PCN into CCJ - all correspondence to old address.

Coupon-mad

Email Moorside immediately, quoting the new letter reference and telling them to erase the old address and to only use the new address for service for this PCN and for any others.

Do that now. Today.

slatmaster

It was done but had no reply. Should i e-mail again stating anything or disputing it?

Cheers

slatmaster

Also no response from letter suggesting joint app to set-aside

slatmaster

So I have had no reply to the legal company inviting a joint set a side and no reply to my email stating the other LBC was served incorrectly (not sure what to do on this point now)

Draft Witness Statement for set-aside: largely adopted from zbubuman.

Don'tmind the numbering, this will be edited. I have added caselaw from Parking prankster re. residents parking spaces. I've also removed bits that dont appy.

Any advice would be appreciated.

Witness statement

Parking Control Management UK Limited

V

Mr XXXXXXX

 

Case number  

XXXXXXX

WITNESS STATEMENT  

I, XXXX, of XXXX , will say as follows:  

1. I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on xxxxxx, in default due to a defective service of Claim.  

2. I was not aware of the claim made against me until an estate agent got in touch with me on 01/07/25 to tell me off some post from a previous address. This was collected on 02/07/25. This is when I found out the Claimant had obtained a default CCJ against me.  

4. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the PCN on 16/06/2023 and the CCJ on 19/12/2024 (filed 09/10/24)  

5. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above.  

6. Whilst I am unsure which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed.  

7. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, 13.3).  Given that I am going further and declaring the unserved claims to be expired and thus, time barred and as such, I am disputing the jurisdiction of the court to dispense with service and allow the claim to continue, this application also relies upon CPR 11 (but due to the lack of service, I cannot also acknowledge service, which that rule assumes a defendant can). In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the expired POC fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".  More detail follows below. 

9. I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order.  

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM  

10. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 19/12/2024. I am aware that the Claimant is Parking Control Management UK Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.  

11. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter at my current address, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as the DVLA, HMRC. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant, and thus should have considered they had obtained incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 23 - 30).  

12. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until letters addressed to the incorrect address which I obtained on 02/07/25 This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).  (SEE EXHIBIT XX-01)

13. The address on the claim is Address A I moved from this address in August 2023 to address B and then to my current address at Address C in March 2024. In support of this, I can provide documentation showing my updated address. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-02)  

14. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.  

 

THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED  

15. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states;  

16. Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”  

DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE  

17. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not, and notify of appeal rights.  

18. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.  

19. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept').  

21. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £313 from the claimant should this request be successful.  

22. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note:  

23. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said  
  
24. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments."  
  
25. The same sentiment was echoed by:  
  
26. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)  
  
27. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012)  
  
28. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, i would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)   

29. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe  
  
30. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all."  

THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED

I HEREBY CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IT NOW (EFFECTIVELY THAT WOULD MEAN DISPENSING WITH SERVICE). THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE VERY LIMITED COURT DISCRETION TO RETROSPECTIVELY VALIDATE DEFECTIVE SERVICE BY RESURRECTING AN EXPIRED AND UNSERVED (AND HOPELESS) CLAIM.

38. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved.   The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.

39. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5).  

40. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved. 

41. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.  

42. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address.  

43. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [09/10/2024] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).  

44. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred.  There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15.  Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.

45. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:

46. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

47. In my case, no.  An old address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service.  

48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.

