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Ccj set aside application as improperly served to old address - DCBL - Euro Car Parks Ltd
Comments
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Ah, I see. Thank you. Yes, I've had a look on the previous letters and will update accordingly.
1 -
Hi @Coupon-mad please find below my edited/ renumbered WS.
Any feedback Would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.
CCJ Witness statement / Draft Order
Draft Order
DRAFT ORDER
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT: CNBC
CLAIM No: XXXXX
BETWEEN:
EURO CAR PARKS Limited (Claimant)
-- and --
Mr XXXX (Defendant)
______________________________________________
DRAFT ORDER
______________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The default judgment dated 23rd June 2025 be set aside.
2. The claim is dismissed for want of proper service within 4 months.
3. The Claimant is to pay the Defendant's attendance costs and their £313 application fee, within 14 days of service of this Order.
WITNESS STATEMENT
I, XXXXXX of XXXXX will say as follows:
1. I make this statement in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me. The judgment was obtained without proper service of the claim form, and I had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the judgment was entered. I respectfully request the Court set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
2. I believe I have a strong and legitimate defence to the claim. In the event that the claim is not dismissed, I respectfully request the opportunity to defend it fully and fairly, in accordance with CPR 13.3, which provides for the setting aside of a default judgment where the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
3. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me on 23/06/2025. I am aware that Euro Car Parks Limited is the Claimant, and the claim appears to relate to an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
4. The address listed on the claim form is xxxx I moved from this address to my current residence at xxxx on 4th April 2025. In support of this, I provide evidence of the most recent DVLA V5c, updated in April 2025 and a copy of my mortgage completion date. I also submit my electoral roll update, dated 1st June 2025.
[see Exhibit A - proof V5C updated in April 2025, copy of my mortgage competition documents and electoral Roll updated in June 2025 ].
4a. I also state that I contacted Euro Car Parks data protection officer via email on 9/05/2025 to update them of my change of address. They responded to this on the same day, asking if my change of address was related to a PCN. I replied immediately, confirming that it was, and provided them with the PCN number and the registration of the vehicle.
[see Exhibit B - a copy of the email exchange with DPO@eurocarparks.com]
5. I was unaware of the claim made against me until I obtained a credit report from TransUnion in September 2025 through my bank app.
6. A few days after this, I called CNBC and made immediate enquiries regarding the claim against me from which I was able to establish that:
- the claim relates to an alleged parking event in February 2024;
- the claim form was sent to an old address at which I no longer reside; and if I had been given the opportunity to do so, I would have successfully defended the claim.
7. CNBC instructed me that I had to submit a N244 form if I would like to set aside the Judgment and pay the fee £313
8. On the 29th September 2025, I contacted the Claimant DCB Legal and invited them to join me in an application to set aside the judgement and dismiss the claim, with the claimant paying the court fee and no order as to costs. I offered them time to reply till 13th October 2025 [see Exhibit C - email sent to DCB legal]
9. A notice of debt recovery (Unpaid CCJ £295.08) was sent to my current address by DCBL on 18th August 2025 and again on 3rd October 2025, (reference number 10067243) [see Exhibit D]. This shows that the Claimant was aware their original address was incorrect, and had successfully traced and identified my correct address as of August 2025.
9a. I would like to submit reasons as to why this matter was not dealt with sooner. During the period of August - December 2025, we were dealing with the care and support of my mother-in-law, whose health was rapidly declining. When I received the initial letter regarding the CCJ debt outstanding in August, we had just been informed that my mother-in-law had 6-12 months to live. Therefore, the reality of the initial letter from DCBL was overlooked. Sadly, my mother-in-law declined much quicker than we were expecting, and she passed away on 5th November 2025. This situation caused extreme stress, anxiety, and financial strain, and therefore, we were unable to commence the N244 set aside application sooner than today. I would ask the court to take our very difficult personal circumstances into consideration when it comes to the timeline of events connected to the CCJ.
9b. However, respectfully, promptness in this N244 application is not a relevant matter as the Claimant had the right address in May but didn't alert their legal reps to use it. Therefore, this application falls squarely as a mandatory CCJ set aside under CPR 13.2 and the court need not trouble itself with CPR 13.3 or promptness because the setting aside of this CCJ is not discretionary.
10. Despite having been provided with the correct address on May 9th 2025, as well as my V5c being updated in April 2025 and my electoral roll details being updated as of April 2025, The Claimant's continued use of my old address renders service of the claim form invalid. The default judgment was consequently entered without proper notice, denying me the opportunity to respond or defend the claim.
