DCB Legal Letter of Claim - UKPC

preloved1416

The bold was the only addition not from the template so I could track changes and will be removed (thank you), should I add anything else from the template or do you think the above is sufficient to submit?

Coupon-mad

Everything is included from the Template Defence, usually. Although I know your Judge wasn't keen.

preloved1416

Hmm, maybe I should just include the entire template including the reference to Henderson v Henderson.

Coupon-mad

Well to please a Judge, you can certainly trim the template of certain waffle - for example you were right to remove the comments of Will Hurley of the IPC, as that commentary changes nothing and your Claimant isn't in the IPC.

I think your version didn't remove anything important.  

preloved1416

Okay great, thank you. I will review one more time, read back your comments and share a finalised version tomorrow. Thank you again for your help and insights! 

preloved1416

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  

Between

UK Parking Control Limited

(Claimant) 

- and -  

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1.       The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. 

2.       The Claimant has previously issued another claim, number XXXX, against the Defendant with substantially identical particulars (except for dates), for the same cause of action, PCNs that should have been pleaded in that claim. The first claim has ruined my credit rating by causing a CCJ by default. The issuing of two separate claims, by the same Claimant and for essentially the same cause of action, is an abuse of the civil litigation process. The long-established case law in Henderson -v- Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313, establishes the principle that when a matter becomes the subject of litigation, the parties are required to advance their whole case.  In Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 3 All ER 41 the court noted that cause of action estoppel “…applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter.” The decision is still good law, and has been cited with approval numerous times, including Aldi Stores v WSP Group plc [2008] 1 WLR 748 and Henley v Bloom [2010] 1 WLR 1770. The Court is invited to strike out the second claim due to cause of action estoppel and to apply appropriate sanctions against the Claimants for filing two abusive and exaggerated claims. 

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

3. It is admitted that on the material dates the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question.

4. The driver was a patron at Costa Coffee shop within the retail park and is therefore a genuine customer.

5. The Particulars of Claim ('POC') appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action”. It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, and the Defendant will dispute the claim the wholly invented 'damages' and extortionate interest (wrongly applied to those false damages) in the event that the court does not strike this claim out due to the doctrine of ‘cause of action estoppel' taken as a preliminary legal point by the Defendant, in paragraph 2 above.

6. The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case is being pursued. 

7. The POC are entirely inadequate, in that they fail to particularise (a) the contractual term(s) relied upon; (b) the specifics of any alleged breach of contract; and (c) how the purported and unspecified 'damages' arose and the breakdown of the exaggerated quantum. 

8. The claim has been issued via Money Claims Online and, as a result, is subject to a character limit for the Particulars of Claim section of the Claim Form.  The fact that generic wording appears to have been applied has obstructed any semblance of clarity.  The Defendant trusts that the court will agree that a claim pleaded in such generic terms lacks the required details and requires proper particularisation in a detailed document within 14 days, per 16PD.3 

9.  This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

10. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

11. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

12. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

13. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts which it is hoped overrides mistakes made in a few appeal cases that the parking industry desperately rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).

14. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred. 

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

15. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

16.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  

 

Conclusion

17. The claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

18. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

19. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

20.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Coupon-mad

Looks fine except you have 'my' credit rating. Should be 'the Defendant's credit rating'.

I'd remove 13 and 14 to make it even more on point for the Judge, in case it's the same one.  Dropping 13 and 14 won't hurt.

And add as shown:

4. The Defendant was a patron at Costa Coffee shop within the retail park and was therefore a genuine customer.  Any breach of a 'relevant obligation or relevant contract' is denied.  Further, the Claimant is put to strict proof of adequate notice of a parking charge such that it was prominently brought to the attention of the Defendant, which is expressly denied.

preloved1416

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  

Between

UK Parking Control Limited

(Claimant) 

- and -  

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1.       The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. 

2.       The Claimant has previously issued another claim, number XXXX, against the Defendant with substantially identical particulars (except for dates), for the same cause of action, PCNs that should have been pleaded in that claim. The first claim has ruined the Defendant’s credit rating by causing a CCJ by default. The issuing of two separate claims, by the same Claimant and for essentially the same cause of action, is an abuse of the civil litigation process. The long-established case law in Henderson -v- Henderson [1843] 67 ER 313, establishes the principle that when a matter becomes the subject of litigation, the parties are required to advance their whole case.  In Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 3 All ER 41 the court noted that cause of action estoppel “…applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter.” The decision is still good law, and has been cited with approval numerous times, including Aldi Stores v WSP Group plc [2008] 1 WLR 748 and Henley v Bloom [2010] 1 WLR 1770. The Court is invited to strike out the second claim due to cause of action estoppel and to apply appropriate sanctions against the Claimants for filing two abusive and exaggerated claims. 

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

3. It is admitted that on the material dates the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question.

4. The Defendant was a patron at Costa Coffee shop within the retail park and was therefore a genuine customer.  Any breach of a 'relevant obligation or relevant contract' is denied.  Further, the Claimant is put to strict proof of adequate notice of a parking charge such that it was prominently brought to the attention of the Defendant, which is expressly denied.

5. The Particulars of Claim ('POC') appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action”. It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, and the Defendant will dispute the claim the wholly invented 'damages' and extortionate interest (wrongly applied to those false damages) in the event that the court does not strike this claim out due to the doctrine of ‘cause of action estoppel' taken as a preliminary legal point by the Defendant, in paragraph 2 above.

6. The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case is being pursued. 

7. The POC are entirely inadequate, in that they fail to particularise (a) the contractual term(s) relied upon; (b) the specifics of any alleged breach of contract; and (c) how the purported and unspecified 'damages' arose and the breakdown of the exaggerated quantum. 

8. The claim has been issued via Money Claims Online and, as a result, is subject to a character limit for the Particulars of Claim section of the Claim Form.  The fact that generic wording appears to have been applied has obstructed any semblance of clarity.  The Defendant trusts that the court will agree that a claim pleaded in such generic terms lacks the required details and requires proper particularisation in a detailed document within 14 days, per 16PD.3 

9.  This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

10. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

11. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

12. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

15. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

16.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  

 

Conclusion

17. The claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

18. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

19. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

20.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

preloved1416

I am hoping to send to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk today as I submitted my AOS on 30th May.

Coupon-mad

Looks ready to sign, date and send!