county court claim form

Coupon-mad

ccbcaq@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk.
That's correct.

Is it still working? Isn't it meant to be the 'justice' one now?

And as for not finding Gladstones email addy, yet you are on THIS forum, Eminowa?

Search the forum for Gladstones email - is that not obvious? Everything is here.

KeithP

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Is it still working? Isn't it mean to be the 'justice' one now?

Ooops... my mistake.

Of course it should be CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk

I write it often enough.

Eminowa

keith P, i know you do, i am just a bit tired. Thanks

Eminowa

Yeah court date set for the 14th of August. I need to send in my WS before the 24th of July. So i will posting what I have written in a bit for support. Thanks

Eminowa

In the County Court at XXXXX
Claim No. XXXXXXXX
Between
Xxxxxxxxxxxx Ltd (Claimant)
and
Xxxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

---

Witness Statement

---

1.I am X, of XXX, and I am the Defendant in this matter, and will say as follows.
2.Attached to this statement is a paginated bundle of documents marked TY1 to which I will refer.
3.The facts in this statement come from my personal knowledge. Where they are not within my personal knowledge, they are true to the best of my information and belief.
4. I confirm that I am the Registered Keeper of the vehicle in question on the March 2018 and thereafter date.

5. I confirm that my vehicle was parked in a bay belonging to my Client. The vehicle was parked there by invitation from my Client who was a tenants residing at this address at the material time.

6. I am a Nursing Asssitant, and I nurse different clients at their residential Home at different Locations,Exhibit A.

7. On this Material [DATE], I went to nurse my client at the said address, and parked my vehicle registration no, XXXXX in the residential car park.

8. I have been to this premises several times to nurse my client , and never for once I have seen any parking signage or received a parking charge notices or even seen a notice on the entrance of the car park saying private land.

9. On this material date I came out after nursing my client,and I saw a parking charge notice placed on my windscreen. I immediately read it and took it to my client, who was upset about it. My client offered to get it cancelled through the landlord.

10. I thought everything was okay, not until I received a claim form from the county court business centre on this particular parking charge notice, with an issue date of 18th March 2019. (Exhibit

11. As the claimant has repeatedly failed to clarify the nature of the claim, the defendant has assumed that it relates to an alleged breach of contract.

12. Therefore, liability for the alleged debt is disputed in its entirety.

13. The fact that no NTK was received and the first time i saw it was in the SAR this spring 11th April 2019. This breaches the IPC code of practice in Part D Schedule 4.1, which states that Operators may send a notice to the registered keeper when a parking charge remains Unpaid or where a Notice to Driver has not previously been issued. The claimant has failed to adhere to his Code of Practice. (Exhibit C).

14. The fact that I have parked here before to nurse my Client and never received a PCN and knew nothing about any alleged contract.
14a. Regarding signage: the defendant argues that there was no signage visible to the drivers entering the parking space in site at the time of the alleged parking contravention and woefully insufficient in conveying the terms of any alleged contract, particularly the most onerous, i.e., the £100 penalty. (Exhibit D)
b. Exhibit - D demonstrate that there are no signs of parking notice for the drivers when entering the car park by the driver.
c. On this matter, the defendant refers to the ruling of ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67, insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any alleged breach of parking terms were clear – both upon entry to the site and throughout.
d. The residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkyingEye distinguished. (Exhibit E)
15. In addition to Paragraph 4 on my defence on breach of claimiant purported contractual term.
We would argue that parking contracts fall under the definition of a distance contract, as specified in section 4 of the regulations:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded;
The signage at this location fails to create any contractual liability due to the failure to comply with the provisions of the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The purported contract created by the signage is a ‘distance contract’ as defined in section 5 of the Regulations, and is therefore subject to the mandatory requirements set out in section 13, relating to the statutory information which must be provided by the trader.

