NCP parking ticket- I won!

Umkomaas

Normally the 'client' would be the PPC, not the solicitors. So if you are addressing your letter to NCP, I would refer to BWL as 'your solicitors', not 'your client'. 

Le_Kirk

Eminowa said:

Coupon-mad said:

Not just silly., NOT part of the POFA.  Unlawful to demand more than the POFA requires. 
 Your wife properly transferred liability, so she has no liability.  Counterclaim.

As you and your client are aware that I was not the driver of the vehicle in all issued PCN's you have outstanding against vehicle XXXXXXX, I want to make it clear that you and your client BWlegal will face a counterclaim of no less than £500. This is on the basis that you are knowingly harassing and processing the data of the wrong person, without reasonable cause (breaching KADOE as well as the DPA 2018).

After providing the name and serviceable address of the driver, your client BWlegal are is asking for a signature from myself me and the driver. This is not part of POFA.  It is unlawful to demand more than the POFA requires. 
I have giving given [or I am giving] you and your client 14days to either transfer liability to the driver and withdraw the county court claim or I will be  Counterclaiming £500 for harassment and discrimination of a disabled person.

Couple of changes, you have also left the VRM showing.  You do mention the counterclaim twice, you might want to reword it so it is only mentioned once.

Eminowa

Le_Kirk said:

Eminowa said:

Coupon-mad said:

Not just silly., NOT part of the POFA.  Unlawful to demand more than the POFA requires. 
 Your wife properly transferred liability, so she has no liability.  Counterclaim.

As you and your client are aware that I was not the driver of the vehicle in all issued PCN's you have outstanding against vehicle XXXXXXX, I want to make it clear that you and your client BWlegal will face a counterclaim of no less than £500. This is on the basis that you are knowingly harassing and processing the data of the wrong person, without reasonable cause (breaching KADOE as well as the DPA 2018).

After providing the name and serviceable address of the driver, your client BWlegal are is asking for a signature from myself me and the driver. This is not part of POFA.  It is unlawful to demand more than the POFA requires. 
I have giving given [or I am giving] you and your client 14days to either transfer liability to the driver and withdraw the county court claim or I will be  Counterclaiming £500 for harassment and discrimination of a disabled person.

Couple of changes, you have also left the VRM showing.  You do mention the counterclaim twice, you might want to reword it so it is only mentioned once.

Thanks. I have actioned and sent it to the PPC.  Should i send bwlegel a copy too?

Le_Kirk

If you do, make sure it is marked as a copy otherwise the way it is worded doesn't make sense.

Eminowa

Le_Kirk said:

If you do, make sure it is marked as a copy otherwise the way it is worded doesn't make sense.

I sent  it to just the PPC only.  Hopely, it comes out positive.  Thanks 

Coupon-mad

You have your defence deadline diarised I assume.

Eminowa

here is a draft copy of my wife's defends. all comments welcomed

IN THE COUNTY COURT

 

Claim No: XXXXXXXX

 

Between

 

       NATIONAL CAR PARKS LIMITED (NCP)

 

(Claimant)

 

    - and - 

 

     MRS XXXXXXXXXXXX                      

 

 (Defendant)

 

      ____________________

 

                                                                              DEFENCE

 

        ____________________

 

 

1.       The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that a contract was entered into - by conduct or otherwise - whereby it was ‘agreed’ to pay a ‘parking charge’ and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue, nor to form contracts in their own name at the location.

 

 The facts as known to the Defendant:

 

2.  It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper, not the driver of the vehicle in question and liability is denied.  

 

3. The defendant first heard about the parking charge in June 2020, after which the defendant informed the claimant of the driver details for all four PCN’s. In August 2020 the defendant received multiple phone calls, text messages and debt recovery letters from the claimant. The defendant has clearly given the details of the driver to the claimant, but the claimant continued to harass the defendant who just lost her mum in August 2020.  The Defendant cannot be held liable due to the Claimant not complying with the ‘keeper liability requirements set out in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4.

 

A contract requires three elements, Offer, Consideration and acceptance. This contract would have been with the driver, not the registered keeper who is the defendant, in this case, therefore it is denied that any contract with the claimant was formed.

 

The claimant is aware that the defendant was not the driver in this case, as this was made clear within the initial appeal for PCN 00001 and then again in the defendant's response email on  20th October 2020.  

 

Within the initial appeal made regarding PCN 00001 the defendant did not provide the driver details as there was no legal requirement to do so and found that the claimant failed to comply with The Protection Of Freedoms Act 2012. 

 

The defendant informed the claimant that PCN 00001 failed to comply with the requirements of Schedule 4 of The Protection Of Freedoms Act 2012 namely, but not limited to, failing to give the invitation to the registered keeper in the format prescribed by section 9 (2) (e) of the Act 

 

The claimant was also made aware of the failure to state the period of parking as the PCN only stated the time the PCN was issued. There was no mention of how long the parking observation took place or the period of parking as required by 9 (2) (a) of the same act. The claimant also failed to state that the creditor does not know both the name and a current address for service for the driver as required by (8) (2)(e)(fii)

 

The defendant made it clear in February 2021 that any further contact will be seen as harassment and contact should only be made to confirm the cancellation of the PCN. The claimant and their debt collection agency ignored this and continued to harass the defendant.

 

 

The defendant gave the claimant 14days to transfer liability to the driver and cancel the N1 claim and the defendant made it clear that the claimant will face a counterclaim on the basis of knowingly harassing and processing the data of the wrong person, without reasonable cause (breaching KADOE as well as the DPA 2018).

 

 

 

 4.  The Particulars of Claim set out an incoherent statement of case and the quantum has been enhanced in excess of any sum hidden in small print on the signage that the Claimant may be relying upon.  Claiming ‘costs/damages’ on an indemnity basis is stated to be unfair in the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, CMA37, para 5.14.3.  That is the official Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA 2015') legislation which must be considered, given the duty in s71.  The Defendant avers that the CRA 2015 has been breached due to unfair terms and/or unclear notices (signs), pursuant to s62 and with regard to the requirements for transparency and good faith, and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 and 18 in Sch2.  NB: this is different from the UTCCRs considered by the Supreme Court, in that there is now a requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair.

 

5.       It is denied that the exaggerated sum sought is recoverable.  The Defendant's position is that this money claim is in part/wholly a penalty, applying the authority in ParkingEye cases (ref: paras 98, 100, 193, 198) ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 and para 419 of HHJ Hegarty’s High Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increasing ultimately to £135.  Much like the situation in this claim, the business model involved sending a series of automated demands to the keeper.  At para 419, HHJ Hegarty found that adding £60 to an already increased parking charge 'would appear to be penal' and unrecoverable.  ParkingEye had dropped this punitive enhancement by the time of Mr Beavis' famous parking event.

 

6.       Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of the cost of their standard automated letter-chain.  It is denied that the Claimants have expended additional costs for the same letters that the Beavis case decision held were a justification for the (already increased from the discount) parking charge sum of £85.  

 

7.  The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties.  It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing.  He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice.  He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #5 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed.  It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

 

8.  Pursuant to Sch4 of the POFA at 4(5), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a parking firm has complied with its other requirements (denied in this case).  It is worth noting that even though the driver was known in Beavis, the Supreme Court considered the POFA, given that it was the only legislation specifically dealing with parking on private land.  There is now also the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 with a new statutory code of practice being prepared, given that the two Trade Bodies have failed to properly govern this industry.

 

 

 

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

 

9.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being dismissed as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.  

 

10.       Their decision was specific to what was stated to be a unique set of facts: the legitimate interest/commercial justification, the car park location and prominent and clear signs with the parking charge itself in the largest/boldest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all parking charges are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and very conspicuous yellow/black signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

11.   Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  

 

12.   The Supreme Court held that the intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of the tests in Beavis.

 

13.       The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Sch2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was agreed.

 

14.   Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include:

 

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (the ‘red hand rule’ case) and

 

(ii)                Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

 

both leading authorities confirming that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

 

(ii)                 Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000,

 

where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In many cases where parking firm Claimants have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio.  To pre-empt that, in fact Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

 

15.   In the alternative, the Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence, of a chain of authority flowing from the landholder of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this Claimant to issue parking charges or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are, nor whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to act as an agent ‘on behalf of’ the landowner.

 

 

 

In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

 

16.   (a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

 

(b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a late Notice of Discontinuance.  The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases by this Claimant, and will seek further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

 

17.   The Defendant invites the court to find that this exaggerated claim is entirely without merit and to dismiss the claim.

Counterclaim

18. The Defendant repeats the defence above, in support of the counterclaim.  The Claimant was also served with a full response to their Letter Before Claim, in which the Defendant provided this Claimant with ample warning about the basis for this counterclaim and gave them every opportunity to take stock of their position and cease desist with their unlawful and harassing conduct without resorting to litigation.  The Claimant's course of conduct, beginning from 2019, has been wholly unreasonable, vexatious and unlawful.

 

Eminowa

draft defend continues

Counterclaim

 

19. This counterclaim is for damages for distress caused by the Claimant's multiple breaches of statutory duty.  The Defendant will rely upon the authorities of (i) Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46 and (ii) Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] EWHC B3 (Mercantile) and other similar authorities as well as primary statute law.  Further, the authority in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA 311 confirms that pecuniary loss is not necessary for compensation to be payable and that pure distress is enough.

20.  The bands of awards for injury to feelings, known as the Vento bands, have been updated from April 2020.  This stems from a landmark case from 2003 (Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police) where the Court of Appeal set out clear guidelines for Courts and Tribunals to apply when they are assessing injury to feelings awards for pure distress, as opposed to financial loss.  The Vento case decided that there is now an accepted quantum for compensation and courts have followed this guidance. In a judgment at the Leeds County Court, 3SP00071 - Blamires v LGO - which was a claim for damages including disability discrimination and a breach of the DPA, an award of £2,500 was granted as compensation for distress, so the Defendant believes this counterclaim is extremely reasonable, given the circumstances.  For claims presented on or after 1st January 2021, the new Vento bands are as follows:

• a lower band of £900 to £9,000 (less serious cases)

• a middle band of £9,000 to £27,000 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band), and

• an upper band of £27,000 to £45,000 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £45,000

21.  To simplify the counterclaim and to assist the court in determining the issue without complicated calculations, it is set - notwithstanding which allegation(s) succeed - at a single sum in compensation at the lowest end of established guidance in the Vento bands, pursuant to the following: 

a) damages for distress caused by the Claimants’ breach of statutory duties under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and misleading actions within the meaning of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, as amended by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”);  

b) damages for distress caused by breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 and General Data Protection Regulation ('the GDPR');

c) damages for distress caused by harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ('the PFHA') ref section 3;

 

Damages for distress caused by the Claimants’ breach of statutory duties under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and misleading actions within the meaning of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, as amended by the Consumer Protection Regulations (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”):

 

22.  The Claimant alleges that there was a contract formed at the moment of parking the car by which the Driver is bound.  Thus, this was a transactional decision within the meaning of the Regulations at 20(b) even though the Driver had no fair opportunity to read and discover the terms by which they would be bound.

23.  The Claimants behaviour seems to be an attempt to mislead the defendant in to thinking that liability cannot be transferred to the driver as the deadline has passed, when in reality the deadline had not passed as the defendant had transferred liability to the driver before court action commenced so the claimant had all the details required to pursue the party liable but instead started litigation processes against the wrong party. Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Schedule 4 states that the

4(1)The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

(2)The right under this paragraph applies only if—

(a)the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

From the notices to keeper received PCN 000001 does not comply with

9 (e)state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—

And Both Notice to keeper do not comply with

9 (2)The notice must—

 (a)specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;

In addition to this the article published by legal professionals part of SCS Law have made it clear if parking company receive driver details before commencing court proceedings then the parking company should pursue the driver.

Civil Procedure Rules 7.2, 1 defines starting proceedings as:

(1) Proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant.

Thus the claimant was fully aware of the driver before commencing court proceedings.

This misleading action questions the real intentions of the claimant as they are legally represented and fully aware of the liable party. The defendant is a litigant who knows they are not the liable party and although this fact was adequately expressed  to the claimant and their legal representatives, they continued to start litigation proceedings. The defendant made it clear that a claim in the name of the defendant would result to a counterclaim due to the unlawful processing of the Defendant’s data.  

24.  Accordingly the Claimants’ conduct amounted to:

(i) an unfair commercial practice which is prohibited under regulation 3 and 

(ii) a misleading action within the meaning of regulations 5 and 6, for which redress is available under regulation 27(J)(b) of the Regulations.

Damages for distress caused by breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 and General Data Protection Regulation ('the GDPR'):

 

25.  Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully.  The Claimants stand in breach of Article 5 (1) of the GDPR (the requirement for lawfulness, fairness and transparency).  Predatory pursuing of the wrong person is entirely at odds with those doctrines and despite the wishes of their principal to cancel this unfair charge, the Claimant's aggressive pursuit and abuse of the Defendant's data has continued.  Accordingly, the processing of my DVLA data was not “necessary for the performance of, or commencing, a contract” and nor was it necessary or justified under any other data processing excuse.  Distress is now included under Article 82 of the GDPR and the 2018 DPA. The Claimants had, and still have, no prospect of furthering their purpose and no legitimate cause to store and/or then to continue processing the Defendant's data. In accordance with Principles 1,2 and 5 of the Data Protection Principles they were not permitted to process or keep it. 

 

26.  The Claimants noted, photographed and stored the Vehicle Registration Mark then requested and received the Defendant’s personal data due to obtaining the registered keeper data relating to that vehicle, from the DVLA.  The purpose was to seek payment of the parking charge which is the subject of the Claimants’ claim. The VRM itself and the Defendant’s details are 'personal data' within the meaning of the DPA 2018 and the associated General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). 

 

27.  Accordingly, at all material times the Claimants were data controllers, and the Defendant a data subject, within the meaning of the Acts. The Claimants were thereby under a statutory duty to process the Defendant’s data only in strict accordance with the DPA 2018 and the GDPR Articles 5 (1)(a) and (b) and 6 (1)(f)). 

 

28.  Article 5 of the GDPR sets out seven key principles which lie at the heart of the general data protection regime. These are broadly the same as the DPA Principles. Article 5(1) requires that personal data shall be:

(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); 

(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; (‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’); 

(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’); 

(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed (‘storage limitation’); 

(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’).

 

29.  Article 5(2) adds that: “The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability').   Article 6(1)f of the GDPR states an exemption if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data. 

 

30.  The processing of the Defendant’s data should have ceased once the claimant was made aware of the driver details.  Did the Claimants have any legitimate cause to continue processing the keeper's data for the purposes of pursuing a parking charge.

 

 

32.  In summary for this allegation, the Claimants as data controllers were and continue to be in breach of their statutory duty under the Acts as follows :-

 i) by obtaining the Defendant’s personal data from the DVLA without a lawful basis, contrary to the DPA Principles and GDPR article 5(1)(a) and (b)

 ii) after receiving the driver details, processing the Defendant’s personal data unlawfully and unfairly and for a purpose other than pursuing the Claimants’ legitimate interests, contrary to the DPA 2018 and GDPR article 5 (1) (a) and (b) and article 6 (1)(f);

 iii) by retaining the Defendants’ data after the purpose for obtaining it (if any) had ended

 

Damages for distress caused by harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ('the PFHA') ref section 3:

 

33.  It is alleged that the Claimant's conduct has crossed the line into harassment and that it has breached the PFHA, which states:

(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct—

(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and

(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.

(2) For the purposes of this section [or section 2A(2)(c)], the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to [or involves] harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.

(3) Subsection (1) [or (1A)] does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows—

(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime,

(b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or

(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.

 

34.  None of the justifications in (3) above can possibly apply.   Despite the Defendant’s appeal, information of driver at the time and continuing reasonable responses, the Claimants persisted in aggressively and unjustifiably pursuing their unreasonable charge. The Claimant’s harassing course of conduct included sending, by themselves or through their agents and/or from Premier Parking Logistics Ltd, multiple demands threatening legal action and misleading the Defendant.  As the Defendant explained to both the debt collection agency and claimant that parking companies cannot arbitrarily impose a 28 day 'limit' on transferring liability before court action. In addition to this providing evidence from legal professionals to avoid litigation against the wrong person, The proper course of action was to transfer liability to the named driver or cancel the PCN but instead, the Claimant's hostile correspondence and threats of court action have been particularly intimidating over a period of time, leaving the Defendant feeling emotionally vulnerable.

35. The Claimants’ course of conduct in pursuing this spurious parking charge, including the issue of these proceedings, amounts to harassment within the meaning of section 1, Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  Instead of transferring liability to the named driver or cancelling the PCN, the Claimant embarked on a harassing course of conduct that has continued on several occasions and has plagued the Defendant, exacerbating anxiety, distress and symptoms of their medical conditions, causing loss of sleep and interfering with their peace of mind.  In all the premises, the conduct of the Claimant amounts to harassment under section 1 of the PFHA as well as harassment pursuant to the EA.  Accordingly the Defendant respectfully seeks damages pursuant to s3(2) of the PFHA.

Damages 

36.  By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Defendant suffered serious distress and anxiety as a result of the Claimant's conduct.   The 'thin skull' rules applies in that the Claimant must take its victim as they find them; the claim being served despite the Defendant's detailed response in pre-action communications.   It has taken - and continues to take - a monumental effort to deal with the aggressive conduct of this Claimant.  The Defendant has suffered substantial and exhausting distress which has impacted upon family life and respectfully seeks damages in the sum of £500 or such sum as the court sees fit.

 

AND THE DEFENDANT COUNTERCLAIMS:- 

37.

a). Compensation in the sum of: £500 or such sum as the Court sees fit including any award of aggravated damages at the court's discretion;

b). Court fees: £60.00 filing fee (if the Defendant does not get help with fees: applied for);

c).  Interest pursuant to s.69 of the County Courts Act 1984, at such rates / for such periods on the sums found due to the Defendant as the Court may deem fit;

d). Costs to be assessed.  As a result of the Claimants’ unreasonable behaviour, the Court is respectfully invited to order the Claimants to pay the Defendants’ costs on an indemnity basis, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rules, rule 27.14 (2) (g). 

 

 

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

 

I believe that the facts contained in this Defence and Counterclaim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

.

1505grandad

You must review that copy and paste relates to your own circumstances  -  for instance:-

Para 34  -  " The Claimant’s harassing course of conduct included sending, by themselves or through their agents and/or from Premier Parking Logistics Ltd, multiple demands threatening legal action and misleading the Defendant."

Coupon-mad

I'd remove this as it isn't needed and breaks up the flow of the point you are making about the POFA:

A contract requires three elements, Offer, Consideration and acceptance. This contract would have been with the driver, not the registered keeper who is the defendant, in this case, therefore it is denied that any contract with the claimant was formed.: