PE discontinued at the site of the Beavis case! (Alleged overstay, Equality Act defence)

Coupon-mad

Have you got photos of this as they repaired the signs in late Summer, we saw other pics:

I had a look at the situation at that car park earlier, and whilst there definitely are several reasonably-sized signs, I noticed that several of them were in disrepair - including the biggest one at the entrance to the car park, where half of the tiny contract text had been ripped away, and that they'd previously changed their 3 hour max stay into a 2 hour one, and had literally just stuck the new terms over the top of the old terms on every sign. 

drellix

Good to know that, CM - I'd obviously much rather be present to fight this anyway.

It just frustrates me that I followed both the advice from yourselves and the instructions from the Courts to an asbolute tee, yet I now have to deal with this nonsense. Forgive me for sounding petulant, but this situation genuinely is the Court's issue, not mine, and yet it's now apparently on me to sort it out. It's sickening.

drellix

Coupon-mad said:

Have you got photos of this as they repaired the signs in late Summer, we saw other pics:

I had a look at the situation at that car park earlier, and whilst there definitely are several reasonably-sized signs, I noticed that several of them were in disrepair - including the biggest one at the entrance to the car park, where half of the tiny contract text had been ripped away, and that they'd previously changed their 3 hour max stay into a 2 hour one, and had literally just stuck the new terms over the top of the old terms on every sign. 

That quote is regarding the pictures I then sent on page one of this thread. I have two more photos of beaten-up signs, too, but they're much more readable compared to those I've already shown you.

Having dug them out, they're attached here:

As you can see, more readable, but not lit, and they've stuck multiple stickers over each other. Probably "not good enough", though, but the ones on page one really ought to be sufficient for showing the signage back then was subpar. I can use the new signs as evidence that the old ones weren't fit for purpose.

Coupon-mad

These might help with your WS bundle:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/80289922#Comment_80289922

And I hear you and agree about the delays and bad admin by the courts that disadvantages and harms consumer defendants.  The issues are caused by this industry.  It is the tsunami of parking claims that started about a decade ago and became worse when bulk litigators jumped on this bandwagon.

PARKING CLAIMS NOW NUMBER HALF A MILLION P.A. - SHOCKINGLY, THAT'S A THIRD OF ALL CASES ON THE SMALL CLAIMS TRACK.

You are JUST IN TIME to do this vital Inquiry to call upon the Justice Committee to keep parking cases out of court:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/80452012#Comment_80452012

Please read and do it!

Closes this Thursday. 

drellix

Thanks CM. Those photos are excellent. I'll also respond to that call for evidence this evening.

drellix

I sent my WS to the Courts and the Claimant exactly 14 days before the 7th of Feb - I can attach it below later today. I also asked the Courts on the same day via an N244 to change the hearing date, knowing I'd have to pay, but hoping to claim my costs back.

I got an email today from PE, CC'ing in the Court, attaching a Notice of Discontinuance.

Wahoo!

I've emailed the Court to ask them to award costs, as is recommended for a late discontinuation. Luckily I never got around to actually paying the £275 to change the hearing date.

I'd also just like to thank everyone in this thread (and the other one for BW Legal and NCP) for helping throughout this whole debacle. You lot do the Lord's work.

I will make a point of sticking around and offering advice where I can. Now that I know that even Claims at Beavis can be effectively countered with a solid Defence and WS, it feels right to pass that knowledge on.

WS and Schedule of Costs to be uploaded this evening for reference.

Not_A_Hope

Good result. Well done Drellix

drellix

Witness Statement of Defendant

1. <I'm the Defendant and this is all my own work>

2. This Witness Statement shall refer to Exhibits within the evidence pack submitted alongside it, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My Defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Facts and Sequence of Events

3. Date, time, and location of the events in question: XX, XX, 2022, at Riverside Retail Park in Chelmsford.

As I am a regular visitor to this retail park, I do not recall the specific details which led to the alleged infractions that resulted in this alleged “parking charge”. The date in question is unremarkable, and the events in question took place some nine months prior to the receipt of the Claim Form, some fourteen months prior to the date upon which this hearing was decided by the Court, and some twenty months prior to the original set date for this hearing of Wednesday, February 7th, 2024.

