county court claim form

Eminowa

Draft defence Update

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

LINK PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1.) The Particulars of Claim are denied.

2. The vehicle with registration mark XXXX XXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper, was parked on the material day correctly within a designated bay in a residential property, as the driver of the vehicle had a client who he had gone to nurse on that material date.

3.) The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant xxxx was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4.)The particulars of claim state that the vehicle XXX XXX incurred the charge for breaching the terms of parking on the land at XXXX Court Swindon.
The particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of practice direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

5.) No evidence has been supplied by this claimant as to who parked the vehicle. Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 there is no presumption in law as to who parked a vehicle on private land nor does there exist any obligation for a keeper to name a driver. The defendant chooses to defend this claim as the registered keeper, as is their right.

6.) Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

7.) ‘Keeper liability’ under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“the POFA”) is dependent upon full compliance with that Act. It is submitted that the Claimant’s Parking Charge Notice and/or Notice to Keeper failed to comply with the statutory wording set out in Schedule 4, Section 9 (f) POFA. And, further, that the signs failed to provide ‘adequate notice’ of any charge. Any non-compliance voids any right to ‘keeper liability’.

8.) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

9.) The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

10.) The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

11.) The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, ('the Beavis case') yet such an assertion is not supported by any similarity in the location, circumstances nor signage. Absent any offer or agreement on a charge, the Beavis case does not assist the claimant and in fact, supports this defence in that the Defendant was the driver (not so here).

12.) The claim form itself is vague and lacks pertinent information as to the grounds for the claimant’s case. The particulars of claim fail to meet CPR16.4 and the Pre-action Protocol. It merely provides a date, location, and an "amount" consisting of a completely unsubstantiated and inflated three-figure sum, vaguely and incoherently adduced by the claimant's solicitors. Gladstones have also added ‘Legal representative’s costs’ of £50. I propose these have not been incurred by the claimant but artificially invented in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery.

13.) The Claimant is put to strict proof to explain why they have failed to comply with the Protocol and why Gladstones appear to consider themselves and their clients to be immune from the rules of the court, which bind every other litigant.

14.) The Claimant has failed to follow the Code of Practice (CoP) of their Trade Body, as regards clear signage and acting in a professional manner to ensure that action is not taken without any cause. The Supreme Court Judges in the Beavis case held that such a CoP is effectively 'regulation' full compliance with which is both expected and binding upon any parking operator.

15.) It is submitted that the conduct of the Claimant in pursuing this claim is wholly unreasonable and vexatious. As such, the Defendant is keeping a note of wasted time and costs so far in dealing with this matter, with a view to claiming any reasonable losses connected with defending this claim and attending any hearings.

16.) The particulars of Claim represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.


In summary, it is the Defendant’s position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using the case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

Dated this XX day of April 2019
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The Defendant believes that the facts stated in this Defence are true.
SIGNED

Coupon-mad

Eminowa wrote: »

i am getting confused now, i thought i was reading in a thread where someone mention that we should mention who the driver was. in regards to that, the PPC are pursueing the registered keeper/ driver because they don't really know who parked on the premises.
i am getting confused here now, because i read on different thread where POFA was used say they cant work on Assumption.

They can't, but you need to decide which route to take:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/74897330#Comment_74897330

Saves me typing...

Eminowa

updated draft defence


IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

LINK PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1.) The Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of vehicle registration number XXXXXXX on the material date. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2.) The facts of the matter are that the Defendant is a visitor of XXXXXXX. The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim consists of a relatively small number of poorly marked ‘private land’ parking spaces located. Given this lack of clarity and the fact there was no clear signs when the Defendant arrived and parked, no contract can be construed from the Claimant's signage, under the contra proferentem principle.

3.) The sign does not conform to the IPC's Code of Practice:
a. (Schedule 1 – Signage, 4), which states the signs should be “clearly legible and placed in such a position (or positions) such that a driver of a vehicle is able to see them clearly upon entering the site or parking a vehicle within the site”; The sign located are therefore impossible to see by a driver in a passing vehicle.
b. (Schedule 1 – Signage, 5), which states the signage ought to “have clear and intelligible wording and be designed such that it is clear to the reasonable driver that he is entering into a contract with the creditor or committing a trespass as the case may be”; Pace V Lengyel (from May 2017) showed that the Claimant's signs (including the one shown by the Claimant in this case) fail to enter into contract with the driver as implied by the Claimant. Nowhere on the sign does it inform the reader that by parking in xxxxxx, he/she is entering into a contract with the Claimant. The words “contract’ or “agreement’ do not appear at all within the sign. The phrase “Terms and Conditions” are not synonymous with a contract. Furthermore, the opening words of the sign appear to be designed more to ward off trespassers than to enter into a contract with the driver. No promise was made by the driver that could constitute consideration because there was no offer known nor accepted. No consideration flowed from the Claimant.

4. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.
The Defendant was authorised by a resident of the flat with a lease agreement, therefore was not unauthorised. The defendant in this case had no reason to conclude or agree that a parking charge applied to such a visitor.

5.) The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant xxxx was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

6.)The particulars of claim state that the vehicle XXX XXX incurred the charge for breaching the terms of parking on the land at XXXX Court Swindon.
The particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of practice direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

7.) No evidence has been supplied by this claimant as to who parked the vehicle. Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 there is no presumption in law as to who parked a vehicle on private land nor does there exist any obligation for a keeper to name a driver. The defendant chooses to defend this claim as the registered keeper, as is their right.

8.) Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

9.) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

10.) The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

11.) The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

12.) The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, ('the Beavis case') yet such an assertion is not supported by any similarity in the location, circumstances nor signage. Absent any offer or agreement on a charge, the Beavis case does not assist the claimant and in fact, supports this defence in that the Defendant was the driver (not so here).

13. No standing - this distinguishes this case from the Beavis case: It is unclear whether the claimant holds a legitimate contract at this private road. As an agent, the Claimant has no legal right to bring such a claim in their name which should be in the name of the landowner.

14. The Beavis case confirmed the fact that, if it is a matter of trespass (not breach of any contract), a parking firm has no standing as a non-landowner to pursue even nominal damages.
The charge is an unenforceable penalty based upon a lack of commercial justification. The Beavis case confirmed that the penalty rule is certainly engaged in any case of a private parking charge and was only disengaged due to the unique circumstances of that case, which do not resemble this claim.

15.) The claim form itself is vague and lacks pertinent information as to the grounds for the claimant’s case. The particulars of claim fail to meet CPR16.4 and the Pre-action Protocol. It merely provides a date, location, and an "amount" consisting of a completely unsubstantiated and inflated three-figure sum, vaguely and incoherently adduced by the claimant's solicitors. Gladstones have also added ‘Legal representative’s costs’ of £50. I propose these have not been incurred by the claimant but artificially invented in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery.

The Claimant's solicitor “Gladstones” is known to be a serial litigant, enabling parking firms to issue up to 1,000 similar unjustified and unchecked claims on a weekly basis, using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 of income.

16.) The Claimant is put to strict proof to explain why they have failed to comply with the Protocol and why Gladstones appear to consider themselves and their clients to be immune from the rules of the court, which bind every other litigant.

17.) The Claimant has failed to follow the Code of Practice (CoP) of their Trade Body, as regards clear signage and acting in a professional manner to ensure that action is not taken without any cause. The Supreme Court Judges in the Beavis case held that such a CoP is effectively 'regulation' full compliance with which is both expected and binding upon any parking operator.

18.) It is submitted that the conduct of the Claimant in pursuing this claim is wholly unreasonable and vexatious. As such, the Defendant is keeping a note of wasted time and costs so far in dealing with this matter, with a view to claiming any reasonable losses connected with defending this claim and attending any hearings.

19.) The particulars of Claim represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.


In summary, it is the Defendant’s position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using the case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

Dated this XX day of April 2019
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The Defendant believes that the facts stated in this Defence are true.
SIGNED

Le_Kirk

2.) The facts of the matter are that the Defendant is a visitor of XXXXXXX. The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim consists of a relatively small number of poorly marked ‘private land’ parking spaces located**. Given this lack of clarity and the fact there was no clear signs when the Defendant arrived and parked, no contract can be construed from the Claimant's signage, under the contra proferentem principle.

** Is something missing here? It just stops!

there were [STRIKE]was[/STRIKE] no clear

Coupon-mad

Remove #13 as you already have that covered, in #10, which is worded better.

Remove #7 because your paragraphs higher up already admit you parked.

And this sentence trails off and makes no sense ending with the word 'located':

2.) The facts of the matter are that the Defendant is a visitor of XXXXXXX. The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim consists of a relatively small number of poorly marked [STRIKE]‘private land’ [/STRIKE]parking spaces located.

