CCJ vs CP Plus Ltd (DCBL) Applying for Set-Aside

NahkoMed

Hi all,

So, having sent the email above on Monday last week I've had no reply (as expected) and I'm cracking on with the witness statement, draft judgement etc ready for the deadline I imposed of 28th April.I've relied heavily on a few examples to be found here, most notably

@confusedparking @icy_fox and others - thanks to you all!

I'm not ready to post the full WS here, but I do have some questions for you all if anyone fancies helping me out a bit. Thanks in advance! Here they are:

 1. In relation to "Denton", there seems to be a lot about the delay that that particular defendant had made in seeking a set-aside. e.g: 

"Assessing a Judgment in Default (Denton):  "Even in a case of relief from sanctions where the delay is lengthy and there is no excuse for it, the court is required to consider all the circumstances of the case, in order to deal justly with the matter: Denton v White." 

That doesn't apply to me specifically since I've responded as soon as I saw evidence of the judgment, but then I can clearly see how the "No Opportunity to Contest" section e.g: 

"if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense.: 

is really important. Should I look to cut out references to delay and keep just the ones that are relevant or is it considered important to keep the flow of the Judge's words intact?

2. When putting together exhibits for CEL v CHAN and VCSL v Carr, should I exhibit them separately or can they be grouped together under "EXHIBIT XX- CEL v CHAN and other judgements"? I've seen both done at various stages of edit on here. It looks to me like the reference to Denton (above) is a quote from a judge in another case (VCSL v Carr). Do I need to include the original Denton case in my exhibits as well?

3. A fact of my case that I consider relevant (perhaps wrongly!) is that - as this thread will testify - DCBL sent the LBC MORE THAN A YEAR prior to submitting a claim (in fact it's almost as if they WAITED for me to move house before doing so...). At the time, I had some back-and-forth with them by email, and it was clear even then that they'd breached the PAP. My last email to them in respect of the LBC was the 12th Feb 2024 and I heard nothing from them until I got the CCJ reminder from DCBLtd in April this year. I consider that unreasonable, so I'm proposing to add the following to the WS. I'd really appreciate feedback on it, up to and including "just leave it out, it's not relevant" etc.

 CLAIMANT HAS ACTED UNREASONABLY

25. I received the Letter Before Claim in respect of this matter from DCB Legal, at my old address, on 30/10/2023, more than 14 months prior to the claim itself being filed. I acknowledged receipt of the LBC in writing on *****, and requested additional information in good faith, as recommended by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims sections 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 (EXHIBIT XX-04).

26. On ****** (already outside the 30 days required by the PAP), I received a reply to these requests which was woefully inadequate in addressing the very reasonable matters I had raised (EXHIBIT XX-04). As such, on 12/02/2024, I wrote to DCB Legal again, restating and further clarifying my requests, and quoting the PAP as follows: “the Pre Action Protocol for Debt claims states that you should provide ‘details of any interest and administrative or other charges added' and it is in this spirit that I request a clear answer to the above questions.”. I did not receive a reply.

27. In fact, I heard nothing further from DCB Legal, nor the Claimant, nor anyone representing the claimant, until the letter I received in April this year, at my new address, informing me of the Judgment that had been made against me in default.

28. Taking the foregoing into account, it seems to me that the Claimant has consistently failed to act in good faith, and to abide by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and that, if they had done so, this matter could well have been resolved without recourse to court proceedings. As it stands, and considering the poor quality of their submission itself, the Claimant’s claim seems to amount to little more than a cynical attempt to extract revenue from me using the legal system. I would ask the court to kindly consider this in light of my defence.

Think that's about it for now. I'll post a full draft in the next couple of days.

Thank you all, from the bottom of my heart!

Coupon-mad

cut out references to delay and keep just the ones that are relevant

Yes. And yes, include what you asked about re the fact there was a whole year between LBC and claim

And they didn't do a check/trace just prior to litigation, which costs around 29 pence with Experian for example, for bulk users like this lot. That breaches their Code of Practice (and breaching a CoP is illegal: a 'misleading action' under the CPUTRs is an offence).

