ukcps claim form

aza123

Hi, I've just received a notice of allocation to the small claims track (hearing) . Is there any templates or examples of the documents/ statements I need to send to the court. Thanks

aza123

.............

Le_Kirk

You must write a witness statement that backs up and supports, with evidence, what you wrote in your defence ergo it is bespoke to you. There are some examples that could be used for style and format. Read threads of posters who have recently won and check their WSs.

Coupon-mad

This stage is normal and fully covered in the NEWBIES thread..

  

aza123

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

 

1.      I am xxxxx of xxxxxxxxxxxxx, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

2.      In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully, and i respectfully ask the court to take this into account.  My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3.      I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are two very recent and persuasive Appeal judgments to support dismissing or striking out the claim. I believe that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims using powers pursuant to CPR 3.4., based in the following persuasive authorities.

4.      The first recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref.E7GM9W44) would indicate the POCs fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. (See Exhibit 1)

5.      The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande(Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10th May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that 'Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim'. (See Exhibit 2)

6.      I believe the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs. The PoCs lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. In fact, the present PoCs are even less detailed than those struck out in Chan and Akande, offering no factual basis for a cause of action.

 

Facts and sequence of events

7.      I confirm that I was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question on the date of the alleged incident.

8. Brief Stop at Gateway House

 

9. At the time of the incident, I had only recently passed my driving test. This was within the first few weeks of obtaining my licence, and I was still becoming confident on the roads. I had never driven in Manchester before and was unfamiliar with the area. I was hesitant and careful, particularly in such a busy city environment. I had taken a wrong turn and was trying to re-orient myself when the passenger in the car said they would “just get out here” to avoid further delay or confusion.

 

10. The passenger had an ACL injury and was struggling to walk long distances. Given the circumstances, I briefly stopped the vehicle to allow them to safely and conveniently exit. The stop lasted less than one minute. I did not park, leave the vehicle unattended, or cause any obstruction. The engine remained running, and I remained in the driver’s seat throughout.

 

11. There is an annual report from POPLA, where lead adjudicator Henry Greenslade refers to what a no stopping zone must look (see exhibit 6)

12. No Visible Signage or Road Markings

 

At the specific location where I stopped, there were no visible signs indicating that stopping or dropping off was prohibited. There were also no red lines, yellow lines, or any other road markings suggesting a restriction applied. Additionally, there were no illuminated or clearly visible signs at the location where I stopped — especially important given that it was nighttime at the time of the incident. (see exhibit 3)

 

13. Poor Placement and Visibility of Signage

 

The only sign I later became aware of was located approximately 100 metres away, near the entrance to the site (as later viewed on Google Maps) (see exhibit 4). Due to the nighttime conditions, the sign’s angle, height (See exhibit 5) and distance, and my unfamiliarity with the area, I did not see this sign at the time. The sign was not illuminated or otherwise visible in low-light conditions. From where I stopped, the sign was neither visible nor legible, and I could not have reasonably known about its content.

 

14. No Contravention Occurred

 

The action I took was a brief, reasonable stop to allow a passenger — who had a mobility-limiting knee injury — to exit the vehicle following a navigation error in an unfamiliar city. It did not amount to parking, nor did it block traffic or infringe upon the rights of others. At no time did I act deliberately or negligently.

 

15. Lack of Contract and Clarity

 

The signage and layout at Gateway House did not offer a clear or readable contract to motorists. For a contract to be enforceable, the terms must be clearly displayed and communicated before any alleged breach. That was not the case in this instance, especially in low-light conditions with no illuminated signage or road markings. No agreement could have been formed. The signage must be read in order for you to enter a contract with the landowner and the fact that you must stop your vehicle before being able to read the sign means you have already broke any contract before being able to enter a conract.

16. I submit that their evidence fails to show that the terms were clearly displayed and accessible, particularly in darkness. As per the guidance in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, adequate notice of terms is essential to enforceability.

17. In Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, it was held that a person cannot be bound by contractual terms if they had no reasonable opportunity to see them. That principle directly applies here.

18. In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163, the court held that terms must be presented before or at the time of contract formation — not after entry. In this case, signage was not visible or clear enough at entry.

19. The 'red hand rule' from Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 further supports that any onerous or unusual terms (such as penalty charges) must be made extremely prominent, which they were not in this instance.

