Help needed with two claims froms

seaside_pillow

@Coupon-mad Noted, thank you for letting me know.

seaside_pillow

Hello Forum, hope you all had a great Xams.

Below is my WS, please let me know what you think.

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

1. I am XXXXX, and I am the Defendant against whom this Claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based on my own knowledge.

2. In my Statement I shall refer to Exhibits 01-05 within the evidence supplied with this Statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My Defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: The Claim should be struck out

3. I draw the court’s attention to two recent and persuasive appeal judgments which support the dismissal or striking out of this claim. I respectfully submit that dismissing this meritless claim aligns with the Overriding Objective. It is my belief that bulk litigators should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic, auto-fill, unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims pursuant to CPR 3.4, based on the following persuasive authorities (I append transcripts of both – plus multiple area court ‘strike outs’ of parking claims that reflect those authorities – in Exhibits 01 to 03).

4. The first persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) indicates that the Particulars of Claim fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th of August 2023, HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the Claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract”. (See Exhibit - 01)

5. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Service Ltd. v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) also indicates that the PoC fails to comply with Part 16. On the 10th of May 2024, HHJ Evans held that “Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim”. (See Exhibit - 02)

6. I respectfully submit that this claim should be struck out due to the represented parking firm’s failure to comply with the basic requirements of CPR, and because the claim has not set out clear and coherent facts as required by CPR 16.4. The claimant has not provided sufficient clarity to explain what specific contract term was allegedly breached, making it impossible for me to adequately respond.

Cause of Action estoppel 

7. The Claimant, being legally represented, knows, or should know, that issuing multiple claims based on similar facts and failing to address all relevant elements in a single claim constitutes an abuse of process. The Claimant has filed two claims with nearly identical particulars, with the only difference being the issue date of the parking charges: 

(i) Claim 1 – XXXXXXX – which was issued on 11/03/2024 – relates to PCNs issued on 04/06/2023 and 06/12/2022. 

(ii) Claim 2 – XXXXXXX – which was issued on 13/03/2024 – relates to a PCN issued on the 05/06/2023, relying on the same facts. 

8. In Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 3 All ER 41 the court noted that cause of action estoppel “...applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter.” 

9. In Henderson -v- Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313 the court noted the following: 

(i) when a matter becomes subject to litigation, the parties are required to advance their whole case; 

(ii) the Court will not permit the same parties to re-open the same subject of litigation regarding matters which should have been advanced in the earlier litigation, but were not owing to negligence, inadvertence, or error; 

(iii) this bar applies to all matters, both those on which the Court determined in the original litigation and those which would have been advanced if the party in question had exercised ''reasonable diligence''. 

10. The Claimant filing the first claim and failing to advance the whole case, any cause of action was immediately extinguished for any other similar fact Parking Charges against me. The courts may estop a second claim where the cause of action is substantially the same. I invite the court to dismiss the second claim under the grounds of cause of action estoppel. In the alternative, the Court is invited to consolidate the claims to be determined together, and to apply appropriate sanctions against the Claimant. 

Facts and sequence of events:

11. The facts in this WS comes from my own knowledge and honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of the case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fails to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". I am unable, based on the particulars of the claim (POC), to understand with certainty what case, allegations, or heads of cost are being pursued, which makes it difficult for me to respond. However, I recognise the vehicle mentioned and admit that I was the registered keeper, but I deny being the driver.

12. I want to bring to the court's attention that I solely serve as the registered keeper of the vehicle in question and have not personally operated the vehicle since assuming keeper status, due to my disability. The vehicle is instead utilised by two authorised family members. 

13. I have another family member who resides in the same residential area mentioned in the claim(s) (Barking Riverside– IG11), and the drivers used the vehicle to visit the said family member. 

14. I was neither present nor a passenger during the instances leading to the alleged PCNs, and because I had not agreed to any ‘contract’ nor was there any consent from me to form or enter into any agreements with the Claimant beforehand. Concerns arise on whether these ‘contract(s)’ are legitimate or legally binding when the principle of consent, as outlined in the common law and the Consumer Rights Act 2015, is considered. 

15. Since the Claimant has not provided any proof or evidence suggesting that I agreed to any of their alleged ‘contract(s)’, the burden of proof remains unmet. Thus, it is sensible to question the legitimacy of these contract(s). 

16. I adamantly refuse to agree to any of PCM UK's demands and invites the court to strike out these claim(s) due to the following reasons: 

(i) PCM-UK's Particulars of Claim(s) fails to outline the terms and conditions of the alleged ‘contract(s)’ or subsequentially provide any evidence about the identity of the driver during the alleged incidents as the vehicles have two authorised drivers. Hence, the Claimant's incoherent Particulars of Claim(s) violate CPR 16.4, warranting the dismissal of the claim(s). 

(ii) The Claimant was previously involved in similar claims in which it was struck out by District Judge Cross of St Albans County Court on 20/09/16 without a hearing, due to Gladstones' template particulars for a private parking firm being “incoherent”, failing to comply with CPR16.4 as mentioned earlier, and “providing no facts that could give rise to any apparent claim in law”. 

(iii) Given PCM-UK's history of questionable practices and ill-treatment towards motorists, which was exposed by BBC Watchdog previously, and their business model, which is characterized by extortionate practices and unfair charges. I view PCM-UK's claim(s) with scepticism due to their lack of integrity. 

17. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be: 

(i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and 

(ii) 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines. 

18. I deny (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case',), which is fully distinguished (See Exhibit - 04).

Hearsay evidence

19. The Claimant's witness is a legal assistant employed by the Claimant’s solicitors and has no direct knowledge of the events that form the basis of the claim. The evidence provided by this individual is entirely reliant on information supplied by the Claimant, making it hearsay and significantly less credible than testimony from someone with direct involvement in the incident.

20. While the Civil Evidence Act 1995 permits hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, such evidence must be given appropriate weight based on its reliability. Under CPR 32.2, the court has discretion to exclude hearsay evidence when it offers limited probative value. In this instance, the witness provides only second-hand information from the Claimant and lacks direct knowledge, rendering the evidence unreliable and of minimal probative value.

21. The Claimant's Witness Statement does not comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, as it fails to clearly differentiate between matters within the witness's personal knowledge and those based on information provided by the Claimant. As the legal assistant has no firsthand knowledge of the events, their statement amounts to hearsay and lacks credibility. Additionally, the witness has not adequately indicated the source of their information and belief, as required under PD 32.18.2.

22. The legal assistant 'witness' is not an employee of the Claimant's company and plays no role in its operations, policies, or management of the parking charge in question. This lack of connection further undermines their ability to provide a credible account of the facts relevant to this case.

23. The Claimant’s WS is written in the third person, contrary to CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.1, which requires a witness to present evidence clearly in their own words and in the first person. This deviation further detracts from the WS’s compliance with procedural requirements.

seaside_pillow

Unenforceable Additional Costs

24. In the Particulars of Claim(s), the Claimant has added £70 per Parking Charge Notice (PCN), claiming this as "contractual costs pursuant to the Contract and PCN terms and conditions.” However, the Claimant’s exhibit GS-2 which is a scanned copy of the signage (not the actual sign displayed, so it cannot be confirmed how clear the text and content would have been in the actual street environment.), the signage states: 

“Non-payment will result in additional charges which will be added to the value of the charge and for which the driver will be liable on an indemnity basis”. 

Since these “additional charges” are stated as being liable by the driver, the Claimant has no legal basis to impose those charges on me as the registered keeper (assuming a contract even existed, which I dispute). As I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and was not the driver at the time of the alleged incidents, any liability for the charge or its additional costs cannot be imposed on me, as I was not the party in actual control of the vehicle.

25. This lack of transparency violates Schedule 2, Paragraph 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), which prohibits terms that unfairly bind the consumer to terms with which they have had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract. It also undermines the Claimant’s ability to enforce the contract, as such terms render it unenforceable under Section 62 of the CRA, which states that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer.

26. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, according to the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), which sets requirements for the “prominence” of contract terms and “consumer notices” under the CRA. In a parking context, this includes a fairness and clarity test for signage and any notices, letters, and other communications meant for the consumer.

27. Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Further, claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

28. The CRA has been breached due to unclear or unfair terms and notices, pursuant to Section 62, with due regard to examples 6, 10, 14, and 18 of Schedule 2, and the requirements for fair and open dealing (this does not necessarily imply bad faith).

29. Furthermore, the DLUHC’s draft IA exposes that the template “debt chaser” stage costs less than £9, supporting HHJ Jackson’s ruling in Excel v Wilkinson (See Exhibit - 05).

30. These additional costs appear arbitrary and penal in nature. Under established legal principles, such as ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015], parking charges must either be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or commercially justified. In this case, the additional £70 is neither justified nor explained.

31. The Claimant has provided no breakdown or explanation of how this £70 was calculated or why it is appropriate. It can only be viewed as a punitive charge, which violates the legal principles prohibiting excessive and unfair contractual penalties.

