URGENT: UKPC & SCS Law

Immy_007

Would i compile a defence on MCOL ? Or print and post?

System

Would i compile a defence on MCOL ? Or print and post?

Have you read the Newbies thread. After 142 posts I would have thought it would be second nature to you. But I understand some people may need more support than others.

In the unlikely event the answer is not in the Newbies thread, could you tell us and I am sure someone will sort it.

KeithP

Immy_007 wrote: »

Would i compile a defence on MCOL ? Or print and post?

No definitely not on MCOL - post #2 of the NEWBIES thread explains why.

Do you have time to post? I think not.

When you are happy with the content, your Defence should be filed via email as described here:

1) Print your Defence.
2) Sign it and date it.
3) Scan the signed document back in and save it as a pdf.
4) Send that pdf as an email attachment to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk
5) Just put the claim number and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'Please find my Defence attached'.
6) Log into MCOL after a few days to see if the Claim is marked "defended". If not chase the CCBC until it is.
7) Wait for the Directions Questionnaire and come back here.

Coupon-mad

Immy_007 wrote: »

Would i compile a defence on MCOL ? Or print and post?

Neither. You email a signed version and can get this done over the weekend.

This is all covered in the NEWBIES thread (post #2) and also the email address is posted on any other defence thread, hundreds of times a month.

Please search as I advised you to, and adapt one someone wrote earlier. Show us.

Immy_007

Right.. after my whole weekend and hardly any sleep..this is the defence i have compiled.. Please have a look as then i could amend, print ,scan and email by 4pm today..Many Thanks

Claim Number: [REF]
BETWEEN:
UKPC Ltd (Claimant)
vs
[NAME] (Defendant)

___________________________________________________________________________
DEFENCE
I am [NAME] of [ADDRESS], [POSTCODE], defendant in this matter.

The claim is denied in its entirety except where explicitly admitted here. I assert that I am not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount at all, for the following reasons, any one of which is fatal to the Claimant's case.

i. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies
ii. The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist
iii. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 applies
iv. The Claimant has no standing to bring a case
v. The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable penalty
vi. Data Protection Act and BPA Code of Practice breach


The claimant has not provided enough details in the particulars of claim to file a full defence. In particular, the full details of the contract which it is alleged was broken have never been provided. As the claimant has not provided this information, signage details have been inferred from stock photographs and the details may not be correct. Minor variants in text may occur. All references to signage therefore, are subject to change once the full particulars of claim have been provided.


13. The claim is (presumably) for breach of contract. In such cases, it is trite law that any charge is intended to put the recipient back in the position they were had the breach not occurred. If the charge is larger, as in this case, then it is a penalty and the whole charge is unenforceable.







i The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies


1. It is asserted that the Claimant’s charges are unlawful, as they are in breach of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, specifically regulation 8(1) of the Regulations and article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive (in providing that an unfair term is not to be binding on the consumer), which is to redress the imbalance between the contracting parties’ bargaining power, and to re-establish equality between them, so that the contract terms which bind the parties are such as the parties would have agreed if they had negotiated the contract on equal terms.

2. The European Court of Justice case of Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona I Manresa [2013] 3 CMLR 5 provides authority for this, and it is submitted that European Court of Justice decisions must be taken judicial notice of by lower courts in England and Wales. The test for unfairness and imbalance in that case is as follows (para 77);

Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that:

– the concept of ‘significant imbalance’ to the detriment of the consumer must be assessed in the light of an analysis of the rules of national law applicable in the absence of any agreement between the parties, in order to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a less favourable legal situation than that provided for by the national law in force. To that end, an assessment of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at his disposal, under national law, to prevent continued use of unfair terms, should also be carried out!!!894;

– in order to assess whether the imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, it must be determined whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations.

3. It is asserted that no reasonable person, of whatever means, would willingly agree to pay a charge of £100 as a consequence of staying over free time, if they had the opportunity to negotiate the contract on equal terms with the other contracting party.

4. It is asserted that any competent solicitor would have negotiated the charge to be equal to a genuine pre-estimate of loss, being the normal legal situation provided for by the national law in force. ParkingEye’s charges in the original hearing were asserted to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued.

5. The Claimant relies on the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of ParkingEye v Beavis. However, in that case the court applied the wrong test for imbalance (para 34 and also para 37, 38)

The judge […] held that the term did not cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations because the charge was no greater than that which a motorist could expect to pay for overstaying in a municipal car park.