11. On Friday 6th February, I carried out research on CheckMyFile, and I got an extract of my credit file which demonstrated I was registered on the Electoral roll at my current address, 15 Lunedale Avenue, from April 2025. [see Exhibit E - credit file attachment]. The Claimant failed to take reasonable steps to verify the Defendant’s current address, as required by CPR 6.9(3) and the BPA Code of Practice 24.1c. A simple and inexpensive “soft trace” (costing around 28 pence) would have revealed the Defendant’s current address.
12. The claimant demonstrated that they could have easily found the defendant’s current address to properly serve the claim and thus could have easily complied with CPR 6.9, having very quickly sent notice of Debt recovery to the correct address, once a default CCJ had been obtained in the defendant’s absence. Additionally, this appears to be a common method of operation used by the clamant to obtain default judgments. This failure to take proper steps is not an isolated case. Many individuals across the country have been similarly affected by the parking industry's failure to confirm accurate addresses, resulting in undue stress and legal burdens. This failure mirrors the principles established in VCS Ltd v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 4 March 2025), where the court held that claimants must take reasonable steps to ensure service is effective. The court emphasised that serving a claim at an outdated address, without reasonable diligence, renders the judgment void.
13. For the court’s reference, Phillip Carr v Vehicle Control Services LTD Neutral Citation Number[2025] EWCA Civ 713 The Court of Appeal hearing can be found here:
https://youtu.be/FvK6XwAGHcs?si=u2khX896cVWcRkTf
13a. You can also find the final judgment here:
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2025/713?court=ewca%2Fciv
I also enclose a copy of the final judgement. See [EXHIBIT F] Thank you.
14. The KADOE (Keeper at Date of Event) system offers only a snapshot of where a vehicle was registered at a particular time, not a reliable service address for court claims. In the Court of Appeal authority of VCS v Carr, the judges said that a DVLA address is "only a starting point" and this remark can be seen and heard in the official CoA youtube recording.
15. Operators are permitted to query the DVLA only once. Therefore, the BPA joint Code mandates that reasonable steps be taken to confirm the defendant’s current address prior to issuing a claim.
16. The use of an outdated DVLA address, without soft trace checks (which are inexpensive and readily available), breaches the BPA joint Code of Practice, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and CPR requirements to take reasonable steps to ensure proper service.
CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT
17. I respectfully bring to the Court’s attention that I was never served with the Particulars of Claim. As a result, I have been denied a fair opportunity to understand or respond to the allegations made.
18. Under CPR 3.4(2), the Court may strike out a statement of case if it: (a) discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim; or (b) constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This claim satisfies both of these grounds.
19. In Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture & Others [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC), the Court held that a failure to serve claim forms properly, combined with deliberate procedural delays, amounted to an abuse of process and warranted the claim being struck out under CPR 3.4 .
20. Similarly, in Nugent v Nugent [2019] EWHC 1151 (Ch), the Court struck out proceedings on the basis that the claim had not been properly served and the claimant had failed to adhere to principles of procedural fairness.
21. These authorities reinforce the proposition that where a party fails to comply with fundamental service requirements and undermines the fair progression of proceedings, striking out the claim is not only justified but necessary to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.
22. The Claimant should not be permitted to waste further Court time or resources, particularly where they have failed to comply with key procedural obligations, including the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the BPA Code of Practice, and CPR 6.9, which obliges a claimant to take ‘reasonable steps’ to verify a defendant’s current address prior to service. The failure to do so is particularly egregious given the Claimant had my new address, yet chose to ignore it.
23. For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Court strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The claim is procedurally defective and was never validly served.
24. I would also respectfully draw the court's attention to the High Court case law of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).
25. This is a significant case concerning the right to conduct litigation under the Legal Services Act 2007. The unserved claim made no mention of a term breached so the Particulars failed Part 16, AND the missing claim form was signed by Sarah Ensall, who is not an authorised person.
26. I respectfully submit that if I, the defendant, am successful in this set aside Application, which given the above evidence I hope to be, then this will make the Claimants liable for my costs (r.38.6(1)) which says:
“Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.”
27. This is the usual rule and it automatically applies because the claim was not allocated to track, so small claims rules are irrelevant.
28. To depart from that 'usual rule', generally, the claimant must show some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant, which they have not.
COSTS
29. In accordance with CPR 46.5, I respectfully request that the Court allow a reasonable amount of preparation time at the Litigant in Person rate of £24 per hour. I estimate that I have spent approximately:
6 hours dealing with DCB Legal correspondence and N244 preparation @ £24/hr = £144
• 20 hours studying case law and preparing this Witness Statement £15/hr = £380
• £150 Emotional distress of getting a CCJ on my credit file and unable to get loans or credit.
30. I also respectfully request that the Court consider ordering the Claimant to reimburse the £313 court fee I was required to pay in order to apply for this set-aside, as well as my reasonable costs for attending any hearing.