Do I need to include the original Denton case in my exhibits as well?

No. It is a well-known test of whether it is appropriate for a court to allow 'relief from sanctions' so your judge will have it.

But re VCS v Carr, have you seen the official video hearing from 4th Match when the final judgment was made by the Court of Appeal? You must watch that video if you haven't already, and provide a link to it in your WS for your judge. Copy some words about it that were written in the past 6 weeks on various CCJ threads at your stage..

Could you change your thread title including the acronym CCJ and name of PPC please? Helps us each time we see it.

NahkoMed

Coupon-mad said:

But re VCS v Carr, have you seen the official video hearing from 4th Match when the final judgment was made by the Court of Appeal? You must watch that video if you haven't already, and provide a link to it in your WS for your judge. Copy some words about it that were written in the past 6 weeks on various CCJ threads at your stage..

Very helpful, thanks. I've added a paragraph about this. I've also renamed the thread as you'll see. Thank you!

Here is a draft of my WS. There may be a fair bit yet to do, though I'm hoping I've got the right idea now.. and I have a couple more questions:

1. I notice that a lot of other submissions of this kind are happening more than 4 months after the intial claim was submitted, and as such the original claim has expired. This isn't the case for me. I think the claim was received by the court on the 12 Jan (though I'm not 100% sure). It was certainly early January. Is it worth waiting to submit this application until it HAS expired, assuming DCBL don't try to re-serve it in the meantime? Is that how it works??

2. Way back at the beginning of this thread are some details which show that, having received the original PCN, I took (actually quite a lot of) steps to communicate with CPPlus about what they were trying to charge me, offering to pay the original £4.50 which they said I owed them, and any proveable damages or loss they'd incurred as a result of "late" payment. I'm wondering if it's worth including anything about that at this stage, or if all that might muddy the waters about the validity (or otherwise) of the POC. I'm trying to paint a picture of myself as acting in good faith (which I can honestly say I have done, ever since they first sent the PCN) in contrast to their shenannigans. Maybe it's not necessary, however.

3. I also tangentially mention Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016], is this one that I need to include in my exhibits or not?

Here's the WS so far, any comments gratefully and humbly received. Once again, Thank you so much to you all.

EXHIBIT XX-01 – Tenancy Agreement and utility bills

EXHIBIT XX-02 – CEL V CHAN and other judgments.

EXHIBIT XX-03 - Letter to Claimant Concerning This Ruling

EXHIBIT XX-04 – Correspondence pertaining to LBC

EXHIBIT XX-05 - Link to Official Video Hearing on VCSL vs CARR

EXHIBIT XX-06 – Particulars of Claim

EXHIBIT XX-07 – N244 Form



Case number 

********

WITNESS STATEMENT 

I, ********, of XXX , will say as follows: 

1. I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on ********, in default due to a defective service of Claim. 

2. I had not received any claim form nor any detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware via letter from Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd on 11/04/2025.

3. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and, should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law I have presented below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, 13.3).  In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the POC fails to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".  More details follow below.

4.  I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order. 

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM 

5. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on *******. I am aware that the Claimant is CP PLUS LTD T/A GROUPNEXUS and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice. 

6. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I received notice of a Debt Recovery Reminder from DCBL on 11th April 2025. This is a breach of  CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Because of this, the judgment was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).   

7. The address on the claim is ************. I moved from this address to my current address at ************, in December 2024. In support of this, I can provide documentation showing my updated address, including tenancy agreement, and utility bills. (EXHIBIT XX-01)


8.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in January 2025 due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

9. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a). 

10. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

11. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT 

12. In the alternative: the claim should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

12.1  THE DEFENDANT (D) IS INDEBTED TO THE CLAIMANT (C) FOR A PARKING CHARGE(S) ISSUED TO VEHICLE ****** AT *******. 2. THE PCN(S) WERE ISSUED ON *********** 3. THE DEFENDANT IS PURSUED AS THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE FOR BREACH OF THE TERMS ON THE SIGNS (THE CONTRACT). REASON:VEHICLE REMAINED ON PRIVATE PROPERTY IN BREACH OF THE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 4. IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE DEFENDANT IS PURSUED AS THE KEEPER PURSUANT TO POFA 2012, SCHEDULE 4. AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS 1. £170 BEING THE TOTAL OF THE PCN(S) AND DAMAGES. 2. INTEREST AT A RATE OF 8% PER ANNUM PURSUANT TO S.69 OF THE COUNTY COURTS ACT 1984 FROM THE DATE HEREOF AT A DAILY RATE OF £.02 UNTIL JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT. 3. COSTS AND COURT FEES                                                                                                                                                                        

13. In view of this woeful POC (EXHIBIT XX-06) I am confident in relying upon three recent persuasive Appeal judgments as authority to support striking out the claim. Dismissing this claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

14. In Car Park Management Service LTD v Akande heard on 10th May 2024 before Her Honour Judge Evans, the following has been stated:

14.1. "The district judge said paragraph 5 of her judgment that she did not accept there was sufficient set out in the claim form to enable the court and in particular the Defendant to understand the nature of the breach alleged. She identified at paragraph 9 that an allegation of breach and the nature of the breach rather than a simple assertion of breach of terms and conditions is fundamental  to a claim of this nature.

14.2. "She identified that there are a number of different ways in which a defendant might breach the terms and conditions  in a car park: for example, not displaying  a ticket, overstaying, not parking within the correct area for parking. She noted that these Particulars of Claim do not specify  which of those, if any, or which other breach was said to have been committed by this Defendant."  (EXHIBIT XX-02)

15. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious DCB Legal with their well-documented connections to the BPA Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

16. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrongly refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.


Having to post the second part below, too long!

NahkoMed

17. In Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179) heard on 7th May 2024 the following has been noted:

17.1. "The starting point of the analysis must be that the defendant, who at all material times lived at the property where his car was parked, was being served with parking enforcement notices by the claimant because through no fault of his own and despite making every effort to get one, he could not display a parking permit to prove to them that he had the right to park his car in that space. He had tried without success to ‘explain this to the claimant, who in substance said it was not their problem and he should take it up with the letting agent/landlord. The claimant then obtained a default judgment for a sum in excess of £10,000 in respect of the accumulated parking charges after they had sent all relevant correspondence to and served the proceedings at an address where the defendant no longer lived. The Circuit Judge rightly found that he could not be criticised for failing to respond to a claim form which he never in fact received."

17.2. Real prospect of a successful defence: "Given the Circuit Judge's finding (which the claimant realistically does not seek to challenge) that there was a real prospect of successfully defending the claim, in my judgment it is arguable with a real prospect of success that she did not properly carry out the holistic evaluation she should have done at the third ‘stage of the Denton test, despite expressly acknowledging that she had to take all the circumstances into consideration."

17.3. No opportunity to defend: "There also appears to have been no specific consideration at the third stage of the fact that in practical terms this defendant has never had an opportunity to advance his valid defence irrespective of whether service was property effected at his former address. That is related to but different from the point that he cannot be blamed for failure to respond to the claim form because he never received it."

17.4. No Opportunity to contest: "Standing back and looking at the bigger picture, if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense.”

17.5. I would also respectfully draw to the attention of the court, the order that was recently given by Lord Justices Bean, Moylan and Phillips setting aside the order of Judge Evans (7th May 2024) which granted the Claimant leave to appeal the decision of District Judge Lyer, setting it aside and restoring Judge Lyer’s original decision. The written details of the order and reasons have not yet been handed down, but a link to the official video hearing is provided in EXHIBIT XX-05. In it, the justices support the District Judge’s decision that even a DVLA check alone was not sufficient to count as “reasonable steps” to identify the defendant’s current address, and that other steps could and should have been taken. This suggests a high bar of responsibility on the Claimant to take such steps in this case.

18. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX-02 - Chan and other Judgments) the Court should strike out the two claims, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

19. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible.  I discovered a CCJ was lodged onto my credit file on Friday 11th April 2025. On the same day I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgment, including the particulars of claim.

