Gladstones Court Claim Documents - incorrect particulars

Hi All,

Bit last minute as the deadline is tomorrow but I've completed my defence for your review if you'd be willing to.

The crux being as above - that we did not park - we stopped. That the signs had been erected without adequate warning, that when we stopped there was no prohibition on stopping/waiting - and that they later must have realised that because they added the stickers to prohibit that at a later date. Finally, that as we were stopped for less than 1 minute no grace period was applied, and that the way the photograph was taken shows that they were out to entrap people due to the recent signage change.

Defence


I assert that I am not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount at all, for the following reasons:

1. I was, at the relevant date, the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. On the material date, my wife stopped in the car park for a period of less than one minute in order to utilise a cash point at the Tesco supermarket on site. The signage at the time did not prohibit stopping or waiting.

2. I subsequently received a Notice to Keeper from the Claimant, alleging that a charge of £100 was due to them. I did not send an appeal to the Claimant. or a further appeal to the Independent Appeals Service (IAS), the allegedly independent body appointed by the Claimant’s trade body, the Independent Parking Committee (IPC). My research revealed that the IAS, far from being independent, is a subsidiary of the IPC, which in turn is owned and run by the same two Directors who also run Gladstones Solicitors, the individuals in question being John Davies, and William Hurley. Such an incestuous relationship is incapable of providing any fair means for motorists to challenge parking charges, as well as potentially breaching the SRA Code of Conduct. As such, the Claimant does not come to this matter with clean hands.

3. The claimant’s signage was erected at the site with no warning to users of the car park from outside of the residential estate, and the estate had no restrictions for the more than ten years the Defendant has lived nearby. It is therefore submitted that there was no adequate warning given for non-residents to be aware of the change to parking rules.

4. The Claimant’s signage at this site states “A valid CPM permit must be clearly displayed in front window at all times.”. It is submitted that if these notices are attempting to make a contractual offer, then as they are forbidding they do not fulfil the basic requirement of a contract, which is that each party to the contract must offer valuable consideration to the other party, on clear terms capable of acceptance. In this case neither the Claimant, nor their principal the landowner, is offering anything to motorists. The notices cannot, therefore, reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

5. Furthermore, at the date on which the defendant stopped the vehicle, the signage made no reference to stopping or waiting being prohibited. Using Google Street View, one can clearly see that this is the case. Photographic evidence will be provided if this case proceeds to trial

6. It is also submitted that the claimant at a later date realised this omission, and subsequently applied stickers to the signage, including the specific sign nearest to where the defendant momentarily stopped, stating “No Stopping / Waiting”. Therefore regardless that there is no valid contract, as per clause 4, there was at the time clearly nothing to cover those who merely stop, as an example to use the cash machine as in this case, as the claimant felt the need to add additional signage. Photographic evidence of these additional stickers will be provided should this case proceed to court.



5. In addition, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 rules that if signage has multiple interpretation the interpretation most favourable to the consumer applies. It is clear from this the signage at the time could be interpreted as not applying to stopping/waiting and therefore should be applied as such.

8. The IPC code of conduct states that a grace period must be allowed in order that a driver might spot signage, go up to it, read it and then decide whether to accept the terms or not. A reasonable grace period in any car park would be from 5-15 minutes from the period of stopping. This grace period was not observed and therefore the operator is in breach of the industry code of practice. Additionally, no contract can be in place by conduct until a reasonable period elapses.

9. Thus the signage was clearly used as a device to entrap motorists into a situation whereby the Claimant sends them invoices for unwarranted and unjustified charges, for which motorists can have no contractual liability due to the terms and conditions not having been sufficiently brought to their attention. This activity is bordering on, if not actually crossing the boundary of, a criminal offence of Fraud By False Representation.

10. Furthermore, it is clear from the angle that the photograph was taken, that it was taken by an attendant who was waiting specifically to photograph people, who due to the recent implementation of the signage would most likely be unaware of the change, and this activity borders on, if not crosses the act of deliberate entrapment.


Additionally, the contract fails informational requirements for contracts established in the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation And Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enacted 13 June 2014.
Any alleged contract would be a distance contract for services as defined in The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013.

The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises contract and off-premises contracts.

The definitions concern themselves with how a contract is concluded (and in particular if face to face contact occurs during this process) and not where the contract is eventually performed. Thus, if a consumer books a hair styling appointment over the web, that is a distance contract even though they go to the salon for the actual styling. If they re-book at the salon, that will be an on-premises contract. If they meet their stylist in Tesco, arrange for an appointment and immediately phone the salon to confirm, that will be an off-premises contract. All these contracts are performed on-premises, but concluded in different ways.

The regulations define an on-premises contract as:
“on-premises contract” means a contract between a trader and a consumer which is neither a distance contract nor an off-premises contract;
Thus a contract cannot be on-premises if it is a distance contract.

The regulations define a distance contract as:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded;

• This is clearly an organised service-provision scheme (for parking)
• The contract is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer.
• There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded.

This is therefore a distance contract.

None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be concluded by parking and walking away.

Regulation 13 lists information to be provided before making a distance contract. The contract fails to provide the required information listed in Schedule 2. As per 13(1) the contract is therefore not binding.

Alternatively if the contract is on or off-premises, the information rules still apply and the contract is not binding as per either 9(1) or 10(1).

Additionally, the charge of £100 is a penalty and unfair consumer charge. The leading case on this matter is ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. In that case it was ruled that the penalties rule was engaged but the charge was not unfair because the motorist had the bargain of 2 hours of valuable free parking in exchange for the risk of paying £100 for overstaying. The risk was clearly brought to the attention of the consumer in a huge font. Here, there is no valuable consideration on offer and no bargain for the consumer, and the charge is hidden in small print. It is submitted that no motorist would agree to pay £100 instantly on stopping and this is therefore and unfair consumer term in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015..


1 In order to issue parking charges, and to pursue unpaid charges via litigation, the Claimant is required to have the written authority of the landowner, on whose behalf they are acting as an agent, in this case Peel Land & Property Ltd. No evidence of such authority was supplied by the Claimant at any time, and the Claimant is put to strict proof of same, in the form of an unredacted and contemporaneous contract, or chain of authority, from the landowner to the Claimant.

1 In addition to the £100 ‘parking charge’, for which liability is denied, the Claimant’s legal representatives, Gladstones Solicitors, have artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding costs of £50 which I submit have not actually been incurred by the Claimant, and which are artificially invented figures in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery. The Court is invited to report Gladstones Solicitors to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority for this deliberate attempt to mislead the Court, in contravention of their Code of Conduct.


1 The Court is invited to dismiss this Claim, and to allow such Defendant’s costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.

Counterclaim

It is not possible that a valid parking charge exists for the following reasons
The signage cannot be safely read while driving. There can therefore be no meeting of minds and no contract by performance
The signage is forbidding and makes no offer to the motorist. There can therefore be no contract.
Even if there was a contract the signage fails informational requirements for contracts established in the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation And Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enacted 13 June 2014, and so any contract would be non-bindng on the consumer
Even if there were a binding contract the charge would be a penalty and unfair consumer term as it is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is not saved by the case law in ParkingEye v Beavis.

There was therefore no valid reason to apply for my keeper data from the DVLA.

Additionally the operator contract with the DVLA only allows them to obtain data for parking contraventions and not for briefly stopping.

My name and address information (together with other information) is classified as personal data within the meaning of s1(1) of the Data Protections Act (DPA). You are misusing this data by attempting to claim a charge is do when there is no possibility a lawful reason exists. Additionally you may only obtain and use this data from the DVLA for parking, and not for stopping.

This is therefore a breach of data principle 1 (data must be used lawfully) and 2 (data must only be used for the purpose provided).

The case of Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) provides authority that misuse of personal data is a tort and that damages may be non-pecuniary. The case of Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] All ER (D) 199 provides authority that a reasonable sum for compensation would be £750.

The case of VCS v Phillip, claim number C9DP2D6C Liverpool 07/12/2016, while not binding, concerns a motorist sent a parking charge for briefly stopping at Liverpool Business Park. The signage there has the equivalent forbidding wording to the signage in this case. The judge ruled that no contract could exist and therefore data had been wrongly obtained from the DVLA. This is therefore a persuasive case that a DPA breach occurs when a parking charge is not legitimately pursued, and that a sum of at least £250 is compensation for pursuing a purported parking charge when there is no reasonable prospect of success.

I therefore claim £250.

New version fixing times where I got muddled and called myself the "claimant" (D'oh) and focusing the defence on the signage change rather than prior time without signs.

Defence


I assert that I am not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount at all, for the following reasons:

1. I was, at the relevant date, the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. On the material date, the defendant’s vehicle was stopped briefly in the car park in order to utilise a cash point at the Tesco supermarket on site, without switching off the engine. The signage at the time did not prohibit stopping or waiting.

2. I subsequently received a Notice to Keeper from the Claimant, alleging that a charge of £100 was due to them. I did not send an appeal to the Claimant. or a further appeal to the Independent Appeals Service (IAS), the allegedly independent body appointed by the Claimant’s trade body, the Independent Parking Committee (IPC). My research revealed that the IAS, far from being independent, is a subsidiary of the IPC, which in turn is owned and run by the same two Directors who also run Gladstones Solicitors, the individuals in question being John Davies, and William Hurley. Such an incestuous relationship is incapable of providing any fair means for motorists to challenge parking charges, as well as potentially breaching the SRA Code of Conduct. As such, the Claimant does not come to this matter with clean hands.

3. The Claimant’s signage at this site states “A valid CPM permit must be clearly displayed in front window at all times.”. It is submitted that if these notices are attempting to make a contractual offer, then as they are forbidding they do not fulfil the basic requirement of a contract, which is that each party to the contract must offer valuable consideration to the other party, on clear terms capable of acceptance. In this case neither the Claimant, nor their principal the landowner, is offering anything to motorists. The notices cannot, therefore, reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

4. Furthermore, at the date on which the defendant’s vehicle briefly stopped, the signage made no reference to stopping or waiting being prohibited. Using Google Street View to view dates both before and after the defendant’s vehicle parked, one can clearly see that this is the case. Photographic evidence will be provided if this case proceeds to trial.

5. It is also submitted that the claimant at a later date realised this omission, and subsequently applied stickers to the signage, including the specific sign nearest to where the defendant momentarily stopped, stating “No Stopping / Waiting”. Therefore, regardless that there is no valid contract as per clause 4, there was at the time clearly nothing to cover those who merely stop, as an example to use the cash machine as in this case, as the claimant felt the need to add additional signage. Current photographic and Google Streetview evidence of these additional stickers from post the date of the defendant’s vehicle briefly stopping, will be provided should this case proceed to court.



6. In addition, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 rules that if signage has multiple interpretation the interpretation most favourable to the consumer applies. It is clear from this the signage at the time could be interpreted as not applying to stopping/waiting and therefore should be applied as such.

7. The IPC code of conduct states that a grace period must be allowed in order that a driver might spot signage, go up to it, read it and then decide whether to accept the terms or not. A reasonable grace period in any car park would be from 5-15 minutes from the period of stopping. This grace period was not observed and therefore the operator is in breach of the industry code of practice. Additionally, no contract can be in place by conduct until a reasonable period elapses.

8. Thus the signage was clearly used as a device to entrap motorists into a situation whereby the Claimant sends them invoices for unwarranted and unjustified charges, for which motorists can have no contractual liability due to the terms and conditions not having been sufficiently brought to their attention. This activity is bordering on, if not actually crossing the boundary of, a criminal offence of Fraud by False Representation.

9. Furthermore, it is clear from the angle that the photograph was taken, that it was taken by an attendant who was waiting specifically to photograph people such as the defendant whilst obviously stopped rather than parked and clearly within the grace period as per the code of conduct. This activity borders on, if not crosses the act of deliberate entrapment.

10. Additionally, the contract fails informational requirements for contracts established in the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation And Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enacted 13 June 2014.
Any alleged contract would be a distance contract for services as defined in The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013.

The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises contract and off-premises contracts.

The definitions concern themselves with how a contract is concluded (and in particular if face to face contact occurs during this process) and not where the contract is eventually performed. Thus, if a consumer books a hair styling appointment over the web, that is a distance contract even though they go to the salon for the actual styling. If they re-book at the salon, that will be an on-premises contract. If they meet their stylist in Tesco, arrange for an appointment and immediately phone the salon to confirm, that will be an off-premises contract. All these contracts are performed on-premises, but concluded in different ways.

