County Court Claim Defence

UTV89

Thanks Coupon, yes that is correct.

I am about to post the second draft of the defence below which combines the facts of this case with the perfect defence template.

Any points in red are ones I think should perhaps be removed/reworded before submitting due to the reasons in italics.

I have removed the majority of references to old cases that were in my first draft as suggested.

This includes a lot of the Beavis references but I am not sure if these should have been kept in on the basis ParkingEye could rely on the Beavis case as setting a precedent?

In terms of spurious costs, the additional costs that have been added to the £100 claim are £50 legal representative’s costs and £25 court fee (so £175 total claim).

I have tried to tailor the perfect defence cost points in line with this (given that the named legal representative, Rachel Ledson, is employed by ParkingEye) but if you think I need to re-word these back to how they appeared in my original defence draft any advice would be much appreciated…

UTV89

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

PARKINGEYE LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the Defendant visited Central Station Warrington with her 3-month-old daughter on 23rd October 2017, to collect passengers arriving on an inbound train. The Defendant arrived at 14:20 and purchased a pay and display ticket at 14:22 from the only payment machine visible from where the car was parked. The Defendant paid £3.00 for 24 hours parking, making the ticket valid until 14:22 on 24th October 2017. The Defendant departed at 15:06 on 23rd October 2017, 46 minutes after initially arriving.

2.1. The Defendant subsequently received a parking charge notice (PCN) from the Claimant for £100. Upon receiving the PCN, the Defendant immediately appealed, sending the Claimant a photo of the pay and display ticket that was purchased 2 minutes after arrival. The Claimant’s response merely stated “We are writing to advise you that your recent appeal has been unsuccessful and that you have now reached the end of our internal appeals procedure. Our records confirm that no parking was purchased on the date of the parking event, despite there being payment methods available on the day in question”.

2.2. Having received no further explanation from the Claimant as to why the £100 “parking charge” was still being pursued, the Defendant returned to the site to try and establish why the pay and display ticket they had purchased was inexplicably being ignored. After much closer scrutiny it transpired there are two separate car parks on the area of land on which the Defendant parked, one operated by APCOA and the other by ParkingEye. Having returned to the site in person and also uncovering numerous other cases of drivers falling victim to the unclear terms at this site, the Defendant has no doubt that the signage for the area operated by ParkingEye is wholly inadequate to form a binding contract.

2.3. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) failed to identify the facts that caused a charge to arise and failed to describe the alleged unpaid parking charges.

2.31. Right to Claim Unpaid Parking Charges from the Keeper of Vehicle – Schedule 4 Paragraph 7 (2) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

Paragraph 7(2) of schedule 4 of POFA 2012 states:

’’The notice must - (b) inform the driver of the requirement to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and describe those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose…and the other facts that made those charges payable…’’

This PCN stated that -

“By either not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park for longer than permitted, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the signage, the Parking Charge is now payable to ParkingEye Ltd” (neither of which is a ‘fact’).

The Defendant had purchased a ticket for the period of parking in good faith, to which no reference was made in the Claimant’s rejection of the Defendant’s PCN appeal, despite the Defendant providing photographic evidence. Thus, the Defendant was deliberately left confused and unaware of the reason for the notice even after the first stage of appeal.

2.32. Furthermore, the Claimant’s allegation is based on images by their ANPR camera of the Defendant’s vehicle at the entrance and exit to the site. These are merely close up images of the vehicle in transit, making it impossible to decipher in which area of the overall car park the images were taken or for the Defendant to realise that a separate car park had been entered, even after receiving the PCN.

2.33. Derek Twigg MP (Halton) has written to ParkingEye on behalf of the Defendant on multiple occasions in an attempt to gain clarity on this particular situation and seek reasonable resolution of the matter. No response has ever been received and the Claimant evidently has no desire to consider the facts that caused the alleged charge to arise.

