GBP Management DCB LEGAL court claim 2025

poshMosh

Hi All,

So I've made a few tweaks to the Defence, including an alternate version of paragraph 3.1 (Italic is the older version I wrote) which depending on the feedback, it will add to the paragraph increment. Please let me know your thoughts:

DEFENCE
1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not
comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to 'state all facts
necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of
action'. The Defendant is unable to understand with certainty the
allegation or the heads of cost. The Defendant denies liability
for the inflated sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is difficult to respond but these facts come from the
Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. To form a contract,
there must be a prominent offer, acceptance, and valuable
consideration. It is neither admitted nor denied that the driver
breached any term. Section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015
(‘the CRA’) creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the
test of fairness. The CRA introduced new requirements for
prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Pursuant to s62 and
paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Sch2 and the duties of
fair/open dealing and good faith, the Defendant avers that this
Claimant generally uses unclear and unfair terms/notices. On the
limited information available, this case appears to be no
different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with
contemporaneous photographs and the Defendant reserves the right
to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided.
However, the court is invited to strike this claim out using its
powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

3. Referring to the POC: paragraph 1 is denied. The Defendant is
not indebted to the Claimant. Paragraph 2 is denied. The Defendant
does not accept that a contravention occurred on 04/04/2024, as
alleged. Whilst the Defendant was the registered keeper, paragraphs 3 and 4 are denied. The Defendant is not liable and has seen no evidence of a breach of prominent terms. The
quantum is hugely exaggerated (no PCN can be £170 on private land)
and there were no damages incurred whatsoever.

3.1 The Defendant has little or no knowledge or recollection of events on the date stated. The vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper. An appeal was lodged and was refused whilst also admitting they did not send a Notice to Keeper and thus the keeper is not liable.

3.1_V2 The Defendant was visiting the NHS as part of a regular series of assessments for their child. The Defendant has parked there many times previously and there has never been a permit on this part of the road and neither is there clear signage to let know drivers know that they should not know there. An appeal was lodged and was refused whilst also admitting they did not send a Notice to Keeper and thus the keeper is not liable. Any contract is denied, and The Claimant is to put strict proof of all of their allegations.

4. Further, regarding the Particulars of Claim paragraph 4, the solicitor signatory of the statement of truth on this claim is knowingly or negligently misleading the court by citing the POFA. Even a smidgen of due diligence would show a professional law firm that there was no NTK ever issued and this was admitted by the Claimant's back office notice processing agents. It is a 'misleading action' to say in the Claim that the client can pursue the Defendant under the POFA 2012.

5. In order to impose a parking charge, as well as proving that
the driver breached an obligation, there must be: (i) a strong
'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss,
and (ii) 'adequate notice' of any relevant obligation(s) and of
the charge itself. None of these requirements have been
demonstrated and this charge is a penalty. ParkingEye v
Beavis [2015] UKSC67 is fully distinguished. Attention is drawn to
paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis and also to ParkingEye Ltd v
Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) a finding
unaffected by Beavis. In Somerfield, HHJ Hegarty (whose decision
was ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs'
further inflating a £75 (discounted to £37.50) parking charge to
£135 was disproportionate to the minor cost of template letters
and 'would appear to be penal'.

6. On 11th July 2025 a Public Consultation by the Ministry of
Housing, Communities and Local Government (‘MHCLG’) began. The
Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 will finally curb the unjust
enrichment of the parking industry and debt recovery agents
(DRAs). Banning DRA fees (mirroring the approach of the last
Government, which called DRA fees ‘extorting money from
motorists’) appears likely. The MHCLG have identified that the
added sums are not part of the parking related charges: 'profit
being made by DRAs is significantly higher than the profits
reported by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be
indicative of these firms having too much control over the market,
thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.
public consultation =
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-parking-code-o
f-practice/private-parking-code-of-practice

7. The claim exceeds the current Code of Practice £100 maximum
parking charge without justification or explanation. Pursuant
to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') it
also exceeds the ‘maximum sum’ recoverable; the explanatory notes
to s4 (5) and (6) state at para 221: ‘’The creditor may not make a
claim against the keeper for more than the amount of the
unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to
the driver was issued (para 4(5)).’
Schedule4 = https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/schedule/4

8. The Claimant is put to proof of POFA and Code of Practice
compliance. It is denied that any DRA sums are due, nor interest
(the delay lies with the Claimant and interest should be
disallowed).

9. The delay in litigation has made retrieving material
documents/evidence impossible for the Defendant, which is highly
prejudicial. The Defendant seeks standard witness costs (CPR
27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct by the Claimant,
opening up further costs (CPR 46.5).

10. The court’s attention is drawn to the common outcome in bulk
parking claims, of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance.
Whilst a Claimant is liable for a Defendant's costs after
discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to the
small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states
(annotation 38.6.1):'Note that the normal rule as to costs does
not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims
track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be
contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved
unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.

Coupon-mad

Remove 3.1 or you are completely ruining your point about no Notice to Keeper!

Le_Kirk

poshMosh said:

3.1_V2 The Defendant was visiting the NHS as part of a regular series of assessments for their child. The Defendant has parked there many times previously and there has never been a requirement for a permit on this part of the road and neither is there clear signage to let know drivers know that they should not know park there. An appeal was lodged and was refused whilst also admitting they did not send a Notice to Keeper and thus the keeper is not liable. Any contract is denied, and The Claimant is to put strict proof of all of their allegations.

