1 Big Car Park, 2 landowners, Valid parking ticket but Parking Charge Issued

claxtome

Thanks once again Loadsofchildren123 and Doam I have amended my draft defence in the previous post above to include a new section for planning permission of signage.

Loadsofchildren123

Chapter and verse on the ex dolo doctrine is set out below, but you don’t need to include this detail in your Defence – this is an extract from my Skeleton argument (ignore the "B" references, these were references to the trial bundle, and I’ve also removed my paragraph numbering) – I also added trespass in which fitted the facts of my case:
The Claimant is not entitled to rely on an illegal or immoral act in order to profit from it, pursuant to the doctrine ex dolo malo non oritur actio. In this case, there are three acts which are illegal and/or immoral: the installation/display of the Claimant’s signage on the Land/Site, trespass and the Claimant’s disregard of Regulations which apply to it and of the BPA CoP. The first is a criminal act, the last two, while not criminal, are undoubtedly immoral and should not be sanctioned by the court. Minor infringements might be forgivable but the wholescale, multiple breaches by the Claimant, and its ignorance of the laws which apply to it, should not be forgiven, particularly when it is obliged to familiarise itself with and follow the law by paragraph A2.4 of the CoP (including consumer law, contract law, and trespass).
The rationale for the doctrine is set out in the early case of Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 where Lord Mansfield[/URL] said:
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may say so. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio"no action arises from deceit". No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own standing or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa ["from an immoral cause"], or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted.
The principle was reaffirmed in RTA (Business Consultants) Ltd v Bracewell [2015] EWHC 630 (QB) (12 March 2015) where, at paragraph 34 of the judgment the above passage was cited.
The Court’s attention is also drawn to Andre Agassi v S Robinson (HM Inspector of Taxes) [2005] EWCA Civ 1507. Whilst not wholly aligned to the issues in this case it has been produced because of the principle it extols that no one should profit from their unlawful conduct. The Court’s attention is drawn to paragraph 20 of the judgment
“It is common ground that, whatever costs may be recoverable by a litigant in respect of professional services such as those provided by Tenon to the appellant, they cannot include the cost of any activities which are unlawful”.
Paragraph 28 continues –“cannot on any view recover the cost of activities performed by Tenon which it was not lawful for them to perform.
Dealing in turn with the three wrongful acts of the Claimant:
Unlawful signage:
The signage displayed on the Land/Site has no planning/advertising consent, which is required under the [in England: Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 (as amended) [In Wales The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992 and the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2012]. The signs are an “advertisement” under the definition in the Regulations.
[In England: Regulation 30] [In Wales: Regulation 27] makes it a criminal offence to display advertisements (which these signs are) without the relevant consent. The local authority has confirmed that the signs have no planning/advertising consent (see email and list of all applications [B2 p152/3]).
The Claimant relies on the signs as having formed a contract with the driver [B1 p9, para 2(ii)]. If there was a contract between the Claimant and the driver, it was illegal at its formation because it was incapable of being created without an illegal act (the erection of the un-consented signs which the Claimant relies on as having made a contractual offer).
Where a contract is illegal when formed, neither party will acquire rights under it, regardless of whether or not there was an intention to break the law; the contract will be void and treated as if it had never been entered into. As such, the asserted contract cannot be enforced
It was clearly unlawful for the Claimant to have in place the signs upon which it relies for the formation of that asserted contract. There has been a clear transgression of a law (the 2007 Regulations) and it is submitted that the Court should not “lend its aid” to this Claimant “who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act”.
Further, it must be contrary to public policy for a court to enforce a contract whereby a party will profit from its criminal conduct. ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores [2012] EWCA Civ 1338 concerned an alleged illegal contract. Whilst the facts of that case are not relevant, the Judge’s comments at paragraph 29 are of importance: “At common law, historically, a distinction has been drawn between cases where the guilty party intended from the time of entering the contract unlawfully and cases where the intention to perform unlawfully was only made subsequently”.
In Somerfield the contract was upheld because the Claimant had no intention, when creating the contract, to deliberately break the law. Differently in this case, the problem arose at the formation of the contract and not in relation to any subsequent act: the Claimant did deliberately break the law by erecting the parking signs which it asserts stated contractual terms, without first having in place the mandatory prior consent required by law. Thus a crime was committed then. Therefore, the illegality in this action was not merely incidental to the creation and part of the performance of the contract as in Somerfield but was central to it. Somerfield guides us that where there was a chance to remove the illegality from future performance the contract could remain in force. In this action the illegality of the Claimant’s signage that existed on the day of the parking cannot be undone, even by any subsequent grant of advertisement consent.
At paragraphs 65-74 of the Somerfield transcript Laws LJ set out three factors which need to be considered in a defence of illegality. The Defendant submits that these should be considered and applied in this case:
- the commission of an illegal wrong being present at the time of entering the contract means that the Claimant will not be able to enforce the contract;
- the illegality is central to the contract and is not merely a minor aspect thus it should not be held to be too remote so as to render the contract enforceable;
- the nature of the illegality: in this case it was a crime and not merely a civil tort as in Somerfield. The gravity of the illegality is therefore far greater.
If the Planning Authority has been unaware of the signs (as it has told the Defendant), and has not therefore taken any formal action against the Claimant, this is irrelevant. Even if the Claimant were to obtain consent, this cannot and will not grant authority and legality for display of the signage prior to the approval date so that the crime being committed when the car was parked will remain a crime for all time.
The crime committed in this case has all of the characteristics of a “crime” and, it is submitted, has to be appropriately regarded with all the gravity society gives to crimes. The Claimant is under a duty to the Court to provide full and fair disclosure by informing it of all relevant issues. The Claimant has failed to advise the Court that a criminal offence was being committed by the display of its signage.
Trespass:
After the Claimant and/or MPS entered into the Parking Contract with the party it claims was the landowner on 28.1.14 (although it was not the landowner, another company was), the Site was sold to a third party (Adriatic Land 2 Ltd) on 24.6.14. Thereafter it is submitted that the Claimant and/or MPS had no rights pursuant to the contract to enter onto the Site and to issue PCNs to unauthorised vehicles. Any such unauthorised entry was therefore a trespass.
The signage has since been removed from the Site (but not from the remainder of the Land), indicating that the Claimant and/or MPS has no rights under the Parking Contract in relation to it and that the current owner took issue over MPS/the Claimant entering the Site in order to issue PCNs to vehicles it considered were parked without authority.
Therefore, the Claimant and/or MPS was committing a trespass on 31.10.15 when it issued the NtD/PCN to the Defendant’s car.
The act of trespass is a tort. The principle of ex dolo malo non oritur actio applies equally to a tortious act as it does to a criminal act.
It must be contrary to public policy for a court to enforce a contract whereby a party will profit from its unlawful conduct.
Breach of legislation:
The Claimant has breached the following Regulations/Act, which are dealt with more fully at paragraph 31 below:
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (“CPRs”)
Consumer Rights Act 2015
Consumer Contract (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013
In addition the Claimant has breached the BPA CoP, a serious matter (see paragraph 33 below). Again, the Claimant’s breaches are not de minimis, they are serious and the court should treat the Claimant’s breaches with the gravity they deserve.
In assessing the fairness of a term and whether to enforce it, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced. The Claimant is guilty of serious breaches of its obligations to the Defendant enshrined in consumer legislation, which must be relevant in determining whether it should be entitled to enforce any contract against the driver and whether it should be entitled to charge what is effectively a penalty. Significantly, the Claimant’s CoP obliges it to be familiar, and comply, with such legislation (paragraph A2.4 [B2 p113]).
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008:
The 2008 Regulations prohibit businesses from displaying any form of trust mark, quality mark or equivalent if they are not authorised to do so. The Claimant is in breach by displaying a sign at the entrance to the site [B2 p97] which bears the BPA roundel signifying that it is a member of BPA’s AOS (when it has not been a member since November 2015); by displaying (or so it claims) on 31.10.15 a sign inside the Land (including the Site) which bore the IPC roundel signifying that it was at that date a member of IPC’s AOS (when it was not then a member) [B1 p14]; by claiming on its website that it is an “accredited member” of BPA when it is not [B2 p138].
Regulation 3: a commercial practice is unfair if it contravenes two requirements. The first strand concerns the requirements of professional diligence; the second is that a failure of professional diligence materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to a “product”. (For “product” refer to paragraph 31.1.5 below).
Regulation 5: a breach of Regulation 3 is an offence. The Office of Fair Trading guidance on the 2008 Regulations at paragraph 10.1 indicates that “Regulations 3(1) and 3(3) of the 2008 Regulations set out the general prohibition on unfair business to consumer commercial practices, also known as the general duty not to trade unfairly. This prohibition allows enforcers to take action against unfair commercial practices, including those that do not fall into the more specific prohibitions of misleading and aggressive practices, or into the very specific banned practices. This means it acts as a safety net. It is designed to ‘future-proof the protections in the CPRs, by setting standards against which all existing and new practices can be judged”. Paragraph 10.4 of the OFT Guidance indicates that professional diligence should evidence “(a) honest market practice in the trader’s field of activity, or (b) the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity”.
The Defendant submits that the first strand of Regulation 3 applies as a result of the criminal conduct involved in the Claimant’s parking enforcement. The second strand begs the question: “Would a consumer be likely to make a different decision about payment of damages if he were told that a crime had to be committed to eventuate in a demand for that payment?”. It is averred that a car park operator who fails to secure, or that its client fails to secure, the relevant mandatory advertisement consent required by law before managing the car park and thereby commits a crime, will be acting in contravention of Regulation 3 of the 2008 Regulations. For having done so the Claimant fell below the standards of a reasonably competent professional having regard to the standards normally expected in its profession with particular regard to the CoP. Further, by failing to advise the Defendant, and this Court, of the criminal conduct associated with its parking enforcement when demanding damages for an alleged breach of contract, it is averred that the Defendant has also been acting with a lack of professional diligence.
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014: these came into force on 1 October 2014, and extended the definition of “product” provided by the 2008 Regulations. It now includes after 1 October 2014 the settlement (rather than the demand) of actual or purported liabilities such as those that the Claimant is seeking to recover from the Defendant by way of alleged damages (see regulation 2(9)). Therefore, taking a decision to settle damages falls within Regulation 3 of the 2008 Regulations. It is submitted that it is incumbent upon the Claimant to show that it was acting with professional diligence.
Regulation 5(3)(b) of the 2008 Regulations indicates that it is a misleading action where there is any failure by a trader to comply with a commitment contained in a code of conduct with which the trader has undertaken to comply. The Claimant was bound to comply with BPA’s CoP, which in turn provides that it must comply with the relevant laws relating to parking enforcement and consumer rights as a condition of its membership of its AOS (A2.4 and 6.8 of the CoP), but has clearly failed to do so. Regulation 5(3)(b) provides a defence in any civil claim.
Consumer Rights Act 2015 [/FONT]
Breaches of the Act include:[/FONT]
s.68: Requirement for transparency
(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.
The terms set out in the signage are not transparent, plan and intelligible, nor are they legible.
s.62 and Schedule 2: The Act defines unfair terms and these include:
’’A term which has the object or effect of inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer in relation to the trader or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by the trader of any of the contractual obligations…” (paragraph 2 of the Schedule) - this is breached by the disclaimers in the Claimant’s signage;
"A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation” (paragraph 6 of Schedule 2) – this is breached by the imposition of a £100 charge for any breach;
A term which has the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract (paragraph 10 of the Schedule) – the Claimant breaches this by its inadequate signage.
The court must of course remember the imbalance between the Claimant, a professional parking operator, and a driver, an ordinary member of the public.
Consumer Contract (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013: As this was a distance contract, formed when one party was not present, the information required by Regulation 13 should have been provided in advance, but was not.
Onerous contractual terms (in this case the £100 charge) should be highlighted, as per Lord Denning’s “red hand rule” set out in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ 2. A reasonable interpretation of the “red hand rule” (and of BPA’s CoP paragraph 18.3/4 and 19.3) would require a charge and the terms upon which it becomes payable to be displayed far more obviously and in far larger lettering than on the sign the Claimant has produced [B1 p14] – there should be fewer words and more “white space” with background contrast suited to an outdoor sign. In Lord Denning’s words 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it”. The signage in the Beavis case did not breach the red hand rule: the signage in this case does.

Loadsofchildren123

It is "actio" - autocorrect keeps sneakily going back and changing it, driving me mad!

Loadsofchildren123

Sorry about the absence of paragraph breaks in that long post, it was full of codes which I tried to delete and ended up deleting the spacing as well. Hopefully it makes sense though.

claxtome

Wow what a defence. Thanks for all your help once again.
It does make sense and greatly received.
You suggest not to add it to my defence which is fair enough.

I assume I would use in the defence bundle if it goes to court?

What do you think to my current draft defence?

Loadsofchildren123

The ex dolo argument is one that is not viewed on this forum as a main defence (unless the LA is taking enforcement action ) - most judges will say that if the council doesn't care why should they. To have any chance of a judge taking notice, you'd have to run the argument properly, using that case law, and persuade the judge to take it seriously. The judges who hear parking cases are junior judges who like to have everything demonstrated clearly to them with case law, and their powers demonstrated to them with reference to the CPR.

If you like, have a look at my full Skeleton which I posted on my Millennium thread. Now this is a much longer Skeleton than would normally be advised, but I had lots of different arguments and did thorough research and decided to go for gold. It may have backfired on me with the judge saying it was way out of proportion - but I would have said that I was entitled to defend a claim with a full defence and why should I cut parts of it out, or not make out the defences properly, just because it was a small claim. The ex dolo defence is there, along with consumer legislation. There are other links in the thread to my other documents. Not sure if there's a link there to my defence but I can let you have this if you'd like it. Again, it's quite wordy because once I started I couldn't stop....

Loadsofchildren123

I think you should emphasise more that the two different areas of the car park were not demarcated in any way (you've put there was no sign and no fence, but add that there were no road markings or anything at all indicating that there were two distinct areas run by different entities, and explain that you entered into the council part, stopped to buy a ticket, and then drove a short distance on to park, not seeing any signs (but now you've gone back you have seen the one, high up, small sign which isn't visible from a car). Perhaps a hand drawn plan might help? I suppose that can wait until your WS which deals with all the facts.

You just need to proof read it. Make sure it's all in the third person - "the Defendant" "he" etc, not I or me.

I'd add to para 5 to emphasise that there was no offer, acceptance or consideration, which are the 3 elements required to prove the existence of a contract.

claxtome

Updated defence (Thanks for advice)->

In the County Court
Claim Number:
Between
xxxx (Claimant)
and
xxxx (Defendant)


Defence Statement


Preliminary Matters.

1. The claimant failed to include a copy of their written contract as per Practice Direction
16 7.3(1) and Practice Direction 7C 1.4(3A). No indication is given as to the
Claimants contractual authority to operate there as required by the Claimants Trade
Association's Code of Practice B1.1 which says
1.1 If you operate parking management activities on land which is not owned by you, you
must supply us with written authority from the land owner sufficient to establish you
as the ‘Creditor’ within the meaning of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (where
applicable) and in any event to establish you as a person who is able to recover
parking charges. There is no prescribed form for such agreement and it need not
necessarily be as part of a contract but it must include the express ability for an
operator to recover parking charges on the landowner’s behalf or provide sufficient
right to occupy the land in question so that charges can be recovered by the operator
directly. This applies whether or not you intend to use the keeper liability provisions.

2. The Particulars of Claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as
there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached. Indeed the Particulars
of Claim are not clear and concise as is required by CPR 16.4 1(a). The Claimants are
known to be serial issuers of generic claims similar to this one. HM Courts Service
have identified over 1000 similar sparse claims. It is believed the term for such behaviour
is roboclaims and as such is against the public interest.

Practice Direction 3A which references Civil Procedure Rule 3.4 illustrates this point:!
1.4 The following are examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of
claim (whether contained in a claim form or filed separately) fall within rule 3.4(2)(a):
1. those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about, for example ‘Money owed £5000’,
2. those which are incoherent and make no sense,
3. those which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts, even if true, do not
disclose any legally recognisable claim against the defendant


On the basis of the above, we request the court strike out the claim for want of a
cause of action.



Statement of Defence

I am XXXXX, defendant in this matter. It is admitted that the Defendant was the
authorised registered keeper of the vehicle in question at the time of the alleged
incident and was the driver of the car that day.
The Defendant denies liability for the entirety of the claim for the following reasons.

1. The claimant has not provided enough details in the Particular of Claim to file a full
defence.
a) The Claimant has stated that a parking charge was incurred.
b) The Claimant has given no indication of the nature of the alleged charge.
c) There is no information regarding why the charge arose, what the original charge
was, what the alleged contract was nor anything which could be considered a fair
exchange of information.
d) On the 20th September 2016 another relevant poorly pleaded private parking
charge claim by Gladstones was struck out by District Judge Cross of St
Albans County Court without a hearing due to their ‘roboclaim’ particulars being
incoherent, failing to comply with CPR. 16.4 and ‘providing no facts that could
give rise to any apparent claim in law.’
e) On the 27th July 2016 DJ Anson sitting at Preston County Court ruled that the very
similar parking charge particulars of claim were efficient and failing to meet CPR 16.4
and PD 16 paragraphs 7.3 – 7.6. He ordered the Claimant in that case to file new
particulars which they failed to do and so the court confirmed that the claim be
struck out.

The Defendant asks that the court orders Further and Better Particulars of Claim and
asks leave to amend the Defence.

2. The Claimant has not complied with the pre-court protocol.
a) No initial information was sent to the Defendant for the following
(i) Full particulars of the parking charges.
(ii) Who the party was that are contracted with ES........
(iii) The full legal identity of the landowner
(iv) A full copy of the contract with the landholder that demonstrated that ES Parking had
their authority.
(v) If the charges were based on damages for breach of contract and if so to provide justification of this sum
(vi) If the charge was based on a contractually agreed sum for the provision of parking
and If so to provide a valid VAT invoice for this 'service'.
(vii) To provide a copy of the signs that ES Parking can evidence were on site and which contended formed a contract with the driver on that occasion, as well as all Photographs taken of the vehicle in question.
b) The defendant asks the court to look at Para 4 on non-compliance and sanction, and point out
that there can be no reasonable excuse for the Claimant's failure to follow the Pre-
action Conduct process, especially bearing in mind that the Claim was issued by their
own Solicitors so they clearly had legal advice before issuing proceedings.


3. The defendant has reasonable belief that the Claimant does not have the authority to issue charges on this land in their own name and that they have no rights to bring action regarding this claim.
a) The Claimant is not the landowner and is merely an agent acting on behalf of the
landowner and has failed to demonstrate their legal standing to form a contract.
b) The Claimant is not the landowner and suffers no loss whatsoever as a result of a
vehicle parking at the location in question
c) The Claimant is put to proof that it has sufficient interest in the land or that there are
specific terms in its contract to bring an action on its own behalf. As a third party
agent, the Claimant may not pursue any charge

