Southgate Park Stansted initial appeal to MET

Hangthemorons

So, have got the notice to keeper for the Southgate Park,  Starbucks/Mcdonalds site. This is my first appeal and have drafted my appeal to MET as below, is there anything that is obvioulsy missing or needs adding. Thanks

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am the registered keeper of vehicle registration number XXXXXX  and am in receipt of your Parking Charge Notice XXXXXXXXXX, issued in relation to a 12-minute stay at Southgate Park, Stansted on XX/07/2025. I am submitting this appeal in my capacity as the keeper and do not identify the driver, nor am I obliged to do so.

I formally appeal this notice on the following grounds:

1. No Opportunity to Comply – Starbucks Was Closed The driver entered the car park with the genuine intention of using Starbucks, the business associated with this specific parking area. However, upon arrival, Starbucks was closed, rendering the in-store terminal (iPad) used for vehicle registration inaccessible. This made it impossible to comply with any requirement to register the vehicle for the advertised one-hour free parking. Crucially, while a pay-by-phone option may have existed, the lack of clear, prominent signage specifically explaining this alternative, especially given the intended method (in-store iPad) was unavailable due to the store's closure, meant the driver had no immediate and obvious means to understand or comply with any terms of parking. Based on signage found online it appears there is a one-hour free parking available. As a result, no breach of terms occurred; the driver could not register or pay due to circumstances entirely beyond their control and a critical lack of clear instruction.

2. Misleading and Ambiguous Signage The signage at Southgate Park is insufficient and misleading, particularly for first-time visitors. The car park appears to serve a shared retail site (Starbucks and McDonald's), with a single entrance/exit and no clear division between potential parking zones. This lack of clear demarcation and guidance, including the failure to adequately present alternative registration methods when the primary in-store option was unavailable, violates the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice (specifically, requirements for clear, prominent, and unambiguous signage at entry and within the site, e.g., Section 18.1). The signage failed to adequately inform a reasonable motorist of the specific terms and conditions or what action was required given the store's closure.

3. No Valid Contract Could Be Formed A binding contract requires clear offer, acceptance, and an ability to understand and comply with terms. At the time in question:

• Starbucks was closed.
• The registration iPad was inaccessible.
• Despite the possibility of a phone payment option, the signage did not clearly explain this method as a viable alternative, nor did it explain what a visitor should do if the primary store (Starbucks) was closed or how to register their vehicle under such circumstances. Therefore, no valid contract could be formed between the driver and MET Parking Services, and consequently, no breach occurred.

4. No Keeper Liability – POFA 2012 Not Satisfied As the keeper, I am not liable unless the strict conditions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Schedule 4) are fully met. Your Notice fails to demonstrate that all POFA requirements have been strictly adhered to, including, but not limited to, the specific wording and timing requirements. Furthermore, it does not provide clear evidence that the land is not excluded land (e.g., subject to airport bylaws). Unless you can provide unequivocal evidence of full POFA compliance, liability cannot be transferred from the unknown driver to me as keeper.

5. Grace Period – BPA Code of Practice Breached The entire duration of the stay was 12 minutes, during which the driver attempted to use the Starbucks facility but was unable to do so due to its closure. The British Parking Association Code of Practice mandates specific grace periods:

• Section 13.2 requires a reasonable grace period to leave the car park if a driver decides not to park.
• Section 13.3 requires a further 10-minute period to leave after a stay. Issuing a charge for such a brief visit, where the driver entered, found the intended facility unusable due to closure, and exited promptly within what constitutes a reasonable period for entry, assessment, and departure (well under the combined minimum 15-minute grace period advised), is a clear breach of this guidance.

Request for Cancellation Given:

• The driver’s genuine intention to use Starbucks.
• The impossibility of compliance due to the store being closed and the primary registration system being unavailable.
• The lack of clear, unambiguous signage and the failure to adequately communicate alternative registration methods, leading to no contract formation.
• The short 12-minute stay, which falls well within the BPA grace period guidelines.
• And your apparent lack of grounds to pursue keeper liability under POFA 2012.