20. The Beavis case is distinguishable because in that situation, the signage was large, bold, and clearly positioned. That was not the case here, so the same principles do not apply.

21. In National Car Parks v HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854, the court recognised that entering a car park alone does not constitute acceptance of terms where payment or clarity is absent. That also applies in my case.

22. Furthermore, the Particulars of Claim provided by the claimant appear to be in breach of Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, and Practice Directions 16PD3 and 16PD7. They failed to clearly state all the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action. This has made it difficult to respond effectively to the claim.

I respectfully request the Court to dismiss the claim on the grounds that:

- No valid contract was formed.

 

- The signage was not sufficiently prominent or clear to meet legal requirements.

 

- The claimant’s evidence is inadequate and does not reflect the actual conditions on-site.

 

- No loss or legitimate interest justifies the charge being pursued.

 

- The Particulars of Claim are deficient and fail to meet the CPR requirements.

 

23. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

 

24. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view).

 

25. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

 

26. Attention is drawn to (i) paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of  Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner) and also to (ii) the binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'.

 

27. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act will curb rogue conduct by operators and their debt recovery agents (DRAs). The Government recently launched a Public Consultation considered likely to bring in a ban on DRA fees, which a 2022 Minister called ‘extorting money from motorists’. They have identified in July 2025: 'profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than ... by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.

 

28. Pursuant to Sch4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') the claim exceeds the maximum sum and is unrecoverable: see Explanatory Note 221: 'The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper ... for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5))'. Late fees (unknown to drivers, not specified on signs) are not 'unpaid parking related charges'. They are the invention of 'no win no fee' DRAs. Even in the (unlikely) event that the Claimant complied with the POFA and CoP, there is no keeper liability law for DRA fees.

 

29. This claim is an utter waste of court resources and it is an indication of systemic abuse that parking cases now make up a third of all small claims. False fees fuel bulk litigation that has overburdened HMCTS. The most common outcome of defended cases is late discontinuance, making Claimants liable for costs (r.38.6(1)). Whilst this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)) the White Book has this annotation: 'Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.

 

Statement of Truth

 

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

Defendant’s signature:

 

Date: 

aza123

the deadline for the WS is 28 july and i havent received anything from them yet. do i need to make any amendments to this before sending ot off? thanks for all the help so far

Coupon-mad

Wait to see what others say but remove 'office junior' because he isn't one!

ChirpyChicken

Coupon-mad said:

Wait to see what others say but remove 'office junior' because he isn't one!

Ibrar Ahmad has left moorside legal after a very short stay 

aza123

Sorry, my mistake they haven't sent a witness statement yet. I need to remove that paragraph 

aza123

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

 

1.      I am xxxxx of xxxxxxxxxxxxx, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

2.      In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully, and i respectfully ask the court to take this into account.  My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3.     I  draw to the attention of the Judge that there are two very recent and persuasive Appeal judgments to support dismissing or striking out the claim. I believe that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims using powers pursuant to CPR 3.4., based in the following persuasive authorities.

4.      The first recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref.E7GM9W44) would indicate the POCs fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. (See Exhibit 1)

5.      The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande(Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10th May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that 'Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim'. (See Exhibit 2)

6.      I believe the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs. The PoCs lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. In fact, the present PoCs are even less detailed than those struck out in Chan and Akande, offering no factual basis for a cause of action.

 

Facts and sequence of events

7.      I confirm that I was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question on the date of the alleged incident.

8. Brief Stop at Gateway House

 

8.1 At the time of the incident, I had only recently passed my driving test. This was within the first few weeks of obtaining my licence, and I was still becoming confident on the roads. I had never driven in Manchester before and was unfamiliar with the area. I was hesitant and careful, particularly in such a busy city environment. I had taken a wrong turn and was trying to re-orient myself when the passenger in the car said they would “just get out here” to avoid further delay or confusion.

 

9. The passenger had an ACL injury and was struggling to walk long distances. Given the circumstances, I briefly stopped the vehicle to allow them to safely and conveniently exit. The stop lasted less than one minute. I did not park, leave the vehicle unattended, or cause any obstruction. The engine remained running, and I remained in the driver’s seat throughout.