4. No planning permission for signage
a) The Claimant is not entitled to rely on an illegal or immoral act in order to profit from it, pursuant to the doctrine ex dolo malo non oritur actio. In this matter, the Claimant does not have planning/advertisement consent in relation to its parking signage on the land in question (which are classed as “advertisements” under the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 (as amended). This is a criminal offence under Regulation 30 of those Regulations. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy the principle ex dolo malo non oritur action should apply – namely, the Claimant should not be allowed to found a cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act (in this case the unlawful signage). The rationale for this is set out in the case of Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 and was reaffirmed in RTA (Business Consultants) Ltd v Bracewell [2015] EWHC 630 (QB) (12 March 2015). The Defendant also relies on Andre Agassi v S Robinson (HM Inspector of Taxes) [2005] EWCA Civ 1507.
b) In addition to the criminal offence committed by the Claimant, it is in breach of various statutory and regulatory provisions set out in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (Regulation 3 – a breach of which is an offence under Regulation 5), the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Sections 62 and 68 and Schedule 2) and the Consumer Contract (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (Regulation 13). Again, the court should not lend its aid to the Claimant in founding a claim based on its unlawful and/or immoral conduct.
c) Furthermore, it must be contrary to public policy for a court to enforce a contract whereby a party will profit from its criminal conduct and the Defendant will rely on ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores [2012] EWCA Civ 1338

5. The signage was inadequate to form a contract with the Defendant even if planning permission is in place
a) Signs are too high to be easily seen from a car thus failing IPC CoP guidelines
b) The car park has 2 different landowners; one area owned by the local council; the other privately owned and managed by the Claimant.
c) The two different areas of the car park were not demarcated in any way
(i) There was no sign which goes against AOS CoP guidelines
(ii) There was also no fence to stop travel between 2 areas
(iii) There were no road markings or anything at all indicating that there were two distinct areas run by different entities
d) The defendant entered into the council part of the car park, stopped to buy a ticket, and then drove a short distance on to park, not seeing any further signs.
e) Upon going back the Defendant has seen the one, high up, small sign which isn't visible from a car
f) A driver who bought a legitimate ticket for Council area of car park but unknowingly ends up parking in the private area of car park can be penalised without knowing it (and vice versa). The Defendant argues this is a form of entrapment. IPC CoP Part B 14.1 says "You must not use predatory or misleading tactics to lure drivers into incurring parking charges Such instances will be viewed as a serious instance of non-compliance"
g) There was no offer, acceptance or consideration, which are the 3 elements required to prove the existence of a contract.

6. Threatening behaviour and breakdown of costs unclear
a) The Claimant has sent threatening and misleading demands which stated that
further debt recovery action would be taken to recover what is owed by passing the
debt to a ‘local’ recovery agent (which suggested to the Defendant they would be
calling round like bailiffs) adding further unexplained charges of £25, and later an
extra £35, to the £100 with no evidence of how this extra charge has been calculated.
No figure for additional charges was 'agreed' nor could it have formed part of the
alleged 'contract' because no such indemnity costs were quantified on the signs.
Terms cannot be bolted on later with figures plucked out of thin air, as if they were
incorporated into the small print when they were not.
b) The extra charges appear to be an added cost with apparently no qualification and an
attempt at double recovery, which the POFA Schedule 4 specifically disallows.
c) The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred £60 costs
to pursue an alleged £100 debt.
d) The Protection of Freedom Act Para 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be
recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper.

Data Protection Act breach
For the reasons set out above, the parking charge which is the subject of these proceedings is invalid. The Claimant therefore had no right to request the keeper’s details from the DVLA and to use them, and has breached the Defendant’s rights under the Data Protection Act by doing both. Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) is authority that misuse of personal data is a tort. Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] All ER (D) 199 is authority that a reasonable sum of compensation would be £750. The Defendant reserves his rights in respect of these matters.

I believe the facts stated in this defence are true.


(Signature) (Date)

claxtome

I had missed you had replied twice Loadsofchildren123.
With regard to the exolo argument. I am happy with the paragraphs i have for this and doubt i would find the time to get fully conversant with your, no doubt, a full and exhaustive argument.

I do appreciate you volunteering to help with it though. :T

Loadsofchildren123

claxtome wrote: »

I had missed you had replied twice Loadsofchildren123.
With regard to the exolo argument. I am happy with the paragraphs i have for this and doubt i would find the time to get fully conversant with your, no doubt, a full and exhaustive argument.

Agreed. You'd use my fuller argument at the actual hearing - no need for this sort of detail in the defence