32. The Claimant’s demand for an additional £70 per PCN is entirely baseless. It is not supported by any clear contractual term, violates the CRA’s requirements for fairness and transparency, and constitutes an unlawful penalty charge. Furthermore, as I am the registered keeper and not the driver, any claim for additional costs from me, as opposed to the driver, is entirely unfounded. The court should strike out this portion of the claim as unenforceable.

Offensive and Baseless Allegation Regarding My Ability to Understand CPR and Legal Issues

33. In paragraph 25 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant’s legal representative — whose knowledge of this matter is entirely second-hand and based solely on information provided by their client — makes an entirely inappropriate and offensive statement regarding my ability to understand the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). They assert, without evidence, that I have relied on a “generic defence” sourced online and suggest that I lack comprehension of the legal arguments and references to the CPR I have presented.

34. This is a baseless and entirely unfounded personal attack. The claimant’s witness has no knowledge whatsoever of my level of education, professional background, or capacity to understand legal matters. It is deeply unprofessional and, quite frankly, embarrassing that a firm of supposed legal professionals would resort to such unfounded insults in an official court document. As a litigant in person, I am not expected to have the same legal expertise as the claimant’s solicitors. However, I have made every effort to research and present a reasonable defence. The claimant’s solicitors, being professionals, should be held to a higher standard of compliance with legal procedures, especially with respect to the Civil Procedure Rules.

35. I respectfully remind the court that I am a litigant in person. I have every right to research legal matters and use any available resources to present my defence, just as the claimant’s solicitors have evidently relied on templates for both their Particulars of Claim(s) and Witness Statement. My defence is fully supported by relevant case law and legal principles, regardless of the method by which I prepared it.

36. Moreover, this unwarranted and disparaging comment about my ability as a litigant in person amounts to unreasonable behaviour on the part of the claimant’s solicitors. Such conduct is clearly designed to intimidate and belittle me, rather than address the actual legal issues in the case. I believe this behaviour violates the spirit of fair litigation and may amount to a breach of the Overriding Objective under CPR 1.1, which requires the parties to act justly and fairly.

37. I respectfully request that the court take note of this unprofessional conduct when making any assessment of costs. The claimant’s solicitors' reliance on personal attacks, rather than focusing on the substance of the legal matters, reflects poorly on their conduct and should be considered when determining whether the claimant has behaved unreasonably in the proceedings.

Claimant’s Assertion Regarding My Defence

38. In paragraph 27 of the claimant's Witness Statement, the claimant asserts that I have been able to produce a "substantive defence" and implies that I have not suffered any prejudice as a result of the claimant's failure to provide detailed and compliant Particulars of Claim(s). I respectfully submit that this assertion is inaccurate and fails to appreciate the nature of my defence.

39. My defence primarily relies on the fact that the Particulars of Claim(s) provided by the claimant were woefully deficient and did not comply with the requirements of CPR 16.4, as they failed to provide sufficient detail about the basis of the claim. As a result, I was unable to understand the case against me or adequately prepare a response to any specific allegations.

40. It is important to highlight that my defence is not "substantive" in the sense that the claimant implies, but is rather a reflection of the claimant's procedural failures and their failure to provide me with any prior information about the alleged breach. This has placed me at a significant disadvantage, and the suggestion that I have not suffered any prejudice as a result is clearly without merit.

41. The claimant cannot now seek to argue that their inadequate (s) is excusable simply because I have pointed out their legal and procedural failings. Their lack of compliance with CPR 16.4 and their failure to link the charge to a specific driver have severely hindered my ability to respond to this claim in any meaningful way beyond disputing the receipt of prior communication and highlighting their procedural errors.

42. I respectfully request that the court takes my position as the registered keeper of the vehicle into account, especially considering that the claimant has failed to produce any evidence showing that I was the driver. Without such evidence, their claim against me as the keeper is without merit.

43. I further ask that the court consider the procedural failures on the part of the claimant, which have placed me in an unjustly disadvantaged position, and that the claimant's claim be dismissed accordingly.

Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4

44. In paragraph 29 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant attempts to excuse their failure to fully comply with CPR 16.4 by asserting that the information provided in their Particulars of Claim(s) was sufficient to make me aware of the nature of the claim. This is a feeble and unconvincing attempt to justify their non-compliance, and I have already provided evidence of recent persuasive cases where similar failures led to claims being struck out.

45. In CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], the court found that vague and inadequate Particulars of Claim(s) that failed to provide essential details were grounds for striking out the claim. The claimant’s Particulars of Claim(s) in this case suffers from the same deficiencies — lacking crucial information such as the specifics of the alleged contravention, the terms supposedly breached, or any supporting evidence.

