VCS (2015) at DSA or Robin Hood Airport.

Redx

this one https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6030360/vcs-doncaster-airport-defence has the arguments about the additional spurious charges in it, I suggest you crib from it any useful parts

Coupon-mad

This will be VERY easy to lose, due to VCS v Ward, so get searching & reading more!

Bylaws is one word, and don't use normal short slang like 'hasn't'.

The Vehicle had to pull up for a few minutes to check their tyre that was very low, they thought that a puncture had occurred so needed to know where the nearest garage was, the Vehicle was literally stopped for a few minutes.

You are describing an emergency so you need to copy the VCS defence about the fact that the bylaws allow stopping for an emergency.

Search for the two obvious keywords...(I don't mean VCS Ward this time!).

TM74

Okay .
Has mine any legs at all ?

Redx

no legs yet, it stops at the belt buckle

Coupon-mad

It will when you do the required reading to see what to avoid & include.

There is no quick fix to a VCS 'stopping case' - you must avoid being dragged down by VCS v Ward and the way to do that is to read what's been said before.

TM74

In The County Court!

Claim No: XXXXXXX

Between

VCS (Claimant)

-and-

XXXXXXX (Defendant)

____________

DEFENCE

____________


1. The Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of vehicle registration number XXXXXXX on the material date. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts of the matter are that the claimant has issued a charge against the Defendant for allegedly stopping at a bus stop however there are no bus services that stop here because it is not a bus stop, there are no bus stop poles stating bus numbers or!timetables.

3. The Defendant also claims that he/she had to stop because of an emergancy, the vehicle suffered a deflated tyre shortly after leaving DSA car park that the claimant paid to stay in, due to this untimely incident the defendant had to stop and check his/her!vehicle, this was outside of DSA car park but within the area which bylaws are practiced.


4.The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim belongs to Peels holdings therefore bylaws come into force here, because the keeper has not named the driver at question the claimant acting as a third party cannot issue a charge.

5.At this location, the secret camera van does not operate in a reasonable, consistent and transparent manner and I contend that VCS have failed to meet the requirements of all of the above points in the BPA Code of Practice.!

6.They will need to show evidence to the contrary on every point, and explain how this hidden camera van can be compliant when this is not a car park, it is a road, and there is no opportunity for drivers in moving traffic to be informed that this technology!is in use and what VCS will use the data captured by ANPR cameras for. VCS have breached the BPA Code of Practice as regards the use of a non-compliant ANPR system being merely a van fitted with a hidden camera, patrolling land which is not a 'car park' and!neither 'managing, enforcing nor controlling parking'.

7.Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

8. The Particulars of Claim do not state that the Defendant was the driver or the keeper of the Vehicle. This indicates that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil!Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction!16 7.5!as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.!

9. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, entered into any contractual agreement with!the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.!

10. The Claimant has yet to respond to the Defendant’s letter dated XXXXXX, sent to!info@vehiclecontrol.co.uk!to which, requesting information lacking in the Letter Before Claim, which breached the requirements of the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, paragraphs!3.1 (a)-(d), 5.1 and 5.2 and the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct, paragraphs 6 (a) and 6 (c). The following requests have been inadequately addressed:

10.1 The details for the claim, as this dates back to XXXXXX and Defendant not having a certain recollection as to what this claim relates to.

10.2 Information as to the alleged breaches of their Terms and Conditions and the proof that the Defendant had breached such Terms and Conditions.

11. As the Claimant has not provided me with the information in paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2, I can only surmise that this claim relates to a time where the Defendant was leaving the Robin Hood, Doncaster Airport when suddenly the Defendant had to stop his Vehicle!in an emergancy due to a deflated tyre so in light of such circumstances, it was only reasonable, for the safety of the Defendant and other road users, to stop driving immediately and safely pull over until the Defendant checked his/her Vehicle The Defendant!stopped the Vehicle at the side of the road for about 3-5 minutes to check the state of his/her tyre, they then discovered it was drivable to a nearby garage where they could inflate the tyre to get home.

12.(3) of Doncaster Sheffield Airport, Bylaws,!2005!states, “Except in an except in an emergency, leave or park a Vehicle or cause it to wait for a period in excess of the permitted time in an area where the period of waiting is restricted by Notice”. As per!Paragraph 5 above, the Defendant’s situation should be regarded as an emergency, as it was an unexpected and serious situation requiring an immediate action, whereby stopping at the side of the road was the said immediate action taken by the Defendant.!

13.(12)!of Doncaster Sheffield Airport, Bylaws,!2005!states, “Without reasonable excuse park a vehicle elsewhere than in a place provided for that purpose”. Should the court not regard the Defendant’s situation as an emergency. As per Paragraph 5 above, the!Defendant’s conduct should be nevertheless regarded as a reasonable excuse to stop the vehicle in such circumstances.!

14. The Claimant may try to persuade the court using the decision in VCS v Ward, which can be fully distinguished and is far from persuasive when scrutinised. In that case, at appeal, the defendant did not appear and the case reportedly ran completely against!the interests of the victim consumer, such that the Judge even lamented the dreadful position he had been steered towards by this Claimant's legal representative who, it seems, effectively ambushed the court with a case not first raised at the original hearing.!In any event, the VCS v Ward case involved a business park and has no application to an Airport case, where the byelaws lay the facts and rules out (very helpfully for the court, and fully in accordance with the Consumer Rights Act!2015)!that an emergencysuch as unexpectedly feeling unwell whilst driving a vehicle, is a 'reasonable excuse' clearly anticipated by the Airport owners to be exempt conduct, and not a contravention at all. This Claimant has misapplied the byelaws rules and twisted them for their!own profit.

15. The Defendant asks the court for the claim to be struck out as an abuse of process on its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules!1998.!

15.1 The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act!2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgement!in Parking Eye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.!

15.2 CPR!44.3 (2)!states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and

(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

15.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'Debt Collection!Charge' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low-cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

15.4 The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses!or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found!is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

15.5 According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.!

15.6 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June!2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of!DJ Grand, who on 21st February!2019!sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones'!robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing

15.6 The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule!27.14!on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable!conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.


Statement of Truth:

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Redx

some spelling errors like defendant and Peel Holdings

TM74

n The County Court!

Claim No: XXXXXXX

Between

VCS (Claimant)

-and-

XXXXXXX (Defendant)

____________

DEFENCE

____________


1. The Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of vehicle registration number XXXXXXX on the material date. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts of the matter are that the claimant has issued a charge against the Defendant for allegedly stopping at a bus stop however there are no bus services that stop here because it is not a bus stop, there are no bus stop poles stating bus numbers or!timetables.

3. The Defendant also claims that he/she had to stop because of an emergancy, the vehicle suffered a deflated tyre shortly after leaving DSA car park that the claimant paid to stay in, due to this untimely incident the Defendant had to stop and check his/her!vehicle, this was outside of DSA car park but within the area which bylaws are practiced.


4.The ‘land’ which forms the basis of the current claim belongs to Peel Group (formerly known as Peel Holdings) therefore bylaws come into force here, because the keeper has not named the driver at question the claimant acting as a third party cannot issue a charge.

5.At this location, the secret camera van does not operate in a reasonable, consistent and transparent manner and I contend that VCS have failed to meet the requirements of all of the above points in the BPA Code of Practice.!

6.They will need to show evidence to the contrary on every point, and explain how this hidden camera van can be compliant when this is not a car park, it is a road, and there is no opportunity for drivers in moving traffic to be informed that this technology!is in use and what VCS will use the data captured by ANPR cameras for. VCS have breached the BPA Code of Practice as regards the use of a non-compliant ANPR system being merely a van fitted with a hidden camera, patrolling land which is not a 'car park' and!neither 'managing, enforcing nor controlling parking'.

7.Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

8. The Particulars of Claim do not state that the Defendant was the driver or the keeper of the Vehicle. This indicates that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil!Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction!16 7.5!as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.!

9. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, entered into any contractual agreement with!the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.!

10. The Claimant has yet to respond to the Defendant’s letter dated XXXXXX, sent to!info@vehiclecontrol.co.uk!to which, requesting information lacking in the Letter Before Claim, which breached the requirements of the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, paragraphs!3.1 (a)-(d), 5.1 and 5.2 and the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct, paragraphs 6 (a) and 6 (c). The following requests have been inadequately addressed:

10.1 The details for the claim, as this dates back to XXXXXX and Defendant not having a certain recollection as to what this claim relates to.

10.2 Information as to the alleged breaches of their Terms and Conditions and the proof that the Defendant had breached such Terms and Conditions.

11. As the Claimant has not provided me with the information in paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2, I can only surmise that this claim relates to a time where the Defendant was leaving the Robin Hood, Doncaster Airport when suddenly the Defendant had to stop his Vehicle!in an emergancy due to a deflated tyre so in light of such circumstances, it was only reasonable, for the safety of the Defendant and other road users, to stop driving immediately and safely pull over until the Defendant checked his/her Vehicle The Defendant!stopped the Vehicle at the side of the road for about 3-5 minutes and then check the state of his/her tyre he then discovered it was drivable to a nearby garage where he/her could inflate his tyre to get him home.

12.(3) of Doncaster Sheffield Airport, Bylaws,!2005!states, “Except in an except in an emergency, leave or park a Vehicle or cause it to wait for a period in excess of the permitted time in an area where the period of waiting is restricted by Notice”. As per!Paragraph 5 above, the Defendant’s situation should be regarded as an emergency, as it was an unexpected and serious situation requiring an immediate action, whereby stopping at the side of the road was the said immediate action taken by the Defendant.!

13.(12)!of Doncaster Sheffield Airport, Bylaws,!2005!states, “Without reasonable excuse park a vehicle elsewhere than in a place provided for that purpose”. Should the court not regard the Defendant’s situation as an emergency. As per Paragraph 5 above, the!Defendant’s conduct should be nevertheless regarded as a reasonable excuse to stop the vehicle in such circumstances.!

14. The Claimant may try to persuade the court using the decision in VCS v Ward, which can be fully distinguished and is far from persuasive when scrutinised. In that case, at appeal, the defendant did not appear and the case reportedly ran completely against!the interests of the victim consumer, such that the Judge even lamented the dreadful position he had been steered towards by this Claimant's legal representative who, it seems, effectively ambushed the court with a case not first raised at the original hearing.!In any event, the VCS v Ward case involved a business park and has no application to an Airport case, where the byelaws lay the facts and rules out (very helpfully for the court, and fully in accordance with the Consumer Rights Act!2015)!that an emergencysuch as unexpectedly feeling unwell whilst driving a vehicle, is a 'reasonable excuse' clearly anticipated by the Airport owners to be exempt conduct, and not a contravention at all. This Claimant has misapplied the byelaws rules and twisted them for their!own profit.

15. The Defendant asks the court for the claim to be struck out as an abuse of process on its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules!1998.!

15.1 The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act!2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgement!in Parking Eye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.!

15.2 CPR!44.3 (2)!states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and

(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

15.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'Debt Collection!Charge' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low-cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

15.4 The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses!or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found!is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

15.5 According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.!

15.6 Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June!2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of!DJ Grand, who on 21st February!2019!sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones'!robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing

15.6 The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule!27.14!on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable!conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.


Statement of Truth:

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Redx

Still some spelling errors, run a spell checker over it

Hint , there is no a in emergency

TM74

Okay thanks