Minster Baywatch

Coupon-mad

POPLA use the joke BPA/IPC merged 'Joint Code' for everything except signage.

ezerscrooge

I think it is sorted now.  Have kept the BPA old code in for signage only, and made comment about that still applying.  Other matters refer to the new joke code.

Any comments great appreciated.

POPLA Appeal

Date: xxxxxx

POPLA Verification Code:  XXXXXXXX

Vehicle Registration:  xxxxx

Being the registered keeper of this vehicle, I received a letter from Minster Baywatch Ltd dated 

12th June 2025 acting as a notice to the registered keeper. My appeal to the Operator was

submitted and acknowledged by Minster Baywatch Ltd on 8th July 2025 and ultimately rejected via a letter dated 20th November 2025.   

 

I contend that as the keeper, I am not liable for the alleged parking charge and wish to appeal against it on the following grounds: 

1.  No contract offered by Minster Baywatch - different company on the sign.

2.  No Evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of compliance with the BPA Code of Practice. 

3.  No proof the vehicle was parked

4.  Non-compliance with PoFA

5.  Inadequate signage

1.                   No contract with Minster Baywatch - different company on the sign.

The signs at the site paypoints are misleading. The Welcome (entrance) sign offers tariffs hence any contract is with Bransby Wilson not Minster Baywatch.  I see nothing at all about Minster Baywatch Ltd (company no. 07517434) on this signage and therefore the driver cannot possibly have entered into a contract with them.  The tariff board with payment machine, and Minster Baywatch signs, are nowhere near each other.  The company clearly making the parking offer is shown as a completely different legal entity, Bransby Wilson Ltd (company no. 04707572) and yet no PCN has been sent by them.   It is a clear invitation and offer made without caveat.  Even if other signs offer something different, the doctrine of contra proferentem would apply to ambiguous terms and the interpretation that most favours the consumer must prevail (Consumer Rights Act 2015).  There is no meeting of minds with Minster Baywatch.   The contract to pay is with Bransby Wilson Ltd and the payments go to Bransby Wilson Ltd (see sample receipt below).  So any breach is with them, not a secondary company.   Minster can't just step in and claim a contractual agreement with them.

Even if the operator replies with evidence that the companies are in some way 'associated', the fact remains that these are different Limited companies, different legal entities and one firm cannot offer a contract on a sign, only for a completely different company to post a PCN.  

Indeed, there is even a question of data abuse, since at no point does a driver agree to a contract with (or even know about) Minster Baywatch Ltd, and yet they have obtained the DVLA data. They cannot obtain this on behalf of Bransby Wilson Ltd, and nor can Bransby Wilson Ltd have got the data for Minster Baywatch Ltd because only the latter are BPA AOS members. This appears to be a case of data sharing abuse and a DVLA KADOE breach, as well as a breach of the BPA rules, whereby AOS members must not use their electronic DVLA link to obtain data for non-AOS members and they are forbidden from sharing or selling data to third parties (except debt collectors and solicitors). 

However, given that POPLA do not consider data/KADOE issues, I will concentrate on the clear contract law issue that will win this case - namely that it is not conspicuous or clear which company operates the site.  The welcome signage and receipt clearly indicate it to be Bransby Wilson Ltd. 

Therefore, I must bring to your attention the following POPLA assessment and decision,  dated 18th July, 2017. 

“Verification Code : 4111647007 Assessor Name : Esther Sargeant  Decision: Successful” 

“Assessor supporting rational for decision

Upon review of the evidence, I am not satisfied that the driver has been identified sufficiently.   In order to transfer liability from the driver, to the registered keeper of the vehicle, the strict provisions laid out in the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 must be adhered to. Upon review of the PCN, I am satisfied that the operator has complied with PoFA  2012. As such, the keeper is now liable for the charge.  

The terms and conditions of the site state: “All users must pay for their parking duration in full… By failing to comply with any of these conditions, you are contractually agreeing to pay the parking charge of £100”. The operator issued the PCN ...because the motorist did not pay the parking fee in full. The site operates Automatic Number Plate Recognition cameras. The cameras captured the appellant entering the site at 11:40, exiting at 13:23 on 20 May 2017; the period of stay was one hour and 42 minutes.  

The appellant states the notice does not state anything about a contract with Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions, though they are shown as the operator on signage.  

Section 18.3 of the British Parking Association Code of Practice states: “Signs must be conspicuous and legible, and written in intelligible language, so that they are easy to see, read and understand”.  