I request that this charge be cancelled immediately. Should you reject this appeal, I will escalate to POPLA and request a full case review based on the above points. Please provide the required POPLA code if you do not agree to cancel.

Yours faithfully,

 

Coupon-mad

Too long. Save all that for POPLA, plus the map of the Airport site that shows this is not 'relevant land'.

Hangthemorons

I've now received the rejection from MET.  my POPLA appeal is as below 

My appeal is as below:

POPLA Appeal – Registered Keeper

I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and am appealing the Parking Charge Notice issued by MET Parking Services. I request that this appeal be upheld on the following grounds.

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1. No Keeper Liability – Failure to Comply with POFA 2012, Schedule 4

The operator has failed to meet the strict requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA), Schedule 4, to hold the registered keeper liable. As the keeper, I can only be held liable if every statutory condition is met. This Notice to Keeper (NtK) fails on multiple mandatory points:

• No “period of parking” – POFA 9(2)(a): The NtK provides only ANPR entry/exit timestamps (“arrived at 01:47:24 and departed at 02:00:06”). These are not the same as the "period of parking" required by POFA, as they include circulation and exit time, not just stationary parking.

• Keeper liability warning not in prescribed form – POFA 9(2)(f): The NtK omits the mandatory statutory phrase “subject to the conditions set out in this Schedule.” This is a fatal omission that prevents the operator from transferring liability to the keeper.

• Creditor not properly identified – POFA 9(2)(h): POFA requires the NtK to clearly identify the creditor. The statement “We, MET Parking Services Limited, are the creditor” is not in the explicit, mandatory format required by some assessors.

• Land description ambiguity – POFA 9(2)(a): The NtK lists the location only as “(346) Southgate Park, Stansted, CM24 1PY” without defining the exact boundaries, which is a requirement of POFA.

Based on the above breaches, keeper liability has not been established.

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2. Possible Statutory Control – Burden on MET to Prove Land is Not Excluded Land

POFA, Schedule 4, paragraph 3, excludes land subject to statutory control from keeper liability. Southgate Park is located adjacent to Stansted Airport. The burden of proof is on MET Parking Services to produce authoritative evidence, such as a landowner plan, to show the site is not subject to statutory control. If they cannot, the site must be treated as excluded land, and keeper liability cannot apply.

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3. Inadequate and Non-Compliant Signage (BPA Code of Practice Sections 18 & 19)

The BPA Code requires clear, prominent entrance signage that is readable from a moving vehicle and illuminated so terms are visible in darkness. The alleged incident occurred at night (~01:47). The operator has produced no evidence of:

• Sign illumination at the time.

• Adequate font size and positioning for legibility.

• Entrance signs meeting BPA Appendix B requirements.

Without illuminated and legible signage, no contract could have been formed.

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4. No Contract Formed – Primary Registration Method Unavailable

The driver entered intending to use the free parking offered via an in-store registration system at Starbucks. On arrival, Starbucks was closed and the registration system was inaccessible. Signage did not clearly explain alternative payment or registration methods for this situation. With no clear and available means to accept the parking offer, no contract was formed, and no breach could occur.

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5. Grace Periods Not Observed (BPA Code of Practice Section 13)

The total stay was 12 minutes. The BPA Code of Practice requires a reasonable observation period upon arrival (13.1) and a minimum 10-minute grace period after parking ends to leave (13.3). A 12-minute total stay could fall entirely within these grace periods. MET has provided no evidence that these statutory grace periods were allowed before issuing the charge.

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6. No Legitimate Interest – Charge is a Penalty

The ParkingEye v Beavis decision allows parking charges only where there is a legitimate interest in enforcing terms. In this case, the premises were closed, there was no customer turnover to protect, and no loss was caused by the short stay. This is a punitive penalty, not commercially justified.

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Conclusion

The operator has failed to establish keeper liability under POFA 2012, has not proven the land is not subject to statutory control, and has failed to demonstrate that a contract was formed or that grace periods were observed. For all these reasons, I am requesting that POPLA upholds this appeal and directs MET Parking Services to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.

