Phase 1: CCJ Removed. Phase 2: Claim Discontinued. Phase 3: Costs.

B789

3.   The defendant also notes point 8, from the letter received from Deputy District Judge Kirkconel on 3rdApril 2023, the following statement “The Claimant must send the documents so that they are received by no later than 4.00pm on 02 May 2023. The claimants documents must include a copy of the agreement (redacted if necessary to preserve commercial confidentiality) giving authority to regulate parking on the land in question.”, this deadline set by the Judge has been ignored.

Perhaps add a very short paragraph after #3 with:

4. The deadline of 4.00 pm on 2nd of  May 2023 set by the Judge DDJ Kirkconel on 3rd of April 2023 has been ignored by the Claimant.

That will make it stand out a bit better.

Your para #4 will now become #5. However, it is very poorly structured and does not make much sense

 5.   This claim was also associated with a surprise CCJ placed on the Defendant, which the Claimant relentlessly denied any wrong doing for 12 months and pursued. Before a day before the hearing signing a consent order admitting to the claim form had been improperly served in the first place. Again, the Claimant ignored the judge’s orders and dates set to refund the Defendant their N244 money.

You need to go back and reword it so that it makes grammatical sense. A suggestion but try to do it in your own words:

5. The claim resulted in an unexpected default CCJ against the Defendant, which the Claimant vigorously purued for a year, harassing the Defendant during this period. However, just one day prior to the set aside hearing, the Claimant agreed to a consent order admitting that the claim form had been improperly served. Despite this, the Claimant has disregarded the court's instructions and failed to reimburse the Defendant the N244 fee as directed.

Harvez63

Thank you, hot about this

1.   I am Mr xxxxxx of xxxxxxxxxxx, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge and research. 

2.   In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows: 

3.   The defendant also notes point 8, from the letter received from DDJ Kirkconel on 3rd April 2023, the following statement “The Claimant must send the documents so that they are received by no later than 4.00pm on 2nd May 2023. The claimants documents must include a copy of the agreement (redacted if necessary to preserve commercial confidentiality) giving authority to regulate parking on the land in question”.

4.   The deadline of 4.00pm on 2nd of May 2023 set by DDJ Kirkconel on 3rd of April 2023 has been ignored by the Claimant. 

5.   The claim resulted in an unexpected default CCJ against the Defendant, which the Claimant vigorously defended as justified for a year. However, just one day prior to the set aside hearing, the Claimant agreed to a consent order admitting that the claim form had been improperly served. Despite this, the Claimant disregarded the court's instructions and failed to reimburse the Defendant the N244 fee as directed within the time set by DDJ Grand.

Sequence of events

6.     I visited the Subway shop on Spring Road, Southampton, on 28th December 2018

7.     It was the first time visiting the car park and a last minute decision to get food on the way home. On entry to the car park I did not see any obvious or prominent contractual signage or during the 13 minute stay during which I remained within the car the entire time. 

8.     The car park is entered from a busy road with pedestrians, moving cars and delivery vehicles to consider.

9.     My partner went inside Subway shop whilst I remained in the car. The car park was empty so I manouvered the car to reverse into a marked bay adjacent to the building. From the drivers seated position whilst parked, there were no signs visible in the car park, and no signs were obvious or prominent during the reversing manoeuvre.

10.  The car park is located between the Subway shop and a Tesco store. The car park is adjacent to these two premises and appears to serve these stores. However, after the event, I learnt that the car park is owned by Vets4Pets in the building adjacent to the Subway shop.

11.  Shortly after this event I received the PCN which was posted to my address. There followed a barrage of letters from debt collectors threating “Debt Recovery” and “CCJs”. The original PCN "invoice" was for £100, discounted if paid within 14 days. 

12.  I appealed the PCN through the Claimants' online appeal portal but it was refused. I have since researched online about this unregulated Claimants appeals service and I could not find any instances where a motorist has had a successful appeal. There are however, hundreds of reports of motorists having their appeal rejected.