 20. On the following Monday (14th April 2025) I wrote to DCB Legal offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment, and making it clear that if no such application was made in the subsequent two weeks, that I would apply unilaterally to the court to set aside the judgment.  (EXHIBIT XX-03). An acknowledgement was received the same day (14th April) confirming receipt of my email, without substance or reply.

21. So on ********, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgment and fairly present my case (EXHIBIT XX-07)

22. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £313 from the claimant should this request be successful.

 CLAIMANT HAS ACTED UNREASONABLY

23. I received the Letter Before Claim in respect of this matter from DCB Legal, at my old address, on (October 2023), more than 14 months prior to the claim itself being filed. I acknowledged receipt of the LBC in writing on (November 2023), and requested additional information in good faith, as recommended by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims sections 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 (EXHIBIT XX-04).

24. On 17th January 2024 (already outside the 30 days required by the PAP), I received a reply to these requests which was woefully inadequate in addressing the very reasonable matters I had raised (EXHIBIT XX-04). As such, on (February 2023), I wrote to DCB Legal again, restating and further clarifying my requests, and quoting the PAP as follows: “the Pre Action Protocol for Debt claims states that you should provide ‘details of any interest and administrative or other charges added' and it is in this spirit that I request a clear answer to the above questions.”. I did not receive a reply.

25. In fact, I heard nothing further from DCB Legal, nor the Claimant, nor anyone representing the claimant, until the letter I received in April this year, at my new address, informing me of the Judgment that had been made against me in default.

26. It is clear  that, following the judgment, representatives of the claimant were very quickly and easily able to locate me at my new address, but failed to do so prior to attempting to serve the claim.  The length of time they waited before submitting a claim to the court provides ample “reason to believe” that I no longer resided at the address they had on file for me. Both CPR 6.9(3), and the BPA Code of Practice (to which the Claimant is required to adhere), therefore require reasonable steps to be taken to identify the address at which I currently reside.

27. Given that they did not do so, the Claimant is in breach of their own code of practice which constitutes a “misleading action” under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 Section 5(3b), which is an Offence.

28. Taking the foregoing into account, it seems to me that the Claimant has consistently failed to act in good faith, and to abide by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and that, if they had done so, this matter could well have been resolved without recourse to court proceedings. As it stands, and considering the poor quality of their submission itself, the Claimant’s claim seems to amount to little more than a cynical attempt to extract revenue from me using the legal system. I would ask the court to kindly consider this in light of my own defence.


Statement of truth: 

29. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

Signed: 

Thanks again all, good night!

Coupon-mad

1. No I would not wait (you MUST act promptly, the court expects it) and I would not bother with the '4 months expired' argument. Concentrate on the old address / improper serve arguments and case law.

2. No not at this stage.

3. No. The Judge can locate that one but must important is VCS v Carr because it is in all fours with your case.

NahkoMed

Hi all,

Time has come for me to submit my application to the court. I had a generic response from DCBLtd essentially saying "We got your email, you must pay, here are the details to do so". So I'm intending to submit tomorrow or Wednesday as I promised I would!

I would really appreciate your experienced eyes on my witness statement and draft order. I've updated it significantly to improve the flow and make more sense of the case law, as well as following your recommendations as best I can @Coupon-mad with regard to the hearing video in VCS vs Carr, "reasonable steps" and "reason to beleive" etc.

I'll post the draft order first here:

Draft Order:

CLAIM No: ********************

BETWEEN:


CP Plus Ltd T/A Group Nexus (Claimant)

-- and --


******* (Defendant)

______________________________________________


DRAFT ORDER


______________________________________________





IT IS ORDERED THAT:

UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on  **********;

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on the Defendant's usual residential address;

AND UPON the court finding that the Particulars of Claim fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) by lacking a concise statement of facts and therefore do not constitute a valid cause of action;

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant on 12th February 2025 is hereby set aside.

2. The claim is struck out on the grounds that the Particulars of Claim fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) and do not provide a concise statement of facts necessary to establish a cause of action.

3. The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of this application in the sum of £313.

NahkoMed

And the witness statment.:

EXHIBIT XX-01 – Tenancy Agreement, Utility Bills, Proof of Change of Address at TSB

EXHIBIT XX-02 – CEL V CHAN and other judgments.