Total: £987 + reasonable attendance costs.
31. I submit that is a fair and proportionate amount in the circumstances and ask the Court to include this in any costs award.
32. With regards to the costs incurred by myself, I would like to state that my case is about setting aside a default judgment (exactly like VCS v Carr) and was not allocated to the Small Claims track at the point when the £313 fee was incurred.
33. VCS v Carr is the Court of Appeal binding authority here. Mr Carr won and his costs were awarded in full, including the £313 fee.
34. The cases are on all fours:
A parking firm, VCS had failed to comply with the CPRs and Industry Code of Practice by issuing a claim to an old address without doing the 'soft address trace' check first (which doesn't require a 'reason to believe' that a person has moved).
35. The clause is mandatory in the 2024 Joint Code in all cases prior to litigation, and it's based on the Government's statutory Code which was 'temporarily' withdrawn in 2022 and is about to be reintroduced this year by the new MHCLG (that clause isn't looking likely to be touched; it wasn't raised in the public consultation). So the failure to do a soft trace - an automated 'sweep' of cases which costs less than 30 pence, in bulk - is:
A clear breach of the rules in the parking sector, is wholly unreasonable,
does not “permit of a reasonable explanation” and ignoring this clause is plainly likely to cause CCJs, and
failure to check an address goes against the Civil Procedure Rules, which is why the Government requires it.
36. In Brookes v HSBC Bank Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 354; [2012], the Court of Appeal provided guidance in the form of 6 key principles which should be considered for the disapplication of CPR 38.6:
37. The starting presumption is that the defendant should recover its costs and the burden is on the claimant to show a good reason for departing from that presumption;
38. Whilst the first four principles set down by Brookes dictate ‘what will not be considered’, the final two principles set the scene for ‘what will be considered’ to disapply the usual rule:
The claimant will usually need to show a change of circumstances to which it has not contributed to or caused;
And such change in circumstance is only likely to suffice where it has been brought about by unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant.
39. I am the innocent party. I have done nothing wrong and the Claimant has not made a case that I have. Therefore, the usual rule in CPR 38.6 has not been disapplied so I should not have to prove unreasonable conduct by the Claimants.
RELIEF SOUGHT
40. In light of the above, I was unable to file a defence or properly respond to the claim. I therefore submit that the Default Judgment was entered incorrectly and respectfully request that it be set aside. The Defendant respectfully requests the Court to:
• Set aside the Default Judgment dated 23/06/2025 under CPR 13.2 and/or 13.3;
• Strike out the underlying claim as it was improperly served and lacks merit; and
• Order the Claimant to reimburse the Defendant’s costs as detailed above.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH:
41. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
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Remove this:
"and had successfully traced and identified my correct address as of August 2025."
…from the end of para 9 because the unreasonable conduct here isn't that you could have been traced sooner, it's that the Claimant (who under DVLA KADOE rules, remains the data controller) had your correct address before litigation!
Add to the starting paras as shown:
2. (As drafted)3. However, the Order I am seeking - as well as the CCJ being set aside, per CPR 13.2 and my costs granted in full, per CPR 38.6 - is for the entire claim to also be struck out at the application hearing, pursuant to the Court of Appeal (parking CCJ) landmark binding decision in VCS v Carr; see paras 13 and 14 below; and per the authorities cited in paragraph 17 onwards, below.
(Renumber the rest, don't delete your current para 3, just make it 4, etc,).
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Thank you. Here is the revised WS:
CCJ Witness statement / Draft Order
Draft Order
DRAFT ORDER
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT: CNBC
CLAIM No: XXXX
BETWEEN:
EURO CAR PARKS Limited (Claimant)
-- and --
Mr XXXX (Defendant)
______________________________________________
DRAFT ORDER
______________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The default judgment dated 23rd June 2025 be set aside.
2. The claim is dismissed for want of proper service within 4 months.
3. The Claimant is to pay the Defendant's attendance costs and their £313 application fee, within 14 days of service of this Order.
WITNESS STATEMENT
I, XXXX, of XXXXXXX, will say as follows:
1. I make this statement in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me. The judgment was obtained without proper service of the claim form, and I had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the judgment was entered. I respectfully request the Court set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
2. I believe I have a strong and legitimate defence to the claim. In the event that the claim is not dismissed, I respectfully request the opportunity to defend it fully and fairly, in accordance with CPR 13.3, which provides for the setting aside of a default judgment where the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
3. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me on 23/06/2025. I am aware that Euro Car Parks is the Claimant, and the claim appears to relate to an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.
