County Court Claim Defence

UTV89

Hi,

My wife fell victim to woefully inadequate Parking Eye signage at Warrington Central station in 2017 where Parking Eye run a car park on the same land as the official station car park which is run by APCOA. In the same way as other users of this forum, she bought a ticket from the APCOA machine (the only machine visible from where she was parked) in good faith that she had paid for her short stay.

She subsequently submitted an unsuccessful POPLA appeal and went on to receive an LBCCC. We returned the LBCCC reply form to Parking Eye after which no further correspondence was received (since the beginning of June 2018).

Last Friday, more than 12 months later, she received a County Court Claim Form. We now have to build her defence.

Before I prepare a draft defence I just have a query regarding the Acknowledgment of Service that we are currently submitting online.

If the case makes it all the way to court and I wish to represent / speak on behalf of my wife in court do I need to complete the Acknowledgment of Service NOW as a “Litigation Friend”?

Or does my wife complete the Acknowledge of Service as the defendant now, after which I will still get the opportunity to speak in court if the case makes it that far?

This will probably be deemed an embarrassingly daft question by many but I am completely new to this and do not want to trip ourselves up at the first hurdle. I have searched the NEWBIES thread but cannot find the answer for this scenario.

Any help in this first instance would be much appreciated.

KeithP

What is the Issue Date on the Claim Form?

Did it come from the County Court Business Centre in Northampton, or from somewhere else?

The named Defendant should complete the Acknowledgement of Service. To do the AoS, follow the guidance offered in a Dropbox file linked from post #2 of the NEWBIES FAQ sticky thread. About ten minutes work - no thinking required.

All paperwork from this point onwards must be in the name of the Defendant.

Redx

the person named on the N1 form as defendant does the AOS online, following the instructions in the walkthrough in that NEWBIES thread

the defendant must appear in court if it gets that far

you are either speaking as a lay representative or a McKenzie friend, so check the differences out later down the line

if the judge allows you to speak, then you can , but may need to take the proof with you in order to speak, its up to the judge

UTV89

Thank you both for such a quick reply.

We had completed all of the AoS following the instructions on the NEWBIES thread but then the mention of a litigation friend at the end threw us off track.

Yes, the claim form did come from the County Court Business Centre in Northampton and the issue date is 24th June 2019

Thanks again

Redx

I would assume that if you had BARGEPOLE assisting in the case, as a Litigation Friend, then maybe this would be filled in at the time ?

my own thoughts are that you act as either lay rep, or McKenzie friend , assisting the defendant on the day

KeithP

UTV89 wrote: »

We had completed all of the AoS following the instructions on the NEWBIES thread but then the mention of a litigation friend at the end threw us off track.

Yes, the claim form did come from the County Court Business Centre in Northampton and the issue date is 24th June 2019.

With a Claim Issue Date of 24th June, and having done the Acknowledgement of Service in a timely manner, you have until 4pm on Monday 29th July 2019 to file your Defence.

That's over three weeks away. Loads of time to produce a perfect Defence, but please don't leave it to the last minute.


When you are happy with the content, your Defence should be filed via email as suggested here:

Print your Defence.
1. Sign it and date it.
   
2. Scan the signed document back in and save it as a pdf.
   
3. Send that pdf as an email attachment to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk
   
4. Just put the claim number and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'Please find my Defence attached'.
   
5. Log into MCOL after a few days to see if the Claim is marked "defence received". If not chase the CCBC until it is.
   
6. Do not be surprised to receive an early copy of the Claimant's Directions Questionnaire, they are just trying to keep you under pressure.
   
7. Wait for your DQ from the CCBC, or download one from the internet, and then re-read post #2 of the NEWBIES FAQ sticky thread to find out exactly what to do with it.

Of course everywhere I have said 'you' or 'your' I mean the Defendant.

dalew007

Sounds like they have had a mass claim put through the county claims in northampton as this is where mine came from, why do they file it from there when the VCS company is based in Sheffield ?

just out of curiosity.

thanks

Le_Kirk

Northampton CCBC is the processing centre for MCOL.

UTV89

Hi all,
After much research I have compiled the first draft of my defence below.

I am conscious this is somewhat lengthy however I just want to ensure all possible bases are covered given that this is our one shot to put them to the court.

I am also aware that Beavis is referenced in multiple points but as ParkingEye could try and rely on the Beavis case themselves, I again want to ensure we are covered from all angles and interpretations of that case.

