**URGENT- CCJ** Need advice if I have posibilities to set aside by N244 and after win the case

Coupon-mad

I wasn't suggesting you get a 'report with fee'. I was talking about you paying the n244 application fee.  Anyway show us the POC.

Lia_F

Coupon-mad said:

I wasn't suggesting you get a 'report with fee'. I was talking about you paying the n244 application fee.  Anyway show us the POC.

I will pay the N244 fee, but I don’t have my WS ready yet and I’m also organising the exhibits. Could you please help me review WS? I provided the link earlier




Hello All,

Coupon-mad 1505grandad Johnersh   Gr1pr  @Le_Kirk

Could you please review my WS to ensure it makes sense?

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RvLvCxpUj30Ku7gQXLO7IfTk0ZuEDO-S/view?usp=drive_link

Many thanks,

@Lia_F

Coupon-mad

Your draft is all over the place (jumps from one subject to another then back again) and concentrates far too much on the PCN defence.

That isn't what your application is about.

Why not read other CCJ set aside threads updated this week? Here's what a good WS posted today looks like:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/81087606/#Comment_81087606

Lia_F

Coupon-mad said:

Your draft is all over the place (jumps from one subject to another then back again) and concentrates far too much on the PCN defence.

That isn't what your application is about.

Why not read other CCJ set aside threads updated this week? Here's what a good WS posted today looks like:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/81087606/#Comment_81087606

Thank you so much! Coupon-mad

Lia_F

@Coupon-mad I appreciate if you can help me to find this transcript: 
Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179)
Many thanks,
Lia

1505grandad

If I May:-

Lia_F

1505grandad said:

If I May:-

Thank you so much 1505grandad

Lia_F

Hello All,

Coupon-mad 1505grandad Johnersh   Gr1pr  @Le_Kirk

Could you please review my WS 

WITNESS STATEMENT 

 

1.I, NAME, residing at ADDRESS, am the Defendant in this case. This statement is submitted in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me on DATE due to defective service of the claim, in case number NUMBER, brought by PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD. The facts stated below are true to the best of my belief and are based on my own knowledge. I am defending this claim as the keeper of the vehicle, not the driver.

 

2. I hereby declare that I have not been served with any claim form or detailed particulars in relation to this matter. I was unaware of the legal proceedings and, as a result, did not have the opportunity to present a defence. The existence of the claim came to my attention on [XX October 2024] upon reviewing my credit report. I subsequently obtained the Particulars of Claim via email from the Civil National Business Centre on [DATE].

 

3. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application is based on the set aside rules under CPR 13.2, as the claim was not properly served, and CPR 13.3, as there is a strong prospect of successfully defending the claim.  In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the expired POC fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".  More detail follows below.

 

4.      I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order. 

 

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM 

 

5. The claim was made against the wrong party due to an incorrect name on the claim form. My name is NAME not NAME. If a claim has been made under an incorrect name, it is essential to apply to have it set aside under CPR 13.2.

 

6. I understand that Parking Control Management Ltd, the Claimant, obtained a Default Judgment against me, the Defendant, on DATE. The claim pertains to an unpaid Parking Charge Notice (PCN) from XX December 2019 at PLACE (at that moment was a project under construction), although the exact location of the PCN is not specified (street name, number, and postal code).

 

7. The claim form was not served at my current address, rendering me unaware of the Default Judgment until a prospective landlord refunded my holding deposit on [XX/10/24], citing concerns from reference checks. On [XX/10/24], I discovered the claim after consulting with the real estate agent Open Rent, who informed me that adverse credit information had been detected on my credit score, despite credit agencies indicating no missed payments. They advised me to contact Equifax, who confirmed the existence of a County Court Judgment (CCJ) against me.

 

This constitutes a breach of CPR 13.2(a), as the claim form was never served to my current address. Consequently, the judgment was improperly entered, as I was unable to submit an acknowledgment of service due to the lack of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).

 

8. The address listed on the claim is: [ADDRESS]. I have relocated multiple times since the date of the alleged parking incident and the subsequent issuance of the claim against me. Below are the details of my address changes during this period. I did not receive the court form or any correspondence at my current address from Gladstone Solicitors or any entity acting on behalf of the claimant, nor at any of my previous addresses while I was residing there.

·         June 2020, I moved to ABROAD due to the COVID-19 pandemic – I provide flight checking confirmation, boarding pass and email giving notice to the landlord.  SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

 

·         September 2021, moved in to address: ADDRESS – I provide electoral roll updated for this address in September 2021 SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

 

·         August 2022, moved to current address: ADDRESS- I provide my tenancy agreement. SEE EXHIBIT XX-00

 

9. I believe the Claimant has breach the CPR. They had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which I no longer resided. In an email sent by Gladstone Solicitors on XX/10/24, after contacting the claimant on XX/10/24 (EXHIBIT – 00), they stated: “We remind you it is the responsibility of the Registered Keeper to ensure the data held by the DVLA is accurate and up to date. Given the last V5C was last issued to the vehicle in question on the DATE, it is clear you failed to update the DVLA when vacating ADDRESS”, However, I sold the car on XX/06/2020 before leaving the country due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (EXHIBIT – 00  car sold)

 

10.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in DATE due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

 

11. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a). 