13.  Five months later (26th June 2019)  I received a letter from the Claimants' legal team now demanding an added £60 for "initial legal costs" on top of the original charge of £100”.   Note to self: include evidence why this added £60 should not be added because... (do some research)

14.  16 days later (12th July 2019) I received the second later from the Claimants legal team threatening even more added fees bringing the total sum claimed to £247.30 which included additional amounts for estimated interest (£12.30), court fees (£25) and solicitors costs (£50).

15.  After receiving the threatening letters from the Claimants legal team, I went back to the car park and found there was now a small sign on entry reading “Parking restrictions in place, see additional signs for full details” [exhibit 01]. This sign was not in place or was much smaller then the sign that was in place in 2017. This entrance sign is not readable by a driver on entry to the car park whilst trying to turn to cross a busy road, across a public footpath and into the car park due to its location. 

16.  The additional sign as evidenced in [exhibit 02], was not only very small but it was in a very dark corner of the car park and at a height that’s not readable from the drivers seat in a car and in the direction of a brick wall/deadend, which one wouldn’t walk or look towards if exiting the car [exhibit 02]. (Note to self: make clear which photos are from the time of the event and which are more recent as proof that they must have been inadequate at the time.)

17.  There are two additional signs on a low wall adjacent to two parking spaces which read “Vets4Pets Veterinary Surgery, Client Parking Only” [exhibit 03]. I did not park nor manoeuvre within these spaces.

18.  Whilst researching the car park, the positions of the signs have been moved every 6 months according to Google Street View historic data. [Exhibits 01 & 04-08].

19.  I visited the car park again on 1st May 2023 and the signs have now quadrupled in size and number compared to 2017when only 2 small signs existed with a font size only readable from a metre or less. [Exhibits 08, 09 10].

20.  The new exit sign which was not in place on 28.12.2017 now makes it clear that parking restrictions are in place [Exhibit 11].

21.  Some of the new signs are already falling apart yet again and the condition of the signs shows that they aren't being checked or maintained to ensure they’re in a readable state [Exhibit 12]. 

22. I refer to British Parking Association (BPA) Approved Operator Scheme (AoS) - Code of Practice version 8 – January 2020 section 19.3 (Exhibit 13). This specifically states that signs with specific parking terms must be placed throughout the site, so that drivers are given the chance to read them at the time of parking or leaving the vehicle. It is no such signs are visible during my stop. (note to self: quote BPA relevant to date of parking event, update)

23. It is therefore denied that I entered a legally binding contract, as no clear and visible signage existed on the road onto the site, or at the car park entrance where I parked my car and on the date of the 28thDecember 2017, at no point did I believe any permission to park was needed. Even if the court believes the sign (that was not prominent and was not seen) is capable of offering and creating a contractual agreement, that offer was not made by this Claimant.

Abuse of process - the quantum

24. This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that the intention is for this to be banned in the new code of practice. It is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable (authorities: two well known ParkingEye cases where modern penalty law rationale was applied). Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67. Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD 

[2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal', i.e. unrecoverable.

25. My stance regarding this punitive add-on is now underpinned by the Government, who have now stated that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

26. Whilst it is known that the rogue parking industry have just filed Judicial Reviews and have delayed the new Code of Practice (as per paragraph 27), the Government is pressing ahead and has conceded to undertake a final Public Consultation and Impact Assessment, as the latter was missing from their rationale. Going by the damning words of the Minister, and the fact that two consultations and an industry and consumer represented Steering Group have already informed the DLUHC's decision over the past two years, I believe there is no reason to think the Government's view will significantly change about adding unconscionable costs that were not incurred and which merely exist as a mechanism to enhance already-doubled parking charges, to fuel the roboclaim race to court and to side-step the £50 legal fees cap set in the Small Clams Track

27. Adding debt recovery/costs/damages/fees (however described) onto a parking charge is due to be banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the incoming statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued

28. This particular Claimant's legal team routinely continues to pursue a sum on top of each PCN, despite indisputably knowing that these are banned costs in the incoming statutory Code of Practice. The claim is exaggerated by inclusion of a false, wholly disproportionate and unincurred 'damages' enhancement of £60 upon which the Claimant seems to have also added interest at 8% calculated from the date of parking. Clearly an abuse of the court process

29. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists.