The Regulations state, at 13(1)(a), that the information listed in Schedule 2 must be given or made available to the consumer in a clear and comprehensible manner. The Claimant’s notice fails to comply with various clauses of Schedule 2, as follows:
2(c) – Requirement to provide a geographical address. The Claimant’s address is given as a PO Box number.(Exhibit G)
2(k) – Requirement to provide a complaint handling policy. This is not described on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(o) – Requirement to provide information about the right to cancel, or to state that there is no right to cancel. This is not stated on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(r) – Requirement to provide information about Codes of Conduct. This does not appear on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(x) – Requirement for access to an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism. Not indicated by the signage. (Exhibit G)

16.Due to these significant breaches of the Regulations, it is submitted that I cannot be held contractually liable, according to the wording of the Regulations at 13 (1) “Before the consumer is bound by a distance contract, the trader must comply to the above states rules. Claimant has failed to comply, so no contract was neither form nor breached.

17. I contest, therefore, that the tenant’s agreement provides an unfettered right to park in their assigned bay for themselves and their invited guests. This cannot be superseded, altered, or ignored by a parking management company post hoc. I refer previous cases such as Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] (Exhibit F), where it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

18. I believe that any parking management company with a legitimate interest in protecting the parking rights of a residential space – which is surely their only purpose – would immediately rescind any charges issued to residents and their legitimate visitor.

19. My vehicle clearly was 'authorised' as per the lease and primacy of contract and avers that the Claimant's conduct in aggressive ticketing is in fact a matter of tortious interference, being a private nuisance to residents.

20. In addition to my defence on paragraph 8, The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard). Where the
Claimant jumper into conclusion that the defendant saw the signs, and agreed with the signs terms and conditions.

21. I have considered the Code of Practice ("CoP") of the International parking community ("IPC"), of which the Claimant is an accredited member. A copy of paragraph 15 of the CoP, which relates to grace periods, is at page 13 of IPC CoP (Exhibit G). 15.1. Drivers should be allowed a sufficient amount of time to park and read any signs so they may make an informed decision as to whether or not to remain on the site. 15.2 Drivers must be allowed a minimum period of 10 minutes to leave a site after a pre-paid or permitted period of parking has expired. 15.3 The reference to 10 minutes in 15.2 above shall not apply where the period of pre-paid or permitted parking does not exceed 1 hour providing that the signage on the site makes it clear to the motorist, in a prominent font, that no grace period applies on that land.

22. In order to be an accredited member of the BPA, compliance with the CoP is compulsory, and a copy of paragraphs 4.1 and 6 of the CoP is at page XXX of AB1.

23.Paragraph 13 of the CoP clearly states that a grace period is to be applied to parking. The CoP makes clear that such grace periods are to be applied both at the start of any parking period and also at the end of any parking period. The whole point of these grace periods is to allow drivers time to find a parking space, to read the signage, and to exit the car park once they have finished parking. Grace periods are not defined, but the CoP requires them to be "a minimum of 10 minutes" either side of the actual parking (paragraphs 13.2 and 13.4).

24. The Claimant may rely on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (Exhibit D) as a binding precedent on the lower court. However, that only assists the Claimant if the facts of the case are the same, or broadly the same. In Beavis, it was common ground between the parties that the terms of a contract had been breached, whereas it is my position that no such breach occurred in this case, because there was no valid contract, and also because the 'legitimate interest' in enforcing parking rules for retailers and shoppers in Beavis does not apply to these circumstances. Therefore, this case can be distinguished from Beavis on the facts and circumstances.

25. Even if the court is minded to accept that a sign was visible, the wording on the sign was prohibitive. Unlike in the Beavis vs ParkingEye case, the Claimant offered no licence to park if not a ‘permit holder’. A purported licence to stop without a permit, in exchange for payment of a ‘charge’ on the one hand, cannot be offered when that same conduct is, on the other hand, expressly prohibited in the signage wording. This does not create any possible contract.

26. This is clear from several cases. An example In PCM-UK v Bull et all B4GF26K6 [2016], residents were parking on access roads. The signage forbade parking and so no contract was in place. A trespass had occurred, but that meant only the landowner could claim, not the parking company.

