CEL claim - stages after CCJ set aside

Coupon-mad

Absolutely DO NOT DELAY adding the Chan transcript!  Now.  Point out near the start that this is the same Claimant.

The word 'offence' is wrong.

And a 6 point Draft Order is old news, since Chan. You should not be asking for an order that lets you defend!   OMG no, you want the whole claim dismissed on the spot due to Chan, and your costs back in full.

Read recent CCJ set aside threads.

Can't recall any usernames but search for NEWEST results (using obvious keywords) and copy one that cites CEL v Chan in the WS (last month we had a few) AND has a 3 point Order.

Le_Kirk

1.4.3.     On HOPEFULLY TOMORROW I have wilfully willingly submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case. 

Look up willfully and see what it means!  You probably meant what I changed it for.  Using other people's WSs is OK but it does have to be checked for correctness of details, grammar and spelling.  I know that the error existed in the example you copied but it is still up to you to check.

1505grandad

A heads-up  -  there is no middle "e" in Judgment in this context  -  Google CCJ

CliveTreeHorn

Coupon-mad said:

Absolutely DO NOT DELAY adding the Chan transcript!  Now.  Point out near the start that this is the same Claimant.

The word 'offence' is wrong.

And a 6 point Draft Order is old news, since Chan. You should not be asking for an order that lets you defend!   OMG no, you want the whole claim dismissed on the spot due to Chan, and your costs back in full.

Read recent CCJ set aside threads.

Can't recall any usernames but search for NEWEST results (using obvious keywords) and copy one that cites CEL v Chan in the WS (last month we had a few) AND has a 3 point Order.

Great. Making amendments now. Is 'alleged incident' better than offence?

KeithP

CliveTreeHorn said:
 Is 'alleged incident' better than offence?

Yes.                       

Le_Kirk

....... and don't forget willfully to willingly

Coupon-mad

Or don't even use that old example!

CliveTreeHorn

Thank you @Coupon-mad @1505grandad @Le_Kirk @KeithP for the feedback - really appreciated. 

Update draft below:

WITNESS STATEMENT 
 
I am XXXXX and I am the Defendant in this matter. This is my supporting statement to my application dated XXXXX requesting to: 
 
a. Set aside the Default Judgment dated 18 April 2023 should be set aside under CPR 13.2 (a) as it was not properly served at my current address and order for the Claimant to pay the Defendant £275 as reimbursement for the set aside fee; 

CPR 13.2 states 
 
13.2 The court must set aside a judgment entered under Part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered because– 
 
(a) in the case of a judgment in default of an acknowledgment of service, any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied 
 
 
CPR 12.3(1) states 
 
12.3 
 
(1) The claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgment of service only if – 
 
(a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and 
 
(b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. 
 
The relevant CPR for acknowledgment of service is CPR 10.3 which states 
 
10.3 
 
(1) The general rule is that the period for filing an acknowledgment of service is – 
 
(a) where the defendant is served with a claim form which states that particulars of claim are to follow, 14 days after service of the particulars of claim 
 
 
CPR 6 deals with service. 
 
As I did not give an address to the claimant at which I could be served, primarily because I was not aware, CPR 6.9 applies. 
 
CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence." 
 
The claimant, having not obtained an address directly from the Defendant, and having obtained an address from a third party quite some time ago and received no response, did not have the requisite knowledge nor perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address in order to serve the claim form. 
 
b. Order for the original claim to be dismissed. 
 
1. DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

1.1.  I was the registered keeper of the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident. 

1.2.  I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 18 April 2023. I am aware that the Claimant is Civil Enforcement Ltd, and that the assumed claim is in respect of unpaid Parking Charge Notices from 24th March 2022 at CAR PARK NAME AND ADDRESS. I contest this charge for the reasons outlined in Part 2 of this defence. 

1.3 I was not aware of the claim made against me until I checked my credit file for the on the evening of the 3rd November 2023. This is when I found out the Claimant had obtained a default CCJ against me. 

1.4 The Claimant served the claim to an old address. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. 

1.5 The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the PCN on 24th March 2022 and the CCJ on 18th April 2023. 

1.6 I have not received any correspondence or notice regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 1.2 above. 

1.7 Whilst I am unsure which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed. 

1.8 I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed, I wish to have the opportunity to defend it properly as per CPR 13.3. 

1.9 I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order. 

 
 
1.10 The address on the claim is OLD ADDRESS. I moved to my current address at NEW ADDRESS on the 13th March 2020. In support of this I provide a copy of my completion statement, alongside a council tax and utility bill. 

1.11 The Defendant has not once received any communication on this matter, via either post or on-screen car ticket.  

1.13  In addition to the above, it should be highlighted that the integrity and law-abiding intention of the Defendant should be taken into consideration on the basis that; 
 

1.13.1   I discovered a CCJ was lodged onto my credit file on the evening of the 3rd November 2023. 

1.13.2     On 6th November 2023 I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgment 

1.13.3     On TODAY I have willingly submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgment and fairly present my case. 

1.13.4  I believe the Claimant has behaved unreasonably in pursuing a claim against me without ensuring they held the Defendant’s correct contact details at the time of the claim. 

1.13.5  On that basis, I believe the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had failed to show due diligence in using an address that the Defendant no longer resides. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence despite having 13 months to establish an address. This has led to a defective service and an irregular judgment. 

1.14  Considering the above I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £275 from the claimant should this request be successful. 
 
2. Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out 

 

2.1 The Defendant draws to the attention of the court that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, by the same Claimant Civil Enforcement Limited).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority. 
 

2.2 A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16.  On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4 (Exhibit xx-01). 