4. Sparse particulars and evidence submitted by the Claimant: The Claimant alleges in their Particulars of Claim that their “ANPR system captured vehicle XXXXXXX entering and leaving the site on XX/XX/2022, and overstaying the max stay period” (see Exhibit 01). The images provided in their response to my Defence are only of this vehicle in transit (see Exhibit 02). No other images of the vehicle were provided. This is not evidence of driver overstay; and the timings themselves are misleading: not only was it ruled in ParkingEye v Ms X. (Altrincham 17/03/2014) that driving to find a parking spot is not the same as parking, but there is a McDonald’s drive-thru located wholly within the boundaries of the retail park, whose customers, despite not parking, would nevertheless be captured upon that ANPR system. No indication of the length of this overstay is provided; it implies that the Claimant is aware of the spurious nature of the Claim itself. The Claimant mentions in their response to my Defence that there is a character limit for the text field in which to provide Particulars, yet the text provided comes nowhere close to this limit; this implies that the Claimant either preferred to omit some of the most important details of the Claim despite this limit, not because of it; or had simply used a pre-defined generic template, which they, along with the rest of the private parking industry, are well-known for.

5. No indication of grace period or observation period despite BPA Code of Practice requirements: Clause 13.3 of the latest British Parking Association (“BPA”) Code of Practice (version 8 – January 2020) (“the BPA CoP”) states that “a Grace Period of at least 10 minutes must be added to the end of a parking event before you issue a PCN”. Note the use of the word “must”; in their response to my Defence, the Claimant repeatedly accuses me of overstaying “by 25 minutes”, which, given the timestamps of the ANPR photographs of XX:XX:XX XM and XX:XX:XX XM, implies that these mandatory guidelines were never considered by the Claimant. When applying the absolute barest minimum interpretation of these mandatory guidelines, the extent of any overstay would amount to a mere six minutes when correctly rounded, which is no basis for a Claim of this proportion nor timescale. This is not the only mitigating factor: Kelvin Reynolds of the BPA explicitly states that there remains a clear difference between “grace periods” and “observation periods” – that being time taken to review any rules in place – in private parking situations, and that good practice allows for this: “The BPA’s guidance specifically says that there must be sufficient time for the motorist to find the space, park their car, observe the signs, decide whether they want to comply with the operator’s conditions and either drive away or pay for a ticket. No time limit is specified. This is because it might take one person five minutes, but another person ten minutes depending on various factors, not limited to disability”. The miniscule discrepancy afforded by a needlessly strict application of these guidelines to any motorist would be considered unfair by any reasonable individual, notwithstanding any further points made in this Witness Statement. Note, again, the use of the word “must” by Mr. Reynolds in reference to the guidelines outlined in the BPA CoP. A fair and proportionate application of either a reasonable grace period, observation period, or both, would have certainly impacted upon the Claimant’s ability to make an unreasonable and spurious Claim such as this one. It is heavily implied that the basis for this Claim is not because of any genuine infraction, intentional or otherwise, by myself, but because these serial litigators have a vested interest in making as many Claims towards as many unsuspecting motorists as possible. This is not how any reasonable firm outside of the unregulated private parking industry would apply its own guidelines, yet the Claimant to this day continues to waste the time of the Courts with spurious, punitive, disproportionate, and needlessly-time-consuming Claims such as this one. Even if this were my sole reasoning – which it is not – I believe that this point alone should be enough for any Court in the country to strike out this Claim in its entirety.

6. Protected characteristics allow for time-based ‘reasonable adjustments’: Both myself and my mother (the latter of which is a likely passenger of the vehicle in question), possess conditions which are more than adequate to meet the definition of disability within the Equality Act 2010 (“the Act”), section 6(1), and are protected characteristics: I received an XXXXX diagnosis in XXXXXX 19XX (see Exhibit 03†), whilst my mother possesses a valid disability ‘Blue Badge’ for the XXXXXX diagnosis she received in XXXXXX 20XX (see Exhibit 04). According to government guidance surrounding the Act, both conditions would be categorised as “substantial”, “long-term”, and “progressive”, meeting the criteria, and both are listed as qualifying conditions within the Act itself. Service providers are required to allow “reasonable adjustments”, which may be applied in all retail situations, including parking situations, for people with such protected characteristics as defined in the Act, section 29(7a). In addition, although the particulars of a protected characteristic do not need to be divulged for the Act to be effective, the Courts are obliged to consider the fairness and proportionality of contract terms in light of the Act in any case, as is outlined in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“the CRA”). As my mother is likely to have been an occupant of the vehicle during this parking event, her badge would be prominently displayed upon the dashboard, and the vehicle would be parked in a disabled bay. Therefore, even if the BPA CoP was adhered to in the most minimal terms for a ten-minute grace period, and the advice of Mr. Reynolds regarding observation periods was wholly disregarded, any subsequent application of reasonable adjustments, as legislated by the Act and further applied by the CRA, would be enough to account for the six-minute discrepancy that constitutes the entirety of the Claimant’s basis for this Claim, which I reiterate is completely disproportionate to any alleged infraction made by myself.