 

12. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

 

13. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

 

CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT 

 

14. In the alternative: the claim should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

 

Particulars of claim:

THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE WITH REGISTRATION  NUMBER (THE 'VEHICLE') PARKED IN BREACH OF  THE TERMS OF PARKING STIPULATED ON THE       SIGNAGE (THE 'CONTRACT') AT PLACE    DEVELOPMENT, ON DATE  THUS INCURRING   THE PARKING CHARGE (THE 'PCN'). THE PCN WAS  NOT PAID WITHIN 28 DAYS OF ISSUE. THE        CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE UNPAID PCN FROM THE      DEFENDANT AS THE DRIVER/KEEPER OF THE        VEHICLE. DESPITE DEMANDS BEING MADE, THE     DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SETTLE THEIR         OUTSTANDING LIABILITY. THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS   £100 FOR THE PCN, £70.00 CONTRACTUAL COSTS   PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT AND PCN TERMS AND   CONDITIONS, TOGETHER WITH STATUTORY INTEREST OF £56.19 PURSUANT TO S69 OF THE COUNTY      COURTS ACT 1984 AT 10.25% PER ANNUM,         CONTINUING AT £0.05 PER DAY.

 

15. In view of this woeful POC (EXHIBIT XX-04) I am confident in relying upon two recent persuasive appeal judgments as authority to support striking out the claim Dismissing this claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

 

Lia_F

Coupon-mad 1505grandad Johnersh   Gr1pr  @Le_Kirk

16. In Car Park Management Service LTD v Akande heard on 10th May 2024 before Her Honour Judge Evans, the following has been stated:

 

"The district judge said paragraph 5 of her judgment that she did not accept there was sufficient set out in the claim form to enable the court and in particular the Defendant to understand the nature of the brech alleged. She identified at pararaph 9 that an allegation of breach and the nature of the breach rather than a simple assertion of breach of terms and conditions is fundamental  to a claim of this nature.

 

"She identified that there are a number of different ways in which a defendant might breach the terms and conditions  in a car park: for example, not displaying  a ticket, overstaying, not parking within the correct area for parking. She noted that these Particulars of Claim do not specify  which of those, if any, or which other breach was said to have been committed by this Defendant."

 

17. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious DCB Legal with their well-documented connections to the IPC Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

 

18. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

 

19. In Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179) heard on 7th May 2024 the following has been noted:

 

19.1 Overriding Objective: The ruling highlighted that under Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 13.3, the objective is to avoid injustice, and even delays in responding should be weighed against the right to a fair trial2.

 

However, the purpose of the power under CPR 13.3 is to avoid injustice, and although a lack of “promptness” in applying to set aside is a mandatory consideration, the rule makes it clear that the overriding objective is paramount. It is far from clear that the Circuit Judge approached the matter from that perspective. I find it telling that there is no mention in her judgement of the overriding objective nor of what the justice of the case required.

 

19.2 Setting Aside Judgment: The court found that the initial judgment was unjust due to Carr's lack of knowledge about the proceedings, which denied him the opportunity to defend himself effectively.

 

Even in a case of relief from sanctions where the delay is lengthy and there is no excuse for it, the court is required to consider all the circumstances of the case, in order to deal justly with the matter: Denton v White. This court has confirmed that the approach in Denton applies in the context of setting aside a judgment in default: FXF v English Karate Federation [2023] EWCA Civ 891

 

19.3 The following is relevant, albeit where the default judgment was obtained after sending to a separate address:

 

The starting point of the analysis must be that the defendant, who at all material times lived at the property where his car was parked, was being served with parking enforcement notices by the claimant because through no fault of his own and despite making every effort to get one, he could not display a parking permit to prove to them that he had the right to park his car in that space. He had tried without success to ‘explain this to the claimant, who in substance said it was not their problem and he should take it up with the letting agent/landlord. The claimant then obtained a default judgment for a sum in excess of £10,000 in respect of the accumulated parking charges after they had sent all relevant correspondence to and served the proceedings at an address where the defendant no longer lived. The Circuit Judge rightly found that he could not be criticised for failing to respond to a claim form which he never in fact received.

 

19.4 Real Prospect of Defence: The court acknowledged that Carr had a legitimate defence against VCS's claims, which further justified setting aside the default judgment2.

 

Given the Circuit Judge's finding (which the claimant realistically does not seek to challenge) that there was a real prospect of successfully defending the claim, in my judgment it is arguable with a real prospect of success that she did not properly carry out the holistic evaluation she should have done at the third ‘stage of the Denton test, despite expressly acknowledging that she had to take all the circumstances into consideration. As a result she placed too much weight on the delay after the defendant became aware of the default judgment, which she said she regarded as the most important factor.

