PCM Claim Form time to write a defence

Johnson2015

Also, my landlord has drafted a letter in support. The letter states that I am a resident, I have use of a marked bay and visitor bays requiring a permit. Would this "witness statement" help with the proceedings or would it hinder things? I can post a redacted version here if that would help?!? Jumping the gun a bit, but I like to be organised. 

Coupon-mad

Not if your PCN is for not displaying a permit. Remind us what your PCN is for?

Johnson2015

Coupon-mad said:

Not if your PCN is for not displaying a permit. Remind us what your PCN is for?

They said the permit was damaged or a copy. 

Johnson2015

Did I not post my 3rd draft here the other day?? Has it been removed? 🤔

Le_Kirk

Johnson2015 said:

Did I not post my 3rd draft here the other day?? Has it been removed? 🤔

The last/latest defence you posted was on 31st March and you received feedback that you would be better off using the template defence and putting your particular circumstances into it - nothing since.

Johnson2015

Le_Kirk said:

Johnson2015 said:

Did I not post my 3rd draft here the other day?? Has it been removed? 🤔

The last/latest defence you posted was on 31st March and you received feedback that you would be better off using the template defence and putting your particular circumstances into it - nothing since.

Gosh!!! I seriously need to give my head a wobble.

OK! here is the latest/3rd draft @Coupon-mad please could I get some input for sections 8 and conclusion. TIA

N.B Was unable to post full defence as too many characters. It is the same layout as the one previously posted except for this part below

Alternative Defence - Failure to set out clearly parking terms
8. In the alternative, the Defendant relies upon Parking Eye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any breach of parking terms were clear - both upon entry to the site and throughout.
8.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.
8.1.1. At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation;
8.1.2. The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the Independent Parking Committee’s ("IPC") Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory; and
8.1.3. The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgment of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3

8.2. The Defendant avers that the residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context, with Parking Eye distinguished.

8.3 The Particulars of Claim do not give any reasons why the Claimant requires a payment other than it results from ‘breaching the terms of parking on the land’. Signage displayed at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  are forbidding signs that cannot create a contract. In the cases of B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B, B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L it was demonstrated that forbidding signage at residential parking spaces did not create a contract.

8.4. There is no evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.
8.4.1. As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner.
8.4.2. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, and of course all enforcement dates/times/days, and the boundary of the site - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do, and when/where.
8.4.3. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is authorised on the material date, to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).
8.4.4. Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.
8.4.5. Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic but crucial information such as the site boundary and any bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the only restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge, as well as the date that the parking contract began, and when it runs to, or whether it runs in perpetuity, and of course, who the signatories are: name/job title/employer company, and whether they are authorised by the landowner to sign a binding legal agreement.
8.4.6. Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:
(i)  If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.
(ii) The written authorisation must also set out:
- the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined by any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation;
- any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement;
- who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs;
- the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

9. This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

10. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

11. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

12. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as this claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

13. The DLUHC consulted for over two years, considering evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt/robo-claim firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate these claims with 'costs/damages' in addition to the strictly capped legal fees the small claims track allows.  

14. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

15. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone these unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage.

Conclusion
16. It is denied that the Claimant has any entitlement to the sums sought, as the claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.
16.1. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

17. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(i) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and;
(ii) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

18.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))." 

19. It is admitted that interest may be applicable, subject to the discretion of the Court on any sum (if awarded), but it is denied that interest is applicable on the total sums claimed by the Claimant.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Date: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Coupon-mad

I don't think you need any of the stuff in para 8 (the Template Defence - start again and simply use it - already covers insufficient signage) and if the bit before that is still banging on about the POFA, then you don't need that either.

And here (if you use this phrase) you obviously don't leave it saying both 'his/her':

8.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.

Johnson2015

Coupon-mad said:

I don't think you need any of the stuff in para 8 (the Template Defence - start again and simply use it - already covers insufficient signage) and if the bit before that is still banging on about the POFA, then you don't need that either.

And here (if you use this phrase) you obviously don't leave it saying both 'his/her':

8.1. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was, without prejudice to his/her primary defence above, inadequate.

