**URGENT- CCJ** Need advice if I have posibilities to set aside by N244 and after win the case

Lia_F

Hi All,

@Coupon-mad
@Le_Kirk
@MLalami50

I only became aware of this CCJ this month after being rejected for renting a flat. The judgment was issued in 2023, but the incident occurred in 2019. I sold the car in 2020 and moved abroad, returning in 2021 to other address. I never received the court form.

The location was a private development with no signage at the street entrance or the bay where I parked. I believed I was parking on a council street and left the permit accordingly.

I contacted the claimant’s solicitors, who said they would issue a consent order if I paid first. However, I’m unsure if they will follow through once I pay, and they want me to accept liability. I responded that I could only pay the court fee and do not accept liability. I’m uncertain if I can negotiate with them again.

A solicitor advised me that a judge might rule the signs were within my field of vision.

I have been drafting a witness statement to proceed with an N244 application. I’m unsure whether to try negotiating with the solicitors again or to proceed with the N244. I would appreciate your advice.

Many thanks,
Lia

Coupon-mad

I contacted the claimant’s solicitors, who said they would issue a consent order if I paid first. However, I’m unsure if they will follow through once I pay, and they want me to accept liability. I responded that I could only pay the court fee and do not accept liability.

You were right to say that.  Move on; no more negotiation.  Application in next week.

But do not use a solicitor for this. We'll help.

Yes you are likely to get the CCJ set aside AND the £303 fee paid back to you because Gladstones used an old address AND you are likely to either see the claim struck out at your hearing, or win at a second 'PCN hearing'.

Also, Gladstones inflated the Claim by adding 10.25% interest which exceeds the top ceiling.  Not allowed.

Use the CCJ set aside case by @Zbubuman as your base but add in a paragraph about the Gladstones 10.25% interest abuse (search the forum).

And use the excerpts from VCS v Carr Court of Appeal (again search the forum this weekend).

Which parking firm?

Lia_F

@Coupon-madThank you very much for your advice, your offer of help, and your prompt response. I will look up the case you mentioned and use the excerpts you suggested. I’m quite new to this forum and usually have trouble finding this information.

The parking firm is: Parking Control Management (Uk) Ltd.

In January 2023, I received a chase letter at my current address with the message below. I did not respond to it.

QUOTE
Please note that in the event of you failing to confirm that the trace address is now your current residential address, we will have no alternative, should proceedings be issued, than to arrange for them to be served at the original address supplied to us by our client.
UNQUOTE

Could this negatively impact my case?

Kind regards,

@Lia_F

Coupon-mad

Nope because you won't mention it.  

Lia_F

@Coupon-mad, thanks for your response. I found the @Zbubuman CCJ set aside case—many thanks!

I don’t see how VCS vs Carr case relates to my situation. I didn’t receive multiple PCNs for predatory ticketing. I didn’t live at that council; I only had a council permit that a relative requested for me. It wasn’t my designated parking space, and I didn’t have the right to park there.

Are you referring to this: “Standing back and looking at the bigger picture, if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense”?

Coupon-mad

I don’t see how VCS vs Carr case relates to my situation.

Eh?

VCS v Carr excerpts should be used in EVERY CCJ SET ASIDE case where an old address was used!  Obviously it's relevant!

Search the forum for it.

Lia_F

Thanks a lot, @Coupon-mad. That really clears things up for me.

Lia_F

@Coupon-mad @icy_fox could you please help me to find VCS vs Carr transcript to present it as Exhibit?
I found in the below that is unreported. I have not found it on the internet.
Thanks for your help. Many thanks! 
https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6553156/vcs-dcbl-own-space-2-claims-1-ccj/p2

Lia_F

@Coupon-madBelow is my witness statement. It is almost identical to @Zbubuman’s

Case number NUMBER

WITNESS STATEMENT 

I, NAME, residing at ADDRESS, will say as follows:

1. I am the Defendant in this matter, and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on DATE, in default due to a defective service of Claim.  I am defending this claim as the registered keeper, not the driver.

2. I only became aware of the Default County Court Judgment after a prospective landlord refunded my holding deposit on XX/10/24, stating that following reference checks, they were no longer comfortable proceeding with my application. On XX/10/24, I discovered this claim after speaking with the real estate agent Open Rent, who informed me that adverse credit was detected on my credit score, despite the credit agencies stating that I had never missed a payment. They advised me to contact Equifax, who confirmed a CCJ against me on XX/10/24.

3.The Claimant served the claim to an old address. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address.