EXHIBIT XX-03 - Letter to Claimant Concerning This Ruling

EXHIBIT XX-04 – Correspondence pertaining to LBC

EXHIBIT XX-05 - Link to Official Video Hearing on VCSL vs CARR

EXHIBIT XX-06 – Particulars of Claim

EXHIBIT XX-07 – N244 Form

EXHIBIT XX-08 - Sequence of Events



Case number 

*******************

WITNESS STATEMENT 

I, [name], of [current address] , will say as follows: 

1.  I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on **********, in default due to a defective service of Claim. 

2. I had not received any claim form nor any detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware via letter from Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd on *********.

3. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and, should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law I have presented below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, 13.3).  In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the POC fails to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".  I present two separate cases which support these grounds for dismissal.

4. The Claimant has, throughout my dealings with them, acted in the most unreasonable manner: First, in ignoring my initial attempts to explain, negotiate and resolve the matter of the initial PCN when I approached them directly, later in failing to respond to questions I raised regarding the Letter Before Claim which fall entirely within the scope of the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, latterly in waiting more than a year after the LBC before submitting a claim to the Court (without my knowledge) and finally, with the egregious and abusive conduct which constitutes that submission itself, which is set out below.
 
5.   I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order. 

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM 

6. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on ********. I am aware that the Claimant is CP PLUS LTD T/A GROUPNEXUS and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice. 

7. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I received notice of a Debt Recovery Reminder from DCBL on 11th April 2025. This is a breach of  CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Because of this, the judgment was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).   

8. The address on the claim is ************. I moved from this address to my current address at ************, in December 2024. In support of this, I can provide documentation showing my updated address, including tenancy agreement, utility bills and proof that I altered my address with the DVLA and TSB bank on *******. (EXHIBIT XX-01)

9.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in January 2025 due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2).

10. The foregoing is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016). Although this case deals with the specific situation in which the Claimant had applied for a retrospective validation of an alternative method of service, the views of the Lord Justices on the matter of set-aside for reasons of failure to properly serve the claim, are illuminating:

11. Time for acknowledgement of service cannot expire if it has not become applicable: “I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable”. 

12. Due process should be followed: “This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”

13. CPR 6.9(3) states: “Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant referred to in entries 1, 2 or 3 in the table in paragraph (2) is an address at which the defendant no longer resides or carries on business, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence or place of business (‘current address’)”. In this case, the Claimant waited for more than a year after my response to the Letter Before Claim (ample “reason to believe” that I may have moved, EXHIBIT XX-04) before filing a claim with the Court, and evidently took no steps whatsoever to ascertain the address of my current residence, since I undertook to update all relevant particulars (DVLA records, Bank, Utility Companies, Local Council etc) immediately after moving (EXHIBIT XX-01). I would also note that Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd (a sister company of DCBL) were easily able to locate me following the judgment, to notify me of the same in the letter I received on 11th April this year (EXHIBIT XX-03).

14. In Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179) heard on 7th May 2024 by Her Honour Judge Evans, clear indication is given that, where particulars of claim have not been received by the defendant, the claimant is not entitled to a judgment by default, and that this is particularly true where there is real prospect of a successful defence. The recent appeal by the claimant (14.5 below, EXHIBIT XX-05) further reinforces the steps that must be taken by a Claimant to ascertain the Defendent's current address:

14.1. "The starting point of the analysis must be that the defendant, who at all material times lived at the property where his car was parked, was being served with parking enforcement notices by the claimant because through no fault of his own and despite making every effort to get one, he could not display a parking permit to prove to them that he had the right to park his car in that space. He had tried without success to ‘explain this to the claimant, who in substance said it was not their problem and he should take it up with the letting agent/landlord. The claimant then obtained a default judgment for a sum in excess of £10,000 in respect of the accumulated parking charges after they had sent all relevant correspondence to and served the proceedings at an address where the defendant no longer lived. The Circuit Judge rightly found that he could not be criticised for failing to respond to a claim form which he never in fact received."