Where can I get the map to attach and is there anything that I've missed.   Thanks,

Coupon-mad

There's another MET thread tonight with the map included. The thread titles will find it. Have a browse.

Hangthemorons

Is all the other bits good for POPLA appeal. Anything missing?Thanks

Hangthemorons

@Coupon-mad - Thank you for the Map. Is there anything I need to change in the POLA appeal?

Thank you 

Coupon-mad

I'd remove your first point (POFA is irrelevant) and I think the second point 'possible statutory control' is too weak.  Most appeals I've seen here are far more robust on that point.  Assert that this is within the Airport Boundary and refer to the map, and say this is not relevant land because of the Airport byelaws taking precedence (and attach or upload the byelaws).

Copy from one already written.  Don't make it short and in your own words.  Copy what has worked!

Also, this is referring to the wrong clause in the Joint Code. This is from the old BPA Code from a year ago:

"The BPA Code of Practice requires a reasonable observation period upon arrival (13.1) and a minimum 10-minute grace period after parking ends to leave (13.3)."

Hangthemorons

@Coupon-mad.

I have rephrased the whole thing and will submit the appeal today. Please new version below .
Any comments would be appreciated. Kept it long and detailed.
Thanks,

Dear Sir/Madam

 As the registered keeper, this is my appeal about a Penalty Charge Notice issued by MET Parking Services Ltd for an alleged breach of the company's terms and conditions in the Southgate Park Car Park at Stansted, CM24 1PY on the . The highlighted that the below mentioned vehicle had been recorded via the system for "remaining at the car park longer than the stay authorised". There was no windscreen ticket on the vehicle - the notice to keeper was sent via post.

For the avoidance of doubt, the driver’s identity has not been provided and this appeal remains purely from the registered keeper.

POPLA Ref:

MET PCN Ref: 

VRN: 

As the registered keeper I wish to refute these charges and have this PCN cancelled on the following grounds:

1.      The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge. Hence the appellant not being the individual liable.

2.      Not relevant Land under POFA 2012; no registered keeper liability (ref POPLA case Steve Macallan 6062356150).

3.      No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of conduct.

4.      Unclear signage and illumination at night

5.      "The BPA Code of Practice requires a reasonable observation period upon arrival (13.1) and a minimum 10-minute grace period after parking ends to leave (13.3)."

6.       The Notice to Keeper does not comply with Protection Of Freedoms Act 2012, schedule 4, paragraph 9, subparagraph 7, and is therefore not POFA compliant.

7.      Previous appeals and complaints upheld by POPLA.

8.      No legitimate interest – charge is a penalty

 Please see detail below :

1.      Appellant not being the individual liable

MET has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge. (ref POPLA case Carly Law 6061796103). In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. Any person(s), with the consent of the registered keeper, may drive a vehicle as long as the driver is insured.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be and as the Registered Keeper), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if MET is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with MET, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. If POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

 Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

 This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

"I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.

 2.      Not relevant land

The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact liable for the charge. At no point have MET Parking Services provided any evidence of who was driving the vehicle at the time. Under POFA (even if it did apply), they must meet strict requirements to have done so.

Airport land is not 'relevant land' as it is already covered by statutory bylaws and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act. As I am the registered keeper I am not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land. I put the Operator to strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require documentary proof from the Airport Authority that this land is not already covered by bylaws.

MET cannot hold a registered keeper liable for any alleged contravention on land that is under statutory control and law. MET will be well aware that they cannot use the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) provisions because Stansted Airport is NOT 'relevant land' as defined in the Act. Any land ... other than-land ... on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control.

NOTE: Airports Act 1986 indicates that Stansted Airport Limited, as an Airport Authority and Highways Authority, falls under statutory control. If Stansted Airport's landowners wanted to hold owners or keepers liable under Airport Bylaws, that would be within the landowner's gift and another matter entirely. However, not possible because MET is not the Airport owner and their 'parking charge' is not and never attempts to be a penalty. It is created for MET's own profit (as opposed to a bylaws penalty). The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under a misrepresented interpretation of the law of agency. Relevant to this is that POPLA assessor Steve Macallan found in 6062356150 in September 2016, that land under statutory control cannot be considered 'relevant land' for the purposes of POFA 2012. If not located on 'relevant land', the operator is unable to rely on POFA 2012 in order to transfer liability to the hirer.

The site referenced in the PCN issued to me by MET Parking is clearly within the boundary of Stansted airport (image provided) and therefore cannot, in any way, be regarded as 'relevant land' under POFA 2012 or justify the issuing of this PCN. MET Parking claim that it is private land and not owned by the airport: this is insufficient evidence of the site being relevant land. They have not stated otherwise (or proven it), and they would need to provide detailed evidence from the owner of the land that this area is in fact relevant land. Evidence can only come from the owner. It is legally impossible under PoFA for an Airport to be 'relevant land'.

Even though the car park may be private land, it indisputably sits within the boundary of Stansted Airport. My map evidence shows the Airport boundary. It's clearly within the airport. It is legally impossible under POFA for an Airportto be 'relevant land'. In the recent past, POPLA has sometimes got this wrong and your service had to apologise for a series of mistakes including the misclassification (assumption) of the same Airport (Stansted) as relevant land, which more than one Assessor took to be true merely because the operator said it was so.

Stansted Site Boundary Map can be found in the following document on the government website:

(Exhibit A).

The vehicle was parked at Southgate Park, which lies within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This is not a speculative assumption - it is a matter of fact. I now submit with this a map from the Airport that clearly shows the official airport boundary. I have marked on this map the location of Southgate Park, which falls squarely within the blue boundary line of Stansted Airport.

The Airport site is under statutory control; all Airports are. The Airports Act 1986 indicates that Stansted Airport Limited, as an Airport Authority and Highways Authority, falls under statutory control. MET cannot disregard airport bylaws by claiming the land is private. Airport bylaws regulate conduct on ALL land within the airport boundary, including private areas like this car park. Therefore PoFA is not applicable to MET's Notice To Keeper.

 

 

Hangthemorons

3.      No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, and of course all enforcement dates/times/days, and the boundary of the site - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do, and when/where. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is authorised on the material date, to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only). Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement. Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic but crucial information such as the site boundary and any bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the only restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge, as well as the date that the parking contract began, and when it runs to, or whether it runs in perpetuity, and of course, who the signatories are: name/job title/employer company, and whether they are authorised by the landowner to sign a binding legal agreement. Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

Section 7.1 states:

“If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges.”

Section 7.21 states:

“If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.”

Section 7.3 states:

“The written authorisation must also set out:

a.             the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b.             any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c.             any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d.             who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e.             the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement”

 

I do not believe that MET’s mere site agreement as a contractor issuing PCNs and letters 'on behalf of' the landowner gives the parking firm any rights to sue in their own name. This is insufficient to comply with the BPA Code of Practice and not enough to hold me liable in law to pay MET (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non-relevant land and MET cannot enforce byelaws themselves). MET have no title in this land and therefore have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court. No evidence has been supplied lawfully showing that MET are entitled to pursue these charges in their own right.

In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner - not merely an 'agreement' with a non-landholder managing agent - otherwise there is no authority. I put MET to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements.

 4.      Non-Compliant Signage - The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

 

I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. POFA 2012 defines 'adequate notice' as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Even in circumstances where POFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. Having considered the signage in place at this particular site against the requirements of Section 18 of the BPA Code of Practice and POFA 2012, I am of the view that the signage at the site - given the minuscule font size of the £100, which is illegible in from the a driver’s view at the site entrance, and is not visible from any parking spaces - is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist. There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case, 2015.

 

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

 

 

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges. Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

 

 

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

 Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, similar in appearance to un-related parking signage, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

 

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs).  Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no signs with the full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering, and the full terms displayed on a single sign, - neither at the entrance nor elsewhere, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 02/06/2016, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

 

From the evidence I have seen the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters that are approximately half an inch high or .40 font size by this guide:

 

I put the operator to strict proof as to the size and font of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself, and to prove the location and number of signs required to be read to fully read the full terms of parking.

