CCJ From Old Address Related to Parking Fine - Seeking advice on set-aside strategy

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Coupon-mad said:

Yes and read the Mazur thread too.

Thanks @Coupon-mad. I will send in my drafts here for your kind assistance in reviewing.

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Ahead of my hearing on Wednesday 16th April, I received the following witness statement which Gladstones Solicitors filed electronically as part of the trial bundle to the court.

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They then proceeded to issue a trial bundle with their WS, my application form and copy correspondence.

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Seeing as they already issued the trial bundle (without my agreement as the court directed) exactly 7 days before trial date, I proceeded to supply them my skeleton argument and draft order and asked them to include them in an updated trial bundle. But they refused, saying they had already filed at court.

So I proceeded to issue my arguments as a supplemental bundle to the court and also included a revised bundle including all documents. See below index:

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MY SKELETON ARGUMENT AND DRAFT ORDER

Claim Number: xxxx

Between: UK Car Park Management Limited

And: xxxx

SKELETON ARGUMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. This is the Defendant's skeleton argument in support of their application to set aside the judgment order dated 6 May 2025 under CPR 13.2 and CPR 13.3.

1.2. The Defendant contends that:

a. The Claimant's agent, Gladstones Solicitors Limited, served the claim to an outdated address, depriving the Defendant of the opportunity to defend the claim.

b. The Defendant only became aware of the proceedings after receiving a letter by email from Empira Ltd (representing Gladstones Solicitors Limited) notifying them of the County Court Judgment (CCJ), and threatening to enforce ‘the debt’.

c. As the claim was not served at the Defendant’s current address at the time of service, and since 4 months have passed since the date of issue of the claim form, the claim has now expired unserved and the period for service cannot be extended.

d. The claim should be struck out because the Particulars of Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

c. The Defendant has a valid defense to the underlying claim.

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Improper Service of the Claim:

a. Under CPR 6.9(3), the Claimant is required to take reasonable steps to verify the Defendant's current address if they have reason to believe the address on record is no longer valid.

“(3) Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant referred to in entries 1, 2 or 3 in the table in paragraph (2) is an address at which the defendant no longer resides or carries on business, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence or place of business.

(4) Where, having taken the reasonable steps required by paragraph (3), the claimant

(a) ascertains the defendant’s current address, the claim form must be served at that address; or

(b) is unable to ascertain the defendant’s current address, the claimant must consider whether there is

(i) an alternative place where; or

(ii) an alternative method by which, service may be effected”

It can be seen that rule 6.9(3) applies when the claimant has “reason to believe” that the defendant no longer lives at the address referred to in entry 1. If there is such reason, then the Claimant must only file at that address if it has been ascertained to be the Defendant’s current address. It can also be seen that rule 6.9 contains a number of additional provisions, the clear purpose of which is to seek to ensure that a defendant is served with a claim form. CPR6.9(4) also compels the Claimant to consider alternative method by which service may be effected – one of such methods being electronic as per CPR 7.5(1)

The Claimant failed to meet this requirement by serving the claim to xxx, while later demonstrating knowledge of the Defendant 's correct home address and email address (for alternative method of service); the Claimant was very eager to send post-judgment correspondence to the Defendant’s email address in order to recover ‘the debt’

b. Furthermore CPR 6.5 (1) directs that “where required by another Part, any other enactment, a practice direction or a court order, a claim form must be served personally”. Additionally, as per CPR 6.5(3) “a claim form is served personally on… an individual by leaving it with that individual…”. As the claim form was not left with the Defendant, having been sent to an incorrect address, the claim form cannot be said to have been served correctly.

c. In “VCS v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 4 March 2025)” The Court of Appeal held that claimants must take reasonable steps to ensure effective service. Service at an outdated address without reasonable diligence can render a judgment invalid. The court also highlighted the importance of the overriding objective, which requires the court to consider the justice of the case. The Defendant in this case was unable to defend the claim due to improper service, and the judgment should be set aside to avoid injustice.

