Recent CCJ - Advice Needed

Coupon-mad

You can try that, and in that case do NOT attach your unavailable dates (yet) and instead change the WS to ask at the top for the CCJ to be set aside by the CNBC without a hearing.

Then ring up and pay £119 and insist you want this done without a hearing as you live in Scotland and the C filed an improper claim in the English courts.

cda17

WS without a hearing:

List of Exhibits and WS below.

EXHIBIT XX-01 – Letter from DCBL to my Aberdeen Address

EXHIBIT XX-02 – Tenancy Agreement, utility bill, driver’s licence.

EXHIBIT XX-03 – CheckMyFile Credit Check Searches

EXHIBIT XX-04 – Particulars of Claim

EXHIBIT XX-05 – Letter sent to Claimant and DCBL

EXHIBIT XX-06 – SAR Response

EXHIBIT XX-07 – VCSL v CARR (Ref. CA-2024-001179)

EXHIBIT XX-08 – N244 Form

 

WITNESS STATEMENT OF MY NAME

IN THE COUNTY COURT Claim No: ##### Judgment Date: 03 December 2024

 

I, MY NAME, of CURRENT ABERDEEN ADDRESS, am the Defendant in this matter and make the following statement in support of my application dated 31 March 2025 to:

a. Set aside the default judgment dated 03 December 2024 (Claim No: ######) on the basis it was not properly served at my current address.

b. Strike out the original claim which has expired unserved and because my actual address is outside of jurisdiction. The Claimants knew or should have known (look how easily they found me after the CCJ) that I live in Aberdeen, outside of the jurisdiction but served the claim to an older 2023 English address.

c. Order reimbursement of the set-aside fee of £119 from the Claimant. These costs being awarded on the indemnity basis, the claim having never been allocated to any track and due to the wholly unreasonable conduct in this litigation.

1. I was the registered keeper of the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident.
   
   
2. I understand that the Claimant obtained a default judgment against me on 03 December 2024. I believe the claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice dated 25 August 2023.
   
   
3. The claim form was not served at my current address, and I was unaware of the County Court Judgment until I received a letter from Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd (DCBL) dated 20 January 2025, which arrived on 25 January 2025. (See EXHIBIT XX-01)
   
   
4. The address on the claim is MANCHESTER ADDRESS. I moved from this address on 28 September 2023 to FRANCE ADDRESS, and then to ABERDEEN ADDRESS 1 on 28 June 2024. I moved to my current address on 14 October 2024. Evidence of these moves is provided, including tenancy agreement, utility bills, and my driving licence. (See EXHIBIT XX-02)
   
   
5. I discovered the judgment only upon receipt of the DCBL letter on 25 January 2025, dated 20 January 2025. I had no knowledge of this claim prior to that letter.
   
   
6. At the time the claim was issued and served, I was no longer residing in England or Wales. I had moved to Scotland, with my residence at ABERDEEN ADDRESS 1 from 28 June 2024, and subsequently to my current address at CURRENT ABERDEEN ADDRESS. These addresses are clearly outside the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
   
   
7. Under CPR 6.36 and Practice Direction 6B, a Claimant must obtain permission from the court to serve proceedings outside of the jurisdiction. No such permission was sought or granted in this case. The Claimant attempted to proceed without following these necessary steps, further invalidating the service of the claim and strengthening the grounds for setting aside the default judgment under CPR 13.2.
   
   
8. In a state of panic, I attempted to contact the Civil National Business Centre on 25 January 2025, but it was the weekend, and I could not get through. I then checked TrustOnline and Checkmyfile.com to verify the judgment and confirm when my more recent addresses were listed. (See EXHIBIT XX-03).
   
   
9. On 27 January 2025, I contacted the Civil National Business Centre again and received an email with the Particulars of Claim. (See EXHIBIT XX-04). I also contacted Spring Parking Ltd and DCBL via letter and email to inform them the claim had been sent to an old address, contrary to CPR 6.9, and invited them to consent to setting aside the judgment. (See EXHIBIT XX-05).
   
   
10. On 17 February 2025, An acknowledgement was received via email confirming receipt of my letter and an acknowledgement the correspondence been sent to an old address; they requested evidence of my new address(s) to review the matter further.
    