4.The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the PCN on DATE and the CCJ on DATE.

5. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above.

6. Whilst I am unsure which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed. 

7. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed, I wish to have the opportunity to defend it properly as per CPR 13.3.

8. I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order.

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM

9. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on DATE. I am aware that the Claimant is PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.

10. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter, other than the brief case details emailed to me on XX/10/2024 from the courts, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as the electoral register, HMRC, etc. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant, and thus should have considered they had obtained incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 23 - 30).

12. The claim form was not served at my current address, so I was unaware of the Default Judgment until I received notice of the failed tenant reference check on XX/10/2024, followed by confirmation from Equifax on XX/10/2024.This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).  (SEE EXHIBIT XX-00)

13. The address on the claim is: ADDRESS. I have moved several times since the date of the alleged parking event and the subsequent claim issued against me. Below are my address changes during this period.

•             June 2020, I moved to ABROAD due to the COVID-19 pandemic – I provide flight checking confirmation, boarding pass and email giving notice to the landlord.  SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

•             September 2021, moved in to address: ADDRESS – I provide electoral roll updated for this address in September 2021 SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

•             August 2022, moved to current address: ADDRESS- I provide my tenancy agreement. SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

14. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country. 

THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED 

15. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states; operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings.

CLAIMANT’S BREACH OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

16. I believe the Claimant has breach the CPR. They had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which I no longer resided. In an email sent by Gladstone Solicitors on XX/10/24, after contacting the claimant on XX/10/24, they stated: “We remind you it is the responsibility of the Registered Keeper to ensure the data held by the DVLA is accurate and up to date. Given the last V5C was last issued to the vehicle in question on the XX November 2021, it is clear you failed to update the DVLA when vacating ADDRESS”, However, I sold the car on XX/06/2020 before leaving the country due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-00) EMAIL

DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE 

17. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not and notify of appeal rights. 

18. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out. 

19. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept'). 

20. The vehicle was sold on XX/06/21 (SEE EXHIBIT XX-00)

Lia_F

21. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

22. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note: 

23. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said: 

24. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments." 

25. The same sentiment was echoed by: 

26. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014) 

27. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) 

28. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, i would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)  

 29. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe 

30. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all." 

THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED

I hereby challenge the jurisdiction of the court to hear it now (effectively that would mean dispensing with service). there are no exceptional circumstances to support the very limited court discretion to retrospectively validate defective service by resurrecting an expired and unserved (and hopeless) claim.

31. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved.   The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.

32. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5). 

33. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved.

34. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.

35. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address.

36. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings DATE and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served). 

37. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred.  There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15.  Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.

38. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:

39. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

40. In my case, no.  An old DVLA address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service.  Indeed the DVLA do not sell 'keeper data' with any warranty that it can be used or relied upon for service of court papers to a motorist; it is merely a snapshot in time of where a vehicle was once registered.

41. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.

42. It seems that Gladstones paid lip service to this rule; they must have traced my current address in 2023 because unexpectedly, I received a Letter Before Claim (LBC).  Why then did they revert to the oldest address for the claim?  A reasonable interpretation could be that they wanted to obtain default CCJs to pass on to their newly created bailiff arm.

43. Whatever the reason, it was vexatious, wholly unreasonable and an abuse of process to trace a newer address, write to it once, then - when they received no reply from me - revert to what they knew was an out-of-date address (where the Claimants had also not heard from me).  Having taken steps to trace it, the newer address used for the LBC had to be used for the claims. But it was not.

44. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

45. In my case, no.  The LBC sent to the correct address out of the blue in 2023 bore all the hallmarks of a scam and offered no information, no photos and no copy of the alleged contract (sign). I heard nothing more and knew nothing about the claim disingenuously sent to a known to be older address. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-00)  LBC from Gladstones

46. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in XX/10/24 – SEE EXHIBIT XX-00  CNBC email with POC) and I knew nothing from PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD about any supposedly outstanding parking charges.  I thought all the incorrectly issued PCN had been cancelled. RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT was a development under construction at that moment. The exact location of the vehicle including street name, number, and postal code, was not specified. The car was left at AVENUE, there was no sign at the intersection of AVENUE and AVENUE warning that continuing onto AVENUE would mean trespassing on private land. The Claimant has failed to establish a legally enforceable contract with me or the driver of the vehicle due to insufficient signage, so any claims would fall at the first hurdle.  PLEASE READ THIS PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY, AS I AM UNSURE IF IT CONTRADICTS THE STATEMENT’S APPROACH (SEE EXHIBIT XX-00 Picture google in the past / picture nowadays taken by myself) Paragraph 64 @Zbubuman 

Lia_F

47. What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

48. I know nothing about this charge from years ago and do not understand why this PCN was not cancelled too, I appealed to PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD.   I do not have the PCN. This is far too late and unfair to resurrect.