The findings from the Court of Appeal hearing are provided separately for the court’s reference in EXHIBIT 1.

d. Under CPR 13.2 The court must set aside a judgment entered under part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered. Given that CPR 6.9 (3) was not met, alongside CPR 6.9 (4) and CPR 6.5, then CPR 13.2 applies and the default CCJ should be set aside.

2.2 DVLA address data may not be reliable  

 DVLA address data may not be accurate. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the keeper to name the driver or to pay, or to inform the keeper they will be liable if not, and about their right to appeal.

a. The system is called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event) because it is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updated a V5C logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA failed to note a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.

b. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept').  

c. A claim sent to an old DVLA registered keeper address despite obtaining an up-to-date address and holding an email address is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check that service is effective.

d. The Defendant's address at the time the Claim was issued was xxx., as supported by the Defendant’s utility bill. The Claimant did not ascertain the Defendant's correct address and failed to consider an alternative method to effect service (electronic) as required under CPR 6.9(4).

e. This oversight mirrors the principles in “CEI_.v Chan (2022)” and “CPMS Ltd v Akande (2022)” where claims sent to outdated addresses were deemed invalid due to lack of diligence.

 f. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said:  

  "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments."

g. The Right Honourable Sir Oliver Heald on 23 December 2016 "announced a crackdown on unresolved debts which can damage people’s credit ratings without them knowing. The action comes after concerns were raised that companies were issuing claims to consumers using incorrect addresses." The Minister added "It cannot be right that people who are unaware of debts can see their lives and finances ruined by county court judgments. That in the digital age, we must ensure companies pursuing unpaid debts make every reasonable effort to contact individuals, rather than simply relying on a letter to an old address.”

2.3 Claim has expired unserved

a. CPR 7.5 (1) states very clearly that “Where the claim form is served within the jurisdiction, the claimant must complete the step required by the following table in relation to the particular method of service chosen, before 12.00 midnight on the calendar day four months after the date of issue of the claim form”.

b. Given that more than 4 months have passed from issue of proceedings, and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served), the Defendant submits that this particular claim is expired and the period for service cannot be extended by this application process. If the Claimant believes there is a cause of action, then the correct procedure would be to file a claim afresh and to the correct address after providing the Defendant with the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt claims issued this time to the correct name and address for service for this Defendant at xxx.

c. The principles confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Carr CPR 7.5(1)), establish that because service was defective (claim form has not been served at the correct address) the claim never became “served” within the period prescribed by CPR7.5(1); consequently the claim is expired and the court lacks authority to revive it.

d. In “Vinos v Marks & Spencer Plc (2001) 3 All ER 784 2” the Court of Appeal-considered - whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form. but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

e. In judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch) 3 the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars Of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant's application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial Deputy Master Marsh stated "The defendants were entitled to know within the four-month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. […] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out”

2.4. Claim should be struck out

a. In addition to the default judgment being set aside, the claim should be struck out because the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5.

b. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrongly refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch. sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

c. In “CPMS Ltd v Akande (Manchester County Court, May 2024)”, the court dismissed a claim where the particulars failed to clearly identify the nature of the alleged contractual breach. The same deficiencies appear to apply in this case. The Claimant has failed to specify the nature of the alleged breach, and the claim should be struck out.

The district judge said in paragraph 5 of her judgment that she did not accept there was sufficient detail set out in the claim form to enable the court and in particular the Defendant to understand the nature of the breach alleged. She identified at paragraph 9 that an allegation of breach and the nature of the breach rather than a simple assertion of breach of terms and conditions is fundamental to a claim of this nature.

She identified that there are a number of different ways in which a defendant might breach the terms and conditions in a car park: for example, not displaying a ticket, overstaying, not parking within the correct area for parking. She noted that these Particulars of Claim do not specify which of those, if any, or which other breach was said to have been committed by this Defendant."

Copies of the authorities relied upon have been provided for the Court’s convenience in EXHIBIT 2.