2.34. This practice ties in with wider research suggesting that private parking charges and the appeals systems are unlikely to be fairly weighted in favour of consumers. This fact was later confirmed in all readings of the Private Parking Code of Practice Bill, from February 2018 to date, where MPs universally condemned the entire industry as operating 'an outrageous scam' typically relying upon hidden, punitive terms that purposely rely on drivers not seeing an unexpected obligation. Both the British Parking Association ('BPA') Trade Body and indeed, ParkingEye themselves were specifically named and shamed more than once in Parliament and the Bill was introduced purely because the industry is out of control, self-regulation has failed, and in many cases any 'appeal' is futile.

2.4. The Defendant denies that signage on and around the site is clear and visible. The Particulars of Claim state that signage is “clearly displayed at the entrance to and throughout the car park” which “states that this is private land, is managed by ParkingEye Ltd, and is a paid parking site, along with other T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”. In order to win the POPLA appeal submitted by the Defendant, ParkingEye also previously claimed that there are signs situated at the entrance, exit and throughout the car park displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.41. ParkingEye clearly relies on contract law, but does not do enough to make clear what the terms and conditions of the contract are, making it far too easy for people to unwittingly fall outside the terms of contract.

2.42. The signage at the site in question is woefully inadequate and extremely confusing. The car park itself is located within the boundaries of the main station car park site operated by APCOA. The signs for the ParkingEye area are unremarkable, in a number of cases obscured and on the whole misleading. On entering the main station site, signs can clearly be seen displaying 20 minutes free parking for users of the station (relating to the APCOA spaces). When entering the ParkingEye area it is not clear that you are leaving the area for which the 20 minutes free parking period is available and entering into another area, operated by another company, for which a separate charge is payable.

2.43. On the immediate approach to the claimed “entrance” of the ParkingEye area, the only sign visible to drivers relates to the APCOA area. The sign which ParkingEye claims is “clearly displayed at the entrance” actually faces in the opposite direction to the main approach and is invisible to drivers until the very last moment that they turn into the alleged “entrance”. Even if the driver has chance to acknowledge this sign on “entrance” the only text in a clear enough font/size to be read simply states “Tariff payable at machine or by phone”. There is some smaller text (which a driver could not possibly be expected to read) relating to terms & conditions however these T&C’s are not actually listed on the sign at the “entrance” itself. There is then a miniscule note at the bottom of the sign which says “Managed by: ParkingEye Ltd” but this is in a font so small that it is difficult to read even on photographs, let alone when driving a vehicle. As with other ParkingEye signage on this site, the sign is also elevated on a pole approximately 7 feet in the air, way above head height for the average person and well above the driving height of standard vehicles. This is the only sign located at the “entrance/exit” to the ParkingEye site and, given the direction in which it faces, completely disproves the Claimant’s previous claim that there are signs situated on entrance and exit displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.44. The ParkingEye affiliated signs within the parking area itself are equally inadequate, sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. In the area that the Defendant’s car was parked there are no clear signs to indicate where the ParkingEye payment machines are located and no legible ParkingEye signs whatsoever between the space in which the Defendant parked and the APCOA payment machine from which the £3.00 ticket was purchased. On the opposite side of the car park to which the Defendant parked there are directional signs with arrows stating “Payment Machines located at the bottom of the car park”. Even in clear daylight these are indecipherable from a relatively short distance, not to mention being unlit, and in the instance of the sign that would have been closest to the Defendant, obscured by overgrown hedges. As such, it is again difficult to understand how ParkingEye can claim its signage is clearly displayed throughout, when no such signage is present on the side of the car park that the Defendant parked.

2.45. Both of the Claimant’s payment machines are located at the furthest possible point from the “entrance” to the ParkingEye area on site and, evidently, extremely easily missed, given the clear visibility of the other payment machine (APCOA) from the majority of spaces on the ParkingEye site. The machines have no distinguishing signage sited alongside them to draw the attention of drivers from a distance such as a ''Pay Here'' arrow or other prominent elevated signpost.

2.46. In regard to the signs which contain the “T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”, the minimum height at which these are displayed is seven feet off the ground and the T&C’s run into over 350 words in very small print. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms. Such terms and conditions cannot be deemed reasonable in forming a consumer contract.

