Old Claim Form for unpaid PCN for incident over 3 years ago

Coupon-mad

Who said it was the wrong place to park? Why are you assuming fault by the driver?

Troublesum1

Coupon-mad said:

Who said it was the wrong place to park? Why are you assuming fault by the driver?

Good point, so best to leave that out completely? Here is a first draft for my defence:

1.       The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that a contract was entered into - by conduct or otherwise - whereby it was ‘agreed’ to pay a ‘parking charge’ and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue, nor to form contracts in their own name at the location.

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2.       It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question but liability is denied. The identity of the driver at the material time is unknown to the Defendant. The Defendant was not the only insured driver of the vehicle in question and is unable to recall who was or was not driving on that unremarkable day, almost four years ago. 

3.  The Defendant was issued with a Claim Form by Legal Team acting on behalf of the Claimant Spring Parking Limited for a Total amount of £298.28 (inclusive of £35 Court Fee & £50 Legal representative's costs). This relates to a PCN that was issued against the Defendant’s vehicle XXXXX nearly four years ago on X, 2019 at Old Address 

4. The Defendant as the registered keeper of the vehicle in question notes that they cannot be held liable due to the Claimant not complying with the ‘keeper liability’ requirements set out in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('PoFA'), Schedule 4

5. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  The Defendant should not be criticised for using some pre-written wording from a reliable source.  The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence. This Defendant signed it after a great deal of research, after adding facts and reading the defence through several times because the court process is outside of their life experience and this claim was an unexpected shock.

6.  With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking cases, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a generic and incoherent statement of case.  Prior to this and in breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims, there were no photos nor a copy of the contract (sign) enclosed with any Letter of Claim.  The POC is sparse on detail or facts about the alleged breach, making it difficult to respond in depth at this time.

7. Following on from where it is noted that the Claimant has elected not to comply with the 'keeper liability' requirements set out in PoFA, Claimant has included a clear falsehood in their POC which were signed under a statement of truth by Yasmin Mia - Claimant’s legal representative who should know (as the Claimant undoubtedly does) that it is untrue to state that the Defendant is 'liable as keeper'. This can never be the case with a Highview claim because this parking firm, same as any Group Nexus company, have never used the POFA 2012 wording, of their own volition. Not only does the POC include this misleading untruth, but the Claimant has also added an unidentified sum in false 'damages' to enhance the claims.  So sparse is their statement of case, that the Claimant has failed to even state any facts about the alleged breach or the amount of the parking charge that was on the signage, because it cannot have been over £100. Which then leads to the question of how they arrive at the Amount Claimed for a Total of £213.28 (The Defendant has excluded the £35 Court Fee & £50 Legal representative's costs for the purposes of this defence point) 

8. PATAS and POPLA Lead Adjudicator and barrister, Henry Michael Greenslade, clarified that with regards to keeper liability, “There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver and the operators should never suggest anything of the sort” (POPLA report 2015).

9. The Defendant does recall receiving multiple "debt collection" letters over the years that can only be described as extremely threatening and harassing in nature from multiple different senders (there was always a different name/company). The letters all appeared to demand immediate action on the part of the Defendant and gave rise to the feeling that they must be part of some sort of scam. It felt like the Defendant was being harassed in to hastily handing over money (with ever changing amounts) in order to avoid further costs down the line, court visits and an impending CCJ that would impact on the Defendant livelihood. The Defendant ignored these threatening “Debt Collection” type letters believing that they could be part of a scam.

10.     The quantum and interest has also been enhanced.  It is denied that the sum sought is recoverable and a significant chunk of this claim represents a penalty, per the authority from two well-known ParkingEye cases.  Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the same modern penalty law rationale was applied, yet here, the learned Judge also considered added 'costs'.  The parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then 'admin costs' inflated it to £135.  At paras 419-428, HHJ Hegarty sitting at the High Court (decision ratified by the CoA) found that adding £60 to enhance the sum sought to £135 'would appear to be penal', i.e. unrecoverable.

11.  The Defendant's stance regarding this punitive add-on is now underpinned by Government intervention and regulation.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published on 7 February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice which all private parking operators must comply with, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

12.  Adding 'debt recovery' costs, damages or fees (however described) on top of a parking charge is banned. In a very short section called 'Escalation of costs' the new statutory Code of Practice now being implemented says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued."  