30. The DLUHC consulted for over two years and considered evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. The DLUHC saw through this and in a published Response (also in February 2022), they identified that some respondents were 'parking firms posing as motorists'. Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, and are effectively Trade Body Board member colleagues passing motorists' data around electronically and seeking to inflate the sum of the parking charge, which in itself is already sufficiently enhanced

31. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the full parking charge itself more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called a 'letter chain' business model that generates a healthy profit

32. These are costs which the Claimant has neither paid nor incurred and were not quantified in prominent lettering on alleged signage. Introducing the purported 'costs' add-on in later debt demands is a moneymaking exercise to extract a high fixed sum from weaker motorists and came far too late. I did not agree to it

33. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice. The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'. A clear steer for the Courts

34. This overrides mistakes made in the appeal cases that the parking industry try to rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy). Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals were findings by Circuit Judges who appeared to be inexperienced in the nuances of private parking law and were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal further

35. It is pertinent to note that the Britannia v Semark-Jullien appeal judgment by HHJ Parkes criticised the District Judges at Southampton, for apparently not having enough evidence to conclude that Britannia 'knew' that their added costs were abusive (unincurred, unpaid and unjustified). Unbeknown to HHJ Parkes, of course all District Judges deal with template, generic evidence and arguments from parking operators every week, and BPA member firms including Britannia, certainly had been told this by Judges up and down the Country for many years. And the decision and words used by the DLUHC show that DJ Grand and DJ Taylor were right all along. As was HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson [not appealed - see Exhibit 14] where she went into great detail about this abuse

36. The Semark-Jullien case is now unreliable going forward and is fully distinguished now that the Government has at last stepped in and exposed and published the truth. This Claimant indisputably has knowledge (and always had knowledge) that they have not paid a penny in debt recovery costs, nor incurred any additional costs that the £100 parking charge is not designed to more than cover. The abuse is now clearly established and a new judgment re-stating this position, in the light of the damning words in the Foreword and the Explanatory Document published alongside the Code of Practice and stating (for the avoidance of doubt) the knowledge that District Judges have from years of experience of seeing these template enhanced claims and telling this Claimant to stop bringing exaggerated parking claims to court, would be welcomed to bring muchneeded clarity for consumers and Judges across England and Wales.

37. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon those old cases, significant errors were made. Evidence - including unclear signage and Codes of Practice - was either ignored, even when in evidence at both hearings (Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to regulatory DVLA KADOE rules requiring landowner authority) or the judgment referred to the wrong rules, with one Judge seeking out the inapplicable BPA Code after the hearing and using it erroneously (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver, was inexplicably aligned with Beavis. The learned Judges were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC

 

CPR 44.11 - further costs

 <Same as Previous>

 

Le_Kirk

13.  Five months later (26th June 2019)  I received a letter from the Claimants' legal team now demanding an added £60 for "initial legal costs" on top of the original charge of £100”.   Note to self: include evidence why this added £60 should not be added because... (do some research)

Isn't that included in the defence template and also in your paragraph 24 and 25, no need to repeat matters.   Every paragraph requires a number and you are missing a number for paragraphs between 24 and 25.

Not_A_Hope

Typo in 14

14.  16 days later (12th July 2019) I received the second later letter from the Claimants legal team

Coupon-mad

I would make this more punchy:

5.   This is a continuation of the contempt already displayed by this Claimant, who has been repeatedly ignoring court rules and deadlines, both in the pre-and post-action phases.  The claim itself was improperly served because they used an address they had prior knowledge was wrong and this action caused an unexpected default CCJ.