4. However, the Order I am seeking - as well as the CCJ being set aside, per CPR 13.2 and my costs granted in full, per CPR 38.6 - is for the entire claim to also be struck out at the application hearing, pursuant to the Court of Appeal (parking CCJ) landmark binding decision in VCS v Carr; see paras 13 and 14 below; and per the authorities cited in paragraph 17 onwards, below.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
5. The address listed on the claim form is XXXXXX. I moved from this address to my current residence at XXXXX on 4th April 2025. In support of this, I provide evidence of the most recent DVLA V5c, updated in April 2025 and a copy of my mortgage completion date. I also submit my electoral roll update, dated 1st June 2025.
[see Exhibit A - proof V5C updated in April 2025, copy of my mortgage competition documents and electoral Roll updated in June 2025 ].
5a. I also state that I contacted Euro Car Parks data protection officer via email on 9/05/2025 to update them of my change of address. They responded to this on the same day, asking if my change of address was related to a PCN. I replied immediately, confirming that it was, and provided them with the PCN number and the registration of the vehicle.
[see Exhibit B - a copy of the email exchange with DPO@eurocarparks .com]
6. I was unaware of the claim made against me until I obtained a credit report from TransUnion in September 2025 through my bank app.
7. A few days after this, I called CNBC and made immediate enquiries regarding the claim against me from which I was able to establish that:
- the claim relates to an alleged parking event in February 2024;
- the claim form was sent to an old address at which I no longer reside; and if I had been given the opportunity to do so, I would have successfully defended the claim.
8. CNBC instructed me that I had to submit a N244 form if I would like to set aside the Judgment and pay the fee £313
9. On the 29th September 2025, I contacted the Claimant DCB Legal and invited them to join me in an application to set aside the judgement and dismiss the claim, with the claimant paying the court fee and no order as to costs. I offered them time to reply till 13th October 2025 [see Exhibit C - email sent to DCB legal]
10. A notice of debt recovery (Unpaid CCJ £295.08) was sent to my current address by DCBL on 18th August 2025 and again on 3rd October 2025, (reference number 10067243) [see Exhibit D]. This shows that the Claimant was aware their original address was incorrect.
10a. I would like to submit reasons as to why this matter was not dealt with sooner. During the period of August - December 2025, we were dealing with the care and support of my mother-in-law, whose health was rapidly declining. When I received the initial letter regarding the CCJ debt outstanding in August, we had just been informed that my mother-in-law had 6-12 months to live. Therefore, the reality of the initial letter from DCBL was overlooked. Sadly, my mother-in-law declined much quicker than we were expecting, and she passed away on 5th November 2025. This situation caused extreme stress, anxiety, and financial strain, and therefore, we were unable to commence the N244 set aside application sooner than today. I would ask the court to take our very difficult personal circumstances into consideration when it comes to the timeline of events connected to the CCJ.
10b. However, respectfully, promptness in this N244 application is not a relevant matter as the Claimant had the right address in May but didn't alert their legal reps to use it. Therefore, this application falls squarely as a mandatory CCJ set aside under CPR 13.2 and the court need not trouble itself with CPR 13.3 or promptness because the setting aside of this CCJ is not discretionary.
11. Despite having been provided with the correct address on May 9th 2025, as well as my V5c being updated in April 2025 and my electoral roll details being updated as of April 2025, The Claimant's continued use of my old address renders service of the claim form invalid. The default judgment was consequently entered without proper notice, denying me the opportunity to respond or defend the claim.
12. On Friday 6th February, I carried out research on CheckMyFile, and I got an extract of my credit file which demonstrated I was registered on the Electoral roll at my current address, XXXX, from April 2025. [see Exhibit E - credit file attachment]. The Claimant failed to take reasonable steps to verify the Defendant’s current address, as required by CPR 6.9(3) and the BPA Code of Practice 24.1c. A simple and inexpensive “soft trace” (costing around 28 pence) would have revealed the Defendant’s current address.
13. The claimant demonstrated that they could have easily found the defendant’s current address to properly serve the claim and thus could have easily complied with CPR 6.9, having very quickly sent notice of Debt recovery to the correct address, once a default CCJ had been obtained in the defendant’s absence. Additionally, this appears to be a common method of operation used by the clamant to obtain default judgments. This failure to take proper steps is not an isolated case. Many individuals across the country have been similarly affected by the parking industry's failure to confirm accurate addresses, resulting in undue stress and legal burdens. This failure mirrors the principles established in VCS Ltd v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 4 March 2025), where the court held that claimants must take reasonable steps to ensure service is effective. The court emphasised that serving a claim at an outdated address, without reasonable diligence, renders the judgment void.
14. For the court’s reference, Phillip Carr v Vehicle Control Services LTD Neutral Citation Number[2025] EWCA Civ 713 The Court of Appeal hearing can be found here:
https://youtu.be/FvK6XwAGHcs?si=u2khX896cVWcRkTf14a.