2.47. It is also vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, that certain areas of this site are unsigned, with no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

2.5. The Particulars of Claim state that the claim is for the Defendant “parking without a valid paid parking ticket”. However, the Defendant purchased a ticket and made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking using an approved payment channel by following the only signage and payment machine visible to her from the area in which she parked.

2.51.1 £3.00 was paid in total, £2.00 more than the £1.00 that the Claimant states is the amount payable for a 46 minute stay (the time claimed by the Claimant that the Defendant did not pay for).

2.52. It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to assume any more obligations for making the payment. In Jolley V Carmel LTD (2000) 2-EGLR-154; it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

2.53. According to the undistinguishable T+C signs in this car park, it transpires that to avoid a Parking Charge visitors are expected to know to input their Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) at the ParkingEye payment machine. These T+C’s are not visible to drivers on entrance.

2.54. The Defendant has sent a subject access request (SAR) to the Claimant, for response during July 2019, and will expand upon the denial of breach in the witness statement and evidence, once the Defendant has seen the details from the SAR and/or in the event that the Court orders the Claimant to file and serve better particulars.

2.55. In relation to this, the Claimant has been put to prove that the ParkingEye payment machines on this site were in full working order on xx/xx/2017. Research indicates that these particular machines are frequently out of service, as evidenced in other claims brought by ParkingEye against drivers on this site and readily supported by photographic evidence, rendering it impossible for drivers to make payments via the machines on the car park.

2.56. In addition, there can be no cause of action in a parking charge case without a 'relevant obligation' and/or 'relevant contract' (the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 refers). Expecting a driver to somehow realise they need to input their Vehicle Registration number at the ParkingEye payment machine, in what the consumer is confident is an extension of the main car park, with no visible reference to entering your VRN on the signs at the “entrance”, is indisputably a 'concealed pitfall' and cannot be described as a 'relevant obligation'.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Furthermore the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

*I HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE ABOVE 2 POINTS RED AS the Particulars of Claim in this case actually name the defendant as “registered keeper” and state that ANPR captured the vehicle “entering and leaving the car park, parking without a valid paid parking ticket”. It also says the vehicle was parked “on private land in breach of the terms and conditions (the contract)”

DOES THIS MAKE ALL OF POINTS 3 & 4 INVALID OR COULD I STILL INCLUDE THEM ON THE BASIS THAT THE DEFENDANT DISPUTES A CONTRACT WAS EVER FORMED AND AS FAR AS THEY WERE AWARE, A VALID PARKING TICKET WAS PURCHASED?

UTV89

5. It is denied that any 'parking charges’ are owed and any debt is denied in its entirety as there is no cause for action against the defendant. The claimant has failed to show locus standi, the defendant does not believe they have a right to bring an action against anyone.

6. Accordingly, it is denied that the driver breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct as no enforceable contract offered at the time by claimant, no cause for action can have arisen.

7. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

8. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in a font which is too small to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract.

9. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that there are specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge, unless specifically authorised by the principal. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name, and that they have no right to bring any action regarding this claim.

10. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £50, for 'Legal representative’s costs’, which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

11. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

12. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

13. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

14. Any purported 'legal costs' are made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut and paste claims. The court is invited to note that no Solicitor’s signature is evident on the Particulars, merely a typed name, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

*THE ABOVE IS HIGHLIGHTED RED AS I AM NOT SURE IF I WOULD BE BETTER GOING INTO MORE DETAIL SUCH AS: The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred the stated additional costs and it is put to strict proof that they have actually been incurred. The Claimant’s legal representative ‘Rachel Ledson’ is ParkingEye’s in house solicitor. The charge of £50 for these solicitor fees is not supportable in the Small Claims Court. It is the will of Parliament in the POFA, that the recoverable sum is just the sum on the Notice to Keeper alone (plus court fee, but not in-house solicitor's salary) and that in the Beavis case they were only able to recover the £85, no additional charges. I believe that ParkingEye’s filings are almost completely automated. No signature is evident just a typed name. The Defendant believes the terms for such conduct are ‘Robo Claims’ which is against the public interest and demonstrates a disregard for the dignity of the court and is unfair on unrepresented consumers.


15. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

16. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

17. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:
''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

18. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

19. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

20. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.


Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.

Coupon-mad

Leave #3 and #4 in, they are OK for all cases. And you can go into a little more detail about Rachel Ledson if you wish.

The only thing that jarred was:

two separate car parks

Not separated enough, surely? Better to say something like:

two adjoining (yet with undefined boundaries) car parks

UTV89

Thanks again for your advice Coupon. “Adjoining” is definitely a more apt description than “separate” and I will update accordingly.

It feels like we are nearly ready to submit… however my one nagging concern is whether I have removed too much of my original content regarding historic cases.

Our strongest argument (in my opinion) will centre around the inadequate signage on the ParkingEye site.

In order to streamline the first draft (and minimise older references) I removed ALL of the below points from the second draft.

Do you think I should put any of these back in to strengthen our defence with supporting precedents?

The Beavis case in particular could be one that ParkingEye try to use themselves so I am wondering if it is best to counter that claim from the off with our own summary of that case?

There are also some points that bring the ANPR under scrutiny and a point questioning why ParkingEye did not mention that the Defendant had a right to ask the landowner to cancel the PCN…

POINTS TO CONSIDER ADDING BACK IN:

2.25 The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

2.27 This case is similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:
''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operator’s signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

2.28 It is the responsibility of ParkingEye to ensure that the terms and conditions are prominently displayed around the site. By contrast these terms and conditions are in very small print, contrary to Lord Denning’s ‘Red hand rule’ and contrary to the requirements of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and in agreement to the parking charge there was no agreement to pay additional sums, which in any case are unsupported by the Beavis case and unsupported for cases on the small claims track

Ultimately, no contract has been formed with the driver to pay the charge. The Defendant refers the court to Excel Parking Services Ltd v Cutts that the content relied on by the Claimant could not be read by a driver entering the car park.

The Defendant has no hesitation in suggesting that being expected to read over 350 small print words, on highly elevated signs, before deciding whether or not to park, represents unreasonable terms and conditions in a consumer contract.

3. This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner.

3.1. The Defendant avers that the factually-different Beavis decision confirms the assertion that this charge is unconscionable, given the signage omission at the time and the other facts of this case. To quote from the Supreme Court:
Para 108: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''.
Para 199: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests. Customers using the car park agree to the scheme by doing so.''
Para 205: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

3.2 At #22, in Beavis, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin's speech in Dunlop: ''as Lord Dunedin himself acknowledged, the essential question was whether the clause impugned was unconscionable or extravagant. [...] The four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts.''
And at #32: ''The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest {of ParkingEye} [...] In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin's four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''

3.3. The Court will be aware that Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty include the principle - which went unchallenged in the completely different 'free car park' considerations in the Beavis case - that: ''it will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid''.

6. The amount is a penalty, and the penalty rule is still engaged, so can be clearly distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis which the Judges held was 'entirely different' from most ordinary economic contract disputes for the following reasons:-
a) The Claimant has no commercial justification
b) The Claimant did not follow the IPC or BPA Code of Practice
c) The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of a vehicle parking at the location in question
d) The amount claimed is a charge and evidently disproportionate to any loss suffered by the Claimant and is therefore unconscionable

7. Non-disclosure of reasonable grounds or particulars for bringing a claim. The proper Claimant is the landowner. Strict proof is required that there is a chain of contracts leading from the landowner to ParkingEye Ltd.

7.1 ParkingEye Ltd are not the lawful occupiers of the land.

7.2 The Claimant is not the landowner and is merely an agent acting on behalf of the landowner and has failed to demonstrate their legal standing to form a contract. No evidence has been provided as to who is the lawful occupier is, nor has any contact address been provided for complaints to the lawful occupier.