6. It is submitted that the European Court of Justice definition of imbalance must take precedence. vRegulation 7 of UTCCR 1999 may also apply depending on the words of the signage.



ii The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist

7. The claim is for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed.

8. The Claimant states, in their Particulars of Claim, that the signage is ‘clearly displayed’ but this is not agreed. Thus, the necessary elements of offer and acceptance to form a contract were not present. Although the Claimant has not provided a signage map in many of their car parks signs are positioned in such a way as to create ‘entrapment zones’ where signage is not clearly visible. The Claimant is put strictly to proof that this is not the case on this site.

9. The elements of offer, acceptance and consideration both ways have therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist.

10. The signage is not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces, especially in relation to the sum of the parking charge itself. The poor/lack of lighting further diminishes the ability of any person to read the signs especially during darkness in the hours the alleged breach is said to have occurred.

11. There was no contract nor agreement on the ‘parking charge’ at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this substantial charge of £85, as a result of this appeal, which is all out of proportion and not saved by the dissimilar ‘ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis’ case. The case turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners. The signs were unusually clear and not a typical example of this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out that the decision related to that car park and those facts only. In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were ‘large lettering’ signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the judges.

12. This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the ‘large lettering’ and ‘prominent signage’ that impressed the Supreme Court judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and agreement on the charge existed. At Cheadle Hulme Shopping Centre, where the alleged incident took place, the signs are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible. The wording is mostly illegible for a number of reasons, firstly it is very cluttered with a lack of white space as background. It is undisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space drastically reduces the legibility of a sign, especially on which must be read before the action of parking and leaving the car. Secondly, the positioning of the signs on the outskirts of the car park, considerably high up makes it impossible to read the conditions on the sign from inside the car, should the signs even be noticed. Even stood directly below the signs it was difficult to read. With the most important information relating to parking charges being in the smallest font. Even from standing below the sign it is illegible so how can it be expected of the driver to be aware of the conditions of the car park and the charges imposed? Do the UKPC expect drivers to bring binoculars along with them to the car park!

13. In ParkingEye v Somerfield [2012] EWCA Civ 1338, the court ruled that the contract between landowner and operator established that any debt was due to Somerfield, not ParkingEye and that ParkingEye did not have the authority to issue legal proceedings in their own name.

14. The sporadic and poorly positioned signage were not sufficient to draw the Defendents attention so no contract could exist.Specifically.

15. Terms were not ‘clear and prominent’ and are therefore are an ‘unfair term’ not legally binding on the Defendant under The Consumer Rights Act 2015

16. As the Claimant failed to make reasonable efforts to make the terms and conditions of the car park clear and prominent, it cannot be assumed that anyone entering the car park was immediately aware of, and agreed, the terms and conditions. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the Defendant saw, read and agreed the terms upon which the claimant is relying.

17. Differences to ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
16. This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner. Strict compliance with the BPA Code of Practice (CoP) was paramount and Mr Beavis was the driver who saw the signs and entered into a contract to pay £85 after exceeding a licence to park free. None of this applies in this material case.

18. The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact ‘Vine vs London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCACiv106’ about a driver not seeing the terms and, consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them. This judgement is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator’s case: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

19. The judgement was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has consented to, and cannot have ‘breached’, an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as ‘private land’ and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver’s seat before parking. So, for this appeal, I put UKPC to strict proof of where the car was parked and how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver’s perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a drivers seat (not stock examples of ‘the sign’ in isolation/close up), in the same lighting conditions. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere ‘stock examples’ of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this

20. The Defendant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout. None of this applies in this material case

21. The BPA Code of Practice sets the requirements for entrance sings. The following requirements are disputed

*The sign should be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.
* Signs should be readable and understandable at all times, including during the hours of darkness or at dusk if and when parking enforcement takes places at those times. This can be achieved in a variety of ways such as by direct lighting or by using the lighting for the parking area. If the sign itself is not directly or indirectly lit, we suggest that it should be made of a retroreflective material similar to that used on public roads and described in the Traffic Signs Manual
The signage states that the land is ‘managed by UK Car Park Limited’ (UKCP). They are therefore (presumably) acting as agents of the landowner or lawful occupier. The signage does not state who the landowner is
The elements of offer, acceptance and consideration both ways have therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist.


iii The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 applies

22. Any alleged contract would be a distance contract for services as defined in The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013

23. The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises contract and off-premises contracts.

24. The definitions concern themselves with how a contract is concluded (and in particular if face to face contact occurs during this process) and not where the contract is eventually performed. Thus, if a consumer books a hair styling appointment over the web, that is a distance contract even though they go to the salon for the actual styling. If they re-book at the salon, that will be an on-premises contract. If they meet their stylist in Tesco, arrange for an appointment and immediately phone the salon to confirm, that will be an off-premises contract. All these contracts are performed on-premises, but concluded in different ways.