You can also find the final judgment here:
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2025/713?court=ewca%2Fciv
I also enclose a copy of the final judgement. See [EXHIBIT F] Thank you.
15. The KADOE (Keeper at Date of Event) system offers only a snapshot of where a vehicle was registered at a particular time, not a reliable service address for court claims. In the Court of Appeal authority of VCS v Carr, the judges said that a DVLA address is "only a starting point" and this remark can be seen and heard in the official CoA youtube recording.
16. Operators are permitted to query the DVLA only once. Therefore, the BPA joint Code mandates that reasonable steps be taken to confirm the defendant’s current address prior to issuing a claim.
17. The use of an outdated DVLA address, without soft trace checks (which are inexpensive and readily available), breaches the BPA joint Code of Practice, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and CPR requirements to take reasonable steps to ensure proper service.
CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT18. I respectfully bring to the Court’s attention that I was never served with the Particulars of Claim. As a result, I have been denied a fair opportunity to understand or respond to the allegations made.
19. Under CPR 3.4(2), the Court may strike out a statement of case if it: (a) discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim; or (b) constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This claim satisfies both of these grounds.
20. In Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture & Others [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC), the Court held that a failure to serve claim forms properly, combined with deliberate procedural delays, amounted to an abuse of process and warranted the claim being struck out under CPR 3.4 .
21. Similarly, in Nugent v Nugent [2019] EWHC 1151 (Ch), the Court struck out proceedings on the basis that the claim had not been properly served and the claimant had failed to adhere to principles of procedural fairness.
22. These authorities reinforce the proposition that where a party fails to comply with fundamental service requirements and undermines the fair progression of proceedings, striking out the claim is not only justified but necessary to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.
23. The Claimant should not be permitted to waste further Court time or resources, particularly where they have failed to comply with key procedural obligations, including the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the BPA Code of Practice, and CPR 6.9, which obliges a claimant to take ‘reasonable steps’ to verify a defendant’s current address prior to service. The failure to do so is particularly egregious given the Claimant had my new address, yet chose to ignore it.
24. For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Court strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The claim is procedurally defective and was never validly served.
25. I would also respectfully draw the court's attention to the High Court case law of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).
26. This is a significant case concerning the right to conduct litigation under the Legal Services Act 2007. The unserved claim made no mention of a term breached so the Particulars failed Part 16, AND the missing claim form was signed by Sarah Ensall, who is not an authorised person.
27. I respectfully submit that if I, the defendant, am successful in this set aside Application, which given the above evidence I hope to be, then this will make the Claimants liable for my costs (r.38.6(1)) which says:
“Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.”
28. This is the usual rule and it automatically applies because the claim was not allocated to track, so small claims rules are irrelevant.
29. To depart from that 'usual rule', generally, the claimant must show some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant, which they have not.
COSTS
30. In accordance with CPR 46.5, I respectfully request that the Court allow a reasonable amount of preparation time at the Litigant in Person rate of £24 per hour. I estimate that I have spent approximately:
6 hours dealing with DCB Legal correspondence and N244 preparation @ £24/hr = £144
• 20 hours studying case law and preparing this Witness Statement £15/hr = £380
• £150 Emotional distress of getting a CCJ on my credit file and unable to get loans or credit.
31. I also respectfully request that the Court consider ordering the Claimant to reimburse the £313 court fee I was required to pay in order to apply for this set-aside, as well as my reasonable costs for attending any hearing.
Total: £987 + reasonable attendance costs.
32. I submit that is a fair and proportionate amount in the circumstances and ask the Court to include this in any costs award.
33. With regards to the costs incurred by myself, I would like to state that my case is about setting aside a default judgment (exactly like VCS v Carr) and was not allocated to the Small Claims track at the point when the £313 fee was incurred.
34. VCS v Carr is the Court of Appeal binding authority here. Mr Carr won and his costs were awarded in full, including the £313 fee.
35. The cases are on all fours:
A parking firm, VCS had failed to comply with the CPRs and Industry Code of Practice by issuing a claim to an old address without doing the 'soft address trace' check first (which doesn't require a 'reason to believe' that a person has moved).
36. The clause is mandatory in the 2024 Joint Code in all cases prior to litigation, and it's based on the Government's statutory Code which was 'temporarily' withdrawn in 2022 and is about to be reintroduced this year by the new MHCLG (that clause isn't looking likely to be touched; it wasn't raised in the public consultation). So the failure to do a soft trace - an automated 'sweep' of cases which costs less than 30 pence, in bulk - is:
A clear breach of the rules in the parking sector, is wholly unreasonable,
does not “permit of a reasonable explanation” and ignoring this clause is plainly likely to cause CCJs, and
failure to check an address goes against the Civil Procedure Rules, which is why the Government requires it.