13.    This particular Claimant's legal team routinely continues to pursue a sum on top of each PCN, despite indisputably knowing that these are banned costs.  The claim is exaggerated by inclusion of a false, wholly disproportionate and unincurred 'damages' enhancement of £60 or £70 upon which the Claimant seems to have also added interest at 8% calculated from the date of parking.  Clearly an abuse of the court process.

14.  The DLUHC considered evidence and took over two years to consult a wide mix of stakeholders before deciding this contentious issue.  According to the DLUHC, almost a fifth of all respondents in 2021 'called for the proposal to be scrapped and debt collection to be banned altogether'.  This despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. The DLUHC saw through this and exposed as fact, in its published Response to the Technical Consultation (also on 7/2/22) that some respondents were 'parking firms posing as motorists'.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis and are effectively Trade Body Board member colleagues passing motorists' data around electronically and inflating parking charges.  This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the full parking charge itself more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called a 'letter chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.

15.   The Ministerial Foreword to the new Code is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

16. These are now banned costs which the Claimant has neither paid nor incurred, and were not quantified in prominent lettering on signage. Introducing the purported 'costs' add-on in later debt demands is a moneymaking exercise to extract a high fixed sum from weaker motorists, and came far to late.  The driver did not agree to it.

17.  Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, it was brought in due to the failure of the previous two competing (self-serving) BPA & IPC codes of practice and the Ministerial Foreword is indisputably talking about existing cases when declaring the add-on to be 'designed to extort money'. A clear steer for the Courts from now on.

18. This overrides the mistakes and presumptions in the appeal cases that the parking industry had been relying upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).  Far from being persuasive or assisting with clarifying the law, regrettably these one-sided appeals were findings by Circuit Judges who appeared to be inexperienced in niche private parking law and where the litigant-in-person consumers had no financial wherewithal to appeal further.

19. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon those old cases, significant errors were made.  Evidence - including unclear signage and Codes of Practice -was either ignored, even when in evidence at both hearings (Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to regulatory DVLA KADOE rules requiring landowner authority) or the judgment referred to the wrong rules, with one Judge seeking out the inapplicable BPA Code after the hearing and using it erroneously (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver, was inexplicably aligned with Beavis. The learned Judges were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC.

20.   The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties.  It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing.  He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice.  He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #5 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed.  It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

Troublesum1

21.  Pursuant to Sch4 of the POFA at 4(5), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a parking firm has complied with its other requirements (denied in this case).  It is worth noting that even though the driver was known in Beavis, the Supreme Court considered the POFA, given that it was the only legislation specifically dealing with parking on private land.  There is now also the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 with a new, more robust and statutory Code of Practice being introduced shortly, which evolved because the two Trade Bodies have failed to properly govern this industry.

POFA and CRA breaches

22.  Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with the other requirements (e.g. adequate signage, correct wording and dates of Notice to Keeper, and the existence of a relevant contract/relevant obligation that was properly communicated).  The Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance, if seeking keeper/hirer liability under the POFA, because liability is not accepted by the Defendant. 

23.   Claiming unexpected ‘costs/damages’ on an indemnity basis is stated to be unfair in the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the official Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA goes further than the UTCCRs, introducing a requirement for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices' (i.e. signage and any other notices/communications, including the timely service of any PCN in parking cases).

24.   Section 71 provides for the duty of court to consider the test of fairness. This includes whether all terms and notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of the consumer.  In the case of letters/the PCN, this means such communications must have been served.   In the case of signage, this must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and the terms clear and unambiguous.  The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and having regard to the requirements for transparency and good faith and as guidance, examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule2.  

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

25.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 PCN and overcame the possibility of it being dismissed as punitive.  However, their Lordships were clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in these cases.  Their decision mentioned a 'unique' set of facts including the legitimate interest, site location and prominent, clear signs with the parking charge in the largest/boldest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuading Judges that these charges are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts (and in particular, the brief and conspicuous yellow/black warning signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

26.   Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  

27.  The Supreme Court held that the intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can a firm claim an unconscionable sum. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests.