7. Deterioration of all signage: The BPA CoP Section 19, Paragraph 19.2 states that “(operators) must use signs to make it easy for (drivers) them to find out what your terms and conditions are”. The Claimant leans extremely heavily, as expected, on the landmark ruling of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, which concerned the same Claimant and the same retail park, to back up this Claim; and, at the time of the landmark ruling in Beavis at the Supreme Court, the fair condition of the signs were used as clear evidence of the validity and binding nature of any contract formed between Mr. Beavis and ParkingEye. Seven years after the fact, the deterioration of those exact same signs, down to the stickers themselves, do not merely imply but plainly show that this is no longer the case. Any reasonable person would agree that the signage at the area at the time of the events in question was in demonstrably atrocious condition (see Exhibits 05-07). I had noticed for quite some time this state of disrepair, to the point that the state of the signs had become practically unnoticeable to me. Having lived in this area all my life, I genuinely believe that the signs in this area, had, up to the date of the events in question, not been received any substantial update in at least the seven years since that landmark ruling was made, given that the Beavis ruling’s example of adequate signage (see Exhibit 08) is – aside from damage – absolutely identical to those, now in disrepair, that I show in Exhibits 05-07. No sign that I would have looked at during that visit would have been fully legible. This therefore is yet another aspect of the conduct of the Claimant that goes directly against the mandatory guidelines of the BPA CoP, as Section 19, Paragraph 19.3 states that “signs must be conspicuous and legible…easy to see, read and understand.” Again, I draw the Court’s attention to the word “must”. If the Claimant believes that the signs constitute a contract, as they make clear that they do multiple times in their response to my Defence, then I argue simply that nobody can be expected to read, understand, and act upon anything written upon a sign which is itself illegible, and therefore no contract can be bound, legally or otherwise, between myself and the Claimant. To further illustrate my point, each example of signage provided by the Claimant in their response to my Defence (see Exhibits 09a, 09b, and 09c) may be precisely refuted by each of my images of the exact same signs, taken at a later date, which show clearly the full extent of the damage accrued (see Exhibits 05-07).

8. New signage installed at a later date: Appendix B of the BPA CoP states that signs “should be placed so that is it readable by drivers without their needing to look away from the road ahead.” Since the date of events in question, I have been reliably informed that ParkingEye has finally replaced these signs, specifically the entrance sign, which was previously located on a dog-leg bend, which therefore distracts the driver. One cannot safely turn a vehicle nearly ninety degrees to the right and read a sign at the same time. Whilst the guidelines only say “should” in this instance, the presence of these newly-erected signs, along with the relocation of the one previously at the entrance to the car park, implies two things: both that a clear need for clarification was present at the time prior to this mass-signage upgrade; and that the previous signage eventually became entirely inadequate in communicating anything whatsoever, let alone the provision of any contract, to the average motorist.

drellix

9. Updated maximum stay duration times: In addition to the above, I have also been made aware that, since the date of events in question, ParkingEye has restored the maximum stay duration at this retail park back to the three hours as recorded at the time of the Beavis ruling, from the two hours as recorded at the date of events in question. The Claimant repeatedly sates in their response to my Defence that the alleged length of time of my original stay was “2 hours and 25 minutes”. This change to the maximum stay duration therefore indicates a clear acknowledgment by ParkingEye that the previous maximum stay duration was inadequate, whilst also showing that, had this parking event taken place today, it would have been unremarkable, and no Claim would be pursued. Given the steps that the government has began to take in regulating the private parking industry, I genuinely believe that this is a case of ParkingEye “jumping before being pushed”, as a shorter maximum stay naturally lends itself to higher numbers of Claims made per year for this car park.