37. In Brookes v HSBC Bank Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 354; [2012], the Court of Appeal provided guidance in the form of 6 key principles which should be considered for the disapplication of CPR 38.6:
38. The starting presumption is that the defendant should recover its costs and the burden is on the claimant to show a good reason for departing from that presumption;
39. Whilst the first four principles set down by Brookes dictate ‘what will not be considered’, the final two principles set the scene for ‘what will be considered’ to disapply the usual rule:
The claimant will usually need to show a change of circumstances to which it has not contributed to or caused;
And such change in circumstance is only likely to suffice where it has been brought about by unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant.
40. I am the innocent party. I have done nothing wrong and the Claimant has not made a case that I have. Therefore, the usual rule in CPR 38.6 has not been disapplied so I should not have to prove unreasonable conduct by the Claimants.
RELIEF SOUGHT
41. In light of the above, I was unable to file a defence or properly respond to the claim. I therefore submit that the Default Judgment was entered incorrectly and respectfully request that it be set aside. The Defendant respectfully requests the Court to:
• Set aside the Default Judgment dated 23/06/2025 under CPR 13.2 and/or 13.3;
• Strike out the underlying claim as it was improperly served and lacks merit; and
• Order the Claimant to reimburse the Defendant’s costs as detailed above.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH:42. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:1 -
Move your COSTS sub-heading up to sit above para 27 instead, and you are done!
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A heads-up - you know who the correct claimant is:-
"8. On the 29th September 2025, I contacted the Claimant DCB Legal………"
20 hours studying case law and preparing this Witness Statement £15/hr = £380???
Also some "Judgments" included an erroneous middle "e".
2 -
Should be £24 ph, which is the LiP rate.
DCB Legal aren't the Claimants.
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Hope the OP works out the correct total in that case!!
2 -
Thank you @Coupon-mad I've edited this. I've also adjusted the costs in line with the £24 per HR rate.
CCJ Witness statement / Draft Order
Draft Order
DRAFT ORDER
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT: CNBC
CLAIM No: M5KF3K56
BETWEEN:
EURO CAR PARKS Limited (Claimant)
-- and --
Mr xxxxxx (Defendant)
______________________________________________
DRAFT ORDER
______________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The default judgment dated 23rd June 2025 be set aside.
2. The claim is dismissed for want of proper service within 4 months.
3. The Claimant is to pay the Defendant's attendance costs and their £313 application fee, within 14 days of service of this Order.
WITNESS STATEMENT
I, xxxxxx, of 15 xxxx, will say as follows:
1. I make this statement in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me. The judgment was obtained without proper service of the claim form, and I had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the judgment was entered. I respectfully request the Court set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
2. I believe I have a strong and legitimate defence to the claim. In the event that the claim is not dismissed, I respectfully request the opportunity to defend it fully and fairly, in accordance with CPR 13.3, which provides for the setting aside of a default judgment where the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
3. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me on 23/06/2025. I am aware that Euro Car Parks is the Claimant, and the claim appears to relate to an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.
4. However, the Order I am seeking - as well as the CCJ being set aside, per CPR 13.2 and my costs granted in full, per CPR 38.6 - is for the entire claim to also be struck out at the application hearing, pursuant to the Court of Appeal (parking CCJ) landmark binding decision in VCS v Carr; see paras 13 and 14 below; and per the authorities cited in paragraph 17 onwards, below.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
5. The address listed on the claim form is xxxx. I moved from this address to my current residence at xxxx on 4th April 2025. In support of this, I provide evidence of the most recent DVLA V5c, updated in April 2025 and a copy of my mortgage completion date. I also submit my electoral roll update, dated 1st June 2025.
[see Exhibit A - proof V5C updated in April 2025, copy of my mortgage competition documents and electoral Roll updated in June 2025 ].
5a. I also state that I contacted Euro Car Parks data protection officer via email on 9/05/2025 to update them of my change of address. They responded to this on the same day, asking if my change of address was related to a PCN. I replied immediately, confirming that it was, and provided them with the PCN number and the registration of the vehicle.
[see Exhibit B - a copy of the email exchange with DPO@eurocarparks.com]
6. I was unaware of the claim made against me until I obtained a credit report from TransUnion in September 2025 through my bank app.
7. A few days after this, I called CNBC and made immediate enquiries regarding the claim against me from which I was able to establish that:
- the claim relates to an alleged parking event in February 2024;
- the claim form was sent to an old address at which I no longer reside; and if I had been given the opportunity to do so, I would have successfully defended the claim.