 

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

 

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

 

''... Letter Visibility Chart shows the maximum reading distance for your sign to make the best impact, as well as the overall readable distance. A good rule of thumb is every 1 inch of letter height provides 10 feet of readability with the best impact. For example, 3” tall letters make the best impact within 30’; however, they can still be seen and read from up to 100’ away''

 

“… The font type that you choose can also impact the visibility of your text. Very thin fonts and script fonts can potentially decrease visibility. When choosing fonts, you should select a bold style that is easy to read and with sufficient spacing between letters (kerning).

 

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.

(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them. This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

 

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

 

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

5.      Grace Periods Not Observed (BPA Code of Practice Section 13)

The entire duration of the stay was 12 minutes, during which the driver attempted to use the Starbucks facility but was unable to do so due to its closure. The British Parking Association Code of Practice mandates specific grace periods:

• Section 13.2 requires a reasonable grace period to leave the car park if a driver decides not to park.

·         Section 13.3 requires a further 10-minute period to leave after a stay. Issuing a charge for such a brief visit, where the driver entered, found the intended facility unusable due to closure, and exited promptly within what constitutes a reasonable period for entry, assessment, and departure (well under the combined minimum 15-minute grace period advised), is a clear breach of this guidance.

 

Hangthemorons

6.      No keeper liability – Failure to comply with Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Schedule 4)

I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and have not been identified as the driver. Under POFA 2012, Schedule 4, the operator can only transfer liability to the keeper if every statutory requirement is met. This Notice to Keeper fails on multiple counts:

a) No “period of parking” – POFA 9(2)(a)
The NtK provides only ANPR entry/exit timestamps (“arrived at 01:47:24 and departed at 02:00:06”), which are not the same as the period of parking. ANPR times include circulation and exit, not actual stationary parking.

b) Keeper liability warning not in prescribed form – POFA 9(2)(f)
The NtK omits the statutory phrase “subject to the conditions set out in this Schedule.” This omission fails to meet POFA’s mandatory wording requirement.

c) Creditor not properly identified – POFA 9(2)(h)
POFA requires the NtK to clearly identify the creditor. There is no explicit statement such as “The creditor is MET Parking Services Limited.”

d) Land description ambiguity – POFA 9(2)(a)
The NtK lists the location only as “(346) Southgate Park, Stansted, CM24 1PY” without defining the exact boundaries or providing proof of MET’s authority over that land.

Based on the above breaches I believe keeper liability has not been established and allow this appeal.

 

7.      Previous appeals and complaints upheld by POPLA.

 

The layout causes widespread confusion and has been criticised publicly by media outlets.

Previous appeals and complaints upheld by POPLA at the same site. POPLA Assessor: please note that there was a

recent decision from your Complaints Team in January 2025 regarding the same MET site where the investigator states:

"The Airport is an Airport and Highways Authority and this site falls under statutory control and as such, MET Parking

can only pursue the driver and it cannot use POFA to transfer liability to you." If you are in any doubt, kindly check with

your Sector Expert or Lead Adjudicator. Any cases in the public domain (and this is one) that POPLA gets wrong

regarding 'keeper liability' law should be corrected. Don't believe the operator in trying to convince you that the land is

relevant land. As previously stated, POPLA assessor Steve Macallan found in 6062356150 in September 2016 that it

cannot be considered 'relevant land' for the purposes of POFA 2012. This issue was also highlighted in POPLA's reply to

a formal complaint, Code ref 4822223007, where Bethany Young acknowledged and apologised for the repeated errors

made by Assessors who had blindly accepted what the operator said and not applied POFA properly.

 

8.No Legitimate Interest in Pursuing the Charge

The principle established in ParkingEye v Beavis permits parking charges only where there is a legitimate interest in enforcing the terms. At 01:47, the premises were closed, there were no customers to protect, and no loss was incurred by the operator. This charge is a punitive penalty, not a commercially justified fee.

 

Taking all the above into account, I therefore respectfully request that my appeal is upheld, and the charge is dismissed

 

 

 

 

Hangthemorons

@Coupon-mad
I also have shorten version as below, would it be better the put in the longer one or the shorter one please.

