Moorside Legal Court Hearing / Preparing Witness Statement

rynno15

Hi all, I just got my letter come through to say I have been allocated a court date on August 4th (small claims).

Some background... I received a non-POFA PCN in October 2023 and I've been following all the usual steps. I submitted a defence using the Moorside/DCBL template and I'm now considering what my options are to lean into for my witness statement.

The PCN issued is non-POFA, but re-reading my defence I realised under the 'facts known to the Defendant' I added: "... the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver". Just to be clear, at no stage previously have I named the driver - only in this one line of the defence. Am I right in assuming I've ruled out any chance of following the non-POFA route through since I've admitted to being driver in my defence? If so, I'll drop that from my WS.

I'm looking to mainly rely on the Chan/Akande argument. The Particulars of Claim seems to be a generic statement and the actual condition I've supposedly breached isn't detailed anywhere here. Does it seem feasible that I could rely on this?

The car park in question isn't pay-and-display. It's a "customers of X only" and specifies "parking not permitted for customers of Y". As far as I'm aware there's no solid evidence I was a "customer of Y" and the only evidence I'm aware of is 2 time-stamped images of the car exactly 5 minutes apart. If they only rely on this as evidence, would it be possible to combat this by arguing this isn't a reasonable 'grace period'?

Thanks for any help.

ChirpyChicken

Why did you admit to being the driver.....

Gr1pr

Yes your WS will be as the driver,  first person witness , forget POFA2012 

The POC have no cause of action,  they don't mention the alleged breach,  so yes use Chan and Akande 

Yes,  mention lack of a suitable grace period etc

rynno15

ChirpyChicken said:

Why did you admit to being the driver.....

After para 2 the defence template says:

If you were driving, add 'and driver' after the word 'keeper'.  If you were leasing or hiring the vehicle then change 'registered keeper' to whatever is true.

OR if the Defendant doesn't know who was driving, say that.

OR deny being the driver if you weren't: ONLY IF TRUE!

 I followed the template too literally. Oh well. It's done now.

Gr1pr said:

Yes your WS will be as the driver,  first person witness , forget POFA2012 

The POC have no cause of action,  they don't mention the alleged breach,  so yes use Chan and Akande 

Yes,  mention lack of a suitable grace period etc

Thanks, I'll add those to my WS then. I'm searching the forum for other examples like this of PCNs for car parks that aren't pay-and-display. Are there any other typical things to mention in a WS in these instances? For reference this is the signage on the land:

Car1980

Well, no £70 for starters.

Common knocked up in Word sign. No doubt that wall of visual noise would be unreadable in the real world. But is that what you found, because on site photos would be better (remember 45p a mile to travel there and back, plus £19 per hour in your WS costs assessment).

Moorside don't always turn up to the hearing by the way.

ChirpyChicken

Car1980 said:

Well, no £70 for starters.

Common knocked up in Word sign. No doubt that wall of visual noise would be unreadable in the real world. But is that what you found, because on site photos would be better (remember 45p a mile to travel there and back, plus £19 per hour in your WS costs assessment).

Moorside don't always turn up to the hearing by the way.

Moorside by default don't attend single ticket cases 

rynno15

Car1980 said:

Well, no £70 for starters.

Common knocked up in Word sign. No doubt that wall of visual noise would be unreadable in the real world. But is that what you found, because on site photos would be better (remember 45p a mile to travel there and back, plus £19 per hour in your WS costs assessment).

Great advice. I might have to make a little trip then. In fact, during the appeal THEY already provided me with a picture of the signage in the day time and as you suspected, it's a sign for ants. Not to mention the alleged contravention occurred at night. I'll go back and get some night-time shots.

Car1980 said:

Moorside don't always turn up to the hearing by the way.

I'm curious when they deem it worthy to show up. Though I have a suspicion they might attend this one.

Coupon-mad

I'd start with asking the judge to strike the claim out due to Chan & Akande then talk about no grace period and no evidence of breach of any of those terms. Not that the POC specifies any conduct.

Is that sign even the same one as they mocked up? Doesn't look quite the same.

rynno15

Coupon-mad said:

I'd start with asking the judge to strike the claim out due to Chan & Akande then talk about no grace period and no evidence of breach of any of those terms. Not that the POC specifies any conduct.

Is that sign even the same one as they mocked up? Doesn't look quite the same.

Thanks, I'll include all that in WS. As for the sign, I'll find out once I re-visit.

I may just use this picture citing UKCPS since this is straight from the original appeal document they sent me. Doubt they have any additional pictures if they're sending me this one.

rynno15

I've had a crack at my WS and I was hoping to get some feedback. Particularly para. 9 onward as the 'Exaggerated claim' and Beavis parts are somewhat standard (though I did alter the Beavis part slightly to suit).