49. It seems no effort has been taken to abide by the above rule as all correspondence has gone to the original address


51. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

53. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested 02/07/25 – SEE EXHIBIT XX-05) and I knew nothing from PCMUK about any supposedly outstanding parking charges. I believed the wrongly issued PCNs had all been cancelled. This was a block of flats where I lived for around 3 years. The Claimant's atrocious moneymaking 'permit scheme' was unwanted. At all times we were authorised to use the parking areas which is part of the flats title and outside of the management companies land. PCMUK, being used by the management company have no jurisdiction on the parking space as it belongs to the flat owner as paret of the lease agreement and not the freeholder.SEE EXHIBIT XX-06    We already had a pre-existing right to park so there was nothing offered by PCMUK that was of value. There was no consideration on offer and thus, no contract, so any claims would fall at the first hurdle.

slatmaster

continued

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON RESIDENTIAL PARKING SPOTS

x. In Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011 it was found the managing agent could not reduce the amount of parking spaces available to residents.

x. In Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E, on appeal it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to temporarily stop near the building entrance for loading/unloading.

x. In Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

x. In Link Parking v Ms P C7GF50J7 [2016] it was also found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

54. What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

55. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to defend duplicate boilerplate robo-claims for meritless parking charges imposed in my own old residence where, as a longstanding tenant, I had leaseholder rights to park.

58. The decision in Good Law Project v (1) Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and (2) Pharmaceuticals Direct Limited [2021] EWHC 1782 (TCC) emphasised the importance of serving a claim form correctly on time. In that case sending the claim form to the wrong email address (the claim form was sent to the solicitors, not the designated email address) did not constitute valid service. - (i've had no e-mail correspondence should I keep in?)

59. In Pitalia & Anor v NHS England [2023] EWCA Civ 657 the Court of Appeal held that a claimant could not resist its claim being struck out as a result of its failure to serve the claim form within the four month period in CPR 7.5. This was the case even though the strike out application had not been made correctly.

60. In IDEAL SHOPPING DIRECT LTD & ORS V MASTERCARD INCORPORATED & ORS [2022] EWCA CIV 14. the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court decision that the claimant had not validly served proceedings and there were no good reasons or exceptional circumstances for the court to indulge the erring Claimant by granting a retrospective order validating the attempted service.

61. Held: CPR 3.10 (General power to rectify following error of procedure) did not enable the court to rectify ineffective service of the claim form and remedy the claimants’ error. That rule should not be used to get around service requirements and the claimants also did not satisfy the requirements under CPR 6.15 or 6.16. Following the approach in Piepenbrock v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) ([69]), having considered all the circumstances under rule 6.15, and finding no ‘good reason’, in Ideal Shopping Direct there were similarly no grounds to find the ‘exceptional circumstances’ required under rule 6.16. 

FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS

62. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”  

63. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out."  

64. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.  

65. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]   

66. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...]  

67. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]  

68. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”  

69. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.  

70.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):  

71. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).  

72. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.  

73. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

CLAIMS SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT  

74. In the alternative: the claims should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

       

76. In view of those woeful POC I am confident in relying upon a recent persuasive Appeal judgment as authority to support striking out the claims (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims). Dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

77. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Moorside Legal) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following authority:

78. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

79. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX-06 - Chan and other Judgments) the Court should strike out the claims, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

1. Given that the MoJ's quarterly statistics show that 90% of small claims go to default CCJs (including this one) there is clearly an abuse by parking claimants who were said by the CJC to be the main perpetrators.I see this as 'vexatious litigation' and there has been a totally unreasonable course of litigation conduct from start to finish.  I contend that I must succeed in getting all my costs awarded, including the court fees £xxx and for travel to and attendance at the application hearing(s).

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

83. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible. I discovered a CCJ on 2nd July 2025. On this very day I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. After seeking legal advice and also educating myself on the above case law while also awaiting my ex partner to provide me the lease agreement for the flat and space where said offence occurred,  on 31st July 2025 I wrote to Moorside offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to seek instructions from the claimant, no response was received so on 19th August 2025, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case (See Exhibit XX-07)  

84. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £313 from the claimant should this request be successful.  

Statement of truth:  

85. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

slatmaster

Draft Order

CLAIM No: XXX

BETWEEN:
XYZ PPC LTD (Claimant)
-- and --
XXX (Defendant)
______________________________________________
DRAFT ORDER
______________________________________________

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on [date];

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's usual residential address;

AND UPON more than 4 months having passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date]

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant on [date] is hereby set aside.

2. The claim should be struck out as more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings [date].

3. Costs of the application be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant in the sum of £313.

Coupon-mad

I couldn't see the new 2025 Court of Appeal CCJ case of VCS v Carr cited? Search the forum for NEWEST results.

And you have no para 75 and I'm not sure - have you seen the POC by now?

74. In the alternative: the claims should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

76. In view of those woeful POC

1505grandad

Also jumps from para 30 to 38.

slatmaster

Appreciate all the help thus far!

The POC I have was on a letter from the legal company that states, a reference number, Vehicle Manufacturer (not make) Location (as a generic place, not specific). i.e 'xxxxxxxxx place' but no specification of a parking spot etc. Description is 'parked without clearly displaying a valid permit at time of enforcement' and the Date of incident.

Does the above constitue POC? If not should i just remove the two points 74/76 and progress?

So edits:

The end would now look like: New bits in italics for ease. Again, numbering will be tidied up. Essentially the introduction of VCS vs Carr in the body and an added conclusion.

HE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM  

10. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 19/12/2024. I am aware that the Claimant is Parking Control Management UK Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.  

11. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter at my current address, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as the DVLA, HMRC. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant, and thus should have considered they had obtained incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 23 - 30).  

12. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until letters addressed to the incorrect address which I obtained on 02/07/25 This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).  (SEE EXHIBIT XX-01)

13. The address on the claim is Address A I moved from this address in August 2023 to address B and then to my current address at Address C in March 2024. In support of this, I can provide documentation showing my updated address. (SEE EXHIBIT XX-02)  

14. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.  

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON EFFECTIVE SERVICE        

 5.1        VCS v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 04 March 2025)

5.1.1    The Court of Appeal in VCS Ltd v Carr held that claimants must take reasonable steps to ensure service is effective. The court emphasised that serving a claim at an outdated address, without reasonable diligence, renders the judgment void.

5.1.2    The court also highlighted the importance of the overriding objective, which requires the court to consider the justice of the case. The Defendant in this case was unable to defend the claim due to improper service, and the judgment should be set aside to avoid injustice.

THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED  

15. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states;  

16. Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”  

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY

83. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible. I discovered a CCJ on 2nd July 2025. On this very day I contacted the County Court Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. After seeking legal advice and also educating myself on the above case law while also awaiting my ex partner to provide me the lease agreement for the flat and space where said offence occurred,  on 31st July 2025 I wrote to Moorside offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to seek instructions from the claimant, no response was received so on 19th August 2025, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case (See Exhibit XX-07)  

84 removed due to duplication with below 6.4 (numbering will be changed)

Conclusion

6.1   I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me should be set aside due to improper service, and the claim should be struck out as it is without merit, fails to comply with the CPR and is now expired. 

6.2.  In VCS v Carr - which is binding 2025 case law from the Court of Appeal - service was held to be invalid and the claim form had expired. Default judgment was rightly set aside and the claim was struck out as expired (the 4 months service deadline had passed and the courts have no discretion to extend the life of an expired claim).

6.3.  The expiry risk was a feature of VCS v Carr: once service is defective, the claim form’s four-month life continues to run; if it expires there is no second bite without a fresh claim or relief under CPR 7.6 (which may be unavailable and which this Claimant has not sought).

6.4. I also ask the Court to order the reimbursement of the set-aside fee of £313 as well as all the Defendant's Court attendance and other costs from the Claimant on the indemnity basis. The claim was not allocated to track, so costs are not dependant upon 'unreasonable conduct' and thus there must be costs in the case for the winning party, as also was the case in VCS v Carr. Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvK6XwAGHcs

Statement of truth:  

85. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

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Looking better with the landmark silver bullet of VCS v Carr!

The POC is from the claim form, not on a letter. Have you seen the claim form or obtained the POC by phoning the CNBC to email a copy?