bakedalasker

I can't find the Abuse of Process thread. Does anyone have a link please.

Le_Kirk

How did you try searching? Use Search this Forum on the first page of the forum, Advanced Search, User Name beamerguy, Keyword(s) Abuse of Process, change the radio Button from Threads to Posts, hit Search Now.

Bakedalasker

Apologise but just found it.

Bakedalasker

Hi guys and thanks for the tips above. Some very useful information for Abuse of Process which I have included in point 10.


Below is my 2nd draft. For the points highlighted in red I need to return to the car park and take pictures of the signs. When I sent my appeal in they claimed all the signage was there and it was clear what I had to do if I had an issue.



I intend adding ot the red highlight regarding the Conflict of Interest the appeal had to the process. That being Gladstones are judge and jury to it all etc etc.


So onto my defence. Your input is much appreciated.


HX Car Park Management (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)



DEFENCE


1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.

2.1 It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXXXX when it was parked at Marco Island, Huntington Street, Nottingham, NG1 1AT in 2019.

2.2. The PCN stated the contravention as 'Failed to purchase and/or validate a pay and display ticket' and this contravention is denied. The Defendant denies liability for the purported parking charge (penalty), not least because it is already common ground that the correct parking charge (tariff) had already been paid.

2.3. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

2.4 The principle of de minimis applies here, namely that this is a legal action for technical breaches of rules or agreements where the impact of the breach is negligible.

3. It is denied that:

a. A contract was formed to pay anything more than the advertised tariff;
b. There was any agreement to pay a further penalty parking charge;
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site which prominently displayed the £100 penalty, in at least as large lettering as the tariffs shown at the machine
d. In addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums;
e. The claimant in fact expended the claimed additional sums;
f. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice.

4.1 The Defendant paid for a ticket for the appropriate time that the car was parked. The response to the initial appeal about the PCN from HX Car Park states "You entered the registration DE. As this is not the full correct registration for your vehicle the ticket is not valid". This clearly shows that the claimant agrees that a ticket was purchased, and the untrue allegation "you entered the registration DE" is denied.

4.2. It was only when a PCN arrived in the post, that the Defendant knew (too late) of what appeared to be a minor data problem caused by the Claimant's system itself incorrectly recording the vehicle registration. There is evidence on the internet, including trustpilot reviews, to show that other users of car parks run by HX Car Park Management have suffered similar machine problems.

4.3 Whilst entering the correct registration into the machine There were two witness on the scene to vouch for this, the defendant's daughter and her friend. The daughter called out the registration number directly from the vehicle number plate to make sure there was no error. This reinforces the suggestion in 4.2 that the machine was at fault.

4.4 Given the fact that the ANPR data did not match with a payment made, an automated PCN was issued. However, it was within the gift of the Claimant to ensure before starting enforcement at any site, that their systems are fit for purpose, including that they correctly store the data inputted by a driver.

4.5. A PCN in these circumstances is completely foreseeable by a professional parking firm, and it is averred that this punitive charge relies upon the Claimant's own data being wrong at the outset, and going unnoticed by a driver.

4.6. It is clear that the claimant is trying to claim an excessive amount for what may be an error in their own data recording equipment. It is preposterous to believe that any driver when promoted to enter a car registration would solely enter two letters. Even if the registration was entered as suggested by the claimant (which is disputed) it is accepted that payment was made, and that a punitive PCN has been issued for a technical breach of terms and conditions.

5. The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

6.1. It is clear that no conduct by the Defendant caused the penalty to arise and a professional parking firm could not reasonably lay any blame with the Defendant, for their own machine's data storage fault. The charge offends against the reasonable and statutory expectations of trader/consumer relations requiring 'open dealing' and the doctrine of good faith.