7.3 No contract with the lawful occupier of the land has been produced by the Claimant, nor a chain of contracts showing authorisation stemming from the lawful occupier of the land. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name and that they have no locus standi to bring this case.

7.4 The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of the vehicle in question.

7.5 The particulars of claim are deficient in establishing whether the claim is brought in trespass. If the driver on the date of the event was considered a trespasser if not allowed to park there, then only the landowner can pursue a case under the tort of trespass not this Claimant. As the Supreme Court in the Beavis V Parking Eye (2015) UK SC 67 case confirmed such a matter would be limited to the landowner themselves for a nominal sum.

7.6 Even if the Claimant is able to produce a landowner contract, it is averred that there can be no legitimate interest arguable by the Claimant in this case. When - all too often at this location - ParkingEye unfairly harvest the data of a registered keeper to charge a driver who has genuinely purchased a ticket in good faith, from the only payment machine visible to them, any commercial justification in the form of landowner support for such unfair ticketing is de facto absent.

7.7. Further, there was no known overstay nor any mischief to deter, nor was there any known misuse of a valuable parking space by the Defendant, whose car was parked in good faith, not in contravention nor causing an obstruction. With no 'legitimate interest' excuse for charging this unconscionable sum given the above facts, this Claimant's claim is reduced to an unrecoverable penalty and must fail.

7.8. This case is fully distinguished in all respects from ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. That Supreme Court decision sets a high bar for parking firms, not a blanket precedent, and the Beavis case essentially turned on a 'complex' and compelling legitimate interest and very clear notices, where the terms were held not to involve any lack of good faith or 'concealed pitfall or trap'. Completely unlike the instant case.

8. This Claimant uses ANPR camera systems to process data but fails to comply with the Information Commissioner's 'Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Cameras and Personal Information' (the ICO Code). This is both a specific Data Protection and BPA Code of Practice breach. The Supreme Court Judges in Beavis held that a Code of Practice is effectively 'regulation' for this blatantly rogue industry, full compliance with which is both mandatory and binding upon any parking operator.

8.1 The ICO Code applies to all ANPR systems, and states that the private sector is required to follow it, in order to meet its legal obligations as a data processor. Members of the BPA are required to comply fully with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and all ICO rules and guidelines, as a pre-requisite of being able to use the DVLA KADOE system and in order to enforce parking charges on private land. At this location, the Claimant has failed and the data gathered about patrons of the site is unconscionable and excessive, given the lack of transparency about the risk of a charge for failing to do something that the driver never knew was a requirement.

9. Lack of good faith, fairness or transparency and misleading business practices

9.1 If a parking firm was truly acting in good faith and keeping the interests of consumers at the heart of their thinking, they would concentrate on ensuring firstly, that patrons could not miss the change of operator upon entering the ParkingEye area and secondly, could not miss the fact that, if they did receive an unfair PCN as a genuine paying driver, they had a right to ask the landowner to cancel it. Clearly the Claimants interest is purely in misleading and punishing customers and extracting as much money as possible in three figure penalties, given that this is the only way ParkingEye make any money.

9.2 The Claimant's negligent or deliberately unfair business practice initially caused the unfair PCN to arise, then the Claimant's silence regarding the simple option of landowner cancellation rights, directly caused these unwarranted proceedings.

9.3 Failing to adequately alert patrons to the VRN keypad requirements upon entry, and then withholding from the registered keeper any/all information about the 'user agreement' with the landowner which could have enabled an immediate route of cancellation, are 'misleading omissions' of material facts. These are specific breaches of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and transgress the tests of fairness and transparency of consumer contracts, as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (this relatively untested legislation was enacted after the final hearing in Beavis and not actively considered in that case). As such, this claim must fail.

Coupon-mad

No, you need none of that case law at defence stage.

In fact a legally qualified poster on pepipoo insists that no case law should be in a defence. Maybe just add this para only, to make it clear that your later arguments will set the case apart from Beavis:

This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner.

The rest, not needed in a defence. Our examples are fluid; we change them over time.

