UKCPM Gladstones Hospital PCN Court Claim

Le_Kirk

I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that their case relies upon the signage at the site consulting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant

Did you mean this: -

I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that their case relies upon the signage at the site [strike]consulting[/strike] constituting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant

nosferatu1001

Every para must be numbered
Think about how you structure it. You want someone to be able to read, understand and get to the MEAT of your point quickly. For example, the section on the EA2010 talks a lot, but doesnt specifically state what the claimant failed to do to MAKE those "reasonable adjustments". For example, allowing more free time to park.

ishrav

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Don't exhibit your defence. the Judge and the C has that:
Do exhibit the Blue Badge as Exhibit 1.

Your WS looks good and includes stuff about the added £60, but make sure you also take to court Sch 2 of the CRA 215, as per CEC16's thread. I assume you've read that case and know what happened in November at Southampton court, even though you haven't been here for months?

Search the forum for Jack Chapman signature and do the same complaint (please) to the SRA as everyone else, as soon as you get the WS with Jack Chapman's facsimile signature in it. You can also mention this in your WS.

You also need a costs schedule at this stage.

Thank you Coupon-mad. I haven't received their WS yet but will definitely complain when I do.
I'm going to make a start on the Costs schedule asap.

For the following, should I highlight any particular bits or just send the print-outs of the schedules/paragraphs as is?

- Paragraphs 98, 193 and 198 of Supreme Court Judgment in Beavis v Parkingeye Ltd [2015]
- Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2
- Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Schedule 4

ishrav

Le_Kirk wrote: »

Did you mean this: -

Aah yes indeed. thank you Le_Kirk

ishrav

nosferatu1001 wrote: »

Every para must be numbered
Think about how you structure it. You want someone to be able to read, understand and get to the MEAT of your point quickly. For example, the section on the EA2010 talks a lot, but doesnt specifically state what the claimant failed to do to MAKE those "reasonable adjustments". For example, allowing more free time to park.

aah ok nosferatu1001. I get what you mean. I'm trying to change that right now

ampersand

ishrav,
Please ensure that a competent and articulate English language writer checks through everything before you send it.
Keith P gave you a lot of valuable input earlier which you didn't seen to acknowledge or incorporate.

ishrav

What other documents should I include as evidence. (I will add copies of the Disabled Badge as pointed out by coupon-mad

ishrav

ampersand wrote: »

ishrav,
Please ensure that a competent and articulate English language writer checks through everything before you send it.
Keith P gave you a lot of valuable input earlier which you didn't seen to acknowledge or incorporate.

sorry ampersand, I'm not actually sure what I've missed from Keith P's advice/input. I've been through the Newbies thread and followed the steps in post number 8. could you tell me what I should be doing please? thank you

ishrav

I've amended the WS and added the bits as suggested by coupon-mad: So i've left out the bits here where i list the exhibits and the bullet points with all the letters i've received from the Claimant/debt recovery agents/solicitors.

Equality Act 2010 Not Complied With

20. At the time of the alleged contravention, I was the holder of a valid Disabled Badge as my medical condition meant that I met the definition of disability under the Equality Act 2010 and I was therefore entitled to ‘reasonable adjustments’ by law.

21. Under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) a public service provider, like the Claimant, has a ‘duty to make reasonable adjustments’ in certain circumstances (Section 29 (7) EqA 2010). Where a provision, criterion or practice of the service provider puts disabled persons generally at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, the service provider is required to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage (Section 20(3) and Schedule 2(2), EqA 2010).

22.The Claimant is a member of the International Parking Community (IPC) Accredited Operator Scheme and has failed to comply with the ‘Reasonable Adjustments’ criteria of the EqA 2010 by not following the IPC’s Code of Practice General Terms regarding disabled motorists (Exhibit RN25):

7 Disabled motorists

7.1 Under the Equality Act 2010 it is your duty to make “reasonable adjustments” to assist disabled people to use any services you provide. It is incumbent on operators to determine what is necessary on their individual sites. Adjustments could include lowered pay and display meters, lowered signage and wider parking bays marked specifically for disabled drivers.

23. According to the EqA 2010, the duty of the service provider to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ is ‘anticipatory’. This means that they cannot wait until a disabled person wants to use their services, but must think in advance (and on an ongoing basis) about what disabled people with a range of impairments, such as mobility impairment, might reasonably need.

24. Chapter 5 of the Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice explains ‘indirect discrimination’ which may occur when a service provider applies an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice which puts people sharing a protected characteristic (such as disability) at a particular disadvantage. By penalising disabled motorists for parking on the location in question, the Claimant puts them at a disadvantage by prohibiting them from parking close to the hospital building which Blue Badge holders need to do in order to be able to get to it safely and easily.

No Contract Offered

25. I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that their case relies upon the signage at the site constituting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant as per Parking Eye vs Beavis. The ‘breaching of terms’ on the Particulars of Claim presumably refers to the supposed ‘contract’ formed by this signage.

26. In ‘Parking Eye vs Beavis’, on which the Claimant relies to justify this charge, it was found that a contract could exist because there was a meaningful ‘offer’ made to the Defendant (that of a licence allowing free parking for a set period of time) and that the Defendant’s agreeing not to overstay this period could constitute a ‘consideration’ in respect of this. There is no such ‘offer’ made by the signage in this case, no ‘contractual licence’, no ‘benefit of free parking‘ and no conceivable way I could have benefitted from this alleged ‘contract’ without breaching its terms.. The ‘Parking Eye vs Beavis’ judgement is littered with references to the disputed charge being justifiable only in the context of the ‘contractual licence to park’ being given to the Defendant, e.g. ‘They must regard the risk of having to pay £85 for overstaying as an acceptable price for the convenience of parking there’.

27. The Supreme Court Judges in the Parking Eye vs Beavis case also said (Exhibit RN216, Para 107) ''in our opinion the term imposing the £85 charge was not unfair. The term does not exclude any right which the consumer may be said to enjoy under the general law or by statute''. But in this case, the imposition of a fine IS unfair and DOES breach 'general law or statute' that is the Equality Act 2010.

28. The parking contract in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case was judged to be ‘objectively reasonable’ partly because ‘motorists generally’ did accept it (Exhibit RN16, Para 108). The landowner wanted as many people as possible to use the car park in question so the contractual arrangements were designed to be attractive to the average motorist. This is the complete antithesis of the supposed ‘contract’ in this case which is designed to actively discourage motorists from parking at the site. The terms of this ‘contract’ are not ‘objectively reasonable’, but deliberately designed to be so heinous that no one in their right mind would agree to them. It follows that this is not a ‘contract’ but a prohibitory notice masquerading as such.

29. If the wording of the signage forbids parking, then there is no offer to park and therefore no contract. This is clear from several Court cases in which it was ruled that if any contractual arrangement could be implied by such signage then it only applied to vehicles which were ‘authorised’ to park and therefore charges could not be made on a contractual basis for vehicles that were not ‘authorised’ to park:

* In PCM-UK v Bull et all B4GF26K6 [2016] (Exhibit RN17) , residents were parking on access roads. The signage forbade parking and so no contract was in place. A trespass had occurred, but that meant only the landowner could claim, not the parking company. District Judge Glen at High Wycombe dismissed all three claims, stating in his judgment that:

“If the notice had said no more than if you park on this roadway you agree to pay a charge then it would have been implicit that PCM was saying we will allow you to park on this roadway if you pay £100 and I would agree with Mr Samuels’ first analysis that essentially the £100 was a part of the core consideration for the licence and was not a penalty for breach. The difficulty is that this notice does not say that at all. This notice is an absolute prohibition against parking at any time, for any period, on the roadway. It is impossible to construct out of this in any way, either actually or contingently or conditionally, any permission for anyone to park on the roadway. All this is essentially saying is you must not trespass on the roadway. If you do we are giving ourselves, and we are dressing it up in the form of a contract, the right to charge you a sum of money which really would be damages for trespass, assuming of course that the claimant had any interest in the land in order to proceed in trespass.”

While this is a County Court decision and therefore not binding, it is similar in nature to the present case and may be considered as persuasive.

* In Horizon Parking v Mr J Guildford C5GF17X2 [2016] (no transcript available) it was also found the signage was forbidding and so the matter was one of trespass. The parking company did not have standing to claim.

30. In the alternative, if it was held that the signage was contractually valid, it would be impossible for a motorist to have read the terms and conditions contained therein from a moving or stopped vehicle, and if the vehicle is stopped, the ‘contravention’ according to the Claimant is already committed.

31. I believe it is also relevant to note here the “Red Hand Rule”, as set out in the leading judgment in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3 (Exhibit RN19) which was an English contract law case on exclusion clauses and bailment. In his judgement Lord Justice Denning stated: “I quite agree that the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it. Some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient”.

32. In the Parking Eye vs Beavis case (Exhibit RN163) the Supreme Court Judges reiterated the requirement for fair and open dealing, at Para 205: “The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.”

33. The Court must consider the fairness of a term, where it is not 'prominent and transparent’. At the roadway where the PCN was issued, it was not transparent that anyone was agreeing to some sort of contract to pay £100 to park under some sort of licence. In this case, the unfair terms include the penalty fine itself and also the added 'costs' bolted onto this claim from thin air which are unfair and breach Part 2 'Unfair Contract Terms' of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

No obstruction caused by the Vehicle

34. I would also like to state that the vehicle in question was not impeding other motorists or restricting traffic flow in any way on the day of the incident, as is evident in the photos taken by the Claimant.

Unfair and additional costs

The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of both the CPRs, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair’.

35. Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus Ltd website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

36. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'damages/costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPR 44.3 (2) which states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

37. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purportedly added costs are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

The Beavis case is against this Claim

38. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters.

39. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

40. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

The POFA 2012 and the ATA Code of Practice are against this Claim

41. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

ishrav

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('the CRA') is against this claim

42. Further, the purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, vague and in breach of the CRA 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'. This Claimant has arbitrarily added an extra 60% of the parking charge in a disingenuous double recovery attempt that has already been exposed and routinely disallowed by many Courts in England and Wales. It is atrocious that this has been allowed to continue unabated for so many years, considering the number of victims receiving this Claimant's exaggerated Letter before Claim, or the claim form, who then either pay an inflated amount or suffer a default judgment for a sum that could not otherwise be recovered. It is only those who defend, who draw individual cases to the attention of the courts one by one, but at last in 2019, some areas noticed the pattern and have moved to stop this abuse of process at source.

43. In Claim number F0DP163T on 11th July 2019, District Judge Grand sitting at the County Court at Southampton, struck out a overly inflated (over the £100 maximum Trade Body and POFA 2012 ceiling) parking firm claim without a hearing for that reason.

44. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number F2QZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

45. That decision in Wales was contested in a N244 application by VCS, but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019. District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. The considered sum in that case was reduced to £100 with a full case hearing to follow, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.

46. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. These include s a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) where the abuse is inherent in the the business model.

The Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing. The judgement for these
three example cases stated that:

''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998…’'

47. Cases summarily struck out in that circuit included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in the Beavis case. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

48. BW Legal made an application objecting to two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against a parking firm for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge. This has been repeated conduct in recent years, on the back of the Beavis case, where parking firms have almost unanimously contrived to add £60, or more, on top of the 'parking charge'. Members of both ATAs who have influence on their self-serving 'Trade Bodies' have even voted to have this imaginary 'damages/debt collection' sum added to their respective two Codes of Practice, to create a veil of legitimacy, no doubt to allow their members to confuse consumers and to enable them to continue to 'get away with it' in several court areas which are still allowing this double recovery.

49. That N244 application to try to protect the cartel-like position of some of the 'bigger player' parking firms, was placed before the area Circuit Judge and a hearing was held on 11th November 2019, with other parking charge cases in that circuit remaining struck out or stayed, pending the outcome. The Defendants successfully argued on points including a citation of the CRA 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points below were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court, who agreed that:

(a) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).

(b) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.

(c) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14.

50. At the hearing, the Judge refused their request to appeal. It was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the CRA 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14. Using the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before, which they had not. The same issues apply to this claim.

51. A transcript will be publicly available shortly. In his summing up, it was noted that District Judge Grand stated: ''When I come to consider whether the striking out of the whole claim is appropriate, that the inclusion of the £60 charge means that the whole claim is tainted by it, the claimant should well know that it is not entitled to the £60. The very fact that they bring a claim in these circumstances seems to me that it is an abuse of process of the court, and in saying that, I observe that with any claim that can be brought before the court that if a party doesn't put in a defence to the claim, default judgments are entered. So, the Claimant, in bringing the claims is, in other cases, aware that if the defendant doesn’t submit a defence, the Claimant is going to get a judgment of a knowingly inflated amount. So I conclude by saying that I dismiss the application to set aside Judge Taylor’s ruling.''

52. Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the CRA 'core exemption'. The CMA Official Government Guidance to the CRA says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).'' The parking industry is the exception to this rule because they have no consumer 'customers' yet are consumer-facing. Their intention is very clearly in many cases (including this case) for a consumer not to see the onerous terms hidden in their notices and it is averred that no regard is paid to consumer law.

53. The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expanded at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. [...] Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''

54. In December 2019 in a different Court circuit, Deputy District Judge Joseph sitting at Warwick County Court had clearly heard about the decisions affecting the IOW, Hampshire, Dorset and Wiltshire circuit because he summarily struck out multiple parking ticket claims from various firms all due to the adding of the false £60 costs to £100 parking charge, that already indisputably (in law and case law) includes those costs.

55. The Judge determined that ''it is an abuse of process for the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.'' further, in issuing his Orders striking out several £160 parking claims without a hearing, the Judge stated that he had ''considered S71(2) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for the fairness of the contract terms and determined that the provision of the additional charge breached examples 6, 10 and 14''.

56. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

57. The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015, and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

58. If this claim is not summarily struck out for the same reasons as the Judges cited in the multiple Caernarfon, Southampton, IOW and Warwick County Court decisions, then due to this Claimant knowingly proceeding with a claim that amounts to an abuse of process, full costs will be sought by the Defendant at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.

59. Many informed Court Court Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts, such as these cases, struck out in recent months without a hearing, due solely to the pretence of adding 'damages' blatantly made up out of thin air.


60. The original PCN (Exhibit RN2) posted by the Claimant states a charge of £100.00 (Discounted to £60.00 if paid within 14 days) however the Claimant's legal firm now inflates these sums, in a deliberate or negligent attempt at more than double recovery:
1. £160.00 Principal debt
2. Legal representative’s costs £50.00
3. Interest £17.87
4. Court fee £25.00
5. Outstanding balance to pay now £252.87

61. The charged claimed include £152.87 over and above the original ‘parking charge’. I have no idea what these charges refer to as there appears to be no contractual basis for them, even if one were to take the Claimant’s somewhat far-fetched view as to what constitutes a ‘contract’ into account. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these additional charges are justified.

62. The Particulars of Claim include £50 for ‘solicitors costs’ yet all I have received from the Claimant’s solicitors are automated letters. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these ‘solicitors costs’ are justified.

63. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

64. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

65. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

Landowner Authority

66. In order to issue parking charges, and to pursue unpaid charges via litigation, the Claimant is required to have the written authority of the landowner, on whose behalf they are acting as an agent. No evidence of such authority has been supplied by the Claimant or their legal representatives, and the Claimant is put to strict proof of the same, in the form of an unreacted and contemporaneous contract, or chain of authority, from the landowner to the Claimant. A Managing Agent is not the Landowner.

67. The Claimant has failed to supply the Defendant with details of the landowner even upon the Defendant’s written request (Exhibit RN13). Hence, the Defendant has been unable to contact the landowners to explain the circumstances to them and to request a cancellation of the PCN.

68. Despite being asked, the Claimant has not provided any indication that they are authorised by the landowner to issue parking charges and carry out Court proceedings on their behalf. The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have the authority to do this, and that the terms and conditions of parking they impose at the site are in line with what they have been authorised to do.

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.