Located where? Add:

at XXXX Court Swindon, where the Defendant was an authorised visitor.

And as I've shown struck through, remove 'private land' as it implies that there were clear signs telling you that...I'm sure there weren't.

Eminowa

After so much deliberation, i have decided to go down this route

Here is the defence i intend to use. sorry if i am been a pain. my apologies

Here is my Draft defence

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

LINK PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1.) The Defendant was the registered keeper of vehicle registration number XXXXXXX on the material date. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The vehicle with registration mark XXXX XXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper, was parked on the material day correctly within a designated bay in a residential property, as the driver of the vehicle had a client who he had gone to nurse on that material date, therefore was not unauthorised. The defendant in this case had no reason to conclude or agree that a parking charge applied to such a visitor.

3.) The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant xxxx was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4.)The particulars of claim state that the vehicle XXX XXX incurred the charge for breaching the terms of parking on the land at XXXX Court Swindon.
The particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of practice direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

5.) No evidence has been supplied by this claimant as to who parked the vehicle. Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 there is no presumption in law as to who parked a vehicle on private land nor does there exist any obligation for a keeper to name a driver. The defendant chooses to defend this claim as the registered keeper, as is their right.

6.) Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

7.) ‘Keeper liability’ under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“the POFA”) is dependent upon full compliance with that Act. It is submitted that the Claimant’s Parking Charge Notice and/or Notice to Keeper failed to comply with the statutory wording set out in Schedule 4, Section 9 (f) POFA. And, further, that the signs failed to provide ‘adequate notice’ of any charge. Any non-compliance voids any right to ‘keeper liability’.

8.) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

9.) The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

10.) The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

11.) The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, ('the Beavis case') yet such an assertion is not supported by any similarity in the location, circumstances nor signage. Absent of any offer or agreement on a charge, the Beavis case does not assist the claimant and in fact, supports this defence in that the Defendant was the driver (not so here).

12.) The claim form itself is vague and lacks pertinent information as to the grounds for the claimant’s case. The particulars of claim fail to meet CPR16.4 and the Pre-action Protocol. It merely provides a date, location, and an "amount" consisting of a completely unsubstantiated and inflated three-figure sum, vaguely and incoherently adduced by the claimant's solicitors. Gladstones have also added ‘Legal representative’s costs’ of £50. I propose these have not been incurred by the claimant but artificially invented in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery.
The Claimant's solicitor “Gladstones” is known to be a serial litigant, enabling parking firms to issue up to 1,000 similar unjustified and unchecked claims on a weekly basis, using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 of income.

13.) The Claimant is put to strict proof to explain why they have failed to comply with the Protocol and why Gladstones appear to consider themselves and their clients to be immune from the rules of the court, which bind every other litigant.

14.) The Claimant has failed to follow the Code of Practice (CoP) of their Trade Body, as regards clear signage and acting in a professional manner to ensure that action is not taken without any cause. The Supreme Court Judges in the Beavis case held that such a CoP is effectively 'regulation' full compliance with which is both expected and binding upon any parking operator.

15.) It is submitted that the conduct of the Claimant in pursuing this claim is wholly unreasonable and vexatious. As such, the Defendant is keeping a note of wasted time and costs so far in dealing with this matter, with a view to claiming any reasonable losses connected with defending this claim and attending any hearings.

16.) The particulars of Claim represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.


In summary, it is the Defendant’s position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using the case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

Dated this XX day of April 2019
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The Defendant believes that the facts stated in this Defence are true.
SIGNED

Eminowa

please i need critics on my defences please.....this is the route i want to go through

Eminowa

coupon-mad.
Please review my draft defence .......please. thanks

KeithP

You still have over two weeks before your Defence is due.

Stop panicking.


There you are... have another bump on me.

Eminowa

What's this?

EMINOWA
View public profile

updated draft defence


IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

LINK PARKING LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1.) The Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of vehicle registration number XXXXXXX on the material date. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2.) The facts of the matter are that the Defendant is a visitor of XXXXXXX. The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim consists of a relatively small number of poorly marked parking spaces located at XXXX Court Swindon, where the Defendant was an authorised visitor. Given this lack of clarity and the fact there were no clear signs when the Defendant arrived and parked, no contract can be construed from the Claimant's signage, under the contra proferentem principle.