Though I acknowledge that the operator has provided evidence of a contract with the landowner, the majority of the signage shows Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions as the  managing agent of the car park.  

I consider that the evidence includes very few of the parking operator’s own signage. The wide-angle photograph of the car park does not appear to show any of the operator’s yellow signage. There is nothing necessarily wrong with one company managing the site and another enforcing upon it. However, to show that the operator in question has entered into the contract with the motorist, rather than Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions, the operator needs to evidence that its signage is sufficiently prominent and clear to the level that there could be no mistaking the circumstances, and that stated the difference between the companies.  

In this case, the entrance sign states: “managed by Minster Baywatch Ltd on behalf of Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions Ltd”. However, other signage states: “This car park is managed by Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions”.  

Though I acknowledge the operator’s yellow signage has its logos displayed and advises motorists: “By entering and remaining on this property, you have agreed to these conditions and contracted with Minster Baywatch to be legally bound by them”, this is in fine print on that cannot be determined from the wide-angle shot of the car park. The operator has not provided a site map.  

As such, I am unable to determine the spread and prevalence of its yellow signage throughout the site. Though I acknowledge in its case summary, the operator has confirmed who manages and who enforces the site, on all signage both parties have displayed that they manage the site.  

Upon review of the evidence, I do not consider that it is conspicuous or clear which company operates the site. As such, I do not consider it is clear which company the motorist entered into a contract with or which signage and terms were viewed. Accordingly, I must allow the appeal. I acknowledge that the appellant raised additional grounds of appeal. However, as I have already allowed the appeal, it is not necessary for me to consider these.” 

Figure 1: Sign from car park in the successful case above.     

Figure 2: Grosvenor Casino sign only with Bransby Wilson shown

It is therefore suggested that Figures 1 and 2 serve to reinforce the point made regarding non- compliance with the 2024 BPA Code of Practice Version 9 (as the signage element of this code still currently applies), specifically:  “Signs and surface markings must be designed, applied and maintained in such a way as to be visible, legible and unambiguous to drivers” 

2.                   No Evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice 

I believe that there is no contract between the driver and Minster Baywatch. I am using this platform to argue that the parking charge notice does not state anything about Bransby Wilson Parking Solutions, though it is only they that are badged on the tariff signage where any contract is offered and receipts clearly show payment made to them.  I therefore bring to your attention that it is neither obvious, nor clear which company operates this site. It is blatantly unclear which company the driver allegedly entered into a contract with, because of the confused signage and terms, as both entities have signage displayed. 

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or  any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the  landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only). 

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules.  A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement. 

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the Single Code of Practice) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement). 

Paragraph 14, Relationship with Landowner, in the The Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice outlines the requirements for written authorisation from the landowner to which I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

Where controlled land is being managed on behalf of a landowner(s), before a parking charge can be issued written confirmation must be obtained by the  parking operator from the landowner(s) covering:

a) the identity of the landowner(s)

b) a boundary map of the land to be managed;

c) such byelaws as may apply to the land relating to the management of parking;

 d) the permission granted to the parking operator by the landowner(s) and the

 duration of that permission

e) the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator,  including as appropriate the duration of free parking permitted, parking tariffs, and  specific permissions and exemptions, e.g. for staff, residents or those stopping for  short periods such as taxi and minicab drivers, delivery drivers and couriers;

f) the means by which parking charges will be issued;

g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents e.g. planning or advertising  consents relating to signs h) the obligations under which the parking operator is working, in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA;

 i) notification of the documentation that the parking operator may be required to supply on request to authorised bodies detailing the relationship with the  landowner; and

j) the parking operator’s approach to the handling of appeals against parking  charges.

 

3.            There is no proof that the vehicle was parked

The Notice to Keeper only shows images of a vehicle entering and leaving a car park.  There is no period of parking mentioned in any correspondence as required by POFA, S4, 9 (2) (a).  A photograph of a vehicle in motion along a road and passing in front of a camera cannot by definition be parked. It cannot be assumed that the vehicle actually parked or if it actually visited the site twice that day and drove out without the ANPR capturing the first leaving event or second entry event.  ANPR is known to be unreliable and has many well documented flaws.

4.                   Non-compliance with PoFA

It is a clear requirement that the Notice to Keeper (NtK) must be received by the Registered Keeper no more than 14 days after the parking event.  Although this notice is dated 12th June 2025, it was not received in the post until Saturday 28th June 2025.  I find it incredulous that it has taken 16 days for the NtK, purportedly prepared on the 12th June, take so long.  Additionally, the date on the NtK is only the date in which the letter was supposedly produced, it is not necessarily the date of posting.   I put Minster Baywatch to strict proof of the date my DVLA data was obtained, who obtained it and the date of posting the PCN.

Given that the NtK was not received until 23 days after the event, then it should be considered to have been served out of time, hence not compliant with PoFA.

5.                   Inadequate Signage

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. POFA 2012 defines 'adequate notice' as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Even in circumstances where POFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. Having considered the signage in place at this particular site against the requirements in the 2024 BPA Code of Practice Version 9 (as the signage element of this code still currently applies) and POFA 2012, I am of the view that the signage at the site is illegible, does not appear at all at the entrance and its immediate area, and vehicles can enter the site and park without seeing another signs  - is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist. 

Section 4.1 of the Single Code of Practice states there must be at least one sign containing the terms and conditions that can be viewed without the driver needing to leave the vehicle.  It is clear that vehicles can enter site, park and the driver leave site without seeing any signs particularly along the  wall by the entrance.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are unremarkable, and the signs at which any contract is formed are Bransby Wilson which make no clear mention of any parking terms or additional charges.  The wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered in very small font. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the Single Code of Practice, the signs offering the tariffs, hence the contract, do not clearly mention the parking charge which can only be found by hunting out other signs on site.  Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for other onerous terms

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read all the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.

(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

 

Coupon-mad

I'd remove point 3. No legs!

ezerscrooge

Point 3 removed.  Thank you ever so much - and at 3am!!  You deserve a gong

Do you think there's much chance of success, POPLA seems to be a law unto itself these days.  Some decisions seem plain bizarre

Coupon-mad

I usually assume POPLA appeals will lose but nobody cares! You won't ever have to pay.

ezerscrooge

Thanks CM.  And another late one foir oyu I see.

I was looking through the past POPLAs (mostly unsuccessful), then at the MB court cases (either discontinued or defeated).  I can't find the one where someone lost at court but I will keep looking.

Having another pop at Grosvenor before putting the POPLA.

Thank you so much for your help.  Will keep the board posted

ezerscrooge

Daughter has had an email from POPLA stating they were awaiting to assign her case to an assessor but that an outcome will still be in 6-8 weeks of the appeal being made. It states the next communication will be the decision.

There's no mention or communication on any operator evidence pack. Is this usually done by email or another method? She keeps checking her emails and spam box.

Coupon-mad

Has she not used the unique long password that the first POPLA email sent her, to 'track' the appeal and look whether there has been an evidence pack logged?

ezerscrooge

Yeh she did but has only just sent it to me. Seems MB submitted their evidence on 19th December so we are well out of time to comment. I would have expected POPLA to send an email saying the pack was in and available for review rather then expecting people to keep logging in on a daily basis. I have gone on to track the appeal to view the operator evidence but the site does not show any evidence despite it stating the operators pack has been received. There is a note stating 'please find attached operator case summary' but there is nothing. Nothing clickable other than 'withdraw appeal'.

Perhaps links to it have been withdrawn due to it now being 'assessment in progress'. I've sent a request to POPLA on why there's no way it cannot be accessed and why they don't email people when it has been received.

They certainly don't make it easy at all. Besides, looking at other posters here who have submitted comments, they seem to have no effect at all on the outcome, even in cases where the operator has outright lied.

I'm expecting an 'unsuccessful' as POPLA is not even a shade on the old London Councils POPLA from the distant past (even they had their faults). They seem to have morphed into the IPC style where the operator can do no wrong.

Is it little wonder these firms are in continuous growth mode - an unfettered licence to print money. Sadly, there's no political will to sort them out.

Will let the forum know of the outcome.

Many thanks for your input so far. Much appreciated.

Coupon-mad

Seems MB submitted their evidence on 19th December so we are well out of time to comment. I would have expected POPLA to send an email saying the pack was in and available for review 

Errr… they did. Always do.

She just failed to tell you.

Same as my friends did the other week. Sigh… what are people thinking, not to ask the person helping them?!

Anyway I sussed they'd failed to update me and we got the POPLA Appeal rewound to 'comments stage' by sending POPLA an urgent email to get an extension:

She must email POPLA with the 10 number POPLA Code in the subject line (not the unique password!) and say she wasn't able to view or open the operator's evidence.

She just puts what I said above about not being able to view the file, ask for the evidence pack to be emailed now and a further seven days allowed to fairly allow comments on it.

TELL HER TO SEND YOU THE REPLY THIS TIME! They'll email the evidence over.