CCJ & High Court Rit

sh4rpy03

Here is the form that I have received 

[Image removed by Forum Team]

Coupon-mad

That image includes too much info.

Here's a redacted version:



Would it be true to say you were working away the final week of November and the first week of December?

... and is it true you DID NOT see that claim because your wife thought she could handle it and tried sending an 'appeal' in her name?

Surely you didn't hand it to her even though it's addressed to you and you were in the midst of a mortgage application? Eek...

sh4rpy03

That all sounds true to me i was on shift from 27th november to 12th of december 

Coupon-mad

Right so that goes into your N244.  I explained exactly what documents to put together in my earlier post.

You can find the address of Hull county court and get down there. It ISN'T the council.

kryten3000

Here let me Google that for you:

https://www.find-court-tribunal.service.gov.uk/courts/kingston-upon-hull-combined-court-centre

sh4rpy03

17/03/2025  Skeleton Defence

1.  I am the Defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge and honest belief. 

 

2.        It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability'. I deny that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

 

Facts and Sequence of events

3.      Date and Time of the Incident: It is admitted that on the material dates, I was the registered keeper of the vehicle registration: YX68 GJK It is known that I was not the driver of the vehicle on the dates of the claimed PCNs.

 

4. The Defendant tried to purchase a ticket from the machine and paid using Apple pay on their mobile phone. The phone indicated payment had been made and the payment notification was displayed on the defendants mobile phone screen, however the ticket machine did not dispense a ticket. The defendant called the number of the office to explain the situation, they where advised that the ticket machine was not dispensing tickets but the payment had been made. As the defendant had input their car registration and made payment they assumed that the machine will have registered the ticket. The defendant has had no communication from the claimant regarding this until they received the letter of enforcement attached.

5.      Inadequate Signage: I have observed a lack of clear and visible signage regarding parking regulations. The sign that was present is placed in an obscure location, making it difficult to notice, far from a typical line of sight. Additionally, the signage featured very small text, making the terms and conditions impossible to read from a reasonable distance. The poor placement and legibility of these signs made it extremely difficult for anybody to be aware of or comply with the parking rules.

6.      Entrance sign: A sign near the entrance to car park was observed, but instead of offering clear guidance, it added to the confusion. The wording on the sign was ambiguous and failed to provide a distinct indication of the specific location it referenced. This lack of clarity created uncertainty as to whether the sign applied to the smaller alternative car park or the adjacent larger car park. The vagueness of the sign could reasonably lead to confusion regarding the applicable parking restrictions.

              

Hidden Terms

7.  The £100 penalty clause is positively buried in small print, as seen on the signs in evidence. The purported added (false) 'costs' are even more hidden and are also unspecified as a sum. Their (unlawful, due to the CRA Schedule 2 grey list of unfair terms) suggestion is that they can hide a vague sentence within a wordy sign, in the smallest possible print, then add whatever their trade body lets them, And the driver has no idea about any risk nor even how much they might layer on top. Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a charge, include:

 

a.      Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

b.       Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2

are both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

c.      Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] UKCA, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

 

 Before making each request for Data, the Customer shall gather evidence to demonstrate that it has Reasonable Cause to request that Data. This evidence may include scans, images, photographs, correspondence and any other evidence that the Customer may rely on to show its compliance with the requirements of this Contract and of the relevant Accredited Trade Association’s Code of Practice.

 

The Claim should be struck out

8.    Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4(1)(b) and (2): The Claimant seeks interest under section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 but does not comply with CPR 16.4(1)(b) and (2), which require the details of the interest sought. While the PoC state the interest rate (8% per annum) and daily rate (£0.02), they do not indicate the date from which interest is claimed, the date to which it is calculated, or the total amount of interest claimed up to that date.

 

9.    Furthermore, these additional costs appear to be arbitrary and penal in nature. Under established law principles, such as ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 (The Beavis Case), parking charges must either be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or commercially justified. In this case, the additional £70 is neither justified nor explained.

 

10.    The claimant has provided no breakdown or explanation of how this amount was calculated or why it is appropriate. It can only be viewed as a punitive charge designed to penalise the Defendant, which is contrary to established legal principles that prohibit excessive and unfair contractual penalties.

 

11.    The Claimant’s demand for additional costs of £70 per PCN is entirely baseless. It is not supported by any clear contractual term, it violates the CRA's requirements for fairness and transparency, and it constitutes an unlawful penalty charge. The court should strike out this portion of the claim as unenforceable.

 

 

The Beavis case is against this claim

12. The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, particularly the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs -  set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

13. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'.

 

14. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. There is one main issue that render this parking charge to be purely penal (i.e. no legitimate interest saves it) and thus, it is unenforceable:

 

Hearsay evidence

15.  The Claimant’s 'witness' is a paralegal employed by the Claimant’s solicitors and has no direct knowledge of the actual events that form the basis of the claim. Any evidence provided by this individual is second-hand, supposedly relying entirely on information supplied by the Claimant, and thus cannot carry the same weight as testimony from someone who witnessed or was directly involved in the incident. 

