CE fine 4-5 months ago whilst seeing a patient

LAEllis

Ok update.

Now have a court date. 30/11/26

I've used a mix of some of the templates/examples on here.

Would be very grateful for some feedback as i absolutely hate this legal stuff and i don't quite trust ChatGPT

-

Updated below

Coupon-mad

That's very good!

I would remove paras 32 and 33 which are out of date. There is no government dept called the DLUHC now, and what is mentioned there is no longer relevant.

And change this:

"However, Beavisdoes not remove the requirement for the Claimant to establish the existence and incorporation of the particular contractual term allegedly breached, nor does it establish an automatic contractual entitlement to an additional £70 debt recovery charge."

To:

However, in fact Beavis is authority for the fact that any pre-action letter / recovery costs are entirely and fully encompassed within the PCN itself.

(then add the stuff about HHJ Moloney's first judgment in Beavis, where he spells that out).

You can copy that but from recent WS by @JackR1 or @Hondawonda and also copy their paragraph putting the C to proof of landowner authority.

Then you are done!

However we don't think your hearing will actually take place, as CEL are discontinuing defended cases before hearings this year. They aren't hunting robust defendants like you…

LAEllis

@Coupon-mad cant thank you enough. Hope they discontinue!

Updated version:

-

Civil Enforcement Ltd (Claimant)

V

Mr X (Defendant)

Witness Statement of Defendant

1. I am Mr X, of (Address) and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

Preliminary matter: Adequacy of the Particulars of Claim

2. The Defendant respectfully draws the Court's attention to a material deficiency in the Claimant's Particulars of Claim. The Particulars do not identify the contractual term allegedly breached, nor do they identify the conduct said to constitute that breach.

3. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Claim No. E7GM9W44), a County Court appeal judgment of HHJ Murch dated 15 August 2023 (Exhibit LEA/1), the Court held that the particulars of claim did not set out the conduct which amounted to the alleged contractual breach. I rely upon that decision as persuasive authority. I also rely upon Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande (Claim No. K0DP5J30), County Court at Manchester, HHJ Evans, 10 May 2024 (Exhibit LEA/2), as further persuasive authority concerning the requirement for adequate particulars in a private parking claim. The Defendant submits that the same material pleading deficiency arises in this case because the Claimant's Particulars of Claim refer only generally to breaches of the terms and conditions and do not identify the conduct said to constitute the breach. The Particulars of Claim identify the vehicle, location, date and ANPR entry and exit times, but do not plead that the alleged breach consisted of a failure to obtain a permit, nor do they identify the contractual term said to require such a permit.

4.This distinction is material because CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires the Particulars of Claim to contain a concise statement of the facts upon which the Claimant relies. Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5, further provides that where a claim is based upon an agreement by conduct, the Particulars must specify the conduct relied upon and state by whom, when and where the acts constituting the conduct were done.

5.The Claimant's own witness statement states at paragraph 21 that the specific breach is set out in greater detail below. In the witness statement served upon me, the subsequent paragraphs do not identify that specific breach in greater detail, but instead paragraph 27 refers the Court back to the Notice to Keeper.

6.The Notice to Keeper states that the alleged contravention was “Failed to obtain a permit in accordance with the notified terms.”

7.The Claimant's Particulars of Claim do not identify this alleged failure to obtain a permit as the conduct said to constitute the contractual breach. The Claimant's Witness Statement refers generally to signage but does not identify the precise contractual wording relied upon to establish the alleged permit requirement.

8. The Claimant's reference to ANPR evidence does not, by itself, establish that the driver failed to obtain a permit or identify the contractual term allegedly breached.

9. The Claimant is also put to strict proof of its authority from the landowner or lawful occupier to enter into contracts with motorists at the location, impose parking charges in its own name and pursue those charges through litigation. No such agreement or other evidence establishing the Claimant's authority has been identified or exhibited in the evidence served upon me.      

Facts and Sequence of events

10. I was the driver of vehicle PF17 HMV on 20 November 2025. I therefore address the Claimant's case on the basis of the alleged contract between the Claimant and the driver.

11.   I am a physiotherapist working for the NHS, and part of my professional duties involves visiting vulnerable patients in their homes to assess their needs and facilitate a return to independence or prevent further decline.

12. On 20 November 2025 I attended the relevant premises in the course of my professional duties to undertake a clinical visit. During the assessment, an unexpected and serious clinical and welfare situation became apparent. The patient was unable to safely mobilise and there were immediate concerns regarding their welfare and ability to remain safely without assistance.

13. In accordance with my professional responsibilities, I considered it necessary to remain with the patient and arrange appropriate assistance, including contacting the relevant persons and services as required.

14. The circumstances were unexpected and outside my control. The additional time spent at the premises was not for personal convenience and was not an elective extension of the visit.

15. I remained at the premises until the immediate situation had been appropriately addressed and it was safe and appropriate for me to leave.

16.  I do not recall receiving the Claimant's alleged pre-action correspondence before the proceedings were issued. The first correspondence from the Claimant which I recall receiving was substantially after the date of the alleged parking event.

Mitigating circumstances

17. I recognise that my occupation as a healthcare professional does not, by itself, create a general exemption from private parking restrictions. My case is based upon the particular circumstances of this visit.

