One Parking Solution - Visitors Space PCN

Coupon-mad

I can tell you copied a really old one, by virtue of this wrong heading:

DEFENCE STATEMENT

...and the 'preliminary' waffle and odd numbering, none of which do we use now. I didn't read further, as I suggest you look again at the example defences and find a more recent one with no 'prelim' stuff and the right heading and numbering.

AOneVS

Thanks for the advice. I've updated the defence, removing some duplication and extraneous fluff:

Preliminary

1. The Particulars of Claim lack specificity and are embarrassing. The Defendant is prejudiced and is unable to prepare a full and complete Defence. The Defendant reserves the right to seek from the Court permission to serve an Amended Defence should the Claimant add to or expand his Particulars at a later stage of these proceedings and/or to limit the Claimant only to the unevidenced allegations in the Particulars.

2. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of any contract and neither comply with the CPR 16 in respect of statements of case, nor the relevant practice direction in respect of claims formed by contract or conduct. The Defendant further notes the Claimant's failure to engage in pre-action correspondence in accordance with the pre-action protocol and with the express aim of avoiding contested litigation.

Background

3. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant is the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXZZZ which is the subject of these proceedings.

4. It is admitted that on [date] the Defendant's vehicle was parked at [location]

5. It is denied that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle. The Claimant is put to strict proof.
5.1. The Claimant has provided no evidence (in pre-action correspondence or otherwise) that the Defendant was the driver. The Defendant avers that the Claimant is therefore limited to pursuing the Defendant in these proceedings under the provisions set out by statute in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("POFA")
5.2. Before seeking to rely on the keeper liability provisions of Schedule 4 POFA the Claimant must demonstrate that:
5.2.1. there was a ‘relevant obligation’ either by way of a breach of contract, trespass or other tort; and
5.2.2. that it has followed the required deadlines and wording as described in the Act to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper.
It is not admitted that the Claimant has complied with the relevant statutory requirements.

5.3. To the extent that the Claimant may seek to allege that any such presumption exist, the Defendant expressly denies that there is any presumption in law (whether in statute or otherwise) that the keeper is the driver. Further, the Defendant denies that the vehicle keeper is obliged to name the driver to a private parking firm. Had this been the intention of parliament, they would have made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those provisions do not apply to this matter.

Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract

6. It is denied that the Defendant was in breach of any parking conditions or was not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and leaseholder of [address], whose tenancy agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant allocated bay, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle or the requirement to display a parking permit. A copy of the lease will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given.

7. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

7. Accordingly it is denied that:
7.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
7.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
7.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.

8. There can be no ‘legitimate interest’ in penalising residents or their visitors for using parking spaces, under the excuse of a scheme where ostensibly and as far as the landowner is concerned, the parking firm is contracted for the benefit of the residents. It is unconscionable, contrary to the requirement of good faith and ‘out of all proportion to any legitimate interest’ to fine residents or their visitors for using allocated parking spaces.

Alternative Defence - Failure to set out clearly parking terms
9. In the alternative, the Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout.
9.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.
9.1.1. At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation;
9.1.2. The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association’s ("BPA") Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory; and
9.1.3. The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgment of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3
9.2. The Defendant avers that the residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkingEye distinguished.

9.3 It is a forbidding sign that cannot create a contract. In the cases of B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B, B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L it was demonstrated that forbidding signage at residential parking spaces did not create a contract.

10. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking parking management. The Claimant has provided no proof of any such entitlement.

Costs on the claim - disproportionate and disingenuous

11. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

12. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny.

13. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

14. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself and there has been no legal advice or personal involvement by any solicitor in churning out this template claim.

15. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages.

16. Unlike this mendacious and greedy Claimant, ParkingEye themselves took on board the Beavis case outcome and they never add fake costs on top of the parking charge. It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters, and all parking firms are very familiar with this case:

http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2015/67.html

“ at para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''

at para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.''

at para 198. ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''
”

17. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

18. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

19. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

20. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed earlier General Judgment or Orders of DJ Grand, who (when sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court in 2018 and 2019) has struck out several parking firm claims. These include a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Orders have been identical in striking out both claims without a hearing, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

21. That is not an isolated judgment striking a parking claim out for repeatedly adding sums they are not entitled to recover. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number FTQZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated:

''Upon it being recorded that Distract Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court v Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

22. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made, in trying to justify the unjustifiable.

23. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

24. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I confirm that the contents of this Defence are true.

AOneVS

That prelim came from a suggested defence in Newbies thread. I'll add the proper header when submitting the final version.

Le_Kirk

I wouldn't have a hyperlink in a defence (or a WS or POPLA appeal come to that) because you cannot expect the judge or court clerks to go searching for it. Simply put the case, ParkingEye v Beavis and, as you have done, put selected parts of the judgment. However, to make things even simpler, just refer to it and keep the evidence for the Witness Statement (WS) and evidence stage which comes later in the process.

