CEL in-house claim: hearing & WS help

bagold

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82048753#Comment_82048753

Sorry if I am not clear in my understanding…

Original PCN by CEL (5 Aug 2024)

Follow up letter from dcbl (27 Dec 2024)

Claim form from CNBC where Claimant is CEL (27 Aug 2025)

Notice of Transfer of Proceedings from CNBC that claim (CEL vs my wife) being transferred to County Court at Clerkenwell & Shorditch (13 Apr 2026)

Notice of Allocation to the Small Claims Track (Hearing) still CEL vs my wife (11 May 2026) - page 2 they say "Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than 4pm on 8th June 2026"

In Dec 2025 a judgment was made against my wife (CEL vs my wife) by CNBC but this was set aside in Jan 2026, when following advice given on this thread I complained and showed proof to CNBC that we had submitted a Defence.

so do I need to do anything now about editing thread title?

In the meantime we are putting the witness Statement together.

Gr1pr

Look at the top left of the claim form

It will mention CEL as the claimant in the top box on the left

Below it, there is another box, possibly saying CEL, or, possibly saying DCB LEGAL instead

2 CEL's means a in-house claim, no 3rd party lawyers

CEL plus DCB LEGAL means the CEL claim is being dealt with by 3rd party lawyers

Definitely start on the WS

If the county court are dealing with it, there is no possible reason to contact the CNBC, they are no longer involved

Coupon-mad

"Claim form from CNBC where Claimant is CEL (27 Aug 2025)"

We know who the Claimant is but who filed the claim? It's on the Claim Form!

bagold

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82048837#Comment_82048837

Claim Form is attached

Gr1pr

So a CEL in-house claim ( because they are the claimant parking company and also their litigation department filed the claim with the CNBC using MCOL. )

Coupon-mad

Please edit your thread title to:

CEL in-house claim: hearing & WS help

bagold

Should I post the Witness Statement here for review or just send it?

Coupon-mad

Show us your draft, so we can make sure you didn't miss anything, and remind us of the WS deadline please.

bagold

Notice of Alocation to the Small Claims Track (Hearing): 11 May 2026

Date of hearing: 11 August 2026

Claimant to pay trial fee to court of £27 by 14 July 2026

Page 2 requires alldocuments to be delievered by 8 June 2026 - As I mentioned below I missed this deadline as my mother was in hospital following heart attack.

We have not received any Witness Statement from Claimant.

Next I will post proposed Witness Statement.

bagold

Civil Enforcement Ltd (Claimant)

V

xxx (Defendant)

Witness Statement of Defendant

1. I am xxx of 24 xxx, xxx, xxx, xx8 8xx, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

2. In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully whilst I have not been served with the Claimant’s Witness Statement and I respectfully ask the court to take this into account. My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Defective Particulars of Claim

3. The Defendant was only stationary in the car park for a short period of time while making a delivery of home cooked food to one of the residents at Oakmead Court West on 6 July 2024. The resident, for whom the meal was being delivered, has mobility issues and is not able to answer the door within the time a person with normal physical capacity can. Time taken to manoeuvre the car within the car park, for the resident to reach the apartment block door (using a zimmer frame), to take the meal to her kitchen, and to return to the car can easily take the time taken on this occasion. The Defendant's car was not causing an obstruction to other vehicles including emergency vehicles.

There is no alternative parking available within the car park or outside the car park within a reasonable distance to be able to make a delivery. Valencia Road immediately outside the car park is unadopted with no parking available. The vehicle was stopped temporarily in a visitor bay to assist with unloading furniture during move-in on 29 May 2025. This was a brief, purposeful activity essential to occupation of the property, not an act of parking for convenience. As a person bringing food the Defendant is classed as a carer and covered by the Equality Act 2010. This was not parking and this principle is supported by the case of Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E (Oxford County Court), in which His Honour Judge Harris QC ruled that

"Unloading in the course of moving in is not parking in the usual sense of the word and does not constitute a breach of terms.”

4. The Claimant’s case is vague, lacking the detail required under Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, which require a claimant to set out all facts necessary to establish a complete cause of action. The Particulars of Claim (POC) simply allege that the driver “Failed to obtain a permit in accordance with the notified terms”. However, the Claimant provides no information on the specific terms said to have been breached, the conduct that allegedly broke those terms, or how any contract was formed. This absence of essential detail fails to justify the claim and has also made it difficult for me to respond to it effectively.

