2 x CCJ's that i was not aware about

Zbubuman

CCBC are absolutely useless. Some of you might remember that i had to resend an updated WS and Draft order ( the ones on my initial application had the set aside fee of £275).

Just received an email for each case saying the N244 application was not attached ( have you seen my previous email with the application and all the attachments ? or bothered to read the email itself stating " i submitted an application earlier today, please find attached updated WS and draft order showing the correct set aside amount of £303? 

AS usual been on hold for over 1hr. Will try them again tomorrow. 

Umkomaas

AS usual been on hold for over 1hr. Will try them again tomorrow. 

Better chance of getting through with less delay if you can make the call at 9am opening time. Good luck.

Zbubuman

Quick update - Just received the below email from Gladstones.

Considering that I sent the original email to them on 08/04/24, they did take their sweet time. 

​Thu 20/06/2024 12:22

Dear Mr XXXX,

Thank you for your email, the contents of which is noted.

As per our obligation under CPR 6 we conducted a Trace XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX  which found an alternative address, we wrote to this address on two separate occasions, namely being XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX. As we received no response under CPR it is our obligation to proceed at the usual or last known residence when proceedings were issued. Therefore as no reply was received both Claims were issued at the last known address.

We therefore disagree with the content of your email and will not completing a joint application to Set Aside the Judgment.

We await your application to set aside the Judgment which will be opposed on the basis explained above.

Kind Regards

   

XXXXXX

Legal Assistant 

Coupon-mad

Fine. Let them. What's happening with your application now?

Zbubuman

Coupon-mad said:

Fine. Let them. What's happening with your application now?

Still waiting on the courts. Had to re-submit all docs ( remember I had to send an updated WS due to the fee change). When i sent the update WS, they said they also need the N244 form. Advised this was sent with my initial application, but the person i spoke to on the phone was not interested in looking for this. Therefore, was easier to resend everything. 

This was back on the 4th, so most probably it has reset the clock by another 4 - 6 weeks.  

bendybackpanda

Really keen to know how your application / hearing went with this? Do you have a date yet?

Zbubuman

bendybackpanda said:

Really keen to know how your application / hearing went with this? Do you have a date yet?

Nothing as of yet, last i checked I was told they are with an allocation judge. And luckily I checked because they still hadnt updated my address and were going to send all paperwork to old address again

Coupon-mad

If that was a phone conversation I would follow up by email and point out the court is in breach of the DPA & UK GDPR 2018 for failing to 'rectify and erase' the old address data.

Lia_F

Zbubuman said:

THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED

I HEREBY CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IT NOW (EFFECTIVELY THAT WOULD MEAN DISPENSING WITH SERVICE). THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE VERY LIMITED COURT DISCRETION TO RETROSPECTIVELY VALIDATE DEFECTIVE SERVICE BY RESURRECTING AN EXPIRED AND UNSERVED (AND HOPELESS) CLAIM.

38. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved.   The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.

39. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5).  

40. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved. 

41. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.  

42. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address.  

43. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).  

44. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred.  There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15.  Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.

45. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:

46. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

47. In my case, no.  An old DVLA address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service.  Indeed the DVLA do not sell 'keeper data' with any warranty that it can be used or relied upon for service of court papers to a motorist; it is merely a snapshot in time of where a vehicle was once registered.

48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.

49. It seems that Gladstones paid lip service to this rule; they must have traced my current address in 2021 because out of the blue, I received a Letter Before Action (LBA).  Why then did they revert to the oldest address for the two claims?  A reasonable interpretation could be that they wanted to obtain default CCJs to pass on to their newly created bailiff arm.

50. Whatever the reason, it was vexatious, wholly unreasonable and an abuse of process to trace a newer address, write to it once, then - when they received no reply from me - revert to what they knew was an out-of-date address (where the Claimants had also not heard from me).  Having taken steps to trace it, the newer address used for the LBA had to be used for the claims x 2. But it was not.


51. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

52. In my case, no.  The LBA sent to the correct address out of the blue in 2021 bore all the hallmarks of a scam and offered no information, no photos and no copy of the alleged contract (sign).  I heard nothing more and knew nothing about the two claims disingenuously sent to a known to be older address. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-04)

53. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in April 2024 – SEE EXHIBIT XX-05) and I knew nothing from UKCPM about any supposedly outstanding parking charges. I believed the wrongly issued PCNs had all been cancelled This was a block of flats where we lived for around 8 years. The Claimant's atrocious moneymaking 'permit scheme' was unwanted and it was inflicted on residents’ mid-way through our tenancy. At all times we were authorised to use the parking areas. We had issues with UKCPM throughout, starting from the beginning of the scheme where 'fines' were being imposed before we even received the unsolicited permits through the post. We complained to the managing agents and got PCNs cancelled. I had no idea that two unfair charges had continued. When we did receive permits, we displayed them as a courtesy, not as an obligation.  We already had a pre-existing right to park so there was nothing offered by UKCPM that was of value. There was no consideration on offer and thus, no contract, so any claims would fall at the first hurdle.

54. What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

55. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to defend two duplicate boilerplate robo-claims for meritless parking charges imposed in my own old residence where, as a longstanding tenant, I had prior rights to park before UKCPM were inflicted upon us.

56. I know nothing about these two charges from years ago and do not understand why these PCNs were not cancelled too.  I think UKCPM have since been removed from the site, due to complaints, so I can't gather evidence of their inadequate signage.  I no longer live there, and I do not have the PCNs or my old Tenancy Agreement. This is far too late and unfair to resurrect.

57. Further, the two claims themselves are an abuse in terms of duplication (Henderson v Henderson is the authority which applies to duplicated litigation) and in view of the inadequate POC x 2, shown later in this statement which is a reason in itself to strike both claims out.

58. The decision in Good Law Project v (1) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and (2) Pharmaceuticals Direct Limited [2021] EWHC 1782 (TCC) emphasised the importance of serving a claim form correctly on time. In that case sending the claim form to the wrong email address (the claim form was sent to the solicitors, not the designated email address) did not constitute valid service.

59. In Pitalia & Anor v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657 the Court of Appeal held that a claimant could not resist its claim being struck out as a result of its failure to serve the claim form within the four month period in CPR 7.5. This was the case even though the strike out application had not been made correctly.

60. In IDEAL SHOPPING DIRECT LTD & ORS V MASTERCARD INCORPORATED & ORS [2022] EWCA CIV 14. the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that the claimant had not validly served proceedings and there were no good reasons or exceptional circumstances for the court to indulge the erring Claimant by granting a retrospective order validating the attempted service.

61. Held: CPR 3.10 (General power to rectify following error of procedure) did not enable the court to rectify ineffective service of the claim form and remedy the claimants’ error. That rule should not be used to get around service requirements and the claimants also did not satisfy the requirements under CPR 6.15 or 6.16. Following the approach in Piepenbrock v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) ([69]), having considered all the circumstances under rule 6.15, and finding no ‘good reason’, in Ideal Shopping Direct there were similarly no grounds to find the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required under rule 6.16. 

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS

62. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”  

63. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out."  

64. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.  

65. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]   

66. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...]  

67. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]  

68. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”  

69. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.  

70.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):  

71. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).  

72. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.  

73. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”  

Could you please tell me what means this simbol  [...] from paragraf 63 - 67? Zbubuman Coupon-mad
Many thanks,
Lia

Coupon-mad

It just means some words have deliberately been snipped (because the missing words are irrelevant to the point being made).