AOneVS

Please could I have some feedback on this defence draft:

IN THE COUNTY COURT
Claim No.:!XXXXXXXX
Between
[One Parking Solution]
(Claimant)

-and-

[NAME OF DEFENDANT]
(Defendant)

DEFENCE

Background

1. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant is the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXZZZ which is the subject of these proceedings.

2. It is admitted that on [date] the Defendant's vehicle was parked at [location]. The vehicle was parked there by invitation from the leaseholder residing at this address at the material time.

3. It is denied that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle. The Claimant is put to strict proof.
3.1. The Claimant has provided no evidence (in pre-action correspondence or otherwise) that the Defendant was the driver. The Defendant avers that the Claimant is therefore limited to pursuing the Defendant in these proceedings under the provisions set out by statute in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("POFA")
3.2. Before seeking to rely on the keeper liability provisions of Schedule 4 POFA the Claimant must demonstrate that:
3.2.1. there was a ‘relevant obligation’ either by way of a breach of contract, trespass or other tort; and
3.2.2. that it has followed the required deadlines and wording as described in the Act to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper.
It is not admitted that the Claimant has complied with the relevant statutory requirements.
3.3. To the extent that the Claimant may seek to allege that any such presumption exist, the Defendant expressly denies that there is any presumption in law (whether in statute or otherwise) that the keeper is the driver. Further, the Defendant denies that the vehicle keeper is obliged to name the driver to a private parking firm. Had this been the intention of parliament, they would have made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those provisions do not apply to this matter.

Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract

4. It is denied that the Defendant was in breach of any parking conditions or was not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and leaseholder of [address], whose tenancy agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant allocated bay, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle or the requirement to display a parking permit. A copy of the lease will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given.

5. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgements on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

5. Accordingly it is denied that:
5.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
5.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
5.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.

6. There can be no ‘legitimate interest’ in penalising residents or their visitors for using parking spaces, under the excuse of a scheme where ostensibly and as far as the landowner is concerned, the parking firm is contracted for the benefit of the residents. It is unconscionable, contrary to the requirement of good faith and ‘out of all proportion to any legitimate interest’ to fine residents or their visitors for using allocated parking spaces.

Alternative Defence - Failure to set out clearly parking terms

7. In the alternative, the Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout.
7.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.
7.1.1. At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation;
7.1.2. The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association’s ("BPA") Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory; and
7.1.3. The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgement of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3
7.2. The Defendant avers that the residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with ParkingEye distinguished.

7.3 It is a forbidding sign that cannot create a contract. In the cases of B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B, B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L it was demonstrated that forbidding signage at residential parking spaces did not create a contract.

8. It is denied that the Claimant has standing to bring any claim in the absence of a contract that expressly permits the Claimant to do so, in addition to merely undertaking parking management. The Claimant has provided no proof of any such entitlement.

Costs on the claim - disproportionate and disingenuous

9. The Claimant, or their legal representatives, has added an additional sum of £60 to the original £100 parking charge, for which no explanation or justification has been provided. Schedule 4 of the Protection Of Freedoms Act, at 4(5), states that the maximum sum which can be recovered is that specified in the Notice to Keeper, which is £100 in this instance. It is submitted that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

10. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

11. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny.

12. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

13. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself and there has been no legal advice or personal involvement by any solicitor in churning out this template claim.

14. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages.

15. Unlike this mendacious and greedy Claimant, ParkingEye themselves took on board the Beavis case outcome and they never add fake costs on top of the parking charge. It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters, and all parking firms are very familiar with this case:

“ at para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''

at para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.''

at para 198. ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''
”

16. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

17. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

18. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

19. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed earlier General Judgement or Orders of DJ Grand, who (when sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court in 2018 and 2019) has struck out several parking firm claims. These include a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Orders have been identical in striking out both claims without a hearing, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgement in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

20. That is not an isolated judgement striking a parking claim out for repeatedly adding sums they are not entitled to recover. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number FTQZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated:

''Upon it being recorded that Distract Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court v Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

21. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made, in trying to justify the unjustifiable.

22. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

23. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I confirm that the contents of this Defence are true.

Le_Kirk

ALL paragraphs require a number.

AOneVS

Hi Le_Kirk, I appreciate your feedback. Please can you point out which paragraph is missing a number? I can't see for looking.

1505grandad

Is the claimant's name in the heading as it is stated in the Court docs?

Coupon-mad

[One Parking Solution]

No such company. Don't use shorthand, copy from the claim form.

Typo here (Might be mine sorry!):

Distract Judge Jones-Evans

And here, it suggests that you were the driver, yet above it you rely on the POFA:

It is denied that the Defendant was in breach of any parking conditions or was not permitted to park

AOneVS

Coupon-mad wrote: »

And here, it suggest you were the driver, yet above it your rely on the POFA:

I was wondering how to play that. This defence is written for my Mum, who I invited round to my house. She parked as a visitor and received the PCN. Is it worth removing the section on POFA altogether?