Help Needed – Claim Form from Parking Firm VCS (LBA “No Stopping” Charge) – Drafting Defence

1505grandad

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/fairer-parking-drive-as-governments-crackdown-on-unjust-charges

Motorists protected as plans to raise standards across the private parking industry unveiled  through a new strengthened Private Parking Code of Practice .

From:

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Alex Norris MP

Published

11 July 2025

Gr1pr

LittleLittle1 said:

Coupon-mad said:

Compare it to my new one and amalgamate.

  

Just a quick note regarding the defence template — excellent work overall and extremely helpful.

One small suggestion:
In paragraph 6, it refers to “the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)”, but this department was renamed in 2021 and is now called the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC).

It might be worth updating the reference to avoid any confusion in court. Something like:

“...a public consultation was launched by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (‘DLUHC’, formerly MHCLG)...”

Hope that helps!
 

 

And was renamed back to the mhclg last year, under Rayner 

Coupon-mad is on the steering group and a new consultation is out  ( look at the date  )

LittleLittle1

Gr1pr said:

Personally,  I would remove the part about anyone being dropped off or picked up,  especially because the POC nor the NTK PCN letter, do not mention it,  so why would you  ?

Rebut the POC,  don't speculate on any circumstances etc, like VCS did in the appeal reply with their allegations 

Also,  if you were NOT the driver,  say so , because airport land is controlled using bylaws and there is no keeper liability,  it's not a public road either,  it's a roadway that the public has access to,  on airport land 

3. The Defendant has little or no recollection of events on the date stated and does not intend to disclose the identity of the driver. For the avoidance of doubt, the Defendant was not the driver at the time and location of the alleged event. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is confirmed that the Defendant was the DVLA-registered keeper.
The Claimant alleges that the Defendant’s vehicle was seen to have stopped in a 'no stopping' zone. This is denied. The three photographs provided with the Charge Notice show the vehicle in slightly different positions over a span of approximately 30 seconds, indicating minimal but continued movement. These images do not prove that the vehicle was stationary.
The vehicle appears to have been proceeding slowly in the vicinity of a pedestrian crossing and may have briefly paused for a reasonable excuse — including a moral obligation or compliance with public safety requirements — wholly unrelated to any alleged contractual terms. If any hesitation occurred, it may have been to view a sign displaying purported contractual terms, which was located directly opposite the vehicle. The act of reading a contractual notice cannot simultaneously be construed as acceptance of the same contract if doing so requires stopping, which the contract itself prohibits. Such an arrangement is self-defeating and unenforceable.
Furthermore, the location is an access road within airport land, governed by airport bylaws rather than the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012. Therefore, no liability can pass to the registered keeper. The Defendant has no legal obligation to name the driver, and no lawful basis exists for the Claimant to pursue the keeper in this instance.
The signage was inadequate to form a binding contract, and no contract can arise where the terms are unreadable without performing the very act they seek to prohibit. The principle of estoppel applies. The Defendant further submits that no breach occurred, and that the alleged term is unfair, non-prominent, and contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all elements of their claim, including landowner authority, contract terms, and the adequacy and prominence of signage.
Although the sign refers to "Private Property", the area is open to the public and indistinguishable from a public highway, with no gates, barriers, or demarcation indicating a transition to private land. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Claimant cannot reasonably expect a driver to be contractually bound by terms that are not clearly communicated in advance. The general appearance and ambiguity as to jurisdiction support the application of the contra proferentem rule against the drafter of the unclear terms.

Le_Kirk

For someone who has little or no recollection of events on the date stated, you seem to know an awful lot about the issue.  The first part, the analysis of the pictures is great as that could have been done after the event from photos provided by the claimant.  You might want to either state that the driver passed information about the signage to the keeper/defendant OR the defendant was a passenger in the car OR a subsequent visit to the area was undertaken after receipt of the claim form.  You could also leave the last two paragraphs for the witness statement.

LittleLittle1

Le_Kirk said:

For someone who has little or no recollection of events on the date stated, you seem to know an awful lot about the issue.  The first part, the analysis of the pictures is great as that could have been done after the event from photos provided by the claimant.  You might want to either state that the driver passed information about the signage to the keeper/defendant OR the defendant was a passenger in the car OR a subsequent visit to the area was undertaken after receipt of the claim form.  You could also leave the last two paragraphs for the witness statement.

Thanks for the feedback — I see your point. In my case, the analysis of the photos and signage was done after the fact, based on the images provided by the claimant. I also happen to know the location fairly well, as I later used the parking facility myself, so I'm familiar with the layout and signage.