5. I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are numerous recent and persuasive Appeal judgments to support dismissing or striking out this claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims. The POC seen here are far worse than the one seen on the below Appeals).

6. The first persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POCsfail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract”. (Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan)

7. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Services (CPMS) Ltd. v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10th May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that “Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim”. (Car Park Management Services (CPMS) Ltd. v Akande)

8. Taking the above paragraphs 3 to 6 into consideration, I find the Claimant’s accusation in Page 1 of their Particulars of Claim (Claim Form) baffling, stating that the Defendant "… Claim for money relating to a Parking Charge for breach of contract terms/conditions (TCs) for parking in private car park (CP) managed by Claimant. Drivers may only park pursuant to TCs of use displayed in CP and agreed upon entry/parking. ANPR cameras or manual patrols monitor vehicles entering/exiting the CP and TC breaches."

9. Given that the driver has never been identified, AND the fact that the deliberate vague/generic wording in the POC is not actually pleading ‘overstay’, how can I possibly be criticised for not responding to a new allegation that has only now been brought forward by the Claimant in their Particulars of Claim.

The Claimants Authority to Issue Parking Charges

10. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view). The Claimant has provided no evidence to prove landowner authority.

No Valid Contract Formed

11. It is neither admitted nor denied that any contract term was breached. However, for a valid contract to be formed, there must be an offer, acceptance, and something of value given in return — which was not present here. Under section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Court must apply a 'test of fairness' and this requires contract terms and any “consumer notices” to be clear and prominent.

Looking at Schedule 2 (examples 6, 10, 14, and 18) and section 62, which require fair, open dealing and good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant is known to use unclear and potentially unfair terms and notices. Based on the limited information provided in this case, the situation appears to be similar. The Claimant is therefore required to strictly prove their case with contemporaneous photographs. (Consumer Rights Act 2015, Section 62 and Section 71)

12. None of the Claimant’s site photographs (Signage Photographs in PCN) display readable terms and conditions, preventing the court from verifying what contractual terms were offered to motorists. Instead, the Claimant relies on a digital stock image of a sign, which does not evidence that this version of the sign —or the specific terms and conditions shown on that stock image—were displayed at the site on 5 August 2024

13. I would also like to draw the attention of the Judge to the Claimant’s photographs on their Parking Charge Notice (PCN). These pictures clearly show that there are no signs erected on the site. No evidence has been supplied regarding its contractual wording. This omission is fatal to the Claimant’s assertion that unambiguous terms were available and capable of forming a contract.

14. The absence of any signage at the site approach and entrance used by the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle is particularly significant. Under Sections 62–68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, contractual terms must be fair, transparent, and prominently displayed. Additionally, as a member of the British Parking Association (BPA), the Claimant is contractually obliged to comply with the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (BPA/IPC Joint Code). Paragraph 3.1.1 of this Code states: “An entrance sign must be displayed and maintained at the entrance to controlled land to inform drivers as appropriate whether parking is permitted subject to terms and conditions, including payment, or is prohibited…” (BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice Version 9 - February 2024).

15.Not only has the Claimant failed to comply with the applicable Code of Practice, but they have also misled the court by asserting that an entrance sign was present when it was not.

16. The misleading and inaccurate signage location plan (ANPR screenshots of vehicle entering and exiting the site) raises serious concerns regarding the reliability of the Claimant’s evidence and their adherence to the required standards. Without clear, accurate, and consistent evidence demonstrating the location and visibility of contractual signage, the Claimant cannot prove that the terms were effectively communicated. As such, no contract could have been formed with the driver.

Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

17. I confirm that I am the registered keeper of the vehicle with registration number xxnnxxx and deny any liability.

18. If the Claimant states that they are pursuing the Defendant as “the contracting party and, in the alternative, on the evidential basis that, on the balance of probabilities, the Defendant was the driver." This assertion will be both incorrect and unsupported.

19. This will contradict any statement suggesting the defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper of the Vehicle.

20. The Defendant has never been identified as the driver, nor has any other person. The Claimant has provided no evidence whatsoever that the Defendant was driving at the time of the alleged breach. Only the driver—as the person who could have potentially seen and accepted any terms on the signage —could possibly be the contracting party.