10. ANPR is not fit for purpose, and cannot be given as sole evidence: I have, since the date of the event in question, been made aware of the ANPR cameras mounted atop otherwise unremarkable poles at the entrance and exit of the car park (see Exhibit 10). The Claimant and government alike have been made aware of the insufficiency of ANPR camera systems for the purposes of tracking customers at private car parks; indeed, the Claimant makes a point to earmark several pages of their response to my Defence for protesting specifically against this government-acknowledged fact. I work in technology and know how these cameras operate due to a matter of course; I therefore genuinely believe that this particular Claim is an example of an ANPR “double-dip”. This is a phrase used specifically by the Government’s Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (“DLUHC”) in their February 2022 private parking Code of Practice (“the DLUHC Code”). Whilst the DLUHC Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry, and, in one fashion or another, some iteration of the DLUHC Code stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of private parking operators to adhere to the otherwise self-serving BPA CoP. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing “market failure” multiple times in this document, a phrase which should be a clear steer for the Courts, in 2024 and beyond, to scrutinise every single aspect of Claims such this one. In addition, and in the same document, the government made it clear that ANPR cannot be relied upon alone to sign off any sort of parking charge; it is the sole reason for the government’s own blanket-banning of such camera systems in all council and local authority car parks. Even if these particular arguments are dismissed, according to both guidance within the DLUHC Code, as well in the BPA CoP, all ANPR camera evidence for private parking events “must also be accompanied by manual checks” performed by an actual human being. Again I draw the Court’s attention to the use of the word “must”; BPA members are required to carry out these manual checks to discount the possibility of “orphan images” generated by ANPR camera systems between multiple visits within a 24-hour period, which are often wrongly read as one period of parking, because ANPR defaults to only saving the “first-in, last-out” images of matching vehicle registrations within a 24-hour period. This specific knowledge, which is known by government and private parking operators alike, is otherwise entirely disregarded by this Claimant in their response to my Defence, despite it being the single most important factor in falsely-issued parking charges; and it is entirely to the Claimant’s benefit to do so. Within the context of any visit in which ANPR cameras are used as the sole evidence by the Claimant, the Courts should consider that it is entirely possible for the parking event in question to be no such singular event at all; it may have been two or more separate valid visits made within the same 24-hour period. There are multiple ways in which this may have happened for the events in question in this specific Claim, to the point where I genuinely and completely believe that an instance of ANPR double-dip has occurred: for instance, I may have returned to the area to return an item, to buy a forgotten item, to visit the gym located on the premises, to drop off my mother, to pick her up, or to visit the drive-thru; this list is hardly exhaustive. As only I can speak as the true witness to the events in question, and no photographic evidence of any sort was submitted to accompany these ANPR camera images, any further specifics cannot possibly be determined, and therefore this Claim ought to fail based on the fact that ANPR evidence alone is not sufficient to issue parking charges of any nature.

11. Inappropriate usage of ANPR: I would also like to highlight the inappropriate use of ANPR by this Claimant, which breaches the UK General Data Protection Regulations 2018, (“UK GDPR”) and fails to comply with the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) ‘Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Cameras and Personal Information' (“the ICO Code”) regarding data captured by ANPR. This kind of practice transgresses the tests of fairness and transparency of consumer contracts, as set out in the CRA, which was enacted after the final hearing in the landmark Beavis case and not considered in that case: “In keeping with the principle of fairness and transparency, it is important that you inform individuals you are processing their personal data. The way to do this is through clear and visible signage explaining that ANPR recording is taking place and, if possible to do so, the name of the controller collecting the information. While it is a challenge to inform motorists that they are being overtly monitored, there are methods you can use, such as physical signs at entrances, posts on official websites and social media.” Given the aforementioned atrocious state of signage at this car park during the date of events in question, I genuinely believe that the inability of the Claimant to keep its own flagship car park in the same condition as it was at the time of the Beavis ruling despite making “healthy” year-on-year profits (see Exhibit 12b) shows that they are in violation of statutory law through this lack of transparency towards motorists who use this car park. Furthermore, this lack of transparency, alongside the lack of ticketing machines and clear indication of the existence and positioning of the ANPR system which they continue to rely on to churn out spurious, unreliable, and unreasonable Claims such as this one, is an obvious example of abuse of process, which I genuinely believe greatly disadvantages customers at the Riverside Retail Park since the date of the final Supreme Court Beavis ruling.

12. Generic template used with incorrect details: In their response to my Defence, the Claimant accuses the me of using a generic template distributed on online forums. I would like to draw the Court’s attention to the sheer hypocrisy of this Claim: not only is that introductory and non-numbered paragraph itself an obviously templated statement, but I genuinely believe that all correspondence that I have ever received (or requested through a Subject Access Request (“SAR”), where multiple physical letters have conveniently failed to show up at my easily-findable service address) from the Claimant, including email correspondence, were created using generic, auto-fill templates used for bulk Claims by this serial litigator. In particular, I draw specific attention to Exhibits 11a-11c, which demonstrates photographs of the Claimant’s letter with repeated paragraphs (11a), and, in spite of their own Claim, an incorrect amount for the original parking charge (11b compared to 11c). These all confirm my suspicions that this firm uses autofill templates, but, moreover, shows that the Claimant does so without any due consideration, diligence, or even accuracy, because they know that a scattergun approach to the business of making Claims against average and unsuspecting motorists generates just as much money, if not more, than if they operated in a less overtly dishonourable manner.