As for the narrative, I’m sticking with the position that I wasn’t the driver and don’t intend to name the driver. If it ever goes to a hearing, I can clarify that I was a passenger. I don’t plan to redraft this part of the defence for now, as I believe it's sufficiently safe and consistent with POFA and the rest of the arguments.

Appreciate the comment though — thanks again!

Here's the latest version:

3. The Defendant has little or no recollection of events on the date stated and does not intend to disclose the identity of the driver. For the avoidance of doubt, the Defendant was not the driver at the time and location of the alleged event. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is confirmed that the Defendant was the DVLA-registered keeper.
The Claimant alleges that the Defendant’s vehicle was seen to have stopped in a 'no stopping' zone. This is denied. The three photographs provided with the Charge Notice show the vehicle in slightly different positions over a span of approximately 30 seconds, indicating minimal but continued movement. These images do not prove that the vehicle was stationary.
The vehicle appears to have been proceeding slowly in the vicinity of a pedestrian crossing and may have briefly paused for a reasonable excuse — including a moral obligation or compliance with public safety requirements — wholly unrelated to any alleged contractual terms. If any hesitation occurred, it may have been to view a sign displaying purported contractual terms, which was located directly opposite the vehicle. The act of reading a contractual notice cannot simultaneously be construed as acceptance of the same contract if doing so requires stopping, which the contract itself prohibits. Such an arrangement is self-defeating and unenforceable.
Furthermore, the location is an access road within airport land, governed by airport bylaws rather than the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012. Therefore, no liability can pass to the registered keeper. The Defendant has no legal obligation to name the driver, and no lawful basis exists for the Claimant to pursue the keeper in this instance.
The signage was inadequate to form a binding contract. No agreement can arise where the terms are unreadable without performing the very act they seek to prohibit. The principle of estoppel applies. The Defendant further submits that no breach occurred, and that the alleged term is unfair, non-prominent, and contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Further, it is denied that the signage ‘specifically details the terms and conditions’ as alleged. The signs were poorly positioned, including being placed at junctions and, in some instances, on the right-hand side of the road. The design and positioning of the signage made it impossible to safely read the alleged terms without slowing or stopping in live traffic. There was no safe opportunity to refuse the alleged contract, and no meaningful chance to read and understand the terms before the Claimant considered a contract to have been formed. In such circumstances, no contract can arise. The signage also displayed a standard UK "No Stopping (clearway)" traffic sign, which is a statutory road sign. This creates ambiguity as to whether the instruction is a regulatory prohibition or a contractual offer, and therefore incapable of forming a valid and enforceable agreement. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all elements of their claim, including landowner authority, contract terms, and the adequacy and prominence of signage — none of which have been evidenced, either in the claim particulars or any prior correspondence.
Although the sign refers to "Private Property", the area is open to the public and indistinguishable from a public highway, with no gates, barriers, or demarcation indicating a transition to private land. The site contains several car park entrances, each with potentially different tariffs and conditions. The signage provides no clear distinction or opportunity to select between them, adding to the confusion and contractual ambiguity. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Claimant cannot reasonably expect a driver to be contractually bound by terms that are not clearly communicated in advance. The general appearance and ambiguity as to jurisdiction support the application of the contra proferentem rule against the drafter of the unclear terms.

LittleLittle1

Coupon-mad said:

How much of this new template defence fitted?

6 out of 10 points of my Defence:

1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable to understand with certainty the allegation or the heads of cost. The Defendant denies liability for the inflated sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is difficult to respond but these facts come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. To form a contract, there must be a prominent offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration. It is neither admitted nor denied that the driver breached any term. Section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘the CRA’) creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness. The CRA introduced new requirements for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Sch2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith, the Defendant avers that this Claimant generally uses unclear and unfair terms/notices. On the limited information available, this case appears to be no different. The Claimant has never provided the wording of the contract they rely upon in any correspondence and is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs. The Defendant reserves the right to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided. However, the court is invited to strike this claim out using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

3. The Defendant has little or no recollection of events on the date stated and does not intend to disclose the identity of the driver. For the avoidance of doubt, the Defendant was not the driver at the time and location of the alleged event. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is confirmed that the Defendant was the DVLA-registered keeper.
The Claimant alleges that the Defendant’s vehicle was seen to have stopped in a 'no stopping' zone. This is denied. The three photographs provided with the Charge Notice show the vehicle in slightly different positions over a span of approximately 30 seconds, indicating minimal but continued movement. These images do not prove that the vehicle was stationary.
The vehicle appears to have been proceeding slowly in the vicinity of a pedestrian crossing and may have briefly paused for a reasonable excuse — including a moral obligation or compliance with public safety requirements — wholly unrelated to any alleged contractual terms. If any hesitation occurred, it may have been to view a sign displaying purported contractual terms, which was located directly opposite the vehicle. The act of reading a contractual notice cannot simultaneously be construed as acceptance of the same contract if doing so requires stopping, which the contract itself prohibits. Such an arrangement is self-defeating and unenforceable.
Furthermore, the location is an access road within airport land, governed by airport bylaws rather than the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012. Therefore, no liability can pass to the registered keeper. The Defendant has no legal obligation to name the driver, and no lawful basis exists for the Claimant to pursue the keeper in this instance.
The signage was inadequate to form a binding contract. No agreement can arise where the terms are unreadable without performing the very act they seek to prohibit. The principle of estoppel applies. The Defendant further submits that no breach occurred, and that the alleged term is unfair, non-prominent, and contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Further, it is denied that the signage ‘specifically details the terms and conditions’ as alleged. The signs were poorly positioned, including being placed at junctions and, in some instances, on the right-hand side of the road. The design and positioning of the signage made it impossible to safely read the alleged terms without slowing or stopping in live traffic. There was no safe opportunity to refuse the alleged contract, and no meaningful chance to read and understand the terms before the Claimant considered a contract to have been formed. In such circumstances, no contract can arise. The signage also displayed a standard UK "No Stopping (clearway)" traffic sign, which is a statutory road sign. This creates ambiguity as to whether the instruction is a regulatory prohibition or a contractual offer, and therefore incapable of forming a valid and enforceable agreement. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all elements of their claim, including landowner authority, contract terms, and the adequacy and prominence of signage — none of which have been evidenced, either in the claim particulars or any prior correspondence.
Although the sign refers to "Private Property", the area is open to the public and indistinguishable from a public highway, with no gates, barriers, or demarcation indicating a transition to private land. The site contains several car park entrances, each with potentially different tariffs and conditions. The signage provides no clear distinction or opportunity to select between them, adding to the confusion and contractual ambiguity. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Claimant cannot reasonably expect a driver to be contractually bound by terms that are not clearly communicated in advance. The general appearance and ambiguity as to jurisdiction support the application of the contra proferentem rule against the drafter of the unclear terms.

4. DVLA registered keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written agreement from the landowner. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to sue under a landowner contract and the terms/scope and dates/details of the parking management service, including the contract itself, all updates and schedules and a map of the site boundary as set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps mock-up).

5. In order to impose a parking charge, as well as proving that the driver breached an obligation, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' of any relevant obligation(s) and of the charge itself. None of these requirements have been demonstrated and this charge is a penalty. ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 is fully distinguished. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis and also to ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) a finding unaffected by Beavis. In Somerfield, HHJ Hegarty (whose decision was ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' further inflating a £75 (discounted to £37.50) parking charge to £135 was disproportionate to the minor cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

6. On 11 July 2025, a public consultation was launched by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (‘DLUHC’, formerly MHCLG). The Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 will finally curb the unjust enrichment of the parking industry and debt recovery agents (DRAs). Banning DRA fees (mirroring the approach of the last Government, which called DRA fees ‘extorting money from motorists’) appears likely. The DLUHC have identified that the added sums are not part of the parking related charges: “profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than the profits reported by parking operators” and “the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure”.

7. The claim exceeds the current Code of Practice £100 maximum parking charge without justification or explanation. Pursuant to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') it also exceeds the ‘maximum sum’ recoverable; the explanatory notes to s4 (5) and (6) state at para 221: ‘’The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper [...] for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5)).’’

8. The Claimant is put to proof of POFA and Code of Practice compliance. It is denied that any DRA sums are due, nor interest (the delay lies with the Claimant and interest should be disallowed).

9. The delay in litigation has made retrieving material documents/evidence impossible for the Defendant, which is highly prejudicial. The Defendant seeks standard witness costs (CPR 27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct by the Claimant, opening up further costs (CPR 46.5).

10. The court’s attention is drawn to the common outcome in bulk parking claims, of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst a Claimant is liable for a Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book commentary at 38.6.1 confirms that while costs are not normally awarded following discontinuance on the small claims track, the court may exercise its discretion under CPR 27.14(2)(g) where a party has acted unreasonably

Coupon-mad

OK you can add the missing points at WS stage.