    
11. On 26 February 2025, DCBL emailed me proposing me to pay a higher fee than the CCJ (£408.56) in return for the submission of a joint application Consent Order. I replied declining this offer and inviting them again to jointly apply to set aside the judgment with less fees, in which they declined one month later, on 26 March 2025.
    
    
12. The Claimant has behaved unreasonably by failing to ensure the claim was served at my correct address. They had access to tools to find my address, as demonstrated by the fact that they eventually located me immediately upon judgment. In fact, my Credit Check at Exhibit XX-03 shows one 'soft trace' carried out to look for my address on the very day of the CCJ. It shows of course that I've lived in Aberdeen during most of 2024, but this address check was either not done, or was conveniently ignored, before litigation. Yet in DCB Legal's response (Exhibit XX-06 – SAR Response) they stated that they did carry out a soft trace. The court may draw its own conclusions.
    
    
13. Their failure to take reasonable steps before litigation is a breach of CPR 6.9 and the BPA Code of Practice.
    
    
14. Due to their failure to serve the claim correctly, I was denied the opportunity to defend the claim. Pursuant to CPR 13.2, the judgment must be set aside. I have acted promptly upon finding out about it, but the claim is a nullity because it was never served as I live in Aberdeen which my Credit Check showed all along was my 'last known address'.
    
    
15. BPA Code of Practice Clause 24.1C requires operators to take reasonable steps to ensure contact details are correct before issuing proceedings. The Claimant failed in this duty.
    
    
16. This failure places a burden on the justice system and on individuals who, like myself, were unaware of the proceedings until post-judgment enforcement.
    
    
17. I dispute the inflated claim amount, and believe it is excessive and unjustified.
    
    
18. I wish to draw the court’s attention to the official recording from the Court of Appeal of this decision for a parking CCJ set aside case where the Defendant was served at an old address despite the Claimant later being able to locate the current one, mirroring my circumstances (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvK6XwAGHcs). Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179) heard on 4 March 2025 the following has been noted (EXHIBIT XX-07 – VCSL v CARR (Ref. CA-2024-001179):
    
    

18.1. Avoiding Injustice: "However, the purpose of the power under CPR 13.3 is to avoid injustice, and although a lack of “promptness” in applying to set aside is a mandatory consideration, the rule makes it clear that the overriding objective is paramount. It is far from clear that the Circuit Judge approached the matter from that perspective. I find it telling that there is no mention in her of the overriding objective nor of what the justice of the case required."

19. Assessing a Judgment in Default (Denton): "Even in a case of relief from sanctions where the delay is lengthy and there is no excuse for it, the court is required to consider all the circumstances of the case, in order to deal justly with the matter: Denton v White. This court has confirmed that the approach in Denton applies in the context of setting aside a judgment in default: FXF v English Karate Federation [2023] EWCA Civ 891"

20. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that:

20.1 If a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):

20.2. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).

20.3. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been affected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here, one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.

20.4. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”

21. Considering all the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £119 from the claimant should this request be successful.

22. In Orton v Barclays Bank UK PLC Trading as Barclay Card [2025] EWCC 12 (27 March 2025) https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/Misc/2025/CC12.html - HHJ Robinson BEM had an appeal brought before him in the County Court at Middlesbrough to deal with Unreasonable behaviour per CPR 27.14(2)(g). HHJ Robinson dismissed the appeal, upholding the District Judge’s decision, confirming that CPR 27.14(2)(g) allows a costs order where a party has behaved unreasonably. The Appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded. The Court also gave Obiter observations suggesting a potential 4-stage framework to guide future assessments of unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g):

- Proof – Is the alleged conduct proven?
- Seriousness – Is the conduct serious/significant enough to require explanation?
- Explanation – Is there a good reason for the conduct?
- Reasonableness – Do any other reasonable explanations emerge when considering the whole case?

22.1. The Claimant’s conduct meets these stages because they failed to check my address, persisted post-judgment despite being informed, and offered unreasonable settlement terms.

23. On 31 March 2025, I submitted my case to set-aside this judgment myself and fairly present my case (EXHIBIT XX-08 – N244 Form)

 

Statement of Truth: I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: ________________________ Date: ________________________

 

If this is good, i'll submit tomorrow morning.