Other points I wanted to mention would relate to the number of people that are being caught out by the signage on this site (as evidenced by other cases on this forum and in the letters page of the local newspaper) however I was not sure if this would be better included in the witness statement rather than the defence?

Any feedback/suggestions on the below would be gratefully received before I formally submit the defence….

Statement of Defence

Date xx/xx/2019 Claim number xxxxxxxx

Facts of the Case

On 23rd October 2017 the Defendant visited Central Station Warrington with her 3-month-old daughter to collect passengers arriving on an inbound train. The Defendant arrived at 14:20 and purchased a pay and display ticket at 14:22. The Defendant paid £3.00 for 24 hours parking, making the ticket valid until 14:22 on 24th October 2017. The Defendant departed at 15:06 on 23rd October 2017, 46 minutes after initially arriving. The Defendant subsequently received a parking charge notice from ParkingEye for £100.

Upon receiving the parking charge notice, the Defendant immediately appealed, sending ParkingEye a photo of the pay and display ticket that was purchased 2 minutes after arrival. ParkingEye’s response merely stated “We are writing to advise you that your recent appeal has been unsuccessful and that you have now reached the end of our internal appeals procedure. Our records confirm that no parking was purchased on the date of the parking event, despite there being payment methods available on the day in question”.

Having received no further explanation from ParkingEye as to why the £100 “parking charge” was still being pursued, the Defendant returned to the site to try and establish why the pay and display ticket they had purchased was being inexplicably ignored by the Claimant.

After much closer scrutiny it transpired there are two separate car parks on the land on which the Defendant parked, one operated by APCOA and the other by ParkingEye. Having returned to the site in person and also uncovering numerous other cases of drivers falling victim to the unclear terms at this site, the Defendant has no doubt that the signage for the area operated by ParkingEye is wholly inadequate to form a binding contract.

In response to the particulars of the claim, the Claimant has no cause of action against the Defendant on the following grounds:

1. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) fails to identify the facts that caused a charge to arise and fails to describe the alleged unpaid parking charges.

1.1 Right to Claim Unpaid Parking Charges from the Keeper of Vehicle – Schedule 4 Paragraph 7 (2) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

Paragraph 7(2) of schedule 4 of POFA 2012 states:

’’The notice must - (b) inform the driver of the requirement to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and describe those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose…and the other facts that made those charges payable…’’

This PCN stated that -

“By either not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park for longer than permitted, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the signage, the Parking Charge is now payable to ParkingEye Ltd” (neither of which is a ‘fact’).

The Defendant had purchased a ticket for the period of parking in good faith, to which no reference was made in the Claimant’s rejection of the Defendant’s PCN appeal, despite the Defendant providing photographic evidence. Thus, the Defendant was deliberately left confused and unaware of the reason for the notice even after the first stage of appeal.

Furthermore, the Claimant’s allegation is based on images by their ANPR camera of the Defendant’s vehicle at the entrance and exit to the site. These are merely close up images of the vehicle in transit, making it impossible to decipher in which area of the car park the images were taken or for the Defendant to realise that a separate car park had been entered, even after receiving the PCN.

1.2 Derek Twigg MP (Halton) wrote to ParkingEye on behalf of the Defendant on multiple occasions in an attempt to gain clarity on this particular situation and seek reasonable resolution of the matter. No response was ever received and the Claimant evidently has no desire to consider the facts that caused a charge to arise.

1.3 This practice ties in with wider research suggesting that private parking charges and the appeals systems are unlikely to be fairly weighted in favour of consumers. This fact was later confirmed in all readings of the Private Parking Code of Practice Bill, from February 2018 to date, where MPs universally condemned the entire industry as operating 'an outrageous scam' typically relying upon hidden, punitive terms that purposely rely on drivers not seeing an unexpected obligation. Both the British Parking Association ('BPA') Trade Body and indeed, ParkingEye themselves were specifically named and shamed more than once in Parliament and the Bill was introduced purely because the industry is out of control, self-regulation has failed, and in many cases any 'appeal' is futile.

2. The Defendant denies that signage on and around the site is clear and visible. The Claim Form issued on xx/xx/2019 states that signage is “clearly displayed at the entrance to and throughout the car park” which “states that this is private land, is managed by ParkingEye Ltd, and is a paid parking site, along with other T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”. In order to win the POPLA appeal submitted by the Defendant, ParkingEye also previously claimed that there are signs situated at the entrance, exit and throughout the car park displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.1 ParkingEye clearly relies on contract law, but does not do enough to make clear what the terms and conditions of the contract are, making it far too easy for people to unwittingly fall outside the terms of contract.