46. I respectfully submit that the claimant’s continued reliance on these deficient Particulars of Claim(s) should result in the court giving no weight to their justification, and I once again refer the court to the persuasive appeal cases I have cited, CPMS v Akande [2024]and CEL v Chan [2023], which I have included as evidence.

Claimant’s Standing and Authority to Sue:

47. Further, it is denied that this Claimant, who is understood to hold only a bare licence as an agent, has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. 

48. In the Claimant's Witness Statement, at paragraph 9, it is stated that Exhibit GS1 is a “copy of the agreement between the landowner and the Claimant.” However, upon reviewing the agreement, it is evident that the agreement is between the Claimant (PCM) and Pinnacle Group, which is explicitly described as the managing agent of the land, not the landowner. The agreement does not provide the Claimant with direct authority from the landowner to issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) or take legal action in its own name. It only grants authority through Pinnacle Group, which is acting as the agent for the landowner.

49. This raises significant concerns about the validity of the agreement. For the Claimant to have standing to bring this claim, they must show that they were properly authorised by the landowner or a party with the appropriate legal authority to take such action. As the agreement is with the managing agent and not the landowner, the Claimant’s authority to sue is questionable.

50. Additionally, the agreement does not explicitly grant the Claimant the authority to form contracts or take legal action in their own name, further undermining the Claimant’s standing in this matter. Without clear evidence that the landowner has authorised the Claimant to take such action, the Claimant’s ability to enforce the parking charges is brought into doubt.

Conclusion

51. the Claimant has failed to meet the burden of proof required in this case. Despite making various assertions regarding the alleged contraventions and my supposed liability, the Claimant has not provided adequate evidence to substantiate their claim. Specifically:

(i) Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4: The Particulars of Claim (PoC) are deficient and do not provide sufficient detail about the alleged contravention. This prevents me from fully understanding the case against me and is a procedural failure that warrants striking out the claim, as per recent cases such as CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023].

(ii) Inadequate and Speculative Witness Testimony: The Claimant's witness statement, provided by a legal assistant with no personal knowledge of the events, is based largely on hearsay and fails to meet the standards set in CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2. This further undermines the reliability of the Claimant's evidence.

52. Furthermore, the Claimant has failed to establish the existence of a valid contract and has not demonstrated that the parking charge notices were issued in accordance with the law. The lack of adequate signage and the unlawful nature of the additional charges render the claim unsustainable. The Claimant's attempt to impose liability for these inflated charges is unsupported by both statutory law and leading case precedents.

53. There is also growing evidence that such claims, particularly those involving inflated charges, are knowingly misleading. The July 2023 DLUHC Impact Assessment revealed that the cost of debt recovery is far lower than the inflated charges being pursued, and the industry has been openly aware of this discrepancy. It is clear that such claims cause significant consumer harm, and it is in the public interest to prevent claims like this from proceeding.

54. In the matter of costs, I seek:

(i) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(ii) a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

55. Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

Coupon-mad

Long ... but looks on point for your case.

Typo here, should read "inadequacies are':

41. The claimant cannot now seek to argue that their inadequate (s) is excusable simply because I have pointed out their legal and procedural failings.

seaside_pillow

@Coupon-mad

Thank you so much for the feedback, I will go ahead and send it.

seaside_pillow

Hi everyone,

I might have missed this info in the "newbies" thread, but if it’s not there, it’s worth adding. The court will not print any attachments exceeding 25 double-sided pages (50 single-sided pages), as per Practice Direction 5B.

My first submission via email was rejected because it was over 50 pages. Luckily, I live close to the court and could hand-deliver the documents, but this could cause big delays if you're further away. Make sure to double-check your page count before submitting electronically!

Hope this helps someone avoid the same issue.

Coupon-mad

seaside_pillow said:

Hi everyone,

I might have missed this info in the "newbies" thread, but if it’s not there, it’s worth adding. The court will not print any attachments exceeding 25 double-sided pages (50 single-sided pages), as per Practice Direction 5B.

My first submission via email was rejected because it was over 50 pages. Luckily, I live close to the court and could hand-deliver the documents, but this could cause big delays if you're further away. Make sure to double-check your page count before submitting electronically!

Hope this helps someone avoid the same issue.

When is the hearing - this month?

Nellymoser

Petitions x 2 calling on Govt to protect motorists from the private parking industry. Please sign and share 🙏 

https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions?q=Private+parking+&state=recent

Good luck at court.

AdamBliss

Any update on this? @seaside_pillow

seaside_pillow

So just got this today through the post. 

And this was the only paper in the post, the supposed attached judgement is not even attached so can’t know @Coupon-mad

and what does “payable by 4pm March 2025.” even mean. When is the deadline to pay ?

FYI @AdamBliss , @Coupon-mad