No problem. 

Just to clarify

1. remove para 8
2. Remove all of section 5
3. Add the below copied from TD

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  To pre-empt the usual template responses from this serial litigator: the court process is outside of the Defendant's life experience and they cannot be criticised for using, in part, pre-written wording suggested by a reliable online help resource. The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence. 

5. With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case.  In breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims, no copy of the contract (sign) accompanied any Letter of Claim.  The POC is sparse on facts and specific breach allegations, which makes it difficult to respond in depth at this time; however this claim is unfair, generic and inflated.  

6.  This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

7. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

8. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

9. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as this claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

10. The DLUHC consulted for over two years, considering evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt/robo-claim firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate these claims with 'costs/damages' in addition to the strictly capped legal fees the small claims track allows.  

11. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

12. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone these unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage.

13. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts which it is hoped overrides mistakes made in a few appeal cases that the parking industry desperately rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).

14.  Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals saw Circuit Judges led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon these, the Defendant avers that errors were made in every case.  Evidence was either overlooked (including signage discrepancies in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted parking contract in Beavis. Those learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of information as the DLUHC, whose incoming statutory Code of Practice now clarifies such matters as a definition of 'parking' as well as consideration and grace periods and minor matters such as 'keying errors' or 'fluttering tickets/permits' where a PCN should not have been issued at all, or should have been cancelled in the pre-action dispute phase.

POFA and CRA breaches

15. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred. 

16. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

17. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer.  Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith. 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished (lack of legitimate interest/prominence of terms)

18. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must each be determined on their own facts.  That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, and took into account the prominent yellow/black uncluttered signs with £85 in the largest/boldest text.  Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

19. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'.

20.  In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver.  Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous 'penalty' was seen or agreed.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio).  

21. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike." 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

22. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

23.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  

Conclusion

24. The claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

25. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

26. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

27.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:

Coupon-mad

You don't need to show us any of the Template Defence.

Just your paras 2 and 3 that slot into it.

Johnson2015

Coupon-mad said:

You don't need to show us any of the Template Defence.

Just your paras 2 and 3

below is my paras 1 to 3 and then I will slot in above the TD

Thanks again!

Preliminary
1. The Particulars of Claim lack specificity and are embarrassing. The Defendant is prejudiced and is unable to prepare a full and complete Defence. The Defendant reserves the right to seek from the Court permission to serve an Amended Defence should the Claimant add to or expand his Particulars at a later stage of these proceedings and/or to limit the Claimant only to the unevidenced allegations in the Particulars.

1.1. The Particulars of Claim fail to refer to the material terms of any contract and neither comply with the CPR 16 in respect of statements of case, nor the relevant practice direction in respect of claims formed by contract or conduct. The Defendant further notes the Claimant's failure to engage in pre-action correspondence in accordance with the pre-action protocol and with the express aim of avoiding contested litigation.

Background
2. It is admitted that at all material times the Defendant was the registered keeper of vehicle registration mark XXXXX which is the subject of these proceedings. The vehicle was insured with xxxxxxxxxx with xxx named drivers permitted to use it.

2.1. It is admitted that on xxxxxxx the Defendant's vehicle was parked at xxxxxxxx

2.1.2 It is denied that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle.
2.2. The Claimant has provided no evidence (in pre-action correspondence or otherwise) that the Defendant was the driver.
2.2.1. To the extent that the Claimant may seek to allege that any such presumption exist, the Defendant expressly denies that there is any presumption in law (whether in statute or otherwise) that the keeper is the driver. Further, the Defendant denies that the vehicle keeper is obliged to name the driver to a private parking firm. Had this been the intention of parliament, they would have made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those provisions do not apply to this matter.

Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract
3. It is denied that the Defendant or lawful users of his/her vehicle were in breach of any parking conditions or were not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and tenant of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, whose tenancy agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was a1n absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant allocated bay, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle or the requirement to display a parking permit. A copy of the lease will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given.

3.1. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

3.2 Accordingly it is denied that:
3.2.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
3.2.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
3.2.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.