Some of it could be used as evidence with your later WS and/or you might choose to do a skeleton argument summarising the case law (see NEWBIES thread, this is optional much nearer the hearing time, and not the same thing at all as the WS, which is your own 'story'/facts of what happened).

UTV89

Sound advice again, thanks Coupon.

I have added the Beavis point back into the below which is hopefully now ready for submission:

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

PARKINGEYE LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the Defendant visited Central Station Warrington with her 3-month-old daughter on 23rd October 2017, to collect passengers arriving on an inbound train. The Defendant arrived at 14:20 and purchased a pay and display ticket at 14:22 from the only payment machine visible from where the car was parked. The Defendant paid £3.00 for 24 hours parking, making the ticket valid until 14:22 on 24th October 2017. The Defendant departed at 15:06 on 23rd October 2017, 46 minutes after initially arriving.

2.1. The Defendant subsequently received a parking charge notice (PCN) from the Claimant for £100. Upon receiving the PCN, the Defendant immediately appealed, sending the Claimant a photo of the pay and display ticket that was purchased 2 minutes after arrival. The Claimant’s response merely stated “We are writing to advise you that your recent appeal has been unsuccessful and that you have now reached the end of our internal appeals procedure. Our records confirm that no parking was purchased on the date of the parking event, despite there being payment methods available on the day in question”.

2.2. Having received no further explanation from the Claimant as to why the £100 “parking charge” was still being pursued, the Defendant returned to the site to try and establish why the pay and display ticket they had purchased was inexplicably being ignored. After much closer scrutiny it transpired there are two adjoining car parks on the area of land on which the Defendant parked, one operated by APCOA and the other by ParkingEye. Having returned to the site in person and also uncovering numerous other cases of drivers falling victim to the unclear terms at this site, the Defendant has no doubt that the signage for the area operated by ParkingEye is wholly inadequate to form a binding contract.

2.3. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) failed to identify the facts that caused a charge to arise and failed to describe the alleged unpaid parking charges.

2.31. Right to Claim Unpaid Parking Charges from the Keeper of Vehicle – Schedule 4 Paragraph 7 (2) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

Paragraph 7(2) of schedule 4 of POFA 2012 states:

’’The notice must - (b) inform the driver of the requirement to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and describe those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose…and the other facts that made those charges payable…’’

This PCN stated that -

“By either not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park for longer than permitted, in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the signage, the Parking Charge is now payable to ParkingEye Ltd” (neither of which is a ‘fact’).

The Defendant had purchased a ticket for the period of parking in good faith, to which no reference was made in the Claimant’s rejection of the Defendant’s PCN appeal, despite the Defendant providing photographic evidence. Thus, the Defendant was deliberately left confused and unaware of the reason for the notice even after the first stage of appeal.

2.32. Furthermore, the Claimant’s allegation is based on images by their ANPR camera of the Defendant’s vehicle at the entrance and exit to the site. These are merely close up images of the vehicle in transit, making it impossible to decipher in which area of the overall car park the images were taken or for the Defendant to realise that a different (adjoining) car park had been entered, even after receiving the PCN.

2.33. Derek Twigg MP (Halton) has written to ParkingEye on behalf of the Defendant on multiple occasions in an attempt to gain clarity on this particular situation and seek reasonable resolution of the matter. No response has ever been received and the Claimant evidently has no desire to consider the facts that caused the alleged charge to arise.

2.34. This practice ties in with wider research suggesting that private parking charges and the appeals systems are unlikely to be fairly weighted in favour of consumers. This fact was later confirmed in all readings of the Private Parking Code of Practice Bill, from February 2018 to date, where MPs universally condemned the entire industry as operating 'an outrageous scam' typically relying upon hidden, punitive terms that purposely rely on drivers not seeing an unexpected obligation. Both the British Parking Association ('BPA') Trade Body and indeed, ParkingEye themselves were specifically named and shamed more than once in Parliament and the Bill was introduced purely because the industry is out of control, self-regulation has failed, and in many cases any 'appeal' is futile.