 

16.  While the Civil Evidence Act 1995 allows hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, it is required to be given less weight, especially when it comes from someone with no firsthand knowledge. Furthermore, under CPR 32.2, the court has the discretion to exclude hearsay evidence when it is of limited probative value. In this case, the witness provides only second-hand information from the claimant and cannot be considered reliable or probative.

 

 

Conclusion

 

17. In conclusion, the claimant has failed to provide clear evidence that a contract was formed, nor has it shown that the parking charge notices were validly issued. The lack of adequate signage and the unlawful nature of the additional charges further invalidate the claimant’s claim. The claimant’s attempt to impose liability for these inflated charges is unsupported by both statutory law and leading case precedents. I ask the court to dismiss the claim and award appropriate costs for the time and effort expended in defending against these unjust claims.

  

18. There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that 'debt recovery' costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.

 

19. With the DLUHC's impending ban on the false 'costs' there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. I believe that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 

20. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Costs Assessment

21. Given the significant time and effort required to Defend against this unjust claim, I respectfully request that the court consider awarding costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g). I have spent considerable time researching, preparing and drafting the Defence,  preparing and drafting this witness statement and attending the hearing. My estimate time incurred is as follows at band 2 rate of £139/hour for summary assessment of court costs:

a.      Research and preparation of defence: 3 hours = £100

 Total costs £300

I request that the court considers the above time incurred at the reasonable rate in its Judgment, given the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour in pursuing this claim plus interest at 8% or some other such rate as deemed appropriate by the Court pursuant to section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984.

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

sh4rpy03

how does this look guys

Bazarius

Para 3 and 4 appears to contradict each other .  One says was not the driver but other says the defendant paid …..  perhaps clarify the defendant’s position  whether was a passenger etc 

but this is a witness statement set aside the writ?  This is more like a Defence than a witness statement . 

No facts are given why it was not defended in the first instance - i.e didn’t receive it because it was not properly served .  Or some other reasons  .   Do not send until the experts says otherwise. 

 

1505grandad

"that will do BUT remove the costs assessment as that does not go in a defence"

So is the SoT wrong?:-

"Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true"

sh4rpy03

Sorry guys and again really appreciate the help in this matter but does this seem better 

 

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

 

INTRODUCTION

1.    I am [Removed by Forum Team], and I am the Defendant in this matter.

 

2.    This is my supporting statement to my application dated 18th march 2025 requesting the court to:

a.    Set aside the default judgment dated 17th January 2025 as it was not properly served at my current address.

b.    Order for the original claim to be dismissed.

c.     Order for the Claimant to pay the Defendant £275 as reimbursement for the set aside fee.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

3.    I was the registered keeper of the vehicle, [Removed by Forum Team] at the time of the alleged event.

 

4.    I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 17th January 2025. I am aware that the DCB Legal LTD and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice from 4th January 2019

 

5.    The claim form was not served to me at my current address, and I was therefore unaware of the default County Court Judgment against me until I received a letter from Direct Collections Bailiffs Ltd dated 11th March 2025 to my current address. This was the first correspondence I had received on the matter.

 

 6.    Discovering this default judgment has had a significant impact on my life. I work offshore for Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy Ltd and required to drive hire cars and have credit cards for travel and I will have to report this to my employer. I am in the midst of purchasing a house and have had to declare this judgment to my mortgage lender.

 

7.    In addition to the above, it should be highlighted that the integrity and law-abiding intention of the Defendant should be taken into consideration on the basis of the below.

 

 

 

SEQUENCE OF RECENT EVENTS

8.  I first discovered there was a default County Court Judgment against me when I received a letter hand delivered from Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd on 12th March 2025. The letter is dated 11th March 2025

 

9.  That same day on 12th March 2025, I called Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd twice to discuss the matter which I was told they could not send me any documents regarding the subject due to them not been allowed to send outbound emails. And I was told to contact the officer on the Letter

 

10. On 13th March 2025 I started to seek advice on the matter via the internet and contacting solicitors

 

11.14th March 2025 I tried to contact the office on the letter at the times of 14:39, and 15:33 to which I had no response and left a voicemail message on both occasions. I purchased searches of the Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines for England and Wales to identify the CCJ to see if it was actually in place

 

12.  On 17th March 2025,The National Debt Helpline and was given some good advice by the Senso the lady who help me acting on this, I contacted the Civil National Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgment. I received an email containing the Particulars of the Claim.

 

13.  On 18th March 2025 I submit my application in order to set-aside this judgment and fairly present my case. I acted promptly to resolve this matter once it came to my attention.