14.2. Real prospect of a successful defence: "Given the Circuit Judge's finding (which the claimant realistically does not seek to challenge) that there was a real prospect of successfully defending the claim, in my judgment it is arguable with a real prospect of success that she did not properly carry out the holistic evaluation she should have done at the third ‘stage of the Denton test, despite expressly acknowledging that she had to take all the circumstances into consideration."

14.3. No opportunity to defend: "There also appears to have been no specific consideration at the third stage of the fact that in practical terms this defendant has never had an opportunity to advance his valid defence irrespective of whether service was property effected at his former address. That is related to but different from the point that he cannot be blamed for failure to respond to the claim form because he never received it."

14.4. No Opportunity to contest: "Standing back and looking at the bigger picture, if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense.”

14.5. I would also respectfully draw to the attention of the court, the order that was recently given by Lord Justices Bean, Moylan and Phillips setting aside the order of Judge Evans (7th May 2024) which granted the Claimant leave to appeal the decision of District Judge Lyer, and restoring Judge Lyer’s original decision. The written details of the order and reasons have not yet been handed down, but a link to the official video hearing is provided in EXHIBIT XX-05. In it, the justices support the District Judge’s decision that even a DVLA check alone was not sufficient to count as “reasonable steps” to identify the defendant’s current address, and that other steps could and should have been taken. This suggests a high bar of responsibility on the Claimant to take such steps in this case.


CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT 

15. In the alternative: the claim should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC (15.1 below, EXHIBIT-XX-06) fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

15.1  THE DEFENDANT (D) IS INDEBTED TO THE CLAIMANT (C) FOR A PARKING CHARGE(S) ISSUED TO VEHICLE ******* AT ***********. 2. THE PCN(S) WERE ISSUED ON ******** 3. THE DEFENDANT IS PURSUED AS THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE FOR BREACH OF THE TERMS ON THE SIGNS (THE CONTRACT). REASON:VEHICLE REMAINED ON PRIVATE PROPERTY IN BREACH OF THE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 4. IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE DEFENDANT IS PURSUED AS THE KEEPER PURSUANT TO POFA 2012, SCHEDULE 4. AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS 1. £170 BEING THE TOTAL OF THE PCN(S) AND DAMAGES. 2. INTEREST AT A RATE OF 8% PER ANNUM PURSUANT TO S.69 OF THE COUNTY COURTS ACT 1984 FROM THE DATE HEREOF AT A DAILY RATE OF £.02 UNTIL JUDGMENT OR SOONER PAYMENT. 3. COSTS AND COURT FEES                                                                                                                                                                       
15.2 In view of this woeful POC (EXHIBIT XX-06) I am confident in relying upon two recent persuasive Appeal judgments as authority to support striking out the claim. Dismissing this claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

16. In Car Park Management Service LTD v Akande heard on 10th May 2024 before Her Honour Judge Evans, the following has been stated:

16.1. "The district judge said paragraph 5 of her judgment that she did not accept there was sufficient set out in the claim form to enable the court and in particular the Defendant to understand the nature of the breach alleged. She identified at paragraph 9 that an allegation of breach and the nature of the breach rather than a simple assertion of breach of terms and conditions is fundamental to a claim of this nature.

16.2. "She identified that there are a number of different ways in which a defendant might breach the terms and conditions  in a car park: for example, not displaying  a ticket, overstaying, not parking within the correct area for parking. She noted that these Particulars of Claim do not specify  which of those, if any, or which other breach was said to have been committed by this Defendant."  (EXHIBIT XX-02)

17. Further, in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 which was also about an N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrongly refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract’.

18. Considering the foregoing, not only has the claim not been properly served, depriving me of the opportunity to defend and contest it, and thereby preventing due process, but also, had I been allowed to do so, a wealth of case law suggests that I would have been successful (EXHIBIT XX-02). With this in mind I respectfully ask the Court to strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

NahkoMed

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

19. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible.  I discovered a CCJ had been made against me on Friday 11th April 2025. On the same day I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgment, including the particulars of claim.