 

2.3 Similarly, at the Wakefield County Court on 8th September 2023, District Judge Robinson considered mirror image POC in claim K3GF9183 (Parallel Parking v anon) and struck the Claim out without a hearing. (See Exhibit xx-02) 

 
2.4 Likewise, in January 2023 (also without a hearing) District Judge Sprague, sitting at the County Court at Luton, struck out a similarly badly-pleaded parking claim with a full explanation of his reasoning. (See Exhibit xx-03) 

 
2.5 Furthermore, at Manchester District Judge McMurtrie and District Judge Ranson also struck out a claim (again without a hearing) on the grounds of POC’s lacking clarity, detail, and precision. As stated in the final image below, the Claimant’s solicitors confirmed they would not file an amended POC, demonstrating again the reliance of a number of firms on robo-letters and illegitimate practices. (See Exhibit xx-04) 

 
2.6 The Defendant believes the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.  The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. It remains uncertain whether the claim pertains to my alleged parking outside of a designated bay, failure to remain on the premises, incorrect bay parking, overstaying the allotted time, or perhaps a technicality associated with the entry process at the kiosk. This lack of specificity places me, the defendant, at a distinct disadvantage, as I find myself in the position of having to mount a defence without a clear understanding of the precise nature of the alleged violation.  

3. ORDER DISMISSING THE CLAIM    

3.1.  I further believe that the original Claim by the Claimant has no merit and should thus be dismissed. I understand the Claimant to be a Private Parking Company that issues “Parking Charge Notices” which the Claimant believes are due as a result of an alleged breach of contract for parking by a motorist. 

3.2.  I had an active parking permit, logged manually via a cash payment from the ticket machine at the time of the alleged incident and given the opportunity I would have appealed the ticket on this basis 

3.3.  For all or any of the reasons stated above, I ask the court of its own volition to strike out this claim and to order the Claimant to refund the Defendant's costs for attending, namely the £275 Court fee in bringing this set aside case, despite not being shown to be liable for any parking charge at all. 

3.4.  If required to defend at a further hearing, I will require all copies of paperwork, letters and other documentation including pictures of all signage from the Claimant in order to make informed decisions and statements in a comprehensive defence as alleged driver. 
 

4. THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM 

4.1 I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 18th April 2023. I am aware that the Claimant is Civil Enforcement Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice. 

4.2. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter, other than the brief case details emailed to me on 6th November 2023 from the courts, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as the electoral register, DVLA, HMRC. The Claimant did not have any contact with the Defendant, and thus should have considered they had obtained incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 25 - 32) 

4.3. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I carried out a credit check on 3rd November 2023. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3). 

4.4 As detailed previously in paragraph 1.10, the address on the claim is ADDRESS A. I moved from this address to my current address at ADDRESS B in 13th March 2020. 

4.5. The fact that there was no response from a series of letters sent to my previous address should have alerted the Claimant to the possibility that I was not residing there. Silence after sending a Notice to Keeper, a reminder and then a Letter before Claim is a clear indicator that the Registered Keeper may not live there. 

4.6 I believe the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which I no longer resided. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence, despite having some 13 months to establish a valid address. This has led to the claim being incorrectly served to an old address and an irregular judgment. 

4.7. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country. 

4.8 I did not receive a PCN on the windscreen of my car to notify me of the alleged charge. 

4.9 The failure to send communication to me regarding the PCN has meant that I have been unable to collect adequate evidence for the purpose of collating a defence, which has disadvantaged me in this matter.  My driving licence is also attached, issued on XXXXX, showing my correct address. 

  

5. THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED 

5.1 International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states; 

5.2 “Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings” 

CliveTreeHorn

6. DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE 

6.1 DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not, and notify of appeal rights. 

6.2 The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out. 

6.3 There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept'). 

6.4 A claim sent to an old DVLA registered keeper address with no soft trace checks (costing as little as 29 pence and offered free by debt collectors connected to the parking industry) fails to meet the IPC Code of Practice, fails to satisfy the specific 'pre-action Protocol for debt claims', and is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check a Defendant's address so that service is effective. 

6.5 Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £275 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

6.6 There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note: 

6.7 In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said 
 
6.8 "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments." 
 
6.9 The same sentiment was echoed by: 
 
6.10 HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014). 
 
6.11 HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012). 
 
6.12 In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, I would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014) 
 
6.13 As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe 
 
6.14 “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all." 
 
 
Statement of Truth: 
I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

  

DRAFT ORDER 
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT 

Civil Enforcement Limited (Claimant) 
And 

XXXXX (Defendant) 
 
District Judge 

UPON reading the Defendant's application dated TOMORROW and the annexed witness statement of XXXXX dated TOMORROW 

UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on 18th April 2023; 

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application; 

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's usual residential address; 

AND UPON more than 4 months having passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant on 18th April 2023 is hereby set aside. 

1. The claim should be struck out as more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings [date]. 

1. Costs of the application be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant in the sum of £275. 

CliveTreeHorn

Apologies, two sections were missed out:

7. CLAIM IS DEAD AS MORE THAN four MONTHS HAVE PASSED FROM THE ISSUE DATE OF PROCEEDINGS 

RELEVANT CASE LAW 

7.1 Case law precludes the court from resurrecting a dead claim more than 4 months after it was improperly served and does not give the courts any scope to do so. 

7.2 There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.” 

7.3 In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out."  

7.4 In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity. 

7.5 “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...] 

7.6 In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...] 

7.7 Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...] 

7.8 The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.” 

7.9 In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so. 

7.10  CPR 12.3(1) states that a Claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): 

7.11 “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a). 

7.12 I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable. 

7.13 This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

 
 

8. THE CLAIM IS DEAD 

8.1 Continuing a dead claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5).  

8.2 The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim is dead. 

8.3 The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address. 

8.4 If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address. 

8.5 This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).