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URGENT HELP NEEDED: Credit Card pin & chip fraud
Comments
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Inside job - someone who knows OP and has access to the mailbox.VictimOfImpersonation wrote: »Well well well.
So this is looking more and more like another postal interception.
The suggestion that the fraudster "knows" the Victim Of Impersonation is just a poor guess unless the OP's postal mail is secure from mailbox dipping but not secure from someone in the house. Mailbox interception fraudsters are just totally brazen. They think nothing about calling your card company impersonationg you multiple times. In my case they even demanded to talk to an RBS call centre manager because after they'd been told that a new Tesco card & RBS Classic would be issued they were told about a dormant Directline account I had at the time and RBS had refused to reissue a card for that one!
Unless the OP knows something in particular about their own vulnerability which we have not been told, I'd say they should completely forget about ideas that a friend/co-worker/family member has had something to do with it and concentrate their energy into taking no further BS from the card company.
If the mail can be stolen then almost everything the fraudster needs to pass security will arrive in the mail over a period, even DoB, although there are some places that DoBs can be too easily obtained e.g. companies house website.
The only thing which may not arrive in the post is a unique password or mother's maiden name and the latter may have been obtained from Ancestry.co.uk or Genes Reunited if someone in the family has not been too clever.
Another possibility is what happened to me in early 2010 - the first impersonation was on the Call Credit website (yes the UK's "third" CRA). They had a security glitch which enable someone to register as me and instantly download my entire credit report.
Either way the OP should complete the paperwork the card issuer will send for the disputed transactions, faxing it back for speed, and insist on the account be credited immediately. It's been too long already. The OP should not be backward in coming forward when speaking with the card issuer. The card issuer has done no-one any favours here. They've been slow over the holiday period (no excuse - credit cards are a 365/52 business) and it sounds like their staff are inadequately trained.0 -
If there is any inside job it is probably that when bent bank workers provided lists of partial information which has been absorbed into a massive organised crime machine. Mailbox dippers are just tiny cogs in the wheel.
The suggestion that the whole episode is the work of a friend, associate or relative of the OP is naive and frankly unhelpful.
The OP should press the card issuer for transcripts of the phone calls if the OP is interested in exactly what personal data was compromised. The card issuer will probably resist and say that they will only provide them to the police. Sobeit. That would be typical.
OP can then tell police that an obstruction to justice may be occurring and that they wish to the police to obtain the transcripts as they may point to the culprit.
This is looking just like another example of one of the biggest organised crimes in the country second only perhaps to drug dealing and probably very much part of it. It is hushed up and there are plenty of willing helpers to hush it up by the looks of some contributions to this thread.0 -
It's very much in their interests to get the customer to come up with ideas as to how the PIN may have been obtained, since at this point many people will admit to compromising their PIN one way or another.the OP reports - "The lady on the phone kept saying she didn’t understand how someone could have my pin" is also accurate and recorded as a matter of fact (even if "uninformed" comment) that would be a disgraceful example of how (some) in the industry jump to a conclusion.
It's not that easy to contrive a story which involves a duplicate card and a PIN reminder both being sent out at around the same time and both being physically intercepted, even though it seems to have happened in this case. Much more often, somebody in the house will have intercepted a new card and got hold of the PIN by other means."It will take, five, 10, 15 years to get back to where we need to be. But it's no longer the individual banks that are in the wrong, it's the banking industry as a whole." - Steven Cooper, head of personal and business banking at Barclays, talking to Martin Lewis0 -
It is happening all the time due to total inadequacies of many card issuers card/PIN reissue security procedures following reported loss or damage to cards. In particular it relates to the inane offer of simultaneous offer of PIN reminder or new PIN by many issuers.It's not that easy to contrive a story which involves a duplicate card and a PIN reminder both being sent out at around the same time and both being physically intercepted, even though it seems to have happened in this case.
Based on what evidence? This is about as likely as a bank worker selling partial sets of private data such as mother's maiden name, account numbers, DoB for £1,500 a hit (clearly some do but it is thankfully rare).Much more often, somebody in the house will have intercepted a new card and got hold of the PIN by other means.
Mailbox dipping is as rife as metal theft. Heard about it, have you ? Do you blame your relatives and housemates when your nearest drain cover goes missing?0 -
It's very much in their interests to get the customer to come up with ideas as to how the PIN may have been obtained, since at this point many people will admit to compromising their PIN one way or another.
It's not that easy to contrive a story which involves a duplicate card and a PIN reminder both being sent out at around the same time and both being physically intercepted, even though it seems to have happened in this case. Much more often, somebody in the house will have intercepted a new card and got hold of the PIN by other means.
It's no good posting on this thread anymore Pqrdef, as Victimofimpersonation knows EXACTLY what happened in the OP's case. There can't possibly be any other explanation for what happened. So it's sorted. See ?
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Victimofimpersonation has already deduced what happened...
Well I don't have an insight into the OP's case but I concur with the general concerns flagged by VoI.
I posted only very slightly OT at #28. I have not noted any industry defence or explanation. Something I didn't mention was that the "glossy black very evidently First Direct communication" was actually a small cardboard box secured only by a small tab, stronger than the adhesive. Therefore capable of being easily opened and resealed without being evident.
First Direct is generally better regarded than average and a subsidiary of one of the world's larger banks. Somebody signed off that communication process. But it is (was) very evidently seriously flawed.
Explanation anybody?0 -
All banks send out communications to their customers in the postal system. Statements, for example, credit card statements, all these have personal information on them, all, usually in envelopes.
How would you like them to send out their communications ? In sealed locked boxes which require a key to open ?0 -
all these have personal information on them, all, usually in envelopes.
Did you actually read and understand #28? The information contained in the "identified easily resealable box" went beyond information contained in postal statements.
I had hoped that at least one "bank apologist" would have recognised the obvious First Direct security weakness I reported. Seems I was wrong.How would you like them to send out their communications ?
My post did not refer to "sending out postal communications" but to the specific issue of including all personal security ID acquired during the account opening secure online setup.
I rest my case.0 -
Did you actually read and understand #28? The information contained in the "identified easily resealable box" went beyond information contained in postal statements.
I had hoped that at least one "bank apologist" would have recognised the obvious First Direct security weakness I reported. Seems I was wrong.
My post did not refer to "sending out postal communications" but to the specific issue of including all personal security ID acquired during the account opening secure online setup.
I rest my case.
I know for a fact that First Direct do not send out security information to customers. So i know that you're making it up.
I'm pleased that you've "rested" your case.0
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