 20. On the following Monday (14th April 2025) I wrote to DCB Legal offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment, and making it clear that if no such application was made in the subsequent two weeks, that I would apply unilaterally to the court to set aside the judgment.  (EXHIBIT XX-03). An acknowledgement was received the same day (14th April) confirming receipt of my email, without substance or reply. A later, generic reply from DCB Ltd (a debt collection agency) was received on 25th April, again without reference to my offer (EXHIBIT XX-03).

21. As such, on 29th April 2025, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgment and fairly present my case (EXHIBIT XX-07)

22. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £313 from the claimant should this request be successful.

 CLAIMANT HAS ACTED UNREASONABLY

23. I received the Letter Before Claim in respect of this matter from DCB Legal, at my old address, on 30/10/2023, more than 14 months prior to the claim itself being filed. I acknowledged receipt of the LBC in writing on 28/11/2023, and requested additional information in good faith, as recommended by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims sections 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 (EXHIBIT XX-04).

24. On ********* (already outside the 30 days required by the PAP), I received a reply to these requests which was woefully inadequate in addressing the very reasonable matters I had raised (EXHIBIT XX-04). As such, on 12/02/2024, I wrote to DCB Legal again, restating and further clarifying my requests, and quoting the PAP as follows: “the Pre Action Protocol for Debt claims states that you should provide ‘details of any interest and administrative or other charges added' and it is in this spirit that I request a clear answer to the above questions.”. I did not receive a reply.

25. In fact, I heard nothing further from DCB Legal, nor the Claimant, nor anyone representing the claimant, until the letter I received in April this year, at my new address, informing me of the Judgment that had been made against me in default.

26. It is clear, therefore, that, following the judgment, representatives of the claimant were very quickly and easily able to locate me at my new address, but failed to do so prior to attempting to serve the claim.  The length of time they waited before submitting a claim to the court provides ample “reason to believe” that I no longer resided at the address they had on file for me. Both CPR 6.9(3), and the BPA Code of Practice (to which the Claimant is required to adhere), therefore require reasonable steps to be taken to identify the address at which I currently reside. Such steps could have easily included a soft credit trace, or even an email to me directly, since the claimant knew full well my email address at that time. Either of these would have resulted in correct service.

27. Given that they did not do so, the Claimant is in breach of their own code of practice which constitutes a “misleading action” under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 Section 5(3b), and is an Offence.

28. Taking the foregoing into account, it seems to me that the Claimant has consistently failed to act in good faith, and to abide by the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the CPR and their own professional code of practice, and that, if they had done so, this matter could well have been resolved without recourse to court proceedings. As it stands, and considering the poor quality of their submission itself, the Claimant’s claim seems to amount to little more than a cynical attempt to extract revenue from me using the legal system. I would ask the court to kindly consider this in light of my own defence.


Statement of truth: 

29. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

Signed: 

NahkoMed

A couple of specific questions I have before I submit this latest draft:

1. As mentioned previously in this thread, I did confirm my address for service as part of the "correspondence pertaining to LBC" which I'm including as EXHIBIT XX-04. Do you think I should include that email for completeness, or leave it out as likely to cause confusion about whether they needed to take "reasonable steps"?

2. I'm potentially eligable for help with fees, how does it work with claiming for costs in that case? The instructions are to submit both applications together, so I won't know whether (or how much) I've had to pay in costs at the time I submit.

3. Notwithstanding point 2. I've opted to claim for the costs of application only. I see that a few other applicants have had costs denied or reserved and I'm wondering if the amount claimed plays into that, any thoughts?

4. In the event that there's not much to do to the statements, I'd really appreciate hearing some reassurance that this is ok! It's a tense time!

Thanks all, so much.

1505grandad

A very quick skim through but:-

is the name of the DJ correct?  -  should the first surname letter be a capital i?  -  i.e.I
"
14.5. I would also respectfully draw to the attention of the court, the order that was recently given by Lord Justices Bean, Moylan and Phillips setting aside the order of Judge Evans (7th May 2024) which granted the Claimant leave to appeal the decision of District Judge Lyer, and restoring Judge Lyer’s original decision."