25. The regulations define an on-premises contract as:
“on-premises contract” means a contract between a trader and a consumer which is neither a distance contract nor an off-premises contract

26. Thus a contract cannot be on-premises if it is a distance contract. The regulations define a distance contract as:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded;


27. This is clearly an organised service-provision scheme (for parking)
The contract is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer.
There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded.

28. This is therefore a distance contract.

29. None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be concluded by parking and walking away.

30. Regulation 13 lists information to be provided before making a distance contract. The contract fails to provide the required information listed in Schedule 2 or a means to have a copy of the contract on a durable medium. Accordingly, 13.1 states the contract is not binding on the consumer.



iv The Claimant has no standing to bring a case

31. The claim form states that the land is ‘managed by UKPC’. They are therefore acting as agents of the landowner.

32. Although each case turns on its own facts, in all cases where UKPC’s contract with the landowner has been fully disclosed, the charge for breach of contract is collected by UKPC on behalf of the landowner. This is usually disclosed in paragraph 3.11. This further confirms UKPC acts as agent for the landowner.

33. If UKPC deny acting as an agent then they are put to strict proof by disclosing the appropriate parts of their contact (usually clauses 3.11 and 8) with the landowner.

34. Fairlie v Fenton establishes the situation regarding agency.

a. If the agent is acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal, they can sue and be sued
b. If the agent is acting on behalf of a named principal, they cannot sue
c. If the agent is acting on behalf of a principal whose name is not disclosed, then they can only sue if they assume the risk; in other words, if they can be sued if they fail to uphold their part of the bargain.

35. This case is clearly (c). The signage states UKPC are acting on behalf of the landowner, but does not state who the landowner is.

36. UKPC therefore have no standing to bring this case. Only the landowner has the right to do this.

37. In ParkingEye v Beavis, clauses 3.11 and 8 were redacted from the contract given to the judges. Therefore any judgment would not have been able to take these clauses into account.

38. The Claimant is put to strict proof they have suffered an actual, or genuine pre-estimate of, loss because of any alleged parking. There is no initial loss to the Claimant, and they have no standing to bring any case.


v The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable penalty

39. The claim is for breach of contract. In such cases, it is trite law that any charge is intended to put the recipient back in the position they were had the breach not occurred. If the charge is larger, as in this case, then it is a penalty and the whole charge is unenforceable.

40. As previously explained, the parking charge amount is due to the landowner, not the claimant. The Claimant collects it on the landowner’s behalf. The Claimant has suffered no actual, or genuine pre-estimate of, loss as a result of any alleged overstay. There is no initial loss to the Claimant, and they have no standing to bring any case.

41. In any case, all costs are due to the cost of enforcement, which was established in ParkingEye v Beavis to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued. These can therefore be mitigated by taking no action. The charge of £100 is primarily intended as a deterrent. It is, therefore, an unenforceable penalty.

42. The charge for breach of contract is collected on behalf of the landowner, according to clause 3.11 of the landowner contract. However, all costs for issuing tickets are borne by UKPC. The landowner therefore suffers no loss at all. This bizarre business arrangement means that there is no cause of action.

43. The Claimant may rely on the ruling of ParkingEye v Beavis, held in the court of appeal in February 2015. This case has since been heard in the Supreme Court. Consideration should therefore be given to staying this case until the judgment is handed down.

44. Each case must turn on its own fact and the facts of that case are different to this.

45. The Court of Appeal ruled that if a charge was not a genuine pre-estimate of loss it could nevertheless be saved as a penalty if (i) there was social justification, and (ii) the charge was no more than needed to deter, which was established by comparison with council charges at that site.

46. The social justification was because the car park was in a town centre near to a railway station and so might be abused by commuters who stayed all day. Additionally it was alleged that retailers would suffer if motorists stayed longer than allowed, and other motorists would not be able to find a space when they wanted to shop. UKPC have not established any social justification in this particular case.