27. The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

28. In additional to paragraph 3b schedule 1, signage 5. Am relying on pace V Lengyel et all C7GF6E3R(2017) the Judged ruling was that the consequences of any contract between the claimant and the defendant required the defendant to do something which he simply could not do, that is display a permit. His inability not to do this was not caused by any act or omission by the defendant but by a state of affairs over which he had no control. Indeed, it must have been obvious to the claimant that if erected a sign providing that it was a term of contract that the driver of any parked vehicle displays a permit. Tt must have been known in advance that many drivers would simply be unable to do this. .
Therefore, insofar as there was any contract between the parties , it was invalid under doctrine of impossibility of performance.

29. I am a health professional who had gone to nurse his client, and was fully authorised by my client to park on his parking bay. If there is no exemption for doctors, nurses and nursing assistant visiting patients and client in the flats then the contract terms are inherently unfair and incapable of binding that driver, who is certainly not an unauthorised visitor.

30. This may be the case of a trespass other than a breach of contract. But since it was not the case of the defendant lable of a trespass, which can only be pursuant that the landowner, I urge the court to kindly strike the case out.

31. Finally, having outlined my witness statement with supporting evidence, I encourage the court to strike out the claims against the Defendant as there are no sound grounds of claim and to grant compensation in accordance to the defendant cost of schedule (Exhibit F)

Coupon-mad

5. I confirm that my vehicle was parked in a bay belonging to my Client. The vehicle was parked there by invitation from my Client who was a tenants residing at this address at the material time.

Can you evidence that? Will the resident write and sign a WS to accompany yours?

Only mention GRACE PERIODS if relevant (ONLY if the car was there mere minutes).

Typo here:
ParkyingEye distinguished. (Exhibit E)

And you do not put the Beavis case in as an exhibit - the Judge will know it.

Delete all of this:

15. In addition to Paragraph 4 on my defence on breach of claimiant purported contractual term.
We would argue that parking contracts fall under the definition of a distance contract, as specified in section 4 of the regulations:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded;
The signage at this location fails to create any contractual liability due to the failure to comply with the provisions of the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The purported contract created by the signage is a ‘distance contract’ as defined in section 5 of the Regulations, and is therefore subject to the mandatory requirements set out in section 13, relating to the statutory information which must be provided by the trader.

The Regulations state, at 13(1)(a), that the information listed in Schedule 2 must be given or made available to the consumer in a clear and comprehensible manner. The Claimant’s notice fails to comply with various clauses of Schedule 2, as follows:
2(c) – Requirement to provide a geographical address. The Claimant’s address is given as a PO Box number.(Exhibit G)
2(k) – Requirement to provide a complaint handling policy. This is not described on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(o) – Requirement to provide information about the right to cancel, or to state that there is no right to cancel. This is not stated on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(r) – Requirement to provide information about Codes of Conduct. This does not appear on the signage. (Exhibit G)
2(x) – Requirement for access to an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism. Not indicated by the signage. (Exhibit G)

16.Due to these significant breaches of the Regulations, it is submitted that I cannot be held contractually liable, according to the wording of the Regulations at 13 (1) “Before the consumer is bound by a distance contract, the trader must comply to the above states rules. Claimant has failed to comply, so no contract was neither form nor breached.

Do put in Exhibit G (signage pics) if they support your case and show they were non-prominent and hidden by the bins, etc.

Make sure you put in as exhibits all 3 county court cases you mentioned:

Pace v Mr N*
PCM v Bull*
PACE v Lengyel*

What about Link v Parkinson*, seeing as your Claimant IS Link?

What about Jopson v Homeguard* and draw a similarity with the 'life would be unworkable in a block of flats' comment, saying that life would be unworkable if ill or elderly flat owners had to face the worry and possible expense of paying unfair penalty parking charges for nurses on a brief visit, when there should be a system to exempt such visitors and the burden for that lies with the parking firm?