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 13.2

14.  I believe the Claimant has behaved unreasonably in pursuing a claim against me without ensuring they held my correct contact details at the time of the claim. I was therefore denied the opportunity to defend the claim. 

 

15.  On that basis, I believe the Claimant has not adhered to Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 6.9 (3) as they failed to show due diligence in using an address at which the Defendant no longer resides. The Claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence despite having over 32 months to establish an address. This has led to the claim being incorrectly served to an old address and an irregular judgment.

 

16.  At no time did the Claimant receive any response from me and therefore the Claimant had reason to believe that it is an address at which I no longer reside. It was improper for the Claimant to rely upon it for service.

 

17.  Under CPR 13.2 the court must set aside a judgment entered under Part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered.  Given that CPR 6.9 (3) was not met, CPR 13.2 applies and the judgment should be set aside.

 

18.  The Claimant is an approved operator of the British Parking Association (BPA). The BPA has anticipated that issues will arise where operators do not take reasonable steps to ascertain correct addresses.

 

19.  Clause 24.1c of the BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice (Version 8 – January 2020) states “Before serving a Letter Before Claim and prior to the issue of proceedings, Operators must, if no responses have been received to the NTD/NTK/reminder letters, take reasonable endeavours to ensure that the contact details for the person you are writing to are correct.”

 

20.  The Claimant failed to take reasonable endeavours to ascertain my correct current address prior to issuing proceedings and is therefore in breach of the Code of Practice. 

 

21.  The system used by the Claimant is called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event) and provides a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updated a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA failed to note a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.

 

22.  I, the Defendant, was 'there to be found' for the sake of a 29 pence bulk Experian trace or similar very inexpensive and immediate credit reference agency address check. I would then have been notified of this judgment and could have taken action to prevent it.

 

23.  Such an address check has evidently been undertaken by Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd whom the Claimant has now instructed to collect the default judgment.

 

24.  According to publicly available information my circumstances are far from being unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses results in an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 13.3

25.  In the alternative, I submit that CPR 13.3 applies and there are very good reasons to set aside this claim. I have good prospects of defending a claim, if served with one, however I have seen no evidence, basis, nor detailed particulars of claim, and the Claimant should be required to file afresh if they believe they have a cause of action.

 

26.  If filed afresh I would anticipate a defence including submissions on:

 

a.    The Claimant failed to meet the Notice to Keeper obligations of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012

b.    Lack of adequate notice of the parking charge on clear signage, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court in ParkingEye Limited v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67

c.     Putting Claimant to strict proof on evidence of landowner authority or a legal contract, as required by the BPA Code of Practice

 

NO SERVICE WITHIN 4 MONTHS OF ISSUE

27.  Given that more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings and service of the claim was defective (as it was never received by myself) I submit that this particular claim is dead and the period for service cannot be extended by this application process. I have no details of this claim beyond the very brief particulars, therefore, if the Claimant believes there is a cause of action then the correct procedure would be to file a claim afresh and I given the chance to appeal, after furnishing me with the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt claims.

 

28.  There are several authorities for this, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which is a reminder of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6(3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”

 

29.  In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2000] EWCA Civ B526 the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

 

INADEQUATE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

30.  In the alternative I submit that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment relating to similar particulars of claim and the same Claimant, which supports striking out the claim. The Claimant has made little attempt to comply with the Practice Direction instead utilising unspecific, auto-fill wording for their particulars of claim.

 

31.  In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) this same Claimant was found to have failed to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5 through inadequate particulars of claim. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

[Chan judgment inserted]

 

COSTS

1.    Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the default judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside.

 

2.    I ask the Court:

 

a.    to order the reimbursement of the fee of £275 from the Claimant should this application successfully see the claim struck out, or in the alternative

 

b.    if the claim is not struck out, to Order that the Claimant serve full particulars and evidence of the term, photographs of the signage and to specify the alleged breach and basis for alleged liability, with the application and hearing attendance costs being reserved, and that in the event of discontinuance after the judgment is set aside, the Claimant must reimburse (within 7 days of the date of discontinuance) the Defendant's costs as they stand after the first hearing 

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Signed __________________

Date 18th March 2025

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DRAFT ORDER

CLAIM No: [Removed by Forum Team]

BETWEEN:

Euro Car Parks Limited (Claimant)

-- and --

[Removed by Forum Team] (Defendant)

  

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

 

1. The default judgment dated 17th January 2025 be set aside.

 

2. The claim is hereby struck out due to the claim form having not been served within 4 months of issue.

OR

The claim is hereby struck out due to the Claimant's failure to particularise the contractual term relied upon or the alleged breach, this being the same Claimant and inadequate Particulars of Claim as seen in Civil Enforcement v Chan (a persuasive recent appeal relating to a mirror image CCJ set aside case)

 

3. The Claimant do pay the Defendant’s costs of this application of £275 on an indemnity basis