Coupon-mad

Yes I think so. Insist on paying £129 (not £313 which is for a case with a hearing).

cda17

CNBC are saying i still have to pay £303 due to wanting it set-aside.

Also, it requires a hearing regardless because of this apparently. I have put "At a remote hearing" on my N244 form.

Cost increases are on the 7th.

Application submitted. Just need to wait 8-9 months now.

Thank you for all the help.

Coupon-mad

cda17 said:

CNBC are saying i still have to pay £303 due to wanting it set-aside.

Also, it requires a hearing regardless because of this apparently. I have put "At a remote hearing" on my N244 form.

Cost increases are on the 7th.

Application submitted. Just need to wait 8-9 months now.

Thank you for all the help.

I did wonder if they'd refuse. It was worth a try, given you are in Scotland but at least it is in and paid for. Game on.

ChirpyChicken

@Coupon-mad seen this a few times. Got a few set aside cases for someone living in Glasgow and the first one has been allocated to the claimants local court (st helens- gladstones) 

So i IMHO won't be a remote hearing (but lucky if it is) so don't be surprised if you have to go to at Helens as that's now the claimants local court

As its most likely to be St Helens, current case allocated first week of March to St Helens, hearing last week of May

ChirpyChicken

In addition if you take the train your looking at around £45 each way on a split far as direct trains from Edinburgh on avanti

LDast

I have just chatted to someone at the CNBC about this problem and I have also raised a complaint. However, as I am not a defendant and don't have any claim numbers, it is down to the individuals concerned to send their complaint to

Here is the transcript of my 'chat' and the issue raised:

Chat Log

Below is a complete log of the chat session.

---

Bot

Please select from the services below. Civil National Business Centre (CNBC) or Traffic Enforcement Centre (TEC) 

CNBC

Bot

Thank you. You are being connected to the Civil National Business Centre webchat team.

You are now chatting with Shaun.

Agent

Good afternoon  can you confirm your name and address please for security

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Agent

ok thanks , how can we help today?

I provide advice to defendants in claims issued by private parking companies through DCB Legal. In the last 10 days, I have had 3 separate cases where the defendants claim has been allocated to St Helens county court when they specifically requested their local county court which is hundreds of miles away.

Under CPR 26.2A(2) and Practice Direction 26, paragraph 7.1, a defended claim against an individual must be transferred to the defendant’s local hearing centre. This misallocation represents a breach of the Civil Procedure Rules and should never have occurred, particularly when the correct hearing centre was explicitly stated on the Directions Questionnaire. This is not an isolated incident. It is part of an emerging pattern where defended claims involving DCB Legal Ltd are improperly allocated to St Helens County Court — a court local to DCB Legal — rather than the defendant’s local hearing centre. There are only two possible explanations for this serious failure: Either CNBC administrative staff are unaware of the basic requirements of CPR 26.2A(2); or There is improper bias, favouritism, or even undue influence being exercised by or on behalf of DCB Legal Ltd to achieve allocations favourable to them. Either scenario is wholly unacceptable and risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the court system.

Each time I have suggested to the defendant that they call the CNBC, they have been fobbed off and told to submit an N244 application which is unfair as the cost is prohibitive when compared to the claim amount and it is an administrative failure by the CNBC, not the defendant.

The CNBC is perfectly able to fix the issue under their administrative powers.

However, as this is obviously not an isolated incident, it points to a problem within the CNCB administration.

Agent

can you give me case numbers?

I cannot just now but I can get them later

I do know that two of the cases were supposed to go to Kingston on Thames but have been allocated to St Helens

I would like a contact email address for the CNCB manager in order to escalate this matter rather than go through the abysmally slow process of filling in the online HMCTS complaint form.

What raises suspicion, is that all these cases have been issued through the bulk litigator DCB Legal whose offices are local to St Helens.

Agent

send email to applications.cnbc@justice.gov.uk and mark email complaint  with its case number

cda17

I still haven't heard anything back. Not even an acknowledgement of my application submission to them via email.

Should i be worried?

Coupon-mad

Yes. Chase it up!