Like I said here to a taxi driver, you can paint a similar picture. Try to adapt the argument to suit a nurse's 'short duration' visit:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/76001754#Comment_76001754

*All are hosted by the Parking Prankster in his 'case law' and 'more case law' pages.

Eminowa

"Make sure you put in as exhibits all 3 county court cases you mentioned:

Pace v Mr N*
PCM v Bull*
PACE v Lengyel*
What about Link v Parkinson*, seeing as your Claimant IS Link?"

I don't think these cases are on my defence, can I still use then for WS, Can i?

Eminowa

1.I am X, of XXX, and I am the Defendant in this matter, and will say as follows.
2.Attached to this statement is a paginated bundle of documents marked TY1 to which I will refer.
3.The facts in this statement come from my personal knowledge. Where they are not within my personal knowledge, they are true to the best of my information and belief.
4. I confirm that I am the Registered Keeper of the vehicle in question on the March 2018 and thereafter date.

5. I am a Nursing Asssitant, and I nurse different clients at their residential Home at different Locations.

6.On this Material [DATE], I went to nurse my client at the said address, and parked my vehicle registration

7. I parked on a residential car park where my client lives, like i always do and never for once have i had a PCN nor had any issues from the residents about parking all through my visit to this client..(Exhibit A)

8. I have been to this premises several times to nurse my client , and never for once I have seen any parking signage or received a parking charge notices or even seen a notice on the entrance of the car park saying private land. (Exhibit

9. On this material date I came out after nursing my client,and I saw a parking charge notice placed on my windscreen. I immediately read it and took it to my client, who was upset about it. My client offered to get it cancelled through the landlord.

10. I thought everything was okay, not until I received a claim form from the county court business centre on this particular parking charge notice, with an issue date of 18th March 2019. (Exhibit C)

11. As the claimant has repeatedly failed to clarify the nature of the claim, the defendant has assumed that it relates to an alleged breach of contract.

12. Therefore, liability for the alleged debt is disputed in its entirety.

13. The fact that no NTK was received and the first time i saw it was in the SAR this spring 11th April 2019. This breaches the IPC code of practice in Part D Schedule 4.1, which states that Operators may send a notice to the registered keeper when a parking charge remains Unpaid or where a Notice to Driver has not previously been issued. The claimant has failed to adhere to his Code of Practice. (Exhibit D).

14. The fact that I have parked here before to nurse my Client and never received a PCN and knew nothing about any alleged contract.
14a. Regarding signage: the defendant argues that there was no signage visible to the drivers entering the parking space in site at the time of the alleged parking contravention and woefully insufficient in conveying the terms of any alleged contract, particularly the most onerous, i.e., the £100 penalty. (Exhibit D)
b. Exhibit - D demonstrate that there are no signs of parking notice for the drivers when entering the car park by the driver.
c. On this matter, the defendant refers to the ruling of ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67, insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any alleged breach of parking terms were clear – both upon entry to the site and throughout.
d. The residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkyingEye distinguished.

15. I contest, therefore, that the tenant’s agreement provides an unfettered right to park in their assigned bay for themselves and their invited guests. This cannot be superseded, altered, or ignored by a parking management company post hoc. I refer previous cases such as Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] (Exhibit E), where it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

16. I believe that any parking management company with a legitimate interest in protecting the parking rights of a residential space – which is surely their only purpose – would immediately rescind any charges issued to residents and their legitimate visitor.

17. My vehicle clearly was 'authorised' as per the lease and primacy of contract and avers that the Claimant's conduct in aggressive ticketing is in fact a matter of tortuous interference, being a private nuisance to residents.

18. In addition to my defence on paragraph 8, The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard). Where the
Claimant jumper into conclusion that the defendant saw the signs, and agreed with the signs terms and conditions.

19. I have considered the Code of Practice ("CoP") of the International parking community ("IPC"), of which the Claimant is an accredited member. A copy of paragraph 15 of the CoP, which relates to grace periods, is at page 13 of IPC CoP (Exhibit G). 15.1. Drivers should be allowed a sufficient amount of time to park and read any signs so they may make an informed decision as to whether or not to remain on the site. 15.2 Drivers must be allowed a minimum period of 10 minutes to leave a site after a pre-paid or permitted period of parking has expired. 15.3 The reference to 10 minutes in 15.2 above shall not apply where the period of pre-paid or permitted parking does not exceed 1 hour providing that the signage on the site makes it clear to the motorist, in a prominent font, that no grace period applies on that land.

20. In order to be an accredited member of the BPA, compliance with the CoP is compulsory, and a copy of paragraphs 4.1 and 6 of the CoP is at page XXX of AB1.

21.Paragraph 13 of the CoP clearly states that a grace period is to be applied to parking. The CoP makes clear that such grace periods are to be applied both at the start of any parking period and also at the end of any parking period. The whole point of these grace periods is to allow drivers time to find a parking space, to read the signage, and to exit the car park once they have finished parking. Grace periods are not defined, but the CoP requires them to be "a minimum of 10 minutes" either side of the actual parking (paragraphs 13.2 and 13.4).

22. The Claimant may rely on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 as a binding precedent on the lower court. However, that only assists the Claimant if the facts of the case are the same, or broadly the same. In Beavis, it was common ground between the parties that the terms of a contract had been breached, whereas it is my position that no such breach occurred in this case, because there was no valid contract, and also because the 'legitimate interest' in enforcing parking rules for retailers and shoppers in Beavis does not apply to these circumstances. Therefore, this case can be distinguished from Beavis on the facts and circumstances.

23. Even if the court is minded to accept that a sign was visible, the wording on the sign was prohibitive. Unlike in the Beavis vs ParkingEye case, the Claimant offered no licence to park if not a ‘permit holder’. A purported licence to stop without a permit, in exchange for payment of a ‘charge’ on the one hand, cannot be offered when that same conduct is, on the other hand, expressly prohibited in the signage wording. This does not create any possible contract.

24. This is clear from several cases. An example In PCM-UK v Bull et all B4GF26K6 [2016], residents were parking on access roads. The signage forbade parking and so no contract was in place. A trespass had occurred, but that meant only the landowner could claim, not the parking company.

25. The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

26. In additional to paragraph 3b schedule 1, signage 5. Am relying on pace V Lengyel et all C7GF6E3R(2017) the Judged ruling was that the consequences of any contract between the claimant and the defendant required the defendant to do something which he simply could not do, that is display a permit. His inability not to do this was not caused by any act or omission by the defendant but by a state of affairs over which he had no control. Indeed, it must have been obvious to the claimant that if erected a sign providing that it was a term of contract that the driver of any parked vehicle displays a permit. Tt must have been known in advance that many drivers would simply be unable to do this. .
Therefore, insofar as there was any contract between the parties , it was invalid under doctrine of impossibility of performance.

27.Life would be a lot hardly,difficult and unworkable if ill or elderly flats owners had to face the worry and possible expense of paying unfair penalty parking charges for nurses on a brief visit, when there should be a system to exempt such visitors and the burden for that lies with the parking firm?

28. I am a health professional who had gone to nurse his client, and was fully authorised by my client to park on his parking bay. If there is no exemption for doctors, nurses and nursing assistant visiting patients and client in the flats then the contract terms are inherently unfair and incapable of binding that driver, who is certainly not an unauthorised visitor.

29. This may be the case of a trespass other than a breach of contract. But since it was not the case of the defendant liable of a trespass, which can only be pursuant that the landowner, I urge the court to kindly strike the case out.

30. Finally, having outlined my witness statement with supporting evidence, I encourage the court to strike out the claims against the Defendant as there are no sound grounds of claim and to grant compensation in accordance to the defendant cost of schedule (Exhibit F)

Eminowa

i cant find a case law to print out of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard)
please can someone direct me, as i cant find it on the Parking Prankster site. thanks

Quentin

You use both IPC & BPA cops?

Your claimant is only accredited by IPC isn't it??