Some suggestions for you paragraph above.

1505grandad

@Le_Kirk -  I believe that that is the para C-m advised to remove?

Coupon-mad

Yep they should stick with version 1:

"3.1 The Defendant has little or no knowledge or recollection of events on the date stated. The vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper. An appeal was lodged and was refused whilst also admitting they did not send a Notice to Keeper and thus the keeper is not liable."

And add back in the ODDLY MISSING para 4 of the Template Defence (now as para 5) because you seem to have just replaced it. No removing any of the template defence! Your para 4 is needed but obviously you just renumber the template to make 11 (ideally 12 paragraphs, if you change '3.1' to 4, etc. which would read better).

Le_Kirk

1505grandad said:

@Le_Kirk -  I believe that that is the para C-m advised to remove?

OK, I misread it as removing the other one.

poshMosh

Thanks all, please find the revised defence with the feedback incorporated in:

DEFENCE
1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not
comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to 'state all facts
necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of
action'. The Defendant is unable to understand with certainty the
allegation or the heads of cost. The Defendant denies liability
for the inflated sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is difficult to respond but these facts come from the
Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. To form a contract,
there must be a prominent offer, acceptance, and valuable
consideration. It is neither admitted nor denied that the driver
breached any term. Section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015
(‘the CRA’) creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the
test of fairness. The CRA introduced new requirements for
prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Pursuant to s62 and
paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Sch2 and the duties of
fair/open dealing and good faith, the Defendant avers that this
Claimant generally uses unclear and unfair terms/notices. On the
limited information available, this case appears to be no
different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with
contemporaneous photographs and the Defendant reserves the right
to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided.
However, the court is invited to strike this claim out using its
powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

3. Referring to the POC: paragraph 1 is denied. The Defendant is
not indebted to the Claimant. Paragraph 2 is denied. The Defendant
does not accept that a contravention occurred on 04/04/2024, as
alleged. Whilst the Defendant was the registered keeper, paragraphs 3 and 4 are denied. The Defendant is not liable and has seen no evidence of a breach of prominent terms. The
quantum is hugely exaggerated (no PCN can be £170 on private land)
and there were no damages incurred whatsoever.

 The Defendant has little or no knowledge or recollection of events on the date stated. The vehicle is recognised, and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper. An appeal was lodged and was refused whilst also admitting they did not send a Notice to Keeper and thus the keeper is not liable

4. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

5. Further, regarding the Particulars of Claim paragraph 4, the solicitor signatory of the statement of truth on this claim is knowingly or negligently misleading the court by citing the POFA. Even a smidgen of due diligence would show a professional law firm that there was no NTK ever issued and this was admitted by the Claimant's back-office notice processing agents. It is a 'misleading action' to say in the Claim that the client can pursue the Defendant under the POFA 2012.

6. In order to impose a parking charge, as well as proving that
the driver breached an obligation, there must be: (i) a strong
'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss,
and (ii) 'adequate notice' of any relevant obligation(s) and of
the charge itself. None of these requirements have been
demonstrated and this charge is a penalty. ParkingEye v
Beavis [2015] UKSC67 is fully distinguished. Attention is drawn to
paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis and also to ParkingEye Ltd v
Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) a finding
unaffected by Beavis. In Somerfield, HHJ Hegarty (whose decision
was ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs'
further inflating a £75 (discounted to £37.50) parking charge to
£135 was disproportionate to the minor cost of template letters
and 'would appear to be penal'.

7. On 11th July 2025 a Public Consultation by the Ministry of
Housing, Communities and Local Government (‘MHCLG’) began. The
Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 will finally curb the unjust
enrichment of the parking industry and debt recovery agents
(DRAs). Banning DRA fees (mirroring the approach of the last
Government, which called DRA fees ‘extorting money from
motorists’) appears likely. The MHCLG have identified that the
added sums are not part of the parking related charges: 'profit
being made by DRAs is significantly higher than the profits
reported by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be
indicative of these firms having too much control over the market,
thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.
public consultation =
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-parking-code-o
f-practice/private-parking-code-of-practice

8. The claim exceeds the current Code of Practice £100 maximum
parking charge without justification or explanation. Pursuant
to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') it
also exceeds the ‘maximum sum’ recoverable; the explanatory notes
to s4 (5) and (6) state at para 221: ‘’The creditor may not make a
claim against the keeper for more than the amount of the
unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to
the driver was issued (para 4(5)).’
Schedule4 = https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/schedule/4

9. The Claimant is put to proof of POFA and Code of Practice
compliance. It is denied that any DRA sums are due, nor interest
(the delay lies with the Claimant and interest should be
disallowed).

10. The delay in litigation has made retrieving material
documents/evidence impossible for the Defendant, which is highly
prejudicial. The Defendant seeks standard witness costs (CPR
27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct by the Claimant,
opening up further costs (CPR 46.5).

11. The court’s attention is drawn to the common outcome in bulk
parking claims, of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance.
Whilst a Claimant is liable for a Defendant's costs after
discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to the
small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states
(annotation 38.6.1):'Note that the normal rule as to costs does
not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims
track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be
contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved
unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.