21. The Claimant relies only on an assumption, claiming that an inference should be drawn because the Defendant has not nominated another driver. However, there is no legal requirement for a registered keeper to name a driver in a private parking matter, and no such presumption exists in law.

22. If the Claimant wishes to pursue the Defendant as the driver, the burden rests entirely on them to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was in fact driving. Mere speculation or assumption is not enough.

23. In April 2023, HHJ Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re-claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward) that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation. HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "My decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed.

24. If, instead, the Claimant seeks to pursue the Defendant as the keeper, then they must meet the strict requirements of POFA 2012 (Schedule 4) to transfer liability from the unknown driver to me as the keeper. (Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) – Schedule 4)

25. However, the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) issued by the Claimant on 05th August 2024 fails to comply with several mandatory requirements under Schedule 4 of the POFA 2012: - The notice fails to provide any warning as stated in Paragraph 9(2)(f) regarding the transfer of liability to the keeper.

- The notice fails to comply with Paragraph 9(2)(i) that dictates that the date on which the notice is sent is specified

(where it is sent by post).

- The notice also fails to state the date from which the mandatory 28-day period in Paragraph 9(2)(f) begins (or ends). This omission makes the legal timeframe indeterminate.

26. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to comply with POFA and cannot transfer liability to me as keeper. There is therefore no lawful basis for this claim against me.

27. The fact that parking firms cannot invoke ‘keeper liability in case of non-compliance with POFA, has been tested on appeal in private parking cases including in the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court (Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith), on appeal re-claim number C0DP9C4E, HHJ Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable without the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Excel's claim was dismissed.

28. The Claimant’s failure to comply with POFA 2012 is unsurprising, as it stems from their own longstanding decision not to adopt the requirements of Schedule 4 before early 2025. At the time of the alleged contravention, Civil Enforcement LTD’s notices—including the PCN issued to me (Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) – Schedule 4)— were deliberately issued on a driver liability only basis. The Claimant was among the small number of parking companies that chose not to use the statutory wording or follow the strict timelines required to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4. (Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) – Schedule 4)

29. In preparing my defence, I have conducted extensive research and identified dozens of Horizon Parking NTKs from publicly available sources, spanning many years. Without exception, all such notices were non-POFA and asserted liability against the driver only. The earliest publicly identifiable example of Horizon issuing a POFAcompliant Notice to Keeper appears to date from March 2025 (ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores)

30. Taken together, this body of evidence demonstrates theClaimant operated exclusively on a driver liability only model until at least early 2025. Their adoption of POFA compliant documentation appears to have begun only at some point during early 2025.

31. It is entirely the Claimant’s prerogative—and permitted by the DVLA—to choose not to comply with POFA 2012. However, a consequence of choosing not to be bound by the statutory wording and timescales of Schedule 4 is that keeper liability cannot arise. Where POFA is not complied with, liability (if any) remains solely with the unidentified driver. In this case, the Claimant has nevertheless suggested to the court that keeper liability applies, despite purposely issuing a non POFA notice. This is misleading and wholly inconsistent with their own established operating model at the time, and with the legal requirements of Schedule 4.

Inflated and Unlawful Charges

32. In accordance with Schedule 4, paragraph 4(5) of the POFA 2012, the Claimant is prohibited from recovering from the keeper any sum greater than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they existed at the time the Notice to Driver was issued. The sum claimed in these proceedings exceeds that statutory maximum and is therefore unrecoverable from the keeper under POFA. (Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) – Schedule 4)

33. Explanatory Note 221 to Schedule 4 confirms that a creditor “may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued.” Any added sums—such as “debt recovery fees”, “late fees”, or other invented add-ons—are not “parking related charges” within the meaning of POFA. These additional amounts do not appear on signage, are not part of any contractual parking charge, and are created solely by third party debt recovery agents. POFA provides no legal basis to impose keeper liability for such DRAfabricated fees, even if (which is denied) the Claimant had otherwise complied with POFA’s conditions.

34. Also, the PCN on the Claimant’s PCN was £100, whereas the Claimant claims £270.50 for the PCN in the POC. They have increased the amount claimed from £100 to 185.50 and have included a Court Fee (£35) and Legal representative’s costs (£50); over double what they initially claimed.

35. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, the Claimant most show two things: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

36. This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate sum; it is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable, indeed it represents a penalty. Attention is drawn to paragraphs 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis (a £100 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner); the court should also read paragraph 3.4 of the original judgment by HHJ Moloney in Beavis, confirming what that authority means by 'costs of the operation'. (ParkingEye v Beavis)

37. The binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419- 428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter chain and 'would appear to be penal'. (ParkingEye v Beavis) The court should note that HHJ Moloney referenced this case in Beavis.

38. In addition to this, the ‘additional charges’ constitutes a double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The court is invited to find the quantum claim is false and an abuse of process as found by HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson in which £60 had been added to a parking charge. (ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores)

39. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Following the beforementioned exaggerated costs and charges, the court is invited to strike out or dismiss the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

Conclusion

40. For all the reasons set out in this statement, the Claimant has failed to establish a valid cause of action. The Particulars of Claim do not meet the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules, fail to specify which contractual terms were allegedly breached, provide no details of the conduct said to amount toa breach, and give no explanation of how any contract was formed. This lack of essential information mirrors the defective pleadings repeatedly criticised and struck out in persuasive appeal authorities and has made it difficult to effectively and properly respond in one’s defence.

41. The Claimant has also failed to demonstrate that any contractual terms were prominently displayed, consistent, or capable of forming a binding agreement with the driver. The Claimant’s own evidence shows inconsistent signage, missing entrance signs, and an inaccurate or misleading site plan. Without clear, reliable, and contemporaneous evidence of the terms allegedly relied upon, no contract could have been accepted and no liability could arise.

42. Moreover, the Claimant has neither identified the driver nor complied with the strict statutory requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 necessary to pursue the registered keeper. The Claimant’s attempt to imply keeper liability despite issuing a non-POFA Penalty Charge Notice is both legally unsound and inconsistent with their own operating model at the time.

43. The Claimant also seeks an inflated sum that includes unlawful and unrecoverable additions. These extra charges have been widely condemned in higher court decisions as disproportionate, penal, and an abuse of process. Such exaggeration further undermines the credibility and validity of the claim.

44. In light of the defective pleadings, noncompliant notices, unreliable and misleading evidence, and exaggerated charges, I respectfully submit that this claim is without merit. I therefore invite the court to strike out or dismiss the claim in its entirety.

Unreasonable Conduct by Claimant(CPR 27.14(2)(g))

45. In the alternative to striking out the claim, I respectfully invite the Court to determine that the Claimant has behaved unreasonably within the meaning of CPR 27.14(2)(g). This Claimant is professionally represented by solicitors specialising in private parking litigation and therefore cannot claim ignorance of the statutory requirements governing their own industry. Despite knowing that their PCN was expressly non POFA and incapable of creating keeper liability — consistent with their longstanding Driver liability only operating model — the Claimant nevertheless pursued keeper liability in their pleadings and witness statement. I also highlighted the non-POFA compliance in both my defence and during the mandatory mediation This was a legally hopeless position that no reasonable litigant, let alone a professional parking operator with specialist legal representation, could have genuinely believed to be viable.

46. Further, the Claimant has submitted misleading evidence, including an inaccurate and demonstrably false “Signage Location Plan” purporting to show signage at the site entrance where no such sign existed. My contemporaneous photographs, site visit, and Google Street View imagery all confirm this omission. The Claimant’s own photographs also expose inconsistencies between the signage displayed on site and the signage relied upon in their evidence bundle. Such defects undermine the reliability of the Claimant’s entire evidential foundation and amount to conduct no reasonable claimant should display.

47. Additionally, the Claimant has advanced vague and defective Particulars of Claim that fail to disclose the alleged contractual terms, the conduct said to amount to a breach, or any cogent explanation of how a contract was formed. They have also inflated the claim with unlawful and unrecoverable additional sums, including a £70 “debt recovery” add on that has been repeatedly condemned in higher court authority as abusive and penal. The persistence in claiming such invented sums, contrary to POFA and contrary to binding authority, further demonstrates unreasonable conduct.

48. Taken collectively, the pursuit of a claim with no legal basis, reliance on contradictory and misleading evidence, failure to plead a coherent cause of action, and continued inflation of the claim with unlawful charges amount to conduct that “transcends mere negligence” and meets the high bar of unreasonableness established in CPR 27.14(2)(g). Should the Court agree, I seek my Litigant in Person costs for time reasonably spent researching, drafting and preparing my defence and witness evidence, in accordance with the applicable LiP rate.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:26 June 2026