I've relied on POFA because as I see it, yes I have said I was a driver in my defence but I did not specify for which date. If it comes to it I'm hoping I can convince the judge to forgive those 2 words in my defence as I hadn't meant I was the driver on the day of the incident. Any comments are much appreciated - very grateful for anyone's time & advice!

XXXX(Claimant)

V

XXXXXX(Defendant)

 

Witness Statement of Defendant

 

1.       I am XXXXXX, (ADDRESS) and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

 

2.       In my statement, I shall refer to (Exhibits 01-XX) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows:

 

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3.  I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are two very recent and persuasive Appeal judgments to support dismissing or striking out the claim (and the first is about this same Claimant).  I believe that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims using powers pursuant to CPR 3.4., based in the following persuasive authorities.

 

4.  The first recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POCs fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15 August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. (See Exhibit 01)

 

5.  The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10 May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that 'Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim'. (See Exhibit 02)

 

6.  I believe the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.

 

7.  The POC lacks clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. In fact, the present POC are even less detailed than those struck out in Chan and Akande, offering no factual basis for a cause of action.

 

Facts and Sequence of events

9.     I was one of the frequent drivers of the named vehicle for daily use and commuting and it is admitted that on the material dates, I was the registered keeper of the vehicle. However, it is unknown who the driver of the vehicle was on the date stated in the PCN, given the PCN dates back to 2023.

 

10.   Multiple individuals were authorised by me to use the vehicle at the times of the alleged contraventions via their own comprehensive insurance policies, which allowed them to use another private vehicle for which they were covered on a third party only basis.

11.  Keeper Liability: Transfer of liability from driver to keeper is contingent on compliance with the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012, Schedule 4. The Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued by the Claimant is stated to be ‘non-POFA’ and therefore does not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As no driver has been named for the date of the alleged contravention, the Claimant is not within their rights to invoke ‘keeper liability’. Furthermore, the keeper is under no legal obligation to name the driver at the time of the alleged incident. The Notice to Keeper must comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 wording prescribed in Schedule 4. By the Claimant’s admission, the NTK is ‘Non-POFA’ and as such parking firms cannot invoke 'keeper liability'. This legal point has already been tested on appeal (twice) in private parking cases and the transcripts will be adduced in evidence:

(i). In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA.  Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all).  HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but dd not. Mr Smith's appeal was allowed and Excel's claim was dismissed. (See Exhibit 03).

(ii). In April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation.  HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed. (See Exhibit 04)

12.  Parking Notice: The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim state: “The PCN was issued on 04/10/2023 on land managed by C… The vehicle was parked in breach of the Terms on C’s signs (the contract), thus incurring the PCN. The driver agreed to pay within 28 days but did not. D is liable as the driver or keeper.” I submit that this wording is generic and fails to identify any specific contractual term or alleged conduct that would constitute a breach. No details are provided about what actions allegedly gave rise to each PCN, nor is there clarity as to whether the allegation is failure to pay, leaving the site, or some other alleged violation. This ambiguity undermines any claim that a valid and enforceable contract was breached. Furthermore, no such agreement was made by the Defendant to pay within 28 days.

13.  Ambiguity of NTK: The NTK issued by the Claimant does not outline clearly the specific term of the contract which the Defendant has allegedly breached. The Defendant is in receipt of a NTK which states the reason for issue as: “Staff and Customers of Nando’s are not permitted to park in this”. It is unclear then the exact nature of the terms the Defendant has allegedly breached and as the NTK includes a clearly unfinished condition of the contract, it is impossible for the Defendant to rightfully understand the full and actual terms in breach from the PCN and to therefore answer to any alleged breaches. (See Exhibit 05)

14.  No Contract, No Breach: The Claimant’s particulars suggest a purported contractual obligation based on signage at the site stating: “Vehicles belonging to Nandos Staff and Customers are not permitted to park in this car park”. I dispute that such wording creates any clear or enforceable contractual term. Without a clearly defined and accessible ‘relevant obligation’ stipulated in legible signage, no valid contract can be formed. Ambiguous or obscure terms – especially where signage is poorly located, obstructed, or inconsistent – cannot be relied upon to establish breach. In any case, the wording used does not clearly specify what constitutes as “Nandos Staff and Customers”, nor does it define what a “Customer” includes. Additionally, I have made no admissions to being a “Nando’s Customer”, and I dispute being either a Nandos’ customer or member of staff. Nor can it be proven by any definition of the term that I was a ‘customer’ of Nandos. (See Exhibit 06)

15.  Poor Signage Visibility: Signage in the car park stipulating details of a contract is woefully inadequate with very small lettering and poor visibility. The signs are placed high up making the small lettering and specifics of the stipulated contract increasingly difficult to read. It is unreasonable to expect the entire sign to be legible during nighttime in October under darker conditions where the sign is particularly difficult to read due to the use of red-coloured font in places coupled with dim orange lights. (See Exhibit 07).