 

10. There is an annual report from POPLA, where lead adjudicator Henry Greenslade refers to what a no stopping zone must look (see exhibit 6)

11. No Visible Signage or Road Markings

 

At the specific location where I stopped, there were no visible signs indicating that stopping or dropping off was prohibited. There were also no red lines, yellow lines, or any other road markings suggesting a restriction applied. Additionally, there were no illuminated or clearly visible signs at the location where I stopped — especially important given that it was nighttime at the time of the incident. (see exhibit 3)

 

12. Poor Placement and Visibility of Signage

 

The only sign I later became aware of was located approximately 100 metres away, near the entrance to the site (as later viewed on Google Maps) (see exhibit 4). Due to the nighttime conditions, the sign’s angle, height (See exhibit 5) and distance, and my unfamiliarity with the area, I did not see this sign at the time. The sign was not illuminated or otherwise visible in low-light conditions. From where I stopped, the sign was neither visible nor legible, and I could not have reasonably known about its content.

 

13. No Contravention Occurred

 

The action I took was a brief, reasonable stop to allow a passenger — who had a mobility-limiting knee injury — to exit the vehicle following a navigation error in an unfamiliar city. It did not amount to parking, nor did it block traffic or infringe upon the rights of others. At no time did I act deliberately or negligently.

 

14. Lack of Contract and Clarity

 

The signage and layout at Gateway House did not offer a clear or readable contract to motorists. For a contract to be enforceable, the terms must be clearly displayed and communicated before any alleged breach. That was not the case in this instance, especially in low-light conditions with no illuminated signage or road markings. No agreement could have been formed. The signage must be read in order for you to enter a contract with the landowner and the fact that you must stop your vehicle before being able to read the sign means you have already broke any contract before being able to enter a conract.

15. I submit that their evidence fails to show that the terms were clearly displayed and accessible, particularly in darkness. As per the guidance in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, adequate notice of terms is essential to enforceability.

16. In Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, it was held that a person cannot be bound by contractual terms if they had no reasonable opportunity to see them. That principle directly applies here.

17. In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163, the court held that terms must be presented before or at the time of contract formation — not after entry. In this case, signage was not visible or clear enough at entry.

18. The 'red hand rule' from Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 further supports that any onerous or unusual terms (such as penalty charges) must be made extremely prominent, which they were not in this instance.

19. The Beavis case is distinguishable because in that situation, the signage was large, bold, and clearly positioned. That was not the case here, so the same principles do not apply.

20. In National Car Parks v HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854, the court recognised that entering a car park alone does not constitute acceptance of terms where payment or clarity is absent. That also applies in my case.

21. Furthermore, the Particulars of Claim provided by the claimant appear to be in breach of Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, and Practice Directions 16PD3 and 16PD7. They failed to clearly state all the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action. This has made it difficult to respond effectively to the claim.

I respectfully request the Court to dismiss the claim on the grounds that:

- No valid contract was formed.

 

- The signage was not sufficiently prominent or clear to meet legal requirements.

 

- The claimant’s evidence is inadequate and does not reflect the actual conditions on-site.

 

- No loss or legitimate interest justifies the charge being pursued.

 

- The Particulars of Claim are deficient and fail to meet the CPR requirements.

 

22. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

 

23. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view).

 

24. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

 

25. Attention is drawn to (i) paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of  Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner) and also to (ii) the binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'.

 

26. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act will curb rogue conduct by operators and their debt recovery agents (DRAs). The Government recently launched a Public Consultation considered likely to bring in a ban on DRA fees, which a 2022 Minister called ‘extorting money from motorists’. They have identified in July 2025: 'profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than ... by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.

 

27. Pursuant to Sch4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') the claim exceeds the maximum sum and is unrecoverable: see Explanatory Note 221: 'The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper ... for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5))'. Late fees (unknown to drivers, not specified on signs) are not 'unpaid parking related charges'. They are the invention of 'no win no fee' DRAs. Even in the (unlikely) event that the Claimant complied with the POFA and CoP, there is no keeper liability law for DRA fees.

 

28. This claim is an utter waste of court resources and it is an indication of systemic abuse that parking cases now make up a third of all small claims. False fees fuel bulk litigation that has overburdened HMCTS. The most common outcome of defended cases is late discontinuance, making Claimants liable for costs (r.38.6(1)). Whilst this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)) the White Book has this annotation: 'Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.

 

Statement of Truth

 

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

Defendant’s signature:

 

Date: