Claim form from DCB Legal LTD

Eminowa

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82096752#Comment_82096752

i did that just incase the thw parking company arw here spying on the thread

patient_dream

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82097801#Comment_82097801

Don't worry about vermin spying.

This forum is the bible for them

Eminowa

OBSERVICE PARKING CONSULTANCY LIMITED (Claimant)

Vs

XXXXXXXXXX (Defendant)

1.  I, XXX of XXX, am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

2.  In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. For the Court’s convenience, I have also included direct links where possible to the full text of any legal judgments mentioned.

3.  I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully, and I respectfully ask the court to take this into account. My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Defective Particulars of Claim

4.  The Claimant’s case is vague, lacking the detail required under Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, which require a claimant to set out all facts necessary to establish a complete cause of action. The Particulars of Claim (POC) simply allege that “the driver of the vehicle with registration XXX parked in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage”. However, the Claimant provides no information on the specific terms said to have been breached, the conduct that allegedly broke those terms, or how any contract was formed. This absence of essential detail fails to justify the claim and has also made it difficult for me to respond to it effectively in my defence.

5.  I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are numerous recent and persuasive Appeal Judgments to support dismissing or striking out this claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims. The POC seen here in my case are far worse than the ones seen on the below Appeals).

6. The first persuasive Appeal Judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) (click for link) would indicate the POCs fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held in paragraph 11 that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract”. 

7.  The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Services (CPMS) Ltd. v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10th May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim. A copy of the transcript of HHJ Evans’ judgement is included in Exhibit AD-04.

The Claimants Authority to Issue Parking Charges

8.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to sue. Under the DVLA KADOE agreement and the BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice Version 9 - February 2024 (Clause 7), the right to manage this site and access my data is strictly contingent upon valid, written landowner authority. The Claimant has failed to disclose the contract, its schedules, or a verified site boundary map. Unreadable signage pictures (Exhibit AD-1), a "digital stock image," and an unverified aerial view are insufficient to prove the Claimant had the legal authority to operate on this specific land on 6 April 2024.

9.  The Claimant’s reliance on One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw [2021] is a misapplication of law. While Wilshaw addresses the formation of a contract with a driver, it does not relieve a Claimant of the burden of proving the specific terms of that alleged contract to the Court. In this instance, the photographs of the signage provided by the Claimant in their evidence bundle (Exhibit AD-1) are of such poor quality that the terms and conditions are entirely unreadable. Consequently, the Claimant has failed to provide the Court with the necessary evidence to determine the specific terms offered or to verify that a binding contract was ever formed. Furthermore, the Claimant’s assertion that landowner authority is unnecessary provided there is a 'binding contract' fails by its own logic: without legible evidence of the terms, the Court cannot conclude that any such contract exists. In the absence of both a visible Landowner Agreement and legible evidence of the contractual terms, the Claimant has failed to establish a cause of action.

No Valid Contract Formed

10. It is neither admitted nor denied that any contract term was breached. However, for a valid contract to be formed, there must be an offer, acceptance, and something of value given in return — which was not present here. Under section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015 ( Consumer Rights Act 2015 ) the Court must apply a 'test of fairness' and this requires contract terms and any “consumer notices” to be clear and prominent. 

11.  Looking at Schedule 2 (examples 6, 10, 14, and 18) and section 62 of the CRA, which require fair, open dealing and good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant is known to use unclear and potentially unfair terms and notices. Based on the limited information provided in this case, the situation appears to be similar. The Claimant is therefore required to strictly prove their case with contemporaneous photographs.

12. None of the Claimant’s photographs of the signage on site (Exhibit AD-1 of the Claimant’s witness statement) include readable terms and conditions, preventing the court from verifying what contractual terms were offered to motorists on these signs. Instead, the Claimant relies on a digital stock image of a sign, which does not evidence that this version of the sign— and the specific terms and conditions shown on that stock image—were displayed at the site on 6 April 2024.

13.  The absence of any signage at the site approach and entrance used by the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle is particularly significant. Under Sections 62–68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ( Consumer Rights Act 2015 ), contractual terms must be fair, transparent, and prominently displayed. Additionally, as a member of the British Parking Association (BPA), the Claimant is contractually obliged to comply with the BPA’s Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice. Section 19.2 of this Code states: “Entrance signs play an important part in establishing a parking contract and deterring trespassers. Therefore, as well as the signs you must have telling drivers about the terms and conditions for parking, you must also have a standard form of entrance sign at the entrance…” (Exhibit AD‑08).

14.  Not only has the Claimant failed to comply with their own applicable Code of Practice, but they have also misled the court by asserting that an entrance sign was present when it was clearly not.

Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

15.  I confirm that I am the registered keeper of the vehicle with registration number XXX and deny any liability.

16.  The Claimant states in paragraph 26 of their witness statement that they are pursuing the Defendant as “the contracting party and, in the alternative, on the evidential basis that, on the balance of probabilities, the Defendant was the driver." This assertion is both incorrect and unsupported.

17.  Furthermore, this contradicts the claimant’s statement in paragraph 21 of their own Witness Statement that “The defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper of the Vehicle”.

18.  The Defendant has never been identified as the driver, nor has any other person. The Claimant has provided no evidence whatsoever that the Defendant was driving at the time of the alleged breach. Only the driver—as the person who could have potentially seen and accepted any terms on the signage—could possibly be the contracting party.

19.  The Claimant relies only on an assumption, claiming that an inference should be drawn because the Defendant has not nominated another driver. However, there is no legal requirement for a registered keeper to name a driver in a private parking matter, and no such presumption exists in law.

20.  If the Claimant wishes to pursue the Defendant as the driver, the burden rests entirely on them to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was in fact driving. Mere speculation or assumption is not enough.

21.  In April 2023, HHJ Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re-claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation. HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed. (Exhibit AD-10)

22.  If, instead, the Claimant seeks to pursue me as the keeper as the Claimant states in the POC and in paragraph 21 of their witness statement, then they must meet the strict requirements under Schedule 4 of POFA 2012 to transfer liability from the unknown driver to me as the keeper. ( Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 )

23.  However, the Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued by the Claimant on 12 April 2024 (Exhibit AD-4 of the Claimant’s witness statement) does not include any of the mandatory requirements under Schedule 4 of POFA 2012. The most notable omission being the failure to provide any warning as stated in Paragraph 9(2)(f) regarding the transfer of liability to the keeper.

24.  Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to comply with POFA and cannot transfer liability to me as keeper. There is therefore no lawful basis for this claim against me.

25.  The fact that parking firms cannot invoke ‘keeper liability in case of non-compliance with POFA, has been tested on appeal in private parking cases including in the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court (Exhibit AD-11), on appeal re-claim number C0DP9C4E, HHJ Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable without the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Excel's claim was dismissed.

26.  The Claimant’s failure to invoke POFA 2012 is not an oversight, but a reflection of their established business model at the material time. In April 2024, the Claimant’s notices—including the Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued to me (Exhibit AD-4 of the claimant’s witness statement) —were intentionally issued on a driver-liability-only basis. The Claimant was among a specific group of operators that historically chose to bypass the statutory requirements of Schedule 4.

27. My research into dozens of the Claimant’s contemporary notices confirms this was a systemic choice. Without exception, Horizon Parking NTKs from this period asserted liability against the driver alone and omitted any mention of POFA 2012 or keeper liability. This research also confirmed that the Claimant only transitioned to a POFA-compliant "Keeper Liability" model around February 2025.

28. Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that at the time of the alleged contravention, the Claimant operated exclusively under a model where only the driver could be held contractually liable.

29. It is highly improbable that this was an oversight. The Claimant’s legal representative, DCB Legal Solicitors, possesses specialized expertise in this field, having been instrumental in the founding of the Independent Parking Committee (IPC) and its associated Code of Practice and appeal process. Given this deep institutional knowledge of parking law and POFA 2012, the decision to pursue a 'Keeper Liability' claim in the absence of POFA compliance is a deliberate choice to litigate a meritless claim.

30.  Bringing a claim with the full knowledge that the statutory requirements for Keeper Liability have not been met constitutes unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g). This has resulted in a significant waste of the Court’s time and resources, forcing the Defendant to contest a claim that the Claimant and their solicitors knew, or ought to have known, had no prospect of success from the outset.

Inflated and Unlawful Charges

31.  In accordance with Schedule 4, paragraph 4(5) of POFA 2012, the Claimant is prohibited from recovering from the keeper any sum greater than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they existed at the time the Notice to Driver was issued. The sum claimed in these proceedings exceeds that statutory maximum and is therefore unrecoverable from the keeper. ( Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 )

32.  Explanatory Note 221 to Schedule 4 confirms that a creditor “may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued.”   Any added sums—such as “debt recovery fees”, “late fees”, or other invented add‑ons—are not “parking related charges” within the meaning of POFA. These additional amounts do not appear on signage, are not part of any contractual parking charge, and are created solely by third‑party debt recovery agents. POFA provides no legal basis to impose keeper liability for such DRA‑fabricated fees, even if (which is denied) the Claimant had otherwise complied with POFA’s conditions.

33. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

34. I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii) a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.

35. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

(iii). Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if the entire sum was 'overdue' on the day of parking;

36. This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

37. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

"Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

38. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

39. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or 'enforcement' (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

40. With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra 'fee'. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery' and the Defendant takes that position.

41. The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs 'eight times less' (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced 'industry standard' Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

42. In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and 'would appear to be penal.

43. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the 'costs of the operation' and the DLUHC's IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

44. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing 'market failure' more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

45. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

46.  To impose a PC, as well as a breach, the Claimant must show two things: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis UKSC67 (https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2013_0280_judgment_c7f37dda32.pdf).

47.  This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate sum; it is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable, indeed it represents a penalty. Attention is drawn to paragraphs 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner); the court should also read paragraph 3.4 of the original judgment by HHJ Moloney in Beavis (click here) , confirming what that authority means by 'costs of the operation'.

48.  The binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores EWHC4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'. The court should note that HHJ Moloney referenced this case in Beavis.

49.  In addition to this, the ‘additional charges’ constitutes a double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The court is invited to find the quantum claimed is false and an abuse of process as found by HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson G4QZ465V in which £60 had been added to a parking charge.

50.  Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Following the beforementioned exaggerated costs and charges, the court is invited to strike out or dismiss the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

Conclusion

51.  For all the reasons set out in this statement, the Claimant has failed to establish a valid cause of action. The Particulars of Claim do not meet the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules, fail to specify which contractual terms were allegedly breached, provide no details of the conduct said to amount to a breach, and give no explanation of how any contract was formed. This lack of essential information mirrors the defective pleadings repeatedly criticised and struck out in persuasive appeal authorities and has made it difficult to effectively and properly respond in one’s defence.

52. The Claimant has also failed to demonstrate that any contractual terms were prominently displayed, consistent, or capable of forming a binding agreement with the driver. The Claimant’s own evidence shows inconsistent signage, missing entrance signs, and an inaccurate and misleading site plan. Without clear, reliable, and contemporaneous evidence of the terms allegedly relied upon, no contract could have been accepted and no liability could arise.

53.  Moreover, the Claimant has neither identified the driver nor complied with the strict statutory requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 necessary to pursue the registered keeper. The Claimant’s attempt to imply keeper liability despite issuing a non‑POFA Notice to Keeper is both legally unsound and inconsistent with their own operating model at the time.

54.  The Claimant also seeks an inflated sum that includes unlawful and unrecoverable additions. These extra charges have been widely condemned in higher court decisions as disproportionate, penal, and an abuse of process. Such exaggeration further undermines the credibility and validity of the claim.

55. In light of the defective pleadings, non‑compliant notices, unreliable and misleading evidence, and exaggerated charges, I respectfully submit that this claim is without merit. I therefore invite the court to strike out or dismiss the claim in its entirety.

Unreasonable Conduct by Claimant(CPR 27.14(2)(g))

56.  In the alternative to striking out the claim, I respectfully invite the Court to determine that the Claimant has behaved unreasonably within the meaning of CPR 27.14(2)(g). The Claimant is professionally represented by a firm of solicitors specialising in private parking litigation and cannot claim ignorance of the statutory requirements governing their own industry. The Claimant states: “The Defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper pf [sic] the Vehicle.” Despite this explicit confirmation that they are pursuing me in my capacity as keeper, the Claimant has failed to mention or reference the POFA a single time in their entire statement.

57.  As Schedule 4 of POFA provides the sole statutory mechanism in English law to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper, the Claimant is knowingly asking the Court to grant a remedy for which they have provided no legal authority. By ignoring the specific issues of POFA non-compliance raised in my Defence while continuing to press a legally hopeless case, the Claimant has demonstrated a vexatious disregard for the law and caused an unnecessary waste of the Court’s resources. No reasonable litigant, let alone a specialist professional, could genuinely believe this position to be viable."

58.  Further, the Claimant has submitted misleading evidence, including an inaccurate and demonstrably false “Signage Location Plan” purporting to show signage at the site entrance where no such sign existed masking the Claimant’s breach of their own Code of Practice. My contemporaneous photographs, site visit, and Google Streetview image all confirm this omission. The Claimant’s own photographs also expose inconsistencies between the signage displayed on site and the signage relied upon in their evidence bundle. Such defects undermine the reliability of the Claimant’s entire evidential foundation and amount to conduct no reasonable claimant should display.

59.  Additionally, the Claimant has advanced vague and defective Particulars of Claim that fail to disclose the alleged contractual terms, the conduct said to amount to a breach, or any cogent explanation of how a contract was formed. They have also inflated the claim with unlawful and unrecoverable additional sums, including a £70 “debt recovery” add‑on that has been repeatedly condemned in higher court authority as abusive and penal. The persistence in claiming such invented sums, contrary to POFA and contrary to binding authority, further demonstrates unreasonable conduct.

60.  Taken collectively, the pursuit of a claim with no legal basis, reliance on contradictory and misleading evidence, failure to plead a coherent cause of action, and continued inflation of the claim with unlawful charges amount to conduct that “transcends mere negligence” and meets the high bar of unreasonableness established in CPR 27.14(2)(g). Should the Court agree, I seek my Litigant‑in‑Person costs for time reasonably spent researching, drafting and preparing my defence and witness evidence, in accordance with the applicable LiP rate.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

SCHEDULE OF LOSSES

Loss of earnings / annual leave (Capped)

Claimant had to take one day of Annual Leave to attend the Court Hearing

- Statutory small‑claims cap: £101.00

Subtotal: £101.00

Printing Costs

Printing, paper and toner costs for documents.

- 120 pages × £0.15 per page = £18.00

Subtotal: £18.00

Travel Expenses

Roundtrip mileage costs for: 1) Site visit of XXX to inspect signage and take photographic evidence 2) Hand-deliver hard copy of Witness statement at XXX County Court 3) Attending the Hearing at XXX County Court

- 21 miles × £0.45 per mile = £9.45

Subtotal: £9.45

Litigant in Person Costs (CPR 27.14(2)(g) – If Awarded)

I reasonably estimate that I spent a minimum of 12 hours preparing my defence, researching the relevant law, examining the Claimant’s evidence, compiling exhibits, and drafting this witness statement. If the Court finds the Claimant has behaved unreasonably under CPR 27.14(2)(g), I seek the Litigant‑in‑Person rate of £19/hour.

- 12 hours research + preparation × £24/hour = £288.00

Subtotal (if awarded): £228.00

TOTAL (excluding LiP costs): £128.45

If unreasonable behaviour proven:

TOTAL (including LiP costs): £356.45

Coupon-mad

"The Particulars of Claim (POC) simply allege that “the driver of the vehicle with registration XXX parked in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage”. However, the Claimant provides no information on the specific terms said to have been breached,"

I repeat: bin it.

Chan and Akande don't apply to your POC (and your POC don't merely say what you put there!). You must deal with the allegation in your POC (and 'POC' isn't the PCN, it is the Claim Form, which in your case DOES specify a breach).

Eminowa

Can we kindly look through my WS and please kindly correct me pls

Coupon-mad

I already did! You must not use that Chan & Akande irrelevant stuff in your case.

🙂

Eminowa

OBSERVICE PARKING CONSULTANCY LIMITED (Claimant)

Vs

XXXXXXXXXX (Defendant)

1. I, XXX of XXX, am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

2. In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. For the Court’s convenience, I have also included direct links where possible to the full text of any legal judgments mentioned.

3. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully, and I respectfully ask the court to take this into account. My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

The Claimants Authority to Issue Parking Charges

4 The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to sue. Under the DVLA KADOE agreement and the BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice Version 9 - February 2024 (Clause 7), the right to manage this site and access my data is strictly contingent upon valid, written landowner authority. The Claimant has failed to disclose the contract, its schedules, or a verified site boundary map. Unreadable signage pictures (Exhibit AD-1), a "digital stock image," and an unverified aerial view are insufficient to prove the Claimant had the legal authority to operate on this specific land on 6 April 2024.

5 The Claimant’s reliance on One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw [2021] is a misapplication of law. While Wilshaw addresses the formation of a contract with a driver, it does not relieve a Claimant of the burden of proving the specific terms of that alleged contract to the Court. In this instance, the photographs of the signage provided by the Claimant in their evidence bundle (Exhibit AD-1) are of such poor quality that the terms and conditions are entirely unreadable. Consequently, the Claimant has failed to provide the Court with the necessary evidence to determine the specific terms offered or to verify that a binding contract was ever formed. Furthermore, the Claimant’s assertion that landowner authority is unnecessary provided there is a 'binding contract' fails by its own logic: without legible evidence of the terms, the Court cannot conclude that any such contract exists. In the absence of both a visible Landowner Agreement and legible evidence of the contractual terms, the Claimant has failed to establish a cause of action.

No Valid Contract Formed

6. It is neither admitted nor denied that any contract term was breached. However, for a valid contract to be formed, there must be an offer, acceptance, and something of value given in return — which was not present here. Under section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015 ( Consumer Rights Act 2015 ) the Court must apply a 'test of fairness' and this requires contract terms and any “consumer notices” to be clear and prominent.

7. Looking at Schedule 2 (examples 6, 10, 14, and 18) and section 62 of the CRA, which require fair, open dealing and good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant is known to use unclear and potentially unfair terms and notices. Based on the limited information provided in this case, the situation appears to be similar. The Claimant is therefore required to strictly prove their case with contemporaneous photographs.

8. None of the Claimant’s photographs of the signage on site (Exhibit AD-1 of the Claimant’s witness statement) include readable terms and conditions, preventing the court from verifying what contractual terms were offered to motorists on these signs. Instead, the Claimant relies on a digital stock image of a sign, which does not evidence that this version of the sign— and the specific terms and conditions shown on that stock image—were displayed at the site on 6 April 2024.

9. The absence of any signage at the site approach and entrance used by the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle is particularly significant. Under Sections 62–68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ( Consumer Rights Act 2015 ), contractual terms must be fair, transparent, and prominently displayed. Additionally, as a member of the British Parking Association (BPA), the Claimant is contractually obliged to comply with the BPA’s Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice. Section 19.2 of this Code states: “Entrance signs play an important part in establishing a parking contract and deterring trespassers. Therefore, as well as the signs you must have telling drivers about the terms and conditions for parking, you must also have a standard form of entrance sign at the entrance…” (Exhibit AD‑08).

10 Not only has the Claimant failed to comply with their own applicable Code of Practice, but they have also misled the court by asserting that an entrance sign was present when it was clearly not.

Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

11 I confirm that I am the registered keeper of the vehicle with registration number XXX and deny any liability.

12. The Claimant states in paragraph 26 of their witness statement that they are pursuing the Defendant as “the contracting party and, in the alternative, on the evidential basis that, on the balance of probabilities, the Defendant was the driver." This assertion is both incorrect and unsupported.

13. Furthermore, this contradicts the claimant’s statement in paragraph 21 of their own Witness Statement that “The defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper of the Vehicle”.

14. The Defendant has never been identified as the driver, nor has any other person. The Claimant has provided no evidence whatsoever that the Defendant was driving at the time of the alleged breach. Only the driver—as the person who could have potentially seen and accepted any terms on the signage—could possibly be the contracting party.

15. The Claimant relies only on an assumption, claiming that an inference should be drawn because the Defendant has not nominated another driver. However, there is no legal requirement for a registered keeper to name a driver in a private parking matter, and no such presumption exists in law.

16 If the Claimant wishes to pursue the Defendant as the driver, the burden rests entirely on them to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was in fact driving. Mere speculation or assumption is not enough.

17 In April 2023, HHJ Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re-claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation. HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed. (Exhibit AD-10)

18. If, instead, the Claimant seeks to pursue me as the keeper as the Claimant states in the POC and in paragraph 21 of their witness statement, then they must meet the strict requirements under Schedule 4 of POFA 2012 to transfer liability from the unknown driver to me as the keeper. ( Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 )

19. However, the Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued by the Claimant on 12 April 2024 (Exhibit AD-4 of the Claimant’s witness statement) does not include any of the mandatory requirements under Schedule 4 of POFA 2012. The most notable omission being the failure to provide any warning as stated in Paragraph 9(2)(f) regarding the transfer of liability to the keeper.

20. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to comply with POFA and cannot transfer liability to me as keeper. There is therefore no lawful basis for this claim against me.

21 The fact that parking firms cannot invoke ‘keeper liability in case of non-compliance with POFA, has been tested on appeal in private parking cases including in the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court (Exhibit AD-11), on appeal re-claim number C0DP9C4E, HHJ Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable without the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Excel's claim was dismissed.

22 The Claimant’s failure to invoke POFA 2012 is not an oversight, but a reflection of their established business model at the material time. In April 2024, the Claimant’s notices—including the Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued to me (Exhibit AD-4 of the claimant’s witness statement) —were intentionally issued on a driver-liability-only basis. The Claimant was among a specific group of operators that historically chose to bypass the statutory requirements of Schedule 4.

23. My research into dozens of the Claimant’s contemporary notices confirms this was a systemic choice. Without exception, Horizon Parking NTKs from this period asserted liability against the driver alone and omitted any mention of POFA 2012 or keeper liability. This research also confirmed that the Claimant only transitioned to a POFA-compliant "Keeper Liability" model around February 2025.

24. Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that at the time of the alleged contravention, the Claimant operated exclusively under a model where only the driver could be held contractually liable.

25 It is highly improbable that this was an oversight. The Claimant’s legal representative, DCB Legal Solicitors, possesses specialized expertise in this field, having been instrumental in the founding of the Independent Parking Committee (IPC) and its associated Code of Practice and appeal process. Given this deep institutional knowledge of parking law and POFA 2012, the decision to pursue a 'Keeper Liability' claim in the absence of POFA compliance is a deliberate choice to litigate a meritless claim.

26 Bringing a claim with the full knowledge that the statutory requirements for Keeper Liability have not been met constitutes unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g). This has resulted in a significant waste of the Court’s time and resources, forcing the Defendant to contest a claim that the Claimant and their solicitors knew, or ought to have known, had no prospect of success from the outset.

Inflated and Unlawful Charges

27. In accordance with Schedule 4, paragraph 4(5) of POFA 2012, the Claimant is prohibited from recovering from the keeper any sum greater than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they existed at the time the Notice to Driver was issued. The sum claimed in these proceedings exceeds that statutory maximum and is therefore unrecoverable from the keeper. ( Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 )

28 Explanatory Note 221 to Schedule 4 confirms that a creditor “may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued.” Any added sums—such as “debt recovery fees”, “late fees”, or other invented add‑ons—are not “parking related charges” within the meaning of POFA. These additional amounts do not appear on signage, are not part of any contractual parking charge, and are created solely by third‑party debt recovery agents. POFA provides no legal basis to impose keeper liability for such DRA‑fabricated fees, even if (which is denied) the Claimant had otherwise complied with POFA’s conditions.

29 The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

30. I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii) a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.

31. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

(iii). Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if the entire sum was 'overdue' on the day of parking;

32 This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

33. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

"Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

34. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

35. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or 'enforcement' (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

40. With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra 'fee'. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery' and the Defendant takes that position.

36. The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs 'eight times less' (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced 'industry standard' Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

37. In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and 'would appear to be penal.

38. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the 'costs of the operation' and the DLUHC's IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

39. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing 'market failure' more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

40. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

41. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, the Claimant must show two things: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis UKSC67 (https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2013_0280_judgment_c7f37dda32.pdf).

42. This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate sum; it is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable, indeed it represents a penalty. Attention is drawn to paragraphs 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner); the court should also read paragraph 3.4 of the original judgment by HHJ Moloney in Beavis (click here) , confirming what that authority means by 'costs of the operation'.

43. The binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores EWHC4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'. The court should note that HHJ Moloney referenced this case in Beavis.

44. In addition to this, the ‘additional charges’ constitutes a double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The court is invited to find the quantum claimed is false and an abuse of process as found by HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson G4QZ465V in which £60 had been added to a parking charge.

45. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Following the beforementioned exaggerated costs and charges, the court is invited to strike out or dismiss the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

Conclusion

46. For all the reasons set out in this statement, the Claimant has failed to establish a valid cause of action. The Particulars of Claim do not meet the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules, fail to specify which contractual terms were allegedly breached, provide no details of the conduct said to amount to a breach, and give no explanation of how any contract was formed. This lack of essential information mirrors the defective pleadings repeatedly criticised and struck out in persuasive appeal authorities and has made it difficult to effectively and properly respond in one’s defence.

47. The Claimant has also failed to demonstrate that any contractual terms were prominently displayed, consistent, or capable of forming a binding agreement with the driver. The Claimant’s own evidence shows inconsistent signage, missing entrance signs, and an inaccurate and misleading site plan. Without clear, reliable, and contemporaneous evidence of the terms allegedly relied upon, no contract could have been accepted and no liability could arise.

48. Moreover, the Claimant has neither identified the driver nor complied with the strict statutory requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 necessary to pursue the registered keeper. The Claimant’s attempt to imply keeper liability despite issuing a non‑POFA Notice to Keeper is both legally unsound and inconsistent with their own operating model at the time.

49. The Claimant also seeks an inflated sum that includes unlawful and unrecoverable additions. These extra charges have been widely condemned in higher court decisions as disproportionate, penal, and an abuse of process. Such exaggeration further undermines the credibility and validity of the claim.

50. In light of the defective pleadings, non‑compliant notices, unreliable and misleading evidence, and exaggerated charges, I respectfully submit that this claim is without merit. I therefore invite the court to strike out or dismiss the claim in its entirety.

Unreasonable Conduct by Claimant(CPR 27.14(2)(g))

51 In the alternative to striking out the claim, I respectfully invite the Court to determine that the Claimant has behaved unreasonably within the meaning of CPR 27.14(2)(g). The Claimant is professionally represented by a firm of solicitors specialising in private parking litigation and cannot claim ignorance of the statutory requirements governing their own industry. The Claimant states: “The Defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper pf [sic] the Vehicle.” Despite this explicit confirmation that they are pursuing me in my capacity as keeper, the Claimant has failed to mention or reference the POFA a single time in their entire statement.

52 As Schedule 4 of POFA provides the sole statutory mechanism in English law to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper, the Claimant is knowingly asking the Court to grant a remedy for which they have provided no legal authority. By ignoring the specific issues of POFA non-compliance raised in my Defence while continuing to press a legally hopeless case, the Claimant has demonstrated a vexatious disregard for the law and caused an unnecessary waste of the Court’s resources. No reasonable litigant, let alone a specialist professional, could genuinely believe this position to be viable."

53. Further, the Claimant has submitted misleading evidence, including an inaccurate and demonstrably false “Signage Location Plan” purporting to show signage at the site entrance where no such sign existed masking the Claimant’s breach of their own Code of Practice. My contemporaneous photographs, site visit, and Google Streetview image all confirm this omission. The Claimant’s own photographs also expose inconsistencies between the signage displayed on site and the signage relied upon in their evidence bundle. Such defects undermine the reliability of the Claimant’s entire evidential foundation and amount to conduct no reasonable claimant should display.

54. Additionally, the Claimant has advanced vague and defective Particulars of Claim that fail to disclose the alleged contractual terms, the conduct said to amount to a breach, or any cogent explanation of how a contract was formed. They have also inflated the claim with unlawful and unrecoverable additional sums, including a £70 “debt recovery” add‑on that has been repeatedly condemned in higher court authority as abusive and penal. The persistence in claiming such invented sums, contrary to POFA and contrary to binding authority, further demonstrates unreasonable conduct.

55 Taken collectively, the pursuit of a claim with no legal basis, reliance on contradictory and misleading evidence, failure to plead a coherent cause of action, and continued inflation of the claim with unlawful charges amount to conduct that “transcends mere negligence” and meets the high bar of unreasonableness established in CPR 27.14(2)(g). Should the Court agree, I seek my Litigant‑in‑Person costs for time reasonably spent researching, drafting and preparing my defence and witness evidence, in accordance with the applicable LiP rate.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

SCHEDULE OF LOSSES

Loss of earnings / annual leave (Capped)

Claimant had to take one day of Annual Leave to attend the Court Hearing

- Statutory small‑claims cap: £101.00

Subtotal: £101.00

Printing Costs

Printing, paper and toner costs for documents.

- 120 pages × £0.15 per page = £18.00

Subtotal: £18.00

Travel Expenses

Roundtrip mileage costs for: 1) Site visit of XXX to inspect signage and take photographic evidence 2) Hand-deliver hard copy of Witness statement at XXX County Court 3) Attending the Hearing at XXX County Court

- 21 miles × £0.45 per mile = £9.45

Subtotal: £9.45

Litigant in Person Costs (CPR 27.14(2)(g) – If Awarded)

I reasonably estimate that I spent a minimum of 12 hours preparing my defence, researching the relevant law, examining the Claimant’s evidence, compiling exhibits, and drafting this witness statement. If the Court finds the Claimant has behaved unreasonably under CPR 27.14(2)(g), I seek the Litigant‑in‑Person rate of £19/hour.

- 12 hours research + preparation × £24/hour = £288.00

Subtotal (if awarded): £228.00

TOTAL (excluding LiP costs): £128.45

If unreasonable behaviour proven:

TOTAL (including LiP costs): £356.45

Eminowa

email from DCB legal as below

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Good Afternoon,

We write in relation to the above matter.

Our client is prepared to make an offer to potentially conclude this matter. We ask that you call us on 0203 838 7038 to discuss this further.

We look forward to hearing from you.





Kind Regards,



Alex Keogh

Case Manager

DCB Legal Ltd



Tel: 0203 434 0433 | DX 23457 Runcorn

Le_Kirk

Squeaky bum time from DCB Legal!

1505grandad

Realise it is likely to be "disco'd" but:-

You state - "Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)" - however in filed Defence you stated:-

"3.1 Due to the length of time, the Defendant has no recollection of the day in question. The Defendant has parked in this car park many times while shopping in st Johns Retail Park, Wolverhampton. The Defendant was unaware of parking restrictions in place. The Defendant had not noticed any ‘Prominent’ signage close to where the vehicle was parked, showing the terms and conditions for use. The small signage was not suitable to alert a motorist, leading to an unawareness of any parking restrictions."

This would suggest on BoP that Defendant is driver - after all the contract is with the driver so why would it matter as stated in D concerning parking restrictions/prominent signage other than to the driver. So therefore suggest that POFA keeper liability paras are not relevant.

Just checking - para 4:-

" Unreadable signage pictures (Exhibit AD-1), a "digital stock image," and an unverified aerial view are insufficient to prove the Claimant had the legal authority to operate on this specific land on 6 April 2024."

Does the above related to the parking event - if so:-

Stated in your filed Defence:-

"The Defendant does not accept that a contravention occurred on xx/xx/2023, as alleged."

Also a pedantic observations - there is an "s" on the end of the claimant's first title name.