49. The decision in Good Law Project v (1) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and (2) Pharmaceuticals Direct Limited [2021] EWHC 1782 (TCC) emphasised the importance of serving a claim form correctly on time. In that case sending the claim form to the wrong email address (the claim form was sent to the solicitors, not the designated email address) did not constitute valid service.

50. In Pitalia & Anor v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657 the Court of Appeal held that a claimant could not resist its claim being struck out as a result of its failure to serve the claim form within the four month period in CPR 7.5. This was the case even though the strike out application had not been made correctly.

51. In IDEAL SHOPPING DIRECT LTD & ORS V MASTERCARD INCORPORATED & ORS [2022] EWCA CIV 14. the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that the claimant had not validly served proceedings and there were no good reasons or exceptional circumstances for the court to indulge the erring Claimant by granting a retrospective order validating the attempted service.

52. Held: CPR 3.10 (General power to rectify following error of procedure) did not enable the court to rectify ineffective service of the claim form and remedy the claimants’ error. That rule should not be used to get around service requirements and the claimants also did not satisfy the requirements under CPR 6.15 or 6.16. Following the approach in Piepenbrock v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) ([69]), having considered all the circumstances under rule 6.15, and finding no ‘good reason’, in Ideal Shopping Direct there were similarly no grounds to find the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required under rule 6.16.

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS

53. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.” 

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54. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

55. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity. 

56. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]

57. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...] 

58. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]  

59. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”  

60. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form, but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so. 

61.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

 62. Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).  

 63. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

64. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT

65. In the alternative: the claim should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

66. The Claimant inexplicably increased the costs from £100 to £XXX.

THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE WITH REGISTRATION  ……… (THE 'VEHICLE') PARKED IN BREACH OF  THE TERMS OF PARKING STIPULATED ON THE       SIGNAGE (THE 'CONTRACT') AT …………, ON DATE THUS INCURRING   THE PARKING CHARGE (THE 'PCN'). THE PCN WAS  NOT PAID WITHIN 28 DAYS OF ISSUE. THE        CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE UNPAID PCN FROM THE      DEFENDANT AS THE DRIVER/KEEPER OF THE        VEHICLE. DESPITE DEMANDS BEING MADE, THE     DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SETTLE THEIR         OUTSTANDING LIABILITY. THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS   £100 FOR THE PCN, £70.00 CONTRACTUAL COSTS   PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT AND PCN TERMS AND   CONDITIONS, TOGETHER WITH STATUTORY INTEREST OF £56.19 PURSUANT TO S69 OF THE COUNTY      COURTS ACT 1984 AT 10.25% PER ANNUM,         CONTINUING AT £0.05 PER DAY.

UNLAWFUL AND EXCESSIVE ADDITIONAL CHARGES

67. The alleged contract is contradictory and confusing as it does not permit parking but imposes a parking charge of £100. Additionally, the Claimant’s demand for an extra £70 per PCN as “contractual costs” is unjustified and punitive, lacking any genuine incurred costs. These fees serve more as a deterrent than compensation for actual losses. The charge is disproportionate and not commercially justifiable, as the original fee of £100 has escalated to £000, including statutory interest. This amount does not reflect any commercially justifiable loss to the company or the landowner. According to the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA), a keeper can only be pursued for the sum stated on the Notice to Keeper.

68. Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) Violation: The CRA 2015 prohibits disproportionate or unfair contract terms. These additional charges do not reflect genuine costs and are imposed without transparency. The Court of Appeal in ParkingEye v Beavis (2015) stated that penalty charges need to reflect a “legitimate interest” and should not exceed what is necessary to protect that interest.

69. Relevant Case Law on Unlawful Charges: Recent cases such as One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw and Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Percy have ruled against the application of inflated administrative fees, deeming them unenforceable unless they reflect actual incurred costs. In this case, the Claimant’s fees are disproportionate and fail to comply with CRA principles.

70.  In view of those woeful POC I am confident in relying upon a recent persuasive Appeal judgment as authority to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims). Dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

71. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Gladstones with their well-documented connections to the IPC Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

72. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

73. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX CEL V CHAN - others) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.