47. In this case equivalent council fines are £25 rising to £50 after 14 days. In comparison to this the sum demanded is clearly far more than that needed to deter, far more than genuine losses, and is therefore disproportionate.

48. Additionally the sum is roughly equivalent to a week’s state pension or a day and a half take home pay at average earnings. It is therefore a huge sum, completely disproportionate to the costs involved in any overstay.

49. The Particulars of Claim lack specificity and are embarrassing. The Defendant is prejudiced and is unable to prepare a full and complete defence. The Defendant reserves the right to seek from the Court permission to serve an Amended defence should the Claimant add to or expand his Particulars at a later stage of these proceedings and/or to limit the Claimant only to the unevidenced allegations in the Particulars of Claim. This lack of is specificity is even more surprising as the claimant is represented by solicitors who specialise in this area of law. The defendant has no legal training or court experience, and has prepared this defence in good faith.

Vi Data Protection Act and BPA Code of Practice breach

50. This Claimant uses ANPR camera systems to process data but fails to comply with the Information Commissioner's 'Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Protection and BPA Code of Practice breach.

51. The ICO Code applies to all ANPR systems, and states that the private sector is required to follow it, in order to meet its legal obligations as a data processor. Members of the BPA are required to comply fully with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and all ICO rules and guidelines, as a pre-requisite of being able to use the DVLA KADOE system and in order to enforce parking charges on private land.

52. The Claimant's failures to comply include, but are not limited to the following, and the Claimant is put to strict proof otherwise on all counts.

53. Lack of an initial privacy impact assessment

54. Lack of the 'Privacy Notice' required to deliver mandatory information about an individual's right of subject access, under the DPA. At no point has the Defendant been advised how to apply for, and what a data subject's rights are, to obtain all images and data held via a Subject Access Request from the Claimant.

55. This Claimant has therefore failed to meet its legal obligations and has breached principle 1 (at least) of the DPA, as well as the BPA Code of Practice.

56. The Defendant avers that a breach of the DPA and failure to comply with ICO rules regarding data captured by ANPR, also transgresses the tests of fairness and transparency of consumer contracts, as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (enacted after the final hearing in Beavis and not considered in that case)

Solicitor Costs

57. The claim includes a sum of £50, described as ‘Solicitor’s costs’. The Claimant is known to be a serial litigant, issuing up to 1,000 similar claims on a weekly basis, using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 of income. Given a standard working week, the claimant’s solicitor can spend no more than a few minutes per claim, hardly justifying the £50. Since these are fully automated, no intervention is required by a solicitor, and the Claimant is put to strict proof to show how this cost has been incurred. The Claimant maintains case notes for each person who has accessed the case, and it is suggested this would be sufficient. The Claimant cannot rely on Nossen’s Letter Patent (1969) to justify the charge, as this is part of their everyday routine, and no ‘expert services’ are involved. The £50 is not valid because it is not incurred by the claimant, generating over £1.5 million a year in profit.

58. Additionally, as this is already included as part of the costs of the claimant, factored into the £100 parking charge, this is essentially double charging.

59. To put this into context, if the work was done by an outside solicitor who charged UKPC £10 (which is believed to be the going rate for this type of work) then UKPC would only be able to claim £10, and not £50.

60. The defendant therefore puts the claimant strictly to proof, by way of timesheets or otherwise, that work was done by the litigant’s expert staff to the value of £50.

61. The £50 solicitor cost was disputed in the test case of ParkingEye v Beavis and Wardley. HHJ Moloney refused to award the £50. His award was; “JUDGMENT FOR CLAIMANT FOR £85 PLUS ISSUE COSTS”. These were presumably the £25 filing fee and £25 hearing fee.

62. The £50 was also struck out by DJ Sparrow on 19 August 2015 in ParkingEye v Mrs S, claim number B9FC508F.

The Claimant has acted unreasonably by not supplying enough information for the defendant to be able to base a defence. The court is thus invited to strike out the claim of its own volition as having no merit and no reasonable prospects of success.

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true

bargepole

This is a complete and utter mish-mash of total rubbish.

You have copied out of date paragraphs from defences written over three years ago, most of which no longer apply following the handing down of the Beavis judgment in Nov 2015.

A Judge would have a field day ripping this to shreds.

bargepole

Here it is with all the waffle, repetition, and irrelevant stuff cut out:


In the County Court
Claim Number: [REF]
BETWEEN:
UKPC Ltd (Claimant)
-and-
[NAME] (Defendant)
___________
DEFENCE
__________

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The Particulars of Claim, in para. 2, state that the Defendant “was the registered keeper or driver of the vehicle(s)”. In para. 3, they state that the Defendant has admitted being the driver, or alternatively that the Claimant has the right to bring a claim against the keeper. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5.

3.The claim appears to be based upon damages for breach of contract. However, it is denied any contract existed. Accordingly, it is denied that the Defendant breached any contractual terms, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

4. The Claimant states, in their Particulars of Claim, that the signage is ‘clearly displayed’ but this is denied. Thus, the necessary elements of offer and acceptance to form a contract were not present.. The Claimant is put to strict proof that their signage at the material location was sufficient to bring the terms and conditions to the attention of motorists.

5. Absent any clear and prominent signage, the elements of offer, acceptance and consideration both ways have therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist.

6. The signage is not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces, especially in relation to the sum of the parking charge itself. The poor/lack of lighting further diminishes the ability of any person to read the signs especially during darkness in the hours the alleged breach is said to have occurred.

7. At Cheadle Hulme Shopping Centre, where the alleged incident took place, the signs are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible. The wording is mostly illegible for a number of reasons, firstly it is very cluttered with a lack of white space as background. It is undisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space drastically reduces the legibility of a sign, especially on which must be read before the action of parking and leaving the car. Secondly, the positioning of the signs on the outskirts of the car park, considerably high up makes it impossible to read the conditions on the sign from inside the car, should the signs even be noticed. Even stood directly below the signs it was difficult to read. With the most important information relating to parking charges being in the smallest font. Even from standing below the sign it is illegible, making it unlikely that drivers would be aware of the conditions of the car park and the charges imposed.

8. This case can be distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) which was dependent upon an undenied contract, formed by unusually prominent signage forming a clear offer and which turned on unique facts regarding the location and the interests of the landowner. Strict compliance with the BPA Code of Practice (CoP) was paramount and Mr Beavis was the driver who saw the signs and entered into a contract to pay £85 after exceeding a licence to park free. None of this applies in this material case.

9. The British Parking Association ("BPA") Code of Practice sets the requirements for entrance sings. The following requirements are mandatory:
(a) The sign should be placed so that it is readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.
(b) Signs should be readable and understandable at all times, including during the hours of darkness or at dusk if and when parking enforcement takes places at those times. This can be achieved in a variety of ways such as by direct lighting or by using the lighting for the parking area. If the sign itself is not directly or indirectly lit, we suggest that it should be made of a retroreflective material similar to that used on public roads and described in the Traffic Signs Manual.

10. The claim form states that the land is ‘managed by UKPC’. They are therefore acting as agents of the landowner. The BPA Code also states that parking operators must have landowner authority to issue parking charges, and to pursue unpaid charges via litigation. The Claimant is put to strict proof of such authority, by means of a contemporaneous and unredacted contract.

11. This Claimant uses ANPR camera systems to process data but fails to comply with the Information Commissioner's 'Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Protection and the BPA Code of Practice for same.

12. The ICO Code applies to all ANPR systems, and states that the private sector is required to follow it, in order to meet its legal obligations as a data processor. Members of the BPA are required to comply fully with the Data Protection Act (DPA) and all ICO rules and guidelines, as a pre-requisite of being able to use the DVLA KADOE system and in order to enforce parking charges on private land.

13. The Claimant's failures to comply include, but are not limited to the following, and the Claimant is put to strict proof otherwise of the following:
a) Lack of an initial privacy impact assessment
b) Lack of the 'Privacy Notice' required to deliver mandatory information about an individual's right of subject access, under the DPA. At no point has the Defendant been advised how to apply for, and what a data subject's rights are, to obtain all images and data held via a Subject Access Request from the Claimant.

14. In summary, for the reasons stated above, the Claimant's case is fatally flawed, and the Court is invited to dismiss the claim in its entirety.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.

Signature

Date

Immy_007

Thank You So Much Bargepole

Really appreciate you having a look and amending it

Il get it printed, signed, scanned and emailed right away

Immy_007

Sent off just earlier just before 4pm deadline..~Phewww in between a mad busy day at work.. will check on MCOL in a few days to check staus..so now i'm assuming to wait to hear from the court for questionnaire?

Computersaysno

So hopefully it's not urgent anymore.....