28.   The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding any person reading them.  Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen, known or agreed.

29.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, include:

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (the ‘red hand rule’ case) and

(ii)                Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

both leading authorities confirming that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii)                 Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000,

where Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.  The CoA held that it was unsurprising that Miss Vine did not see the sign, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In many cases where parking firm Claimants have cited Vine in statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio.  

30. Fairness and clarity of terms and 'consumer notices' are paramount in the new statutory Code and this stance is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In the November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed:  "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike." 

 

Lack of landowner authority evidence and lack of ADR

31.  DVLA registered keeper data is only supplied to pursue parking charges issued on private land, where there is an independently signed landowner agreement (this is part of the KADOE rules for AOS BPA or IPC members).  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, etc. and there has been no evidence that the freeholder authorises this Claimant to issue PCNs at the place where the vehicle was and/or for the reasons given.  Nor is it known what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are or were.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of same and that they have standing to enforce charges by means of civil litigation in their own name.

32. The Defendant further avers that the Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).  Both the rival parking Trade Bodies provided 'appeals services' which reportedly fail to consider facts and rules of law properly, and find in favour of parking firms most of the time: e.g. despite purporting to be decided by legally qualified Adjudicators, the IPC's version upheld appeals in just 4% of decided cases, as reported in their 2020 Annual Report.  Both POPLA and the IAS will be replaced by the DLUHC's new Appeals Service as soon as possible and looking at the Appeals Annex in the new Code, disputed cases such as this would very likely have been cancelled without the need for court, had a proper ADR existed.  The fact is, there was no fair ADR on offer and - whether or not a defendant engaged with it - the Claimant's reliance upon it is not something that should sway the court into a belief that a fair process was followed before litigation.

33.  In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) that, in the event of a late Notice of Discontinuance (which the Defendant is aware happens where parking firms use and abuse the court process as a cheap form of debt collection) any paid-for hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing. The Defendant may seek a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and may seek costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.  CPR r.38.6 states that the claimant is liable for the defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) but this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))." 

 

Conclusion

31.  The abusive conduct by parking firms operating under previous Codes (described by several District Judges as 'self-serving') has caused consumer harm on a grand scale.  The Defendant believes that knowingly inflated claims such as this should not be allowed to continue, and invites the court to dismiss the false 'costs' element at least, and to consider whether an appropriate sanction is to resume the policy of striking out enhanced parking claims altogether.  With the DLUHC's ban on additional costs, there is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCS to only deal with the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings and to allow such claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers every year, who suffer inflated CCJs or pay more than they should at or before Letter of Claim stage.

32.   The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court's time and that of the Defendant. 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

---

It's pretty generic, should I be looking to add anything? Any advice would be greatly appreciated, I would like to submit this tomorrow as I believe the deadline is Wednesday.

Many thanks

Coupon-mad

That first paragraph is not from the template defence. I have no time to check the rest but use the template defence without alterations, except for your added facts (paras 2 & 3 onwards).

You current draft paragraph 3 says nothing at all that the Judge doesn't already know, so remove it.  Replace it with some facts about the location and why a driving family member may have been using the site (shopping? Visiting a relative who lived in a flat there?).  Your para 3 tells the Judge nothing.

Coupon-mad

And please ONLY show us your added words, not the whole template!

Troublesum1

Coupon-mad said:

That first paragraph is not from the template defence. I have no time to check the rest but use the template defence without alterations, except for your added facts (paras 2 & 3 onwards).

You current draft paragraph 3 says nothing at all that the Judge doesn't already know, so remove it.  Replace it with some facts about the location and why a driving family member may have been using the site (shopping? Visiting a relative who lived in a flat there?).  Your para 3 tells the Judge nothing.

Many thanks for your reply Coupon. Sorry I've just got confused I'm reading another thread where you seem to suggest this is a new template? https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/79049943/#Comment_79049943 Very probable I've just read this wrong.

In any case I assume the following is the correct first point from the template:

1. The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the Particulars.

Here are my 2. & 3.

2.       It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question but liability is denied. The identity of the driver at the material time is unknown to the Defendant. The Defendant was not the only insured driver of the vehicle in question and is unable to recall who was or was not driving on that unremarkable day, almost four years ago.