2.2 The signage at the site in question is woefully inadequate and extremely confusing. The car park itself is located within the boundaries of the main station car park site operated by APCOA. The signs for the ParkingEye area are unremarkable, in a number of cases obscured and on the whole misleading. On entering the main station site, signs can clearly be seen displaying 20 minutes free parking for users of the station. When entering the ParkingEye area it is not clear that you are leaving the area for which the 20 minutes free parking period is available and entering into another area, operated by another company, for which a separate charge is payable.

2.21 On the immediate approach to the claimed “entrance” of the ParkingEye area, the only sign visible to drivers relates to the APCOA area. The sign which ParkingEye claims is “clearly displayed at the entrance” actually faces in the opposite direction to the main approach and is invisible to drivers until the very last moment that they turn into the alleged “entrance”. Even if the driver has chance to acknowledge this sign on “entrance” the only text in a clear enough font/size to be read simply states “Tariff payable at machine or by phone”. There is some smaller text (which a driver could not possibly be expected to read) relating to terms & conditions however these T&C’s are not actually listed on the sign at the “entrance” itself. There is then a miniscule note at the bottom of the sign which says “Managed by: ParkingEye Ltd” but this is in a font so small that it is difficult to read even on photographs, let alone when driving a vehicle. As with other ParkingEye signage on this site, the sign is also elevated on a pole approximately 7 feet in the air, way above head height for the average person and well above the driving height of standard vehicles. This is the only sign located at the “entrance/exit” to the ParkingEye site and, given the direction in which it faces, completely disproves the Claimant’s previous claim that there are signs situated on entrance and exit displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.22 The ParkingEye affiliated signs within the parking area itself are equally inadequate, sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. In the area that the Defendant’s car was parked there are no clear signs to indicate where the ParkingEye payment machines are located and no legible ParkingEye signs whatsoever between the space in which the Defendant parked and the APCOA payment machine from which the £3.00 ticket was purchased. On the opposite side of the car park to which the Defendant parked there are directional signs with arrows stating “Payment Machines located at the bottom of the car park”. Even in clear daylight these are indecipherable from a relatively short distance, not to mention being unlit, and in the instance of the sign that would have been closest to the Defendant, obscured by overgrown hedges. Although somewhat irrelevant to this case, as the Defendant was parked on the opposite side of the car park, this proves that even if she had been facing in that direction the signage would have been unreadable. As such, it is again difficult to understand how ParkingEye can claim its signage is clearly displayed throughout.

2.23 Both of the ParkingEye payment machines are located at the furthest possible point from the “entrance” to the ParkingEye area on site and, evidently, are extremely easily missed, given the clear visibility of the other payment machine (APCOA) from the majority of spaces on the ParkingEye site. The machines have no distinguishing signage sited alongside them to draw the attention of drivers from a distance such as a ''Pay Here'' arrow or other prominent elevated signpost.

2.24 In regard to the signs which contain the “T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”, the minimum height at which these are displayed is seven feet off the ground and the T&C’s run into over 350 words in very small print. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

2.25 The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

POSSIBLY INCLUDE LINK TO CASE HERE - I AM NOT ALLOWED TO INCLUDE IT IN THIS POST AS A NEW USER OF THE FORUM

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

2.26 It is also vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, that certain areas of this site are unsigned with no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

2.27 This case is similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:
''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operator’s signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

2.28 It is the responsibility of ParkingEye to ensure that the terms and conditions are prominently displayed around the site. By contrast these terms and conditions are in very small print, contrary to Lord Denning’s ‘Red hand rule’ and contrary to the requirements of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and in agreement to the parking charge there was no agreement to pay additional sums, which in any case are unsupported by the Beavis case and unsupported for cases on the small claims track

Ultimately, no contract has been formed with the driver to pay the charge. The Defendant refers the court to Excel Parking Services Ltd v Cutts that the content relied on by the Claimant could not be read by a driver entering the car park.
The Defendant has no hesitation in suggesting that being expected to read over 350 small print words, on highly elevated signs, before deciding whether or not to park, represents unreasonable terms and conditions in a consumer contract.

2.29 Photographic evidence for all referenced signage at Central Station Warrington is readily available to corroborate all of the claims above.

3. This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner.

3.1. The Defendant avers that the factually-different Beavis decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the signage omission at the time and the other facts of this case. To quote from the Supreme Court:

Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.

Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''

Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

3.2 At #22, in Beavis, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin's speech in Dunlop: ''as Lord Dunedin himself acknowledged, the essential question was whether the clause impugned was unconscionable or extravagant. [...] The four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts.''

And at #32: ''The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest {of ParkingEye} [...] In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin's four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''

3.3. The Court will be aware that Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty include the principle - which went unchallenged in the completely different 'free car park' considerations in the Beavis case - that: ''it will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid''.

4. The Claim Form issued on xx/xx/2019 states that the claim is for the Defendant “parking without a valid paid parking ticket”. However, the Defendant purchased a ticket and made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking using an approved payment channel by following the only signage and payment machine visible to her from the area in which she parked.

4.1 £3.00 was paid in total, £2.00 more than the £1.00 that the ParkingEye signage states is the amount payable for a 46 minute stay (the time claimed by ParkingEye that the Defendant did not pay for).

4.2 It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to assume any more obligations for making the payment. In Jolley V Carmel LTD (2000) 2-EGLR-154; it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

4.3. According to the undistinguishable T+C signs in this car park, it transpires that to avoid a Parking Charge visitors are expected to know to input their Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) at the ParkingEye payment machine. These T+C’s are not visible to drivers on entrance. Upon receiving the claim, the Defendant researched this all too common issue and was advised to complain to the landowner. Unsurprisingly, this was conspicuous by its absence as an option offered by ParkingEye in their signs or paperwork, prior to commencing proceedings.

4.4 The Defendant has sent a subject access request (SAR) to the Claimant, for response during July 2019, and will expand upon the denial of breach in the witness statement and evidence, once the Defendant has seen the details from the SAR and/or in the event that the Court orders the Claimant to file and serve better particulars.

4.5 In relation to this, the Claimant has been put to prove that the ParkingEye payment machines on this site were in full working order on xx/xx/2017. Research indicates that these particular machines are frequently out of service, as evidenced in other claims brought by ParkingEye against drivers on this site and readily supported by photographic evidence, rendering it impossible for drivers to make payments via the machines on the car park.

DEFENCE CONTINUED IN NEXT POST...

UTV89

5. No sum payable to this Claimant was accepted nor even known about by the driver; as they were not given a fair opportunity to discover the onerous terms by which they would later be bound.

6. The amount is a penalty, and the penalty rule is still engaged, so can be clearly distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis which the Judges held was 'entirely different' from most ordinary economic contract disputes for the following reasons:-
a) The Claimant has no commercial justification
b) The Claimant did not follow the IPC or BPA Code of Practice
c) The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of a vehicle parking at the location in question
d) The amount claimed is a charge and evidently disproportionate to any loss suffered by the Claimant and is therefore unconscionable

7. Non-disclosure of reasonable grounds or particulars for bringing a claim. The proper Claimant is the landowner. Strict proof is required that there is a chain of contracts leading from the landowner to ParkingEye Ltd.

7.1 ParkingEye Ltd are not the lawful occupiers of the land.

7.2 The Claimant is not the landowner and is merely an agent acting on behalf of the landowner and has failed to demonstrate their legal standing to form a contract. No evidence has been provided as to who is the lawful occupier is, nor has any contact address been provided for complaints to the lawful occupier.

7.3 No contract with the lawful occupier of the land has been produced by the Claimant, nor a chain of contracts showing authorisation stemming from the lawful occupier of the land. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name and that they have no locus standi to bring this case.

7.4 The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of the vehicle in question.

7.5 The particulars of claim are deficient in establishing whether the claim is brought in trespass. If the driver on the date of the event was considered a trespasser if not allowed to park there, then only the landowner can pursue a case under the tort of trespass not this Claimant. As the Supreme Court in the Beavis V Parking Eye (2015) UK SC 67 case confirmed such a matter would be limited to the landowner themselves for a nominal sum.

7.6 Even if the Claimant is able to produce a landowner contract, it is averred that there can be no legitimate interest arguable by the Claimant in this case. When - all too often at this location - ParkingEye unfairly harvest the data of a registered keeper to charge a driver who has genuinely purchased a ticket in good faith, from the only payment machine visible to them, any commercial justification in the form of landowner support for such unfair ticketing is de facto absent.

7.7. Further, there was no known overstay nor any mischief to deter, nor was there any known misuse of a valuable parking space by the Defendant, whose car was parked in good faith, not in contravention nor causing an obstruction. With no 'legitimate interest' excuse for charging this unconscionable sum given the above facts, this Claimant's claim is reduced to an unrecoverable penalty and must fail.

7.8. This case is fully distinguished in all respects from ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. That Supreme Court decision sets a high bar for parking firms, not a blanket precedent, and the Beavis case essentially turned on a 'complex' and compelling legitimate interest and very clear notices, where the terms were held not to involve any lack of good faith or 'concealed pitfall or trap'. Completely unlike the instant case.

7.9 In addition, there can be no cause of action in a parking charge case without a 'relevant obligation' and/or 'relevant contract' (the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 refers). Expecting a driver to somehow realise they need to input their Vehicle Registration number at the ParkingEye payment machine, in what the consumer is confident is an extension of the main car park, with no visible reference to entering your VRN on the signs at the “entrance”, is indisputably a 'concealed pitfall' and cannot be described as a 'relevant obligation'.

8. This Claimant uses ANPR camera systems to process data but fails to comply with the Information Commissioner's 'Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Cameras and Personal Information' (the ICO Code). This is both a specific Data Protection and BPA Code of Practice breach. The Supreme Court Judges in Beavis held that a Code of Practice is effectively 'regulation' for this blatantly rogue industry, full compliance with which is both mandatory and binding upon any parking operator.

8.1 The ICO Code applies to all ANPR systems, and states that the private sector is required to follow it, in order to meet its legal obligations as a data processor. Members of the BPA are required to comply fully with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and all ICO rules and guidelines, as a pre-requisite of being able to use the DVLA KADOE system and in order to enforce parking charges on private land. At this location, the Claimant has failed and the data gathered about patrons of the site is unconscionable and excessive, given the lack of transparency about the risk of a charge for failing to do something that the driver never knew was a requirement.

9. Lack of good faith, fairness or transparency and misleading business practices

9.1 If a parking firm was truly acting in good faith and keeping the interests of consumers at the heart of their thinking, they would concentrate on ensuring firstly, that patrons could not miss the change of operator upon entering the ParkingEye area and secondly, could not miss the fact that, if they did receive an unfair PCN as a genuine paying driver, they had a right to ask the landowner to cancel it. Clearly the Claimants interest is purely in misleading and punishing customers and extracting as much money as possible in three figure penalties, given that this is the only way ParkingEye make any money.

9.2 The Claimant's negligent or deliberately unfair business practice initially caused the unfair PCN to arise, then the Claimant's silence regarding the simple option of landowner cancellation rights, directly caused these unwarranted proceedings.

9.3 Failing to adequately alert patrons to the VRN keypad requirements upon entry, and then withholding from the registered keeper any/all information about the 'user agreement' with the landowner which could have enabled an immediate route of cancellation, are 'misleading omissions' of material facts. These are specific breaches of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and transgress the tests of fairness and transparency of consumer contracts, as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (this relatively untested legislation was enacted after the final hearing in Beavis and not actively considered in that case). As such, this claim must fail.

10. The amount demanded is excessive and unconscionable. The Claimant’s representative has artificially inflated the value of the claim from £100 to £175.

10.1 The Protection Of Freedom Act para 4 (5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated in the Notice to Keeper.

The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred the stated additional costs and it is put to strict proof that they have actually been incurred. The Claimant’s legal representative ‘Rachel Ledson’ is ParkingEye’s in house solicitor. The charge of £50 for these solicitor fees is not supportable in the Small Claims Court. It is the will of Parliament in the POFA, that the recoverable sum is just the sum on the Notice to Keeper alone (plus court fee, but not in-house solicitor's salary) and that in the Beavis case they were only able to recover the £85, no additional charges. I believe that ParkingEye’s filings are almost completely automated. No signature is evident just a typed name. The Defendant believes the terms for such conduct are ‘Robo Claims’ which is against the public interest and demonstrates a disregard for the dignity of the court and is unfair on unrepresented consumers.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.
Signed

UTV89

Just giving this a bump in the hope that one of you can please help...?

Any advice/suggestions before I submit the defence would be much appreciated.