8. CNBC instructed me that I had to submit a N244 form if I would like to set aside the Judgment and pay the fee £313
9. On the 29th September 2025, I contacted the Claimant DCB Legal and invited them to join me in an application to set aside the judgement and dismiss the claim, with the claimant paying the court fee and no order as to costs. I offered them time to reply till 13th October 2025 [see Exhibit C - email sent to DCB legal]
10. A notice of debt recovery (Unpaid CCJ £295.08) was sent to my current address by DCBL on 18th August 2025 and again on 3rd October 2025, (reference number 10067243) [see Exhibit D]. This shows that the Claimant was aware their original address was incorrect.
10a. I would like to submit reasons as to why this matter was not dealt with sooner. During the period of August - December 2025, we were dealing with the care and support of my mother-in-law, whose health was rapidly declining. When I received the initial letter regarding the CCJ debt outstanding in August, we had just been informed that my mother-in-law had 6-12 months to live. Therefore, the reality of the initial letter from DCBL was overlooked. Sadly, my mother-in-law declined much quicker than we were expecting, and she passed away on 5th November 2025. This situation caused extreme stress, anxiety, and financial strain, and therefore, we were unable to commence the N244 set aside application sooner than today. I would ask the court to take our very difficult personal circumstances into consideration when it comes to the timeline of events connected to the CCJ.
10b. However, respectfully, promptness in this N244 application is not a relevant matter as the Claimant had the right address in May but didn't alert their legal reps to use it. Therefore, this application falls squarely as a mandatory CCJ set aside under CPR 13.2 and the court need not trouble itself with CPR 13.3 or promptness because the setting aside of this CCJ is not discretionary.
11. Despite having been provided with the correct address on May 9th 2025, as well as my V5c being updated in April 2025 and my electoral roll details being updated as of April 2025, The Claimant's continued use of my old address renders service of the claim form invalid. The default judgment was consequently entered without proper notice, denying me the opportunity to respond or defend the claim.
12. On Friday 6th February, I carried out research on CheckMyFile, and I got an extract of my credit file which demonstrated I was registered on the Electoral roll at my current address, 15 Lunedale Avenue, from April 2025. [see Exhibit E - credit file attachment]. The Claimant failed to take reasonable steps to verify the Defendant’s current address, as required by CPR 6.9(3) and the BPA Code of Practice 24.1c. A simple and inexpensive “soft trace” (costing around 28 pence) would have revealed the Defendant’s current address.
13. The claimant demonstrated that they could have easily found the defendant’s current address to properly serve the claim and thus could have easily complied with CPR 6.9, having very quickly sent notice of Debt recovery to the correct address, once a default CCJ had been obtained in the defendant’s absence. Additionally, this appears to be a common method of operation used by the clamant to obtain default judgments. This failure to take proper steps is not an isolated case. Many individuals across the country have been similarly affected by the parking industry's failure to confirm accurate addresses, resulting in undue stress and legal burdens. This failure mirrors the principles established in VCS Ltd v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 4 March 2025), where the court held that claimants must take reasonable steps to ensure service is effective. The court emphasised that serving a claim at an outdated address, without reasonable diligence, renders the judgment void.
14. For the court’s reference, Phillip Carr v Vehicle Control Services LTD Neutral Citation Number[2025] EWCA Civ 713 The Court of Appeal hearing can be found here:
https://youtu.be/FvK6XwAGHcs?si=u2khX896cVWcRkTf
14a. You can also find the final judgment here:
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2025/713?court=ewca%2Fciv
I also enclose a copy of the final judgement. See [EXHIBIT F] Thank you.
15. The KADOE (Keeper at Date of Event) system offers only a snapshot of where a vehicle was registered at a particular time, not a reliable service address for court claims. In the Court of Appeal authority of VCS v Carr, the judges said that a DVLA address is "only a starting point" and this remark can be seen and heard in the official CoA youtube recording.
16. Operators are permitted to query the DVLA only once. Therefore, the BPA joint Code mandates that reasonable steps be taken to confirm the defendant’s current address prior to issuing a claim.
17. The use of an outdated DVLA address, without soft trace checks (which are inexpensive and readily available), breaches the BPA joint Code of Practice, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and CPR requirements to take reasonable steps to ensure proper service.
CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT
18. I respectfully bring to the Court’s attention that I was never served with the Particulars of Claim. As a result, I have been denied a fair opportunity to understand or respond to the allegations made.
19. Under CPR 3.4(2), the Court may strike out a statement of case if it: (a) discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim; or (b) constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This claim satisfies both of these grounds.
20. In Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture & Others [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC), the Court held that a failure to serve claim forms properly, combined with deliberate procedural delays, amounted to an abuse of process and warranted the claim being struck out under CPR 3.4 .