2.4. The Defendant denies that signage on and around the site is clear and visible. The Particulars of Claim state that signage is “clearly displayed at the entrance to and throughout the car park” which “states that this is private land, is managed by ParkingEye Ltd, and is a paid parking site, along with other T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”. In order to win the POPLA appeal submitted by the Defendant, ParkingEye also previously claimed that there are signs situated at the entrance, exit and throughout the car park displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.41. ParkingEye clearly relies on contract law, but does not do enough to make clear what the terms and conditions of the contract are, making it far too easy for people to unwittingly fall outside the terms of contract.

2.42. The signage at the site in question is woefully inadequate and extremely confusing. The car park itself is located within the boundaries of the main station car park site operated by APCOA. The signs for the ParkingEye area are unremarkable, in a number of cases obscured and on the whole misleading. On entering the main station site, signs can clearly be seen displaying 20 minutes free parking for users of the station (relating to the APCOA spaces). When entering the ParkingEye area it is not clear that you are leaving the area for which the 20 minutes free parking period is available and entering into another area, operated by another company, for which a separate charge is payable.

2.43. On the immediate approach to the claimed “entrance” of the ParkingEye area, the only sign visible to drivers relates to the APCOA area. The sign which ParkingEye claims is “clearly displayed at the entrance” actually faces in the opposite direction to the main approach and is invisible to drivers until the very last moment that they turn into the alleged “entrance”. Even if the driver has chance to acknowledge this sign on “entrance” the only text in a clear enough font/size to be read simply states “Tariff payable at machine or by phone”. There is some smaller text (which a driver could not possibly be expected to read) relating to terms & conditions however these T&C’s are not actually listed on the sign at the “entrance” itself. There is then a miniscule note at the bottom of the sign which says “Managed by: ParkingEye Ltd” but this is in a font so small that it is difficult to read even on photographs, let alone when driving a vehicle. As with other ParkingEye signage on this site, the sign is also elevated on a pole approximately 7 feet in the air, way above head height for the average person and well above the driving height of standard vehicles. This is the only sign located at the “entrance/exit” to the ParkingEye area and, given the direction in which it faces, completely disproves the Claimant’s previous claim that there are signs situated on entrance and exit displaying the terms and conditions of the site.

2.44. The ParkingEye affiliated signs within the parking area itself are equally inadequate, sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. In the area that the Defendant’s car was parked there are no clear signs to indicate where the ParkingEye payment machines are located and no legible ParkingEye signs whatsoever between the space in which the Defendant parked and the APCOA payment machine from which the £3.00 ticket was purchased. On the opposite side of the car park to which the Defendant parked there are directional signs with arrows stating “Payment Machines located at the bottom of the car park”. Even in clear daylight these are indecipherable from a relatively short distance, not to mention being unlit, and in the instance of the sign that would have been closest to the Defendant (albeit on the other side of the car park), obscured by overgrown hedges. As such, it is again difficult to understand how ParkingEye can claim its signage is clearly displayed throughout, when no such signage is present on the side of the car park that the Defendant parked.

2.45. Both of the Claimant’s payment machines are located at the furthest possible point from the “entrance” to the ParkingEye area on site and, evidently, extremely easily missed, given the clear visibility of the other payment machine (APCOA) from the majority of spaces on the ParkingEye site. The Claimant’s machines have no distinguishing signage sited alongside them to draw the attention of drivers such as a ''Pay Here'' arrow or any other prominent signpost that could be from a distance.

2.46. In regard to the signs which contain the “T+C’s by which those who park on site agree to be bound”, the minimum height at which these are displayed is seven feet off the ground and the T&C’s run into over 350 words in very small print. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms. Such terms and conditions cannot be deemed reasonable in forming a consumer contract.

2.47. It is also vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, that certain areas of this site are unsigned, with no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

2.5. The Particulars of Claim state that the claim is for the Defendant “parking without a valid paid parking ticket”. However, the Defendant purchased a ticket and made all reasonable efforts to make payment for parking using an approved payment channel by following the only signage and payment machine visible to her from the area in which she parked.