18 . The vehicle was present because I was carrying out my professional duties as an NHS physiotherapist. An unexpected and serious patient welfare situation arose during the visit and required me to remain with the patient and arrange appropriate assistance.

19. The circumstances were therefore materially different from a driver simply choosing to remain at the premises for personal convenience.

20. Clause 8.4.6 of the applicable Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice requires operators to consider mitigating circumstances in accordance with Annex F. Annex F recognises circumstances involving illness and emergencies. I rely upon those provisions as relevant mitigation, while recognising that they do not create an automatic exemption for every healthcare professional.

21. The Claimant seeks a total of £170 before interest, comprising the £100 parking charge and a further £70 described as debt recovery costs.

22. I do not accept that the Claimant has established a contractual entitlement to recover the additional £70 from me.

23. The Claimant is required to identify the precise contractual wording upon which it relies for this additional sum and to demonstrate that the term was incorporated into the contract allegedly formed with the driver.

24. The Notice to Keeper states that failure to pay may result in debt recovery action and that further debt recovery fees of "up to £70" may be incurred. That wording does not, without more, establish that £70 became contractually payable by me in this particular case.

25. The fact that the applicable parking sector Code of Practice permits a sum of up to £70 to be added to an overdue parking charge does not itself create a contractual debt. The Claimant must establish its contractual entitlement to the particular sum claimed.

26. I also note that the Claimant's witness statement describes the additional £70 as "debt recovery costs". I put the Claimant to strict proof of the legal and contractual basis upon which this additional sum is claimed.

27. The Claimant relies upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. I do not dispute that the Supreme Court upheld the £85 parking charge in that case. However, that decision does not establish that a parking operator is automatically entitled to recover a further sum for debt recovery.

28. The first-instance judgment in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis, HHJ Moloney QC, considered the composition of the £85 parking charge. At paragraph 3.4, HHJ Moloney referred to ParkingEye's operating costs, including the costs of enforcement (Exhibit LEA/3). This is relevant to the distinction between the contractual parking charge itself and a subsequent additional sum described by the Claimant as debt recovery costs.

29. The Supreme Court's decision in Beavis therefore does not provide a contractual or automatic entitlement to add a further £70 to the parking charge. The Claimant must still establish the contractual and legal basis upon which the additional £70 is said to be payable in this particular case.

30. In ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1338 (Exhibit LEA/4), the Court of Appeal considered an increased parking charge following non-payment. The underlying judgment considered whether the additional sum was proportionate to the minor costs involved in the automated recovery process. I rely upon that authority as relevant to the need for the Claimant to establish a proper basis for any additional recovery sum rather than simply adding it to the parking charge.

31. I also rely upon Excel Parking Services Ltd v Wilkinson (Claim No. G4QZ465V) (Exhibit LEA/5) as persuasive County Court authority concerning the addition of a further sum to a parking charge and the treatment of such an addition as an abuse of process. I recognise that this is a County Court decision and is not binding upon this Court.

Conclusion

32. I was attending the premises in the course of my professional duties as an NHS physiotherapist when an unexpected and serious patient welfare situation arose.

33. The circumstances which caused the visit to extend beyond its anticipated duration were outside my control. I remained with the patient and arranged appropriate assistance because it was necessary to do so.

34. The Claimant has not adequately pleaded the conduct said to constitute the contractual breach and is put to strict proof of the precise contractual term, its incorporation by adequate signage, its application to this visit and the alleged breach. The Claimant has also failed, on the evidence presently served, to establish a contractual entitlement to the additional £70 claimed as debt recovery costs.

35.  The Defendant respectfully submits that the claim should be struck out or dismissed, and invites the Claimant to discontinue the proceedings rather than incur further costs and court time.

36. In relation to costs, I ask the Court to award any costs properly recoverable under CPR 27.14, including reasonable travel expenses and any applicable loss of earnings or loss of leave for attendance at the hearing.

37. If the Court considers that the Claimant's conduct has been unreasonable, I also ask the Court to consider making an order under CPR 27.14(2)(g).

38.    Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date: 06 October 2026

-

LEA/1 — Civil Enforcement Ltd v Ming Tak ChanClaim No. E7GM9W44
County Court at Luton — HHJ Murch
15 August 2023

LEA/2 — Car Park Management Service Ltd v Charles AkandeClaim No. K0DP5J30
County Court at Manchester — HHJ Evans
10 May 2024

LEA/3 — ParkingEye Ltd v BeavisClaim No. 3JD05152
County Court at Chelmsford — HHJ Moloney QC
First-instance judgment

LEA/4 — ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd[2012] EWCA Civ 1338
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
17 October 2012

LEA/5 — Excel Parking Services Ltd v Miss Ann WilkinsonClaim No. G4QZ465V
County Court at Bradford — District Judge Jackson
2 July 2020

Coupon-mad

I think you are still missing the important bit about what HHJ Moloney said at para 3.4 about the £85 PCN in Beavis 'including the costs of enforcement' and you must have links or exhibits taking the judge to HHJ Moloney's transcript and also Chan & Akande.

LAEllis

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82160912#Comment_82160912

Thanks.

I've updated the above post and included the exhibits in the final document.

I prematurely submitted the old version. I assume i can email this asking for this to supersede the previous.

Coupon-mad

You can ask… that was silly though. 🙂