(then the rest of that para),

You can also beef up your section about costs due to this wholly unreasonable conduct.  Search the forum for Horsefield and find the costs argument someone wrote in April.

Castle

Harvez63 said:

Thank you, hot about this

Sequence of events

6.     I visited the Subway shop on Spring Road, Southampton, on 28th December 2018

Last week you said it was 28th December 2017!

Harvez63

@Le_Kirk I'm not sure, I kind of want to leave it in because of the dates and time frame in which costs where being increased quickly? if you definitely think it should come out, I will remove it. thank you though

@Not_A_Hope good spot, thank you. 

@Coupon-mad I like punchy, I've added that in and will look into the Horsefield on my lunch today. Thank you

@Castle glad you spotted that, thank you 

Harvez63

I'm worried I've messed this up! Pressure being on this week to complete but here goes 

1.   I am Mr xxxxxx of xxxxxxxxxxx, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge and research. 

 

2.   In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows: 

 

3.   The defendant would like highlight point 8, from the letter received from DDJ Kirkconel on 3rd April 2023, the following statement “The Claimant must send the documents so that they are received by no later than 4.00pm on 2nd May 2023. The claimants documents must include a copy of the agreement (redacted if necessary to preserve commercial confidentiality) giving authority to regulate parking on the land in question”.

 

4.   The deadline of 4.00pm on 2nd of May 2023 set by DDJ Kirkconel on 3rd of April 2023 has been ignored by the Claimant. 

 

5.   This is a continuation of the contempt already displayed by this Claimant, who has been repeatedly ignoring court rules and deadlines, both in the pre-and post-action phases.  The claim itself was improperly served because they used an address they had prior knowledge was wrong and this action caused an unexpected default CCJ. The claim resulted in an unexpected default CCJ against the Defendant found on record by chance, which the Claimant vigorously defended as justified for a year. However, just one day prior to the set aside hearing, the Claimant agreed to a consent order admitting that the claim form had been improperly served. Despite this, the Claimant disregarded the court's instructions and failed to reimburse the Defendant the N244 fee as directed within the time set by DDJ Grand.

 

Sequence of events

 

6.   I visited the Subway shop on Spring Road, Southampton, on 28th December 2017.

 

7.   It was the first time visiting the car park and a last minute decision to get food on the way home. On entry to the car park I did not see any obvious or prominent contractual signage or during the 13 minute stay during which I remained within the car the entire time. 

 

8.   The car park is entered from a busy road with pedestrians, moving cars and delivery vehicles to consider.

 

9.   My partner went inside Subway shop whilst I remained in the car. The car park was empty so I manouvered the car to reverse into a marked bay adjacent to the building. From the drivers seated position whilst parked, there were no signs visible in the car park, and no signs were obvious or prominent during the reversing manoeuvre.

 

10. The car park is located between the Subway shop and a Tesco store. The car park is adjacent to these two premises and appears to serve these stores. However, after the event, I learnt that the car park is owned by Vets4Pets in the building adjacent to the Subway shop.

 

11. Shortly after this event I received the PCN which was posted to my address. There followed a barrage of letters from debt collectors threating “Debt Recovery” and “CCJs”. The original PCN "invoice" was for £100, discounted if paid within 14 days. 

 

12. I appealed the PCN through the Claimants' online appeal portal but it was refused. I have since researched online about this unregulated Claimants appeals service and I could not find any instances where a motorist has had a successful appeal. There are however, hundreds of reports of motorists having their appeal rejected.

 

13. Five months later (26th June 2019)  I received a letter from the Claimants' legal team now demanding an added £60 for "initial legal costs" on top of the original charge of £100”. 

 

14. 16 days later (12th July 2019) I received the second letter from the Claimants legal team threatening even more added fees bringing the total sum claimed to £247.30 which included additional amounts for estimated interest (£12.30), court fees (£25) and solicitors costs (£50).

 

15. After receiving the threatening letters from the Claimants legal team, I went back to the car park and found there was now a small sign on entry reading “Parking restrictions in place, see additional signs for full details” [exhibit 01]. This sign was not in place or was much smaller then the sign that was in place in 2017. This entrance sign is not readable by a driver on entry to the car park whilst trying to turn to cross a busy road, across a public footpath and into the car park due to its location. 

 

16. The additional sign as evidenced in [exhibit 02], was not only very small but it was in a very dark corner of the car park and at a height that’s not readable from the drivers seat in a car and in the direction of a brick wall/deadend, which one wouldn’t walk or look towards if exiting the car [exhibit 02]. (Note to self: make clear which photos are from the time of the event and which are more recent as proof that they must have been inadequate at the time.)

 

17. There are two additional signs on a low wall adjacent to two parking spaces which read “Vets4Pets Veterinary Surgery, Client Parking Only” [exhibit 03]. I did not park nor manoeuvre within these spaces.

 

18. Whilst researching the car park, the positions of the signs have been moved every 6 months according to Google Street View historic data. [Exhibits 01 & 04-08].

 

19. I visited the car park again on 1st May 2023 and the signs have now quadrupled in size and number compared to 2017 when only 2 small signs existed with a font size only readable from a metre or less. [Exhibits 08, 09 10].

 

20. The new exit sign which was not in place on 28.12.2017 now makes it clear that parking restrictions are in place [Exhibit 11].

 

21. Some of the new signs are already falling apart yet again and the condition of the signs shows that they aren't being checked or maintained to ensure they’re in a readable state [Exhibit 12]. 

 

22. I refer to British Parking Association (BPA) Approved Operator Scheme (AoS) - Code of Practice version 8 – January 2020 section 19.3 (Exhibit 13). This specifically states that signs with specific parking terms must be placed throughout the site, so that drivers are given the chance to read them at the time of parking or leaving the vehicle. It is no such signs are visible during my stop. (note to self: quote BPA relevant to date of parking event, update)

 

23. It is therefore denied that I entered a legally binding contract, as no clear and visible signage existed on the road onto the site, or at the car park entrance where I parked my car and on the date of the 28thDecember 2017, at no point did I believe any permission to park was needed. Even if the court believes the sign (that was not prominent and was not seen) is capable of offering and creating a contractual agreement, that offer was not made by this Claimant.

 

Abuse of process - the quantum

 

24. This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that the intention is for this to be banned in the new code of practice. It is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable (authorities: two well known ParkingEye cases where modern penalty law rationale was applied). Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67. Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD 

[2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal', i.e. unrecoverable.

 

25. My stance regarding this punitive add-on is now underpinned by the Government, who have now stated that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

 

26. Whilst it is known that the rogue parking industry have just filed Judicial Reviews and have delayed the new Code of Practice (as per paragraph 27), the Government is pressing ahead and has conceded to undertake a final Public Consultation and Impact Assessment, as the latter was missing from their rationale. Going by the damning words of the Minister, and the fact that two consultations and an industry and consumer represented Steering Group have already informed the DLUHC's decision over the past two years, I believe there is no reason to think the Government's view will significantly change about adding unconscionable costs that were not incurred and which merely exist as a mechanism to enhance already-doubled parking charges, to fuel the roboclaim race to court and to side-step the £50 legal fees cap set in the Small Clams Track

 

27. Adding debt recovery/costs/damages/fees (however described) onto a parking charge is due to be banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the incoming statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued

 

28. This particular Claimant's legal team routinely continues to pursue a sum on top of each PCN, despite indisputably knowing that these are banned costs in the incoming statutory Code of Practice. The claim is exaggerated by inclusion of a false, wholly disproportionate and unincurred 'damages' enhancement of £60 upon which the Claimant seems to have also added interest at 8% calculated from the date of parking. Clearly an abuse of the court process

 

29. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists.

 

30. The DLUHC consulted for over two years and considered evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. The DLUHC saw through this and in a published Response (also in February 2022), they identified that some respondents were 'parking firms posing as motorists'. Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, and are effectively Trade Body Board member colleagues passing motorists' data around electronically and seeking to inflate the sum of the parking charge, which in itself is already sufficiently enhanced

 

31. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the full parking charge itself more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called a 'letter chain' business model that generates a healthy profit

 

32. These are costs which the Claimant has neither paid nor incurred and were not quantified in prominent lettering on alleged signage. Introducing the purported 'costs' add-on in later debt demands is a moneymaking exercise to extract a high fixed sum from weaker motorists and came far too late. I did not agree to it

 

33. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice. The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'. A clear steer for the Courts

 

34. This overrides mistakes made in the appeal cases that the parking industry try to rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy). Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals were findings by Circuit Judges who appeared to be inexperienced in the nuances of private parking law and were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal further

 

35. It is pertinent to note that the Britannia v Semark-Jullien appeal judgment by HHJ Parkes criticised the District Judges at Southampton, for apparently not having enough evidence to conclude that Britannia 'knew' that their added costs were abusive (unincurred, unpaid and unjustified). Unbeknown to HHJ Parkes, of course all District Judges deal with template, generic evidence and arguments from parking operators every week, and BPA member firms including Britannia, certainly had been told this by Judges up and down the Country for many years. And the decision and words used by the DLUHC show that DJ Grand and DJ Taylor were right all along. As was HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson [not appealed - see Exhibit 14] where she went into great detail about this abuse

 

36. The Semark-Jullien case is now unreliable going forward and is fully distinguished now that the Government has at last stepped in and exposed and published the truth. This Claimant indisputably has knowledge (and always had knowledge) that they have not paid a penny in debt recovery costs, nor incurred any additional costs that the £100 parking charge is not designed to more than cover. The abuse is now clearly established and a new judgment re-stating this position, in the light of the damning words in the Foreword and the Explanatory Document published alongside the Code of Practice and stating (for the avoidance of doubt) the knowledge that District Judges have from years of experience of seeing these template enhanced claims and telling this Claimant to stop bringing exaggerated parking claims to court, would be welcomed to bring muchneeded clarity for consumers and Judges across England and Wales.

 

37. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon those old cases, significant errors were made. Evidence - including unclear signage and Codes of Practice - was either ignored, even when in evidence at both hearings (Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to regulatory DVLA KADOE rules requiring landowner authority) or the judgment referred to the wrong rules, with one Judge seeking out the inapplicable BPA Code after the hearing and using it erroneously (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver, was inexplicably aligned with Beavis. The learned Judges were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC

 

Harvez63

CPR 44.11 - further costs

 

38.   I am appending with this bundle, a fully detailed costs assessment which also covers my proportionate but unavoidable further costs and I invite the court to consider making an award to include these, pursuant to the court's powers in relation to misconduct (CPR 44.11). In support of that argument, I remind the court that the Claimants representative did not have reasonable cause to issue the PCN, as there were no Claimant signs clearly and prominently displayed on the approach road to Subway shop car park, at the entrance to the car park, or near the space in which my vehicle was stationary. It is denied that clear and visible signage exists within this car park; therefore it is denied I am in breach of terms and conditions. Not only could this claim have been avoided and the Claimant has no cause of action, but it is also vexatious to pursue an inflated sum that includes double recovery.

 

My fixed witness costs - ref PD 27, 7.3(1) and CPR 27.14

 

39.   As a litigant-in-person I have had to learn relevant law from the ground up and spent a considerable time researching the law online, processing and preparing my defence plus this witness statement. I ask for my fixed witness costs. I am advised that costs on the Small Claims track are governed by rule 27.14 of the CPR and (unless a finding of 'wholly unreasonable conduct' is made against the Claimant) the Court may not order a party to pay another party’s costs, except fixed costs such as witness expenses which a party has reasonably incurred in travelling to and from the hearing (including fares and/or parking fees) plus the court may award a set amount allowable for loss of earnings or loss of leave.