2.51. £3.00 was paid in total, £2.00 more than the £1.00 that the Claimant states is the amount payable for a 46 minute stay (the time claimed by the Claimant that the Defendant did not pay for).

2.52. It is not reasonable in these circumstances for the driver to assume any more obligations for making the payment. In Jolley V Carmel LTD (2000) 2-EGLR-154; it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach.

2.53. According to the undistinguishable T+C signs in this car park, it transpires that to avoid a Parking Charge visitors are expected to know to input their Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) at the ParkingEye payment machine. These T+C’s are not visible to drivers on entrance.

2.54. The Defendant has sent a subject access request (SAR) to the Claimant, for response during July 2019, and will expand upon the denial of breach in the witness statement and evidence, once the Defendant has seen the details from the SAR and/or in the event that the Court orders the Claimant to file and serve better particulars.

2.55. In relation to this, the Claimant has been put to prove that the ParkingEye payment machines on this site were in full working order on xx/xx/2017. Research indicates that these particular machines are frequently out of service, as evidenced in other claims brought by ParkingEye against drivers on this site and readily supported by photographic evidence, rendering it impossible for drivers to make payments via the machines on the car park.

2.56. In addition, there can be no cause of action in a parking charge case without a 'relevant obligation' and/or 'relevant contract' (the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 refers). Expecting a driver to somehow realise they need to input their Vehicle Registration number at the ParkingEye payment machine, in what the consumer is confident is an extension of the main car park, with no visible reference to entering your VRN on the signs at the “entrance”, is indisputably a 'concealed pitfall' and cannot be described as a 'relevant obligation'.

3. The wording of the Particulars of Claim suggest that the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Furthermore the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, failing to specify how the terms were breached, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

5. It is denied that any 'parking charges’ are owed and any debt is denied in its entirety as there is no cause for action against the defendant. The claimant has failed to show locus standi, the defendant does not believe they have a right to bring an action against anyone.

6. Accordingly, it is denied that the driver breached any of the Claimant's purported contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct as no enforceable contract offered at the time by claimant, no cause for action can have arisen.

7. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

8. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in a font which is too small to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract.

9. This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner.

10. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that there are specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge, unless specifically authorised by the principal. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name, and that they have no right to bring any action regarding this claim.

11. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £50, for 'Legal representative’s costs’, which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

12. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

13. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

14. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

15. Any purported 'legal costs' are made up out of thin air. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred the stated additional costs and it is put to strict proof that they have actually been incurred. The Defendant believes that the Claimant’s legal representative ‘Rachel Ledson’ is ParkingEye’s in house solicitor. The charge of £50 for these solicitor fees is not supportable in the Small Claims Court. The Defendant believes that ParkingEye’s filings are almost completely automated. No signature is evident just a typed name, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity. The Defendant believes the terms for such conduct are ‘Robo Claims’ which is against the public interest and demonstrates a disregard for the dignity of the court and is unfair on unrepresented consumers.

16. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

17. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

18. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:
''IT IS ORDERED THAT the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

19. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

20. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

21. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.


Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.

Name

Signature


Date

Le_Kirk

18. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:
''IT IS ORDERED THAT the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

This looks like an instruction to the judge and, in my opinion, would look better like this:-

striking out both claims without a hearing:
Both DJs stated ''IT IS ORDERED THAT the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the ...........

UTV89

Quick update… Defence was submitted to CCBC and confirmation of receipt has been received. Currently waiting for the Directions Questionnaire (form N180) to arrive as per bargepole’s guidelines.

In terms of the Directions Questionnaire (link below) if I intend to act as a lay representative for my wife in court, do I need to be listed as a witness in section D3?
Similarly (or alternatively) do I need to be listed as an interpreter in section D4?

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/787306/n180-eng.pdf

Thanks
UTV89

Le_Kirk

Your wife is defendant and she turns up to court. You tick interpreter IF and ONLY if she or you require one. You are not a witness. When you turn up to court on the day, just mention to the court clerk/usher when you book in that you will be lay rep or McKenzie friend - look them up to see the difference.