13. Materially different circumstances from the Beavis landmark ruling: Aside from the obvious facts that this hearing takes place some nine years after the Beavis case and that the Defendant is different, that particular Supreme Court decision sets a high bar for parking firms, not a blanket precedent. The material conditions which affected the final outcome of the Beavis case turned on a “complex” and compelling legitimate interest (see Exhibit 12a), very clear notices where the terms were held not to invoke any lack of good faith or “perceived pitfall or trap” (see Exhibit 12b), and confirmed that the penalty rule is certainly engaged in any case of a private parking charge and was only disengaged due to the unique circumstances of that case (see Exhibit 12c). The state of repair of signage at the date of events in question was such that it would be impossible for myself to understand any information relating to a perceived contract between myself and the Claimant; significant commercial changes both within and near to the site in question have taken place within a seven-year, now nine-year, period which render any underlying “scheme serving legitimate interests” in Beavis to no longer apply to this particular case; and, notwithstanding the deterioration of signage, the admission of both government and the private parking industry at large that ANPR is not sufficient to sign off any parking charge implies that the terms of any such perceived contract are now under significantly heavier scrutiny in 2024 than they were in 2015. Therefore, I genuinely believe that, without the material conditions of the Beavis case to uphold this particular Claim, the evidence “as seen on the day” should be given greater precedence; that is to say, only my evidence as the single true witness to events in question, as ANPR camera evidence is not sufficient to issue parking charges of any description and the Claimant is yet to provide strict proof of any parking infraction by myself.

Conclusion

14.  Without the Beavis case to rely on, and with what the Defendant genuinely believes  to be a combination of multiple factors which tip the scale in favour of a serial litigator, namely: a lack of concrete evidence; a tacit acknowledgement of both the heavily deteriorated signage and unfit-for-purpose maximum stay period; the protected characteristics of myself and any other likely occupants of the vehicle; government and private parking industry acknowledgement alike of the insufficiency of ANPR systems alone; the extremely likely possibility of an ANPR double-dip; the miniscule six-minute discrepancy if one uses the harshest definition of a “grace period” and ignores the “observation period” entirely, or the lack of application of any “reasonable adjustments” in the face of an otherwise slight and unintentional perceived overstay; it is clear that this Claim is entirely without merit, and should be totally struck out. The Defendant’s genuine belief is simple: that it is in the public interest that Claims like this one – particularly due to its over-reliance on a now outdated landmark ruling at the same location despite fundamentally different material conditions – should be struck out in its entirety, because knowingly weak parking Claims such as this one, made by serial litigators such as this Claimant, both clog up the Courts unnecessarily and cause consumer harm on such a grand scale that even this current government, who have their own myriad laundry list of blunders, are starting to take initiative to regulate the industry.

15.  In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14,

b) At the time of writing, only evidence of the submission of the enquiry to change the original hearing date may be presented, in the form of the email sent to the Court, the response in writing, and the subsequent N244 sent by email to the Court (see Addendums 01-03). If the Defendant is ordered to pay a sum to the Court (understood to be in excess of £100 at the time of submission of this Witness Statement) for the changing of this hearing date, then the Defendant asks for costs relating to the rescheduling of this hearing, pursuant to the relevant CPR sections;

and c) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.

16.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to Claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a Claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Statement of truth:

17. <SoT>

Exhibits

01. Sparse particulars of Claim by the Claimant – no indication of timings

02. ANPR images of vehicle XXXXXXX entering and exiting the premises

03. XXXXXX diagnosis of the Defendant

Evidence of this would be provided here, but, as of the date of submission of this Witness Statement, I am yet to receive the relevant documentation from my General Practitioner. If this documentation arrives prior to the final hearing date, then I shall submit it via email to the Court as a late addition; I will also inform the Claimant.