3.) The sign does not conform to the IPC's Code of Practice:
a. (Schedule 1 – Signage, 4), which states the signs should be “clearly legible and placed in such a position (or positions) such that a driver of a vehicle is able to see them clearly upon entering the site or parking a vehicle within the site”; The sign located are therefore impossible to see by a driver in a passing vehicle.
b. (Schedule 1 – Signage, 5), which states the signage ought to “have clear and intelligible wording and be designed such that it is clear to the reasonable driver that he is entering into a contract with the creditor or committing a trespass as the case may be”; Pace V Lengyel (from May 2017) showed that the Claimant's signs (including the one shown by the Claimant in this case) fail to enter into contract with the driver as implied by the Claimant. Nowhere on the sign does it inform the reader that by parking in xxxxxx, he/she is entering into a contract with the Claimant. The words “contract’ or “agreement’ do not appear at all within the sign. The phrase “Terms and Conditions” are not synonymous with a contract. Furthermore, the opening words of the sign appear to be designed more to ward off trespassers than to enter into a contract with the driver. No promise was made by the driver that could constitute consideration because there was no offer known nor accepted. No consideration flowed from the Claimant.

4.) Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.
The Defendant was authorised by a resident of the flat with a lease agreement, therefore was not unauthorised. The defendant in this case had no reason to conclude or agree that a parking charge applied to such a visitor.

5.) The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant xxxx was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

6.)The particulars of claim state that the vehicle XXX XXX incurred the charge for breaching the terms of parking on the land at XXXX Court Swindon.
The particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of practice direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

7.) Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

8.) The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

9.) The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

10.) The Claimant’s signs are in small print, the terms are illegible. And so no contract was formed with the driver to pay £60, £100, £160 or any sum at all, since the signs have no legible ‘charge’ which could be visible on arrival and the wording is prohibitive and in any event. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by any driver who was not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they - and this Defendant- would later be pursued. Where terms on a parking sign are not seen then there can be no contract (the Defendant relies upon the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest; CA 5 APR 2000 in this regard).

11.) The Claimant may try to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, ('the Beavis case') yet such an assertion is not supported by any similarity in the location, circumstances nor signage. Absent any offer or agreement on a charge, the Beavis case does not assist the claimant and in fact, supports this defence in that the Defendant was the driver (not so here).

12.)The Beavis case confirmed the fact that, if it is a matter of trespass (not breach of any contract), a parking firm has no standing as a non-landowner to pursue even nominal damages.
The charge is an unenforceable penalty based upon a lack of commercial justification. The Beavis case confirmed that the penalty rule is certainly engaged in any case of a private parking charge and was only disengaged due to the unique circumstances of that case, which do not resemble this claim.

13.) The claim form itself is vague and lacks pertinent information as to the grounds for the claimant’s case. The particulars of claim fail to meet CPR16.4 and the Pre-action Protocol. It merely provides a date, location, and an "amount" consisting of a completely unsubstantiated and inflated three-figure sum, vaguely and incoherently adduced by the claimant's solicitors. Gladstones have also added ‘Legal representative’s costs’ of £50. I propose these have not been incurred by the claimant but artificially invented in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery.

The Claimant's solicitor “Gladstones” is known to be a serial litigant, enabling parking firms to issue up to 1,000 similar unjustified and unchecked claims on a weekly basis, using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 of income.

14.) The Claimant is put to strict proof to explain why they have failed to comply with the Protocol and why Gladstones appear to consider themselves and their clients to be immune from the rules of the court, which bind every other litigant.

15.) The Claimant has failed to follow the Code of Practice (CoP) of their Trade Body, as regards clear signage and acting in a professional manner to ensure that action is not taken without any cause. The Supreme Court Judges in the Beavis case held that such a CoP is effectively 'regulation' full compliance with which is both expected and binding upon any parking operator.

16.) It is submitted that the conduct of the Claimant in pursuing this claim is wholly unreasonable and vexatious. As such, the Defendant is keeping a note of wasted time and costs so far in dealing with this matter, with a view to claiming any reasonable losses connected with defending this claim and attending any hearings.

17.) The particulars of Claim represents neither a necessary deterrent, nor an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests, and the Beavis case is distinguished.


In summary, it is the Defendant’s position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using the case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

Dated this XX day of April 2019
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The Defendant believes that the facts stated in this Defence are true.
SIGNED