 

40.   Throughout the process, I have spent a significant amount of time and resources, and paid court fees to try to resolve this matter. As a litigant in person, I have had to learn relevant law from the ground up and spent a considerable time researching the law online, trying to reach the Claimant, processing and preparing an application package, set aside hearing materials, my Defence, this witness statement, supporting evidence, and trial bundle, among other things. This has led to a significant accumulation of wasted efforts. A conservative and reasonable account of the litigant in person time, costs, and court fees I have incurred are detailed in the Schedule of Costs.

 

41.   At the same time, the Claimant has engaged in wholly unreasonable behaviour and vexatious litigation, if not outright misconduct. The catalogue of errors begins from the absence of signage, terms, conditions, and any contractual basis – and continues with the failure to use my current address they acknowledged having had all along, obtaining a Judgment in Default using a wrong address acquired in a way that did not adhere to regulation, the lack of interest to provide any relevant details or help appeal the wrongly entered Judgment even if they later admitted their mistake. Ignoring court rulings and deadlines. This has caused significant stress.

 

42.   Even if the Claimant would argue that some single point listed above is a genuine error or otherwise reasonable, put together, they reveal a pattern of behaviour that is wholly unreasonable which is based on unfounded allegations and Particulars of Claim.

 

Due to the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour, I seek my costs on an indemnity basis.

 

43.    I seek my costs on an indemnity basis following the Claimant’s wholly unreasonable behaviour throughout the process, pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g), as detailed in the Schedule of Costs. 

 

44.   When considering the Claimant’s behaviour, I would like to draw the Court’s attention to Ridehalgh v Horsefield & Anor [1994] EWCA Civ 40: https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1994/40.htm. The authority articulates the definitions of unreasonable or improper behaviour as follows:

 

45.   "Unreasonable" also means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner's judgment, but it is not unreasonable.

 

46.   "Improper" means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The adjective covers, but is not confined to, conduct which would ordinarily be held to justify disbarment, striking off, suspension from practice or other serious professional penalty. It covers any significant breach of a substantial duty imposed by a relevant code of professional conduct. But it is not in our judgment limited to that. Conduct which would be regarded as improper according to the consensus of professional (including judicial) opinion can be fairly stigmatised as such whether or not it violates the letter of a professional code.

 

47. If the Court finds the Claimant’s behaviour unreasonable, considering Ridehalgh v Horsefield & Anor [1994] EWCA Civ 40 cited above and pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g), the Court can order "such further costs as the court may assess by the summary procedure and order to be paid by a party who has behaved unreasonably." In this case, I seek my litigant in person costs as detailed in the Schedule of Costs, pursuant to CPR 46.5, and on an indemnity basis, pursuant to CPR 44.3.

 

 

48. CPR 44.4(3) states that when deciding the amount of costs, the court will also have regard to “(a) the conduct of all the parties, including in particular (i) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings; and (ii) the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to try to resolve the dispute”, and “(c) the importance of the matter to all the parties.” In this case, the Claimant’s conduct before and during the proceedings has been unreasonable. Unlike the Particulars of Claim state, clearly visible signs, terms, and conditions were absent, and the Claimant failed to use my current address in any correspondence to address this matter. This led to the Judgment entered in Default, which this Defendant considers a highly important matter. Yet, the Claimant did not offer any help to resolve it, even if it was a direct consequence of their negligence with addresses and threatened my business due to the inability to obtain credit during a quiet period.

 

49. The fixed sum for loss of earnings/loss of leave apply to any hearing format and are fixed costs at PD 27, 7.3(1) ''The amounts which a party may be ordered to pay under rule 27.14(3)(c) (loss of earnings)... are: (1) for the loss of earnings or loss of leave of each party or witness due to attending a hearing ... a sum not exceeding £95 per day for each person.''

 

Statement of truth: I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

Harvez63

I really hope I'm close to the mark