04. Disability ‘blue badge’ for XXXXXX; the Defendant’s mother. Face redacted for privacy.

05. Deterioration of entrance signage

06a. Deterioration of periodic signage: extreme peeling and deformation due to light and heat damage

06b. Deterioration of periodic signage: significant peeling and deformation due to light and heat damage

06c. Deterioration of periodic signage: significant deformation and discolouration due to light and heat damage

07. Deterioration and needlessly-high placement of ANPR signage

08. Adequate signage, as determined by the Beavis case (pre-Claim: 2015)

09a. Original state of entrance signage (pre-Summer 2023)

09b. Original state of periodic signage (pre-Summer 2023)

09c. Original state and positioning of ANPR signage (pre-Summer 2023)

10. Clandestine placement of ANPR cameras

11a. Automation/templating in the Claimant’s response to Defence: repeated paragraphs

11b. Automation/templating in the Claimant’s response to Defence: wrong charge

11c. Automation/templating in the Claimant’s response to Defence: original PCN

12a. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis 2015: Paragraph 98

12b. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis 2015: Paragraph 193

12c. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis 2015: Paragraph 198

Addendums

01. Email enquiry regarding the changing of the original hearing date

02. Letter from the Court requesting an N244 or Consent Order to change the hearing date

03. Email sent attaching an N244, requesting to change the hearing date

drellix

Defendants Cost Application

1. CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) but that this does not apply to Claims allocated to the Small Claims Track (r.38.6(3)). However, the white book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a Claimant in a case allocated to the Small Claims Track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(g))."

2. On this basis, I would like to request a Costs Order to be made against the Claimant, given that they have behaved unreasonably by their conduct: starting from the very point of issuing a spurious parking charge without providing clear Particulars of Claim nor any material supporting evidence from a human witness, instead relying solely on ANPR “evidence” of entering and leaving the car park in question, knowing full well that this cannot constitute evidence without accompaniment by physical human checks.

3. Then, sending a copy-pasted and templated Response to Defence wherein they did not check either their evidence or even get the costs demanded from their initial PCN/NTK correct, which was received by myself long-after the deadline demanded by the Courts;

4. Then, after nearly twenty months of harassment via the Courts – in which, due to a tsunami of cases such as this one submitted by both the Claimant and other private parking operators in the interim, amounting to a third of all Small Claims cases in 2023 alone, caused multiple significant delays resulting in an original hearing date set several months after the six month time period specified by the Courts in the N180 Directions Questionnaire at question E5, and forcing me to send a N244 to the Court specifying a requirement to change this hearing date and therefore potentially incurring additional costs –  doing precisely the same thing with a copy-pasted and late-received Witness Statement;

5. And, finally, culminating in the final insult of sending an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance, immediately after having received my own Witness Statement.

6. The Defendant avers that this poorly pleased Claim – with spurious to no detail in the Particulars, near-total reliance upon the landmark ruling of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, which concerned the same Claimant and the same retail park, but is otherwise entirely distinguished due to time and lack of care and attention by the Claimant to this car park, and, despite updating both their signage and max stay period as tacit proof of their acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of their Claim, still advancing it to the Witness Statement stage anyway – and then the extremely late discontinuance (after I had chosen to submit the N244 to change the hearing date and therefore pay the £275 charge to do so for an in-person hearing, though luckily no payment had been made)), amounts to an obvious attempt to ambush, at multiple stages, a litigant in person with allegations never specifically pleaded in the Particulars, nor properly outlined in either their Response to Defence or Witness Statement, then abandon that Claim leaving the Defendant with the burden of costs.

7. This is a gross abuse of process; sanctions ought to be imposed upon the Claimant. The Defendant relies upon para 41 of Mitchell v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [2014] 1 WLR 795 which is re-iterated in para 24 of Denton v T H White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, and asks for costs on the indemnity basis.

8. Costs Schedule attached.

Defendant’s Schedule of Costs

Ordinary Costs:

£95.00 – Loss of Earnings/Leave for the original hearing date (capped at £95, latest payslip attached, at approx. £XXX daily, £XX hourly)

£95.00 SUBTOTAL

Ordinary Costs (applicable only if the Court still requires payment)

£275.00 – Cost of N244 order to change the original hearing date

£275.00 SUBTOTAL

Further Costs for Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 27.14(2)(g):

£228.00 – Research, preparation and drafting of documents (6 hours for Defence, 6 hours for Witness Statement, at Litigant in Person rate of £19 per hour)

£15.00 Stationery, printing, photocopying and postage

£243.00 SUBTOTAL

 

£613.00 TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED (IF THR COURT STILL REQUIRES PAYMENT)

£338.00 TOTAL COSTS CLAIMED (OTHERWISE)