3. MERITORIOUS DEFENCE 

The Defendant disputes the claim on substantive grounds and has a real prospect of successfully defending it if allowed to do so.  Upon discovering the judgment on 24 June 2025, the Defendant acted promptly to apply for the judgment to be set aside, demonstrating compliance with CPR 13.3.

Interests of Justice  

Allowing the judgment to stand would result in significant prejudice to the Defendant

a. The Defendant has suffered significant prejudice. including damage to their credit record and undue stress caused by the improper service of the claim.

b. This has caused the Defendant serious stress to their mental health as well as significant time and resources spent consulting and researching this defence.

c. The prejudice outweighs any inconvenience to the Claimant, who failed to ensure proper service.

Setting it aside ensures a fair opportunity to defend the case.  

4. RELIEF SOUGHT The Defendant respectfully requests the court to:

a. Set aside the default judgment dated 6 May 2025 as it was not correctly served at my current address

b. Order for the original claim to be struck out

c. All costs to be covered by the Claimant

Please see below my cost assessment and other evidence attached to this skeleton argument.

5. DEFENDANT COST ASSESSMENT

ITEM	RATE	UNIT	QTY	COST	Notes
Application fee	£313	-	1	£313.00	one-off
Loss of Leave	£95	Day	1	£95.00	practice direction 45
Research and preparation for hearing	£24	Hour	10	£240.00
Travel	£0.45	Mile	20	£9.00	travel for court apeparance
TOTAL				£657.00

EXHIBIT 1: Link to VCS vs CARR

Phillip Carr v Vehichle Control Services LTD - Find Case Law - The National Archives

EXHIBIT 2: Link to CPMS Ltd v Akande and Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan

Chan_Akande.pdf

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MY DRAFT JUDGMENT ORDER:

CLAIM No: xxxx

BETWEEN:UK CAR PARK MANAGEMENT LTD (Claimant)-- and --xxxx (Defendant)______________________________________________

DRAFT ORDER______________________________________________

UPON reading the Defendant's application dated 25 July 2025 and the annexed witness statement;

AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;

AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's current residential address;

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.      The default judgment dated 6 May 2025 be set aside.

2.      The claim be struck out pursuant to the reasons and principles in the binding Court of Appeal judgment in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Carr [2025] EWCA Civ 713 (11 June 2025) and due to the POC failing to comply with Part 16, pursuant to Civil Enforcement v Chan and CPMS v Akande.

3.      The Claimant pay the Defendant's costs summarily assessed at £313 plus the Defendant's costs for attending the hearing on an indemnity basis.

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I'll appreciate your feedback on the above as I couldn't update in real time due to the short time period between when Gladstones filed at court and when I could respond. @Coupon-mad @ChirpyChicken

Based on recent evidence from other cases, I am preparing for the judge o most likely set aside the judgment but insist on a defence to the original claim. To get ready for this scenario, I am currently working on a draft defense which I hope to have ready before court date on Wednesday 15th April.

Car1980

They have failed to bring their claim under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, so you could point out in your skeleton that they have provided no evidence as to the identity of the driver and have failed to bring their action under any legal mechanism that could make the Registered Keeper liable in any way.

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https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/81958822#Comment_81958822

Thanks very much. Interesting POV, I never really considered that in my skeleton. Perhaps if the judge doesn't let me include it in my argument on the day I will bring it up as part of a possible defence?

Coupon-mad

Yes but only really worth trying if you weren't driving or are uncertain who was.

Your bundle looks fine apart from this which is totally wrong:

"e. This oversight mirrors the principles in “CEI_.v Chan (2022)” and “CPMS Ltd v Akande (2022)” where claims sent to outdated addresses were deemed invalid due to lack of diligence."

No they weren't. Chan & Akande weren't CCJ cases & had no wrong address issue. I recall telling the original author of that skelly to remove that paragraph.

No worries. You do later explain correctly why you are relying on Chan& Akande.

And a heads up that Mazur was overturned on appeal and looks likely to head to the Supreme Court, so don't waste any time genning up on that case that I mentioned last year.