Appeal Against Penalty Charge Notice (PCN)

POPLA Reference: [Insert POPLA Reference] MET PCN Reference: Vehicle Registration Number (VRN):Date of Contravention: 

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing as the registered keeper of the vehicle with VRN  to formally appeal the Penalty Charge Notice (PCN) issued by MET Parking Services Ltd. I refute the charges on the following grounds and request that this PCN be canceled.

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Key Grounds for Appeal

1. No Keeper Liability Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

The land at Southgate Park, Stansted, CM24 1PY, is not "relevant land" as defined by POFA 2012. As a site within the boundary of Stansted Airport, it is subject to statutory control and airport bylaws. Therefore, the operator, MET Parking Services, cannot use POFA to hold the registered keeper liable.

• POFA Exclusion: POFA Schedule 4, paragraph 3(1) explicitly states that the Act does not apply to land where parking is subject to statutory control. Stansted Airport, as an Airport Authority, is governed by the Airports Act 1986.

• POPLA Precedent: This has been confirmed by multiple POPLA decisions, including the precedent set by Assessor Steve Macallan (case ref: 6062356150) and a recent complaint decision in January 2025, which confirmed that MET cannot use POFA on this specific site to transfer liability to the keeper.

• No Admission of Driver Identity: As the registered keeper, I have no legal obligation to name the driver. Since keeper liability cannot be established on this non-relevant land, and the operator has not provided proof of who was driving, they have no lawful right to pursue this charge from me.

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2. Failure to Comply with BPA Code of Practice: Grace Periods

The British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice mandates specific grace periods that MET Parking Services has failed to observe.

• Arrival and Departure Grace Periods: Section 13.1 requires a reasonable observation period upon arrival, and Section 13.3 mandates a minimum 10-minute grace period after parking to allow the driver to leave the site.

• Insufficient Stay Time: The recorded total stay was only 12 minutes. The driver entered the car park, found the intended facility (Starbucks) closed, and exited promptly. This short duration falls well within a reasonable period for a driver to enter, assess the situation, and leave, well under the combined minimum 15-minute grace period advised by the BPA Code of Practice. Charging for such a brief, non-parking stay is a breach of this guidance.

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3. Unclear and Non-Compliant Signage

The signage at this location is inadequate and fails to form a clear and binding contract with the driver.

• Lack of Prominence: The signs are not prominent, and key information, such as the £100 parking charge, is in a small, illegible font. The signs are also sporadically placed and not clearly visible from all parking spaces.

• POFA Requirement for "Adequate Notice": POFA 2012 requires "adequate notice" of the charge, which this signage fails to provide. The case law from ParkingEye v Beavis is not applicable here, as the signage in that case was exceptionally clear and prominent, unlike the signs at Southgate Park.

• Binding Case Law: The Court of Appeal judgment in Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106 is binding and supports my position. In that case, the court found that if a driver does not see the terms of a sign because they are not prominent or clearly marked, no contract can be formed. The same principle applies here.

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4. No Legitimate Interest

The charge is a punitive penalty, not a commercially justifiable fee.

• No Loss Incurred: The alleged contravention occurred at 01:47, a time when the business premises (Starbucks) were closed. There was no legitimate business interest to protect, no customers to serve, and no financial loss incurred by the operator.

• Penalty Clause: A charge that is disproportionate to any potential loss, especially at a time of night when no business is operating, is an unenforceable penalty.

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5. No Evidence of Landowner Authority

The operator has not provided strict proof of its authority to operate on this land and issue PCNs in its own name.

• BPA Code of Practice: Section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice requires the operator to have a written, unredacted contract with the landowner that clearly defines the boundaries of the land and authorizes the operator to pursue parking charges.

• Insufficient Evidence: A generic witness statement is not sufficient. I require an unredacted copy of the contract to verify that MET has the legal standing to pursue this charge.

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Conclusion

For all the reasons stated above—the inability to hold the keeper liable on non-relevant land, the failure to observe required grace periods, the non-compliant signage, the lack of a legitimate interest, and the absence of proven landowner authority—I respectfully request that you uphold this appeal and cancel the Penalty Charge Notice.