6.2. Further, the Claimant will no doubt hope to convince the court that a 'relevant contract' existed and was breached. As this would be a consumer contract, it must be 'fair' and 'transparent' as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

6.3 And the Claimant would have the court believe that a 'relevant obligation' existed, which under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (setting out the will of Parliament for parking tickets issued on private land, even if a Claimant is not relying upon that Act) is defined as ''an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract''.

6.4 The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

7. The Claimant may also try to rely upon the completely different Supreme Court case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, the Defendant avers that decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the facts. To quote from the decision in Beavis:

7.1.Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

7.2 Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

7.3 Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''


8. Further and in the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices under defined parameters (including when caused by failure of their own data processing/excessive storage) and to form/offer contracts in their own name, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

9. It is the Defendant's case that there can be no legitimate interest or commercial justification in pursuing paying patrons for a hundredfold penalty when it is agreed that payment was actually made.

9.1. The penalty represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.
10. The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'.

10.1. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'administration/recovery costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
10.1.a only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
10.1.b resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10.2 The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

10.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, case law and two statute laws hold that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

10.4 Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages.

10.5 It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters, and all parking firms are very familiar with this case:

http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2015/67.html

10.6. This charge is unconscionable and devoid of any 'legitimate interest', given the facts. To quote from the decision in the Beavis case at Para [108]: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''. Ad at [199]: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests.''

10.7. In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

“
10.7.a at para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''

10.7.b at para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.''

10.7.c at para 198. ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''
”
10.8. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

10.9 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts in England and Wales. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number FTQZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

10.10 That decision in Wales was appealed by VCS but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019, where District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. However, in light of the overriding objective (CPR 1) he would allow the Claimant to proceed, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.

10.11 In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later but in England - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being summarily struck out in the IOW and Hants circuit. These included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

10.12 At the hearing for BW Legal's N244 application to appeal against two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against Britannia Parking for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge, the Defendants successfully argued on all three counts including a citation of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court on 11 November 2019, where he agreed that:

10.12.a The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).
10.12.b The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.
10.12.c The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the POFA para 9.

10.13. Further, it was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14 and due to the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before. The Claimants were refused their request to appeal - given that the £160 claim in its entirety, was adjudged to have been 'tainted' by breaches of two statute laws and going behind a Supreme Court ruling - and both Defendants were awarded their costs.

10.14 Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the 'core exemption' as set out in the CRA 2015. The CMA Official Government Guidance says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).''

10.15 The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expended at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. 1.20 Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

10.16 In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

10.17 The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim £160 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015 and that relief from sanctions should be refused and costs will be sought by the Defendant on the indemnity basis.

10.18. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety (due to the similarities with the Southampton case where the entire claim was deemed 'tainted') and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant.



11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Name
Signature
Date

Coupon-mad

For the points highlighted in red I need to return to the car park and take pictures of the signs.

Not yet, as no photos or evidence go with the defence. Evidence is later.

You don't need to check 3b & 3c. they are true and I've never been to that car park!

Add more here:

6.4 The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

6.5. Further, to use and twist against a consumer, the failure of the Claimant's own old PDT machine system in order to paint a picture of failure by the innocent driver - who certainly did not only key in two letters - offends against paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms which may be unfair) in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

And remove the two links, as a defence has no attachments or links.

Bakedalasker

Defence nearly finished. I'll give it a proof read nearer the time of my submittel.



Only thing I'm considering adding is the IAS appeal I went through. I want to highlight the Conflict of Interest here where Gladstones run the appeal service then represent HX. I'm sure Gladstone will want to stay away from that so will not mention it in their claim. I see no harm in myself informing the judge on that score.


Defence


HX Car Park Management (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)



DEFENCE


1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged incident.

2.1 It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that claim relates to a purported debt as the result of the issue of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the vehicle XXXXXXX when it was parked at Marco Island, Huntington Street, Nottingham, NG1 1AT in 2019.

2.2. The PCN stated the contravention as 'Failed to purchase and/or validate a pay and display ticket' and this contravention is denied. The Defendant denies liability for the purported parking charge (penalty), not least because it is already common ground that the correct parking charge (tariff) had already been paid.

2.3. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

2.4 The principle of de minimis applies here, namely that this is a legal action for technical breaches of rules or agreements where the impact of the breach is negligible.

3. It is denied that:

a. A contract was formed to pay anything more than the advertised tariff;
b. There was any agreement to pay a further penalty parking charge;
c. That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site which prominently displayed the £100 penalty, in at least as large lettering as the tariffs shown at the machine
d. In addition to the parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums;
e. The claimant in fact expended the claimed additional sums;
f. The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the International Parking Community Code of Practice.

4.1 The Defendant paid for a ticket for the appropriate time that the car was parked. The response to the initial appeal about the PCN from HX Car Park states "You entered the registration DE. As this is not the full correct registration for your vehicle the ticket is not valid". This clearly shows that the claimant agrees that a ticket was purchased, and the untrue allegation "you entered the registration DE" is denied.

4.2. It was only when a PCN arrived in the post, that the Defendant knew (too late) of what appeared to be a minor data problem caused by the Claimant's system itself incorrectly recording the vehicle registration. There is evidence on the internet, including trustpilot reviews, to show that other users of car parks run by HX Car Park Management have suffered similar machine problems.

4.3 Whilst entering the correct registration into the machine There were two witness on the scene to vouch for this, the defendant's daughter and her friend. The daughter called out the registration number directly from the vehicle number plate to make sure there was no error. This reinforces the suggestion in 4.2 that the machine was at fault.

4.4 Given the fact that the ANPR data did not match with a payment made, an automated PCN was issued. However, it was within the gift of the Claimant to ensure before starting enforcement at any site, that their systems are fit for purpose, including that they correctly store the data inputted by a driver.

4.5. A PCN in these circumstances is completely foreseeable by a professional parking firm, and it is averred that this punitive charge relies upon the Claimant's own data being wrong at the outset, and going unnoticed by a driver.

4.6. It is clear that the claimant is trying to claim an excessive amount for what may be an error in their own data recording equipment. It is preposterous to believe that any driver when promoted to enter a car registration would solely enter two letters. Even if the registration was entered as suggested by the claimant (which is disputed) it is accepted that payment was made, and that a punitive PCN has been issued for a technical breach of terms and conditions.

5. The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

6.1. It is clear that no conduct by the Defendant caused the penalty to arise and a professional parking firm could not reasonably lay any blame with the Defendant, for their own machine's data storage fault. The charge offends against the reasonable and statutory expectations of trader/consumer relations requiring 'open dealing' and the doctrine of good faith.

6.2. Further, the Claimant will no doubt hope to convince the court that a 'relevant contract' existed and was breached. As this would be a consumer contract, it must be 'fair' and 'transparent' as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

6.3 And the Claimant would have the court believe that a 'relevant obligation' existed, which under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (setting out the will of Parliament for parking tickets issued on private land, even if a Claimant is not relying upon that Act) is defined as ''an obligation arising under the terms of a relevant contract''.

6.4 The Defendant avers that there was no such obligation or burden that could fairly and squarely fall at the feet of the Defendant that day, and that such an imbalance in consumer rights and interests certainly falls under Part 2 'Prohibitions' of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
6.5. Further, to use and twist against a consumer, the failure of the Claimant's own old PDT machine system in order to paint a picture of failure by the innocent driver - who certainly did not only key in two letters - offends against paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms which may be unfair) in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

7. The Claimant may also try to rely upon the completely different Supreme Court case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. However, the Defendant avers that decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the facts. To quote from the decision in Beavis:

7.1.Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

7.2 Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

7.3 Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''


8. Further and in the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices under defined parameters (including when caused by failure of their own data processing/excessive storage) and to form/offer contracts in their own name, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

9. It is the Defendant's case that there can be no legitimate interest or commercial justification in pursuing paying patrons for a hundredfold penalty when it is agreed that payment was actually made.

9.1. The penalty represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.
10. The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'.

10.1. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'administration/recovery costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
10.1.a only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
10.1.b resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10.2 The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

10.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, case law and two statute laws hold that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.
10.4 Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages.
10.5 It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters, and all parking firms are very familiar with this case:
10.6. This charge is unconscionable and devoid of any 'legitimate interest', given the facts. To quote from the decision in the Beavis case at Para [108]: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''. Ad at [199]: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests.''
10.7. In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

10.7.a at para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''
10.7.b at para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.''
10.7.c at para 198. ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''
10.8. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.
10.9 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts in England and Wales. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number FTQZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''
10.10 That decision in Wales was appealed by VCS but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019, where District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. However, in light of the overriding objective (CPR 1) he would allow the Claimant to proceed, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.
10.11 In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later but in England - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being summarily struck out in the IOW and Hants circuit. These included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''
10.12 At the hearing for BW Legal's N244 application to appeal against two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against Britannia Parking for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge, the Defendants successfully argued on all three counts including a citation of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court on 11 November 2019, where he agreed that:
10.12.a The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).
10.12.b The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.
10.12.c The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the POFA para 9.
10.13. Further, it was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14 and due to the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before. The Claimants were refused their request to appeal - given that the £160 claim in its entirety, was adjudged to have been 'tainted' by breaches of two statute laws and going behind a Supreme Court ruling - and both Defendants were awarded their costs.
10.14 Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the 'core exemption' as set out in the CRA 2015. The CMA Official Government Guidance says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).''
10.15 The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expended at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. 1.20 Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''
10.16 In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.
10.17 The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim £160 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015 and that relief from sanctions should be refused and costs will be sought by the Defendant on the indemnity basis.
10.18. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety (due to the similarities with the Southampton case where the entire claim was deemed 'tainted') and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Name
Signature
Date

Coupon-mad

Only thing I'm considering adding is the IAS appeal I went through. I want to highlight the Conflict of Interest here where Gladstones run the appeal service then represent HX. I'm sure Gladstone will want to stay away from that so will not mention it in their claim. I see no harm in myself informing the judge on that score.

That can go in your story in the witness statement (later).

I would also save all of this until the later WS (but don't forget to add it then!) because the rest is enough to cover it, at this stage:

10.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, case law and two statute laws hold that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.
10.4 Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages.
10.5 It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters, and all parking firms are very familiar with this case:
10.6. This charge is unconscionable and devoid of any 'legitimate interest', given the facts. To quote from the decision in the Beavis case at Para [108]: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''. Ad at [199]: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests.''
10.7. In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

10.7.a at para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''
10.7.b at para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.''
10.7.c at para 198. ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''
10.8. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.
10.9 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts in England and Wales. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number FTQZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''
10.10 That decision in Wales was appealed by VCS but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019, where District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. However, in light of the overriding objective (CPR 1) he would allow the Claimant to proceed, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.
10.11 In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later but in England - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being summarily struck out in the IOW and Hants circuit. These included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''
10.12 At the hearing for BW Legal's N244 application to appeal against two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against Britannia Parking for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge, the Defendants successfully argued on all three counts including a citation of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court on 11 November 2019, where he agreed that:
10.12.a The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).
10.12.b The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.
10.12.c The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the POFA para 9.
10.13. Further, it was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14 and due to the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before. The Claimants were refused their request to appeal - given that the £160 claim in its entirety, was adjudged to have been 'tainted' by breaches of two statute laws and going behind a Supreme Court ruling - and both Defendants were awarded their costs.
10.14 Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the 'core exemption' as set out in the CRA 2015. The CMA Official Government Guidance says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).''
10.15 The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expended at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. 1.20 Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''
10.16 In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

Your numbering needs re-doing. You have 4.1 without a 4 first, and 6.1 without a 6 first.