3. Defendant does not recall the PCN in question nor any correspondence related to the PCN. Defendant kept spare key for car which was accessible by many family members and close friends. The location of the incident was the Defendant's place of residence so any driver could have plausibly parked the vehicle in an attempt to return the vehicle to the owner. The Defendant was issued with a Claim Form by Legal Team acting on behalf of the Claimant Spring Parking Limited for a Total amount of £298.28 (inclusive of £35 Court Fee & £50 Legal representative's costs). This relates to a PCN that was issued against the Defendant’s vehicle XXXXX nearly four years ago on X, 2019 at Old Address 

Coupon-mad

Remove this and add in something about primacy of contract / your rights of way and wording from your old lease instead:

"The Defendant was issued with a Claim Form by Legal Team acting on behalf of the Claimant Spring Parking Limited for a Total amount of £298.28 (inclusive of £35 Court Fee & £50 Legal representative's costs). This relates to a PCN that was issued against the Defendant’s vehicle XXXXX nearly four years ago on X, 2019 at Old Address."


Did you miss the residential defence example wording, shown in a link or two in the NEWBIES thread?

You've got no wording about your rights as tenant or leaseholder and 'derogation from grant' / 'primacy of contract' which are phrases we'd expect to see in any residential defence.

Mouse007

Read this

http://parking-prankster.blogspot.com/2016/11/residential-parking.html

And at least add these 2

In Pace v Mr N C6GF14F0 [2016] it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

In Link Parking v Ms P C7GF50J7 [2016] it was also found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

What did your lease say about parking? Was the permit system included in that or imposed upon you at a later date?

Troublesum1

Coupon-mad said:

Remove this and add in something about primacy of contract / your rights of way and wording from your old lease instead:

"The Defendant was issued with a Claim Form by Legal Team acting on behalf of the Claimant Spring Parking Limited for a Total amount of £298.28 (inclusive of £35 Court Fee & £50 Legal representative's costs). This relates to a PCN that was issued against the Defendant’s vehicle XXXXX nearly four years ago on X, 2019 at Old Address."


Did you miss the residential defence example wording, shown in a link or two in the NEWBIES thread?

You've got no wording about your rights as tenant or leaseholder and 'derogation from grant' / 'primacy of contract' which are phrases we'd expect to see in any residential defence.

Thanks Coupon. So the reason I didn't drill into that side of things is because I did not have a permit at the time of the incident to park in the residential parking. I had been put on the waiting list to gain a permit at the price of £50 per month (I might have an email loosely proving this). I also don't know where my tenancy agreement is for this particular tenancy. In the case that what I've just said doesn't stop me from using the defence you've suggested is the following what I'm looking for?

Authority to Park and Primacy of Contract
6. It is denied that the Defendant or lawful users of his/her vehicle were in breach of any parking conditions or were not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and leaseholder of [address], whose tenancy agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant allocated bay, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle or the requirement to display a parking permit. A copy of the lease will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given.

7. The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

7. Accordingly it is denied that:
7.1. there was any agreement as between the Defendant or driver of the vehicle and the Claimant
7.2. there was any obligation (at all) to display a permit; and
7.3. the Claimant has suffered loss or damage or that there is a lawful basis to pursue a claim for loss.

Troublesum1

Mouse007 said:

Read this

http://parking-prankster.blogspot.com/2016/11/residential-parking.html

And at least add these 2

In Pace v Mr N C6GF14F0 [2016] it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

In Link Parking v Ms P C7GF50J7 [2016] it was also found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

What did your lease say about parking? Was the permit system included in that or imposed upon you at a later date?

Thank you very much Mouse I'm only just seeing this post. I will read the link thoroughly and add the points you suggested. I actually managed to find my tenancy agreement from that time and the only thing I can see on parking is the following:

The Tenant acknowledges they have been made aware that as part of the Landlord’s planning obligations (1.1. under Schedule 4 of the S106 Agreement) the Tenant or any resident or occupier of XXX is not permitted to use or apply for a permit to park a vehicle in a place designated in an Order made under section 45(2) of the Road Regulation Act 1984 (unless the occupant is the holder of a disabled person’s badge issued pursuant to section 21 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970).

Doesn't make any sense to me actually.