16.   Lack of Physical Demarcation: There is no physical barrier, fencing, or otherwise to separate or indicate which of the numerous signs apply to any given bay within the car park. Given the apparent lack of any clear instructions or physical impediments, it is unreasonable for any individual to ascertain which signage therefore applies to any given area or bay located within the car park. (See Exhibit 08)

17.  No ‘Exit Only’ Signage: On the day of the alleged incident, I accessed the car park by route of which the Claimant has indicated as ‘exit only’ on a map of the car park they provided me. However, on the day, access via this route had no clear indication that entrance was not permitted from this direction. It is reasonable for the Defendant to assume that entry is permissible unless signage is present to indicate otherwise, such as a ‘No Entry’ sign or proper road symbol pursuant of The Highway Code. Without clear signage to the contrary, access was gained to the car park from a route where there are no signs to indicate this is a car park of which Terms and Conditions apply to parking, thus there was no sign positioned where a driver can easily read or digest its content before entering from this direction. (See Exhibit 09)

18.  Unreasonable ‘Grace Period’: I have made no admission, nor is there any reason to believe, that the vehicle in question was parked for any extended period of time. The Claimant has shown the vehicle parked for precisely 5 minutes, but has not produced any further evidence to indicate the duration of stay extended beyond this time. The Claimant has therefore not provided a sufficient ‘grace period’ for the Defendant to reasonably assess the details of the conflicting signage (where available) and to make an informed decision. As is the case, the vehicle was shortly moved and no terms or contract should reasonably be applicable. (See Exhibit 10)

rynno15

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently examined by the Government

 19.    The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

 

20.    I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii)  a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.

21.            The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

(iii).  Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if the entire sum was 'overdue' on the day of parking;

22.    This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

 

23.    The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

"Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

24.    Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

 

25.    Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or 'enforcement' (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

 

26.    With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra 'fee'. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery' and the Defendant takes that position.

 

27.    The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs 'eight times less' (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced 'industry standard' Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

 

28.    In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and 'would appear to be penal.

 

29.    This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the 'costs of the operation' and the DLUHC's IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

 

30.    Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing 'market failure' more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

 

31.    In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

32.    Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

 

33.    Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

 

34.    The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

 

35.    Now for the first time, the DLUHC's draft IA exposes that template 'debt chaser' stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel v Wilkinson. (See Exhibit 11)

 

The Beavis case is against this claim

36.    The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs - (See Exhibit 12) - set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

37.    Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'. (See Exhibit 13 for paragraphs from ParkingEye v Beavis).

 

38.    In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. There are two main issues that render this parking charge to be purely penal (i.e. no legitimate interest saves it) and thus, it is unenforceable:

(i). Concealed pitfall or trap:

The signage in this case required individuals to not be a customer or staff of Nandos without defining a ‘customer’ and whether that pertains to individuals who enter the premises of Nandos, those who pay for products / services from Nandos, or otherwise. Furthermore, the specific term denoting this is in a font colour that differs from the rest of the signage so as to purposefully conceal or mislead readers. Given the signage makes no attempt to define a ‘customer’, and I dispute being a ‘customer’ or staff of Nandos, this concealed clause by way of font can reasonably be considered a ‘trap’ set out by the parking firm to mislead or confuse.

 

(ii). Hidden Terms:

The purported added (false) 'costs' are hidden and are also unspecified as a sum.  Their (unlawful, due to the CRA Schedule 2 grey list of unfair terms) suggestion is that they can hide a vague sentence within a wordy sign, in the smallest possible print, then add whatever their trade body lets them, until the DLUHC bans it in 2024. And the driver has no idea about any risk nor even how much they might layer on top. Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a charge, include:

(a)               Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

 

(b)              Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

 

(c)            Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

 

Conclusion

 

38.    The Defendant asks the judge to read the persuasive Judgment from His Honour Judge Murch (August 2023) in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, and deliver the same outcome given this Claimant has submitted a similarly vague POC.  It is worth noting that in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case the POC, while still ambiguous, did contain a subtle indication of the alleged contravention, specifically regarding the duration of the defendant's parking on the premises. In contrast, the POC in this case lacks even a minimal effort to hint at the nature of the alleged violation.  In the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, full costs were awarded to the motorist and the claim was struck out.

 

39.    Evidence provided by the Defendant clearly shows a gross lack in adequate signage both within the parking area and surrounding the exit route of the car park. Additionally, the signage indicated hidden ‘pitfalls’ and ‘traps’ through use of poorly visible fonts and undefined clauses.

40.    There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that 'debt recovery' costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.

 

41.    With the DLUHC's ban on the false 'costs' there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 

41.    In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(i) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(ii) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

 

42.    Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

 

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Defendant’s signature:

 

Date:

[costs & exhibits added following this]