 

19.5 No opportunity to defend (albeit a different address casing a "failure to respond"):

 

There also appears to have been no specific consideration at the third stage of the fact that in practical terms this defendant has never had an opportunity to advance his valid defence irrespective of whether service was property effected at his former address. That is related to but different from the point that he cannot be blamed for failure to respond to the claim form because he never received it.

 

19.6 No Opportunity to contest (first sentence):

 

Standing back and looking at the bigger picture, if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense. Visiting those consequences upon him simply because of a 2-year delay in seeking to set the judgment aside during a period when he was undergoing a divorce and his parents became ill might be regarded as falling outside the generous ambit of decisions that were reasonably open to the court when that and all other relevant factors are weighed together.

 

20. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX-02 - Chan and other Judgments) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

 

STRONG PROSPECT OF SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE CLAIM

 

21. The driver selected this parking spot because there was no indication that it violated any regulations. There was no visible signage indicating the area’s private status, nor were there clear entrance signs. Had there been adequate and conspicuous signage, he would not have parked there and thus would not have entered into any implied contract resulting in this significant charge. Consequently, no contract could be formed with the landowner, rendering all parking charge notices issued there invalid.

 

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

22. On XX/10/24 after a prospective landlord refunded my holding deposit stating that following reference checks, they were no longer comfortable proceeding with my application.

 

23. On XX/10/24, I discovered this claim after speaking with the real estate agent Open Rent, who informed me that adverse credit was detected on my credit score, despite the credit agencies stating that I had never missed a payment. They advised me to contact Equifax.

 

24. On XX/10/24, Equifax confirmed that I had a CCJ and provided me with the case number.

 

25. On XX/10/24, I purchased the County Court Judgment report from www.trustonline.org.uk for case number NUMBER. The report lists an old address, ADDRESS, where I have not lived since 2020.

 

26. On XX/10/24, I attempted to contact the County Court Business Centre by telephone but was unable to speak with anyone due to the long waiting time. I also sent an email.

 

27. On XX/10/24, after trying daily, I finally managed to speak by phone with the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information regarding this default judgment. I was informed that I would receive an email containing the Particulars of the Claim, which I received immediately.

 

28. On XX/10/24  I sent an email to PCM - PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD to the only publicly available email they display - info@pcm-uk.co.uk to inform them that they had served court papers to an incorrect address, while they could easily have found my current address, thus not complying with the Civil Procedure Rules 6.9 and inviting them to consent to setting aside the claim, rather than wasting the courts time further. I requested an urgent reply to this email, and informed PCM that I was willing to defer making a unilateral application to set aside the judgment until 4 pm on 01 November 2024.

29. On XX/10/2024 I received a further email from Gladstones Solicitors Ltd  saying:

We confirm we will consent to an application to have the judgment set aside, subject to the conditions as set out below:

1.            Payment is made of the judgment amount in the sum of £XXX.XX

2.            You accept liability for the above amount and pay the cost of the application.  

3.            You agree not to seek a costs order from our Client, nor the recovery of any sums paid.

I responded, stating that I am not liable and once again inviting them to jointly apply to set aside the judgment.

 

30. On XX/11/24, after failing to reach an agreement for a Consent Order with PCM - PARKING CONTROL MANAGEMENT (UK) LTD, I have submitted my case in order to set aside this judgment and have the opportunity to fairly present my case. (EXHIBIT XX-05)

 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT REGARDING THE IMPACT OF THE CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS ON THE DEFENDANT’S LIFE AND MENTAL WELLBEING

 

31. This CCJ has significantly impacted my financial situation and personal life, by firstly, ruining my credit score which at the time was very good and as such crippling the defendant financially and preventing the defendant from being able to obtain credit with reasonable interest rates at a most difficult time in the defendant’s life.  My son and I are searching for a new place to live because our landlady is selling the flat. I am applying alone, as my son is an 18-year-old university student. My salary is insufficient to afford a two-bedroom flat, and most landlords do not accept students and want two incomes. I have been looking for a place to move for months, and when I finally found a flat, the landlady refused to rent it to me due to the CCJ on my credit record. We are at risk of becoming homeless, and the council cannot provide us with accommodation because we have lived in the council area for less than five years. This entire situation has caused us significant emotional distress. EXHIBIT XX-00

 

32. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful.

 

Statement of truth: 

 

33. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Coupon-mad

I'd remove paragraph 5 about your name.  It is in the wrong place and fairly unimportant. And this makes no sense:

"f a claim has been made under an incorrect name, it is essential to apply to have it set aside under CPR 13.2."  (No it isn't!).

You've also removed all the quotation marks from your quotes from the CoA in VCS v Carr which makes it impossible to tell which are your words and which are quotes from a Judge.

Show us your Draft Order.

Tell us what your exhibits are.