21. Similarly, in Nugent v Nugent [2019] EWHC 1151 (Ch), the Court struck out proceedings on the basis that the claim had not been properly served and the claimant had failed to adhere to principles of procedural fairness.
22. These authorities reinforce the proposition that where a party fails to comply with fundamental service requirements and undermines the fair progression of proceedings, striking out the claim is not only justified but necessary to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.
23. The Claimant should not be permitted to waste further Court time or resources, particularly where they have failed to comply with key procedural obligations, including the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the BPA Code of Practice, and CPR 6.9, which obliges a claimant to take ‘reasonable steps’ to verify a defendant’s current address prior to service. The failure to do so is particularly egregious given the Claimant had my new address, yet chose to ignore it.
24. For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Court strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The claim is procedurally defective and was never validly served.
25. I would also respectfully draw the court's attention to the High Court case law of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).
26. This is a significant case concerning the right to conduct litigation under the Legal Services Act 2007. The unserved claim made no mention of a term breached so the Particulars failed Part 16, AND the missing claim form was signed by Sarah Ensall, who is not an authorised person.
COSTS
27. I respectfully submit that if I, the defendant, am successful in this set aside Application, which given the above evidence I hope to be, then this will make the Claimants liable for my costs (r.38.6(1)) which says:
“Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.”
28. This is the usual rule and it automatically applies because the claim was not allocated to track, so small claims rules are irrelevant.
29. To depart from that 'usual rule', generally, the claimant must show some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant, which they have not.
30. In accordance with CPR 46.5, I respectfully request that the Court allow a reasonable amount of preparation time at the Litigant in Person rate of £24 per hour. I estimate that I have spent approximately:
6 hours dealing with DCB Legal correspondence and N244 preparation @ £24/hr = £144
• 20 hours studying case law and preparing this Witness Statement £24/hr = £480
• £150 Emotional distress of getting a CCJ on my credit file and unable to get loans or credit.
31. I also respectfully request that the Court consider ordering the Claimant to reimburse the £313 court fee I was required to pay in order to apply for this set-aside, as well as my reasonable costs for attending any hearing.
Total: £1087 + reasonable attendance costs.
32. I submit that is a fair and proportionate amount in the circumstances and ask the Court to include this in any costs award.
33. With regards to the costs incurred by myself, I would like to state that my case is about setting aside a default judgment (exactly like VCS v Carr) and was not allocated to the Small Claims track at the point when the £313 fee was incurred.
34. VCS v Carr is the Court of Appeal binding authority here. Mr Carr won and his costs were awarded in full, including the £313 fee.
35. The cases are on all fours:
A parking firm, VCS had failed to comply with the CPRs and Industry Code of Practice by issuing a claim to an old address without doing the 'soft address trace' check first (which doesn't require a 'reason to believe' that a person has moved).
36. The clause is mandatory in the 2024 Joint Code in all cases prior to litigation, and it's based on the Government's statutory Code which was 'temporarily' withdrawn in 2022 and is about to be reintroduced this year by the new MHCLG (that clause isn't looking likely to be touched; it wasn't raised in the public consultation). So the failure to do a soft trace - an automated 'sweep' of cases which costs less than 30 pence, in bulk - is:
A clear breach of the rules in the parking sector, is wholly unreasonable,
does not “permit of a reasonable explanation” and ignoring this clause is plainly likely to cause CCJs, and
failure to check an address goes against the Civil Procedure Rules, which is why the Government requires it.
37. In Brookes v HSBC Bank Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 354; [2012], the Court of Appeal provided guidance in the form of 6 key principles which should be considered for the disapplication of CPR 38.6:
38. The starting presumption is that the defendant should recover its costs and the burden is on the claimant to show a good reason for departing from that presumption;
39. Whilst the first four principles set down by Brookes dictate ‘what will not be considered’, the final two principles set the scene for ‘what will be considered’ to disapply the usual rule:
The claimant will usually need to show a change of circumstances to which it has not contributed to or caused;
And such change in circumstance is only likely to suffice where it has been brought about by unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant.
40. I am the innocent party. I have done nothing wrong and the Claimant has not made a case that I have. Therefore, the usual rule in CPR 38.6 has not been disapplied so I should not have to prove unreasonable conduct by the Claimants.
RELIEF SOUGHT
41. In light of the above, I was unable to file a defence or properly respond to the claim. I therefore submit that the Default Judgment was entered incorrectly and respectfully request that it be set aside. The Defendant respectfully requests the Court to:
• Set aside the Default Judgment dated 23/06/2025 under CPR 13.2 and/or 13.3;
• Strike out the underlying claim as it was improperly served and lacks merit; and
• Order the Claimant to reimburse the Defendant’s costs as detailed above.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH:
42. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
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On point 9. . Do I need to remove the word "claimant"? Thank you
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