The regulations define an on-premises contract as:
“on-premises contract” means a contract between a trader and a consumer which is neither a distance contract nor an off-premises contract;
Thus a contract cannot be on-premises if it is a distance contract.

The regulations define a distance contract as:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded;

• This is clearly an organised service-provision scheme (for parking)
• The contract is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer.
• There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded.

This is therefore a distance contract.

None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be concluded by parking and walking away.

Regulation 13 lists information to be provided before making a distance contract. The contract fails to provide the required information listed in Schedule 2. As per 13(1) the contract is therefore not binding.

Alternatively if the contract is on or off-premises, the information rules still apply and the contract is not binding as per either 9(1) or 10(1).

11. Additionally, the charge of £100 is a penalty and unfair consumer charge. The leading case on this matter is ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. In that case it was ruled that the penalties rule was engaged but the charge was not unfair because the motorist had the bargain of 2 hours of valuable free parking in exchange for the risk of paying £100 for overstaying. The risk was clearly brought to the attention of the consumer in a huge font. Here, there is no valuable consideration on offer and no bargain for the consumer, and the charge is hidden in small print. It is submitted that no motorist would agree to pay £100 instantly on stopping and this is therefore and unfair consumer term in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015..


12. In order to issue parking charges, and to pursue unpaid charges via litigation, the Claimant is required to have the written authority of the landowner, on whose behalf they are acting as an agent, in this case Peel Land & Property Ltd. No evidence of such authority was supplied by the Claimant at any time, and the Claimant is put to strict proof of same, in the form of an unredacted and contemporaneous contract, or chain of authority, from the landowner to the Claimant.

13. In addition to the £100 ‘parking charge’, for which liability is denied, the Claimant’s legal representatives, Gladstones Solicitors, have artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding costs of £50 which I submit have not actually been incurred by the Claimant, and which are artificially invented figures in an attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules using double recovery. The Court is invited to report Gladstones Solicitors to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority for this deliberate attempt to mislead the Court, in contravention of their Code of Conduct.


14. The Court is invited to dismiss this Claim, and to allow such Defendant’s costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.

Counterclaim

It is not possible that a valid parking charge exists for the following reasons
The signage cannot be safely read while driving. There can therefore be no meeting of minds and no contract by performance
The signage is forbidding and makes no offer to the motorist. There can therefore be no contract.
Even if there was a contract the signage fails informational requirements for contracts established in the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation And Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enacted 13 June 2014, and so any contract would be non-bindng on the consumer
Even if there were a binding contract the charge would be a penalty and unfair consumer term as it is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is not saved by the case law in ParkingEye v Beavis.

There was therefore no valid reason to apply for my keeper data from the DVLA.

Additionally the operator contract with the DVLA only allows them to obtain data for parking contraventions and not for briefly stopping.

My name and address information (together with other information) is classified as personal data within the meaning of s1(1) of the Data Protections Act (DPA). You are misusing this data by attempting to claim a charge is do when there is no possibility a lawful reason exists. Additionally you may only obtain and use this data from the DVLA for parking, and not for stopping.

This is therefore a breach of data principle 1 (data must be used lawfully) and 2 (data must only be used for the purpose provided).

The case of Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) provides authority that misuse of personal data is a tort and that damages may be non-pecuniary. The case of Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] All ER (D) 199 provides authority that a reasonable sum for compensation would be £750.

The case of VCS v Phillip, claim number C9DP2D6C Liverpool 07/12/2016, while not binding, concerns a motorist sent a parking charge for briefly stopping at Liverpool Business Park. The signage there has the equivalent forbidding wording to the signage in this case. The judge ruled that no contract could exist and therefore data had been wrongly obtained from the DVLA. This is therefore a persuasive case that a DPA breach occurs when a parking charge is not legitimately pursued, and that a sum of at least £250 is compensation for pursuing a purported parking charge when there is no reasonable prospect of success.

I therefore claim £250.

Hey Coupon Mad,

ah yes - they added £60 I’ll add that too.

Noted on the defendant part - I’d already can through and changed that in my latest draft.

Where’s the reference to Peel? I can’t spot that?

I’m assuming I have nothing to lose